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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to study the construction of 
the first Egyptian railway and its impact on Anglo-Egyptian re­
lations: it appempts to throw new light on a neglected subject
and period of 19th century Egypt. The railway was a matter of 
interest to the British government and produced a vast correspond­
ence, which highlights Anglo-French rivalries in Egypt. It covers 
the reign of ‘Abbas I, of which it illuminates several aspects, 
and modifies the accepted view. It is therefore intended as a 
contribution to a more objective appraisal of ‘Abbas’s rule. The 
principal sources used include unpublished British and French docu­
ments and published Arabic and Western materials as listed in the 
bibliography.
After an introductory survey of British policy concerning 
Middle East communications, the thesis falls into five chapters. 
Chapter One traces how the railway project was originated and de­
veloped, and discusses Britain's views in the setting of her general 
policy concerning communications with India. It explains Muhammad 
‘Ali's interest in the project, and assesses his motives for aban­
doning it. Chapter Two examines the railway issue in view of ‘Abbas's 
internal and external policies, and Britain's relations with both 
Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, and attempts to revise the verdict as 
to who initiatedthe construction of the railway. It analyses French
opposition, and appraises the motives of ‘Abbas*s Anglophile policy. 
Chapter Three deals with efforts made by Britain to secure the com­
pletion of the railway during Sa‘id*s reign, when French influence 
predominated, and to annul any attempt to cede the railway to foreign 
speculators. Chapter Four enquires into the programme of construction 
of the railway, the organisation of the railway administration, the 
system of management, and the employment of English drivers and tech­
nicians. It also investigates the policy of substituting Egyptians 
for Europeans, the qualifications of the former and Britain’s reaction 
to this policy. The final chapter examines the social and economic 
significance for Egypt of the railway, dealing especially with the 
corvee and with effects on the growth of towns, internal trade and 
communications and transit traffic.
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Introduction
BRITISH POLICY CONCERNING 
COMMUNICATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
"Egypt is the Key to Asia, the thorough­
fare to India; which cannot long be aban­
doned to the exclusive influence and con­
trol of those whose hostile ambition is 
matter of history.
Stoddart to Palmerston,
9 Feb. 1847 in F.O. 78/710.
12.
Prom ancient times up to the last years of the fifteenth 
century, Egypt was a main channel of communication and trade. In 
the Middle Ages, spices, perfumes, silk and woollen textiles and 
metals came by sea from the East to the Red Sea, whence they were 
conveyed through Egypt, either by land or by the Nile, to the 
Mediterranean coast. The Mediterranean acted as an international 
route of communication, where the trade was landed at Genoa and 
Venice. Prom these ports, these products were distributed to the 
different parts of central and western Europe. At the close of 
the fifteenth century the world witnessed an important change, 
not in the means of transport, but in the routes of communication 
for, during 1497-8, Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope 
and reached India. The Portuguese were driven to discover an 
alternative route to get away from the high taxes the Mamluk govern­
ors of Egypt had imposed on trade.^
The circumnavigation of Africa was a serious blow to the 
Egyptian route. It brought goods to Europe more cheaply, easily 
and safely than by way of the long caravan route and perilous sea
i
"^ M. M. §afwat, Injiltira wa qanat al-Suways. pp. 1-6; for a 
general survey of the course of Oriental trade from the close of 
the great Crusades until the 18th c. sees A. H. Lybyer, "The 
Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade", The English 
Historical Review# XXX, 1915, pp. 577-588.
passages. Not until the last two decades of the sixteenth century
idid the English turn their attention to the Cape, and make efforts 
to round it to break the Portuguese monopoly of the Eastern trade.^ 
On 31 December 1600 the East India Company was established. This 
Company was invested with a monopoly of trade with India by the 
Cape route and was forbidden to operate in the Mediterranean. The 
diversion of world trade to the Atlantic route did not completely 
suppress Egypt’s external trade, but it reduced its importance to
a great extent. Some of the products transported between the east
2and the west continued to come through Egypt. After the Ottoman 
conquest of Syria and Egypt (1516-1517), the Levant trade revived
3to some extent, but remained of secondary importance. But the 
Red Sea trade had been seriously affected since the Ottoman con­
quest of Egypt in 1517 when this sea, as holy waters, was closed 
to all Christian ships. This was one of the reasons which en­
couraged the European merchants to abandon the old trade route and 
turn to the Cape which took the place of Cairo and Alexandria.
^For the penetration to the East by the Cape route see: Sir V. 
Poster, England’s quest of Eastern Trade, London, 1933, ch. XII, 
pp. 127-135.
^R. al-Barrawi and M. H. ‘Ulaish, al-Tajawwur al-iqtigadi fi 
Migr. pp. 28-32; M. P. Lahifcah, Ta'rikh Migr al-iqtigadi, pp. 
38-46.
3B. Lewis, The Arabs in history. London, 1950, p.158.
Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the ships of the 
East India Company wsre only allowed to go as far as Jedda.^ It 
was not before the nineteenth century that main routes of world 
trade returned to the Middle East. The idea of re-opening the 
overland passage across Egypt appeared towards the end of the 
eighteenth century when Egypt’s geographical position came to 
constitute an important rfile in the Anglo-French contest over 
interests.
1. British and French Interests in Egypt prior to 1798: 
Unlike the French, British commercial interest was not de­
veloped by diplomatic activity either at Constantinople or in 
Egypt. Indeed, from the seventeenth century until 1756, British 
consuls resided in Egypt, appointed and maintained by the English 
Levant Company. But in the latter year the Levant Company re­
solved to abandon the consulate at Cairo since trade with Egypt
2was faced with uncertainty of success. A distinct line must be
^H. L. Hoskins, British Routes to India, pp. 3-5; A. C. Wood,
A History of the Levant Company, p.167.
2Sometimes, when no English Consul was appointed, English affairs 
were left in the hands of the French Consul. For further details 
on this point cf. Wood, op.cit.. pp. 32-35, 78-79, 124-125, 
165-166. In 1756, English affairs were put under the protection 
of the Dutch Consul; British interes.it in Egypt in the second half 
of the 18th c. has been fully examined by Mohammad Anis in his 
Ph.D. thesis Some aspects of British interests in Egypt in the 
late 18th c. (1775-1798?^ Birmingham, 1950, chs. IV, V, VI, VII
14.
(cont.)
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drawn between the views of British officials and British travel­
lers. The interest entertained in official circles was only in 
the use of the Egyptian route for official despatches to and from 
India. On the other hand, British travellers were interested in 
opening up trade between India and Egypt, and this initiative 
was indeed their own. Those early advocates of the Suez Overland 
route were James Bruce and George Baldwin.'*' The earliest British 
official who recognised the geographical importance of Egypt was 
Warren Hastings, then Governor-General of Bengal. In 1775 he ’ 
succeeded in concluding a commercial treaty with Muhammad Bey Abu
(cont.) and V m .  For a comprehensive survey of official docu­
ments and other manuscript sources dealing with British interest 
in the same period see H. S. Deighton ’’Some English sources for 
the study of Modem Egyptian History”, in Political and social 
change in modem Egypt (ed. P. M. Holt), to be published by Ox­
ford University Press, London.
^James Bruce, Travels..... to discover the source of the Nile, in 
the years 1768-1775. chiefly vol. I, ch. II; vol. IV, pp. 620- 
650; and in 1801, George Baldwin published his Political Recol­
lections relative to Egypt its relative importance to England
and France..., pp. 1-227. He also published in 1784 a pamphlet
entitled The Communication with India by the Isthmus of Suez (in 
I.O., F.R., vol. 5 ) . There are also strong arguments made by 
Col. James Capper, in the service of the East India Company, 
and which are contained in his Observations on the passage to 
India through Egypt, and across the Great Desert. London, 1783,
pp. x-xx. He said (p. xix) "by the several ways of the Cape of
Good Hope, Suez, and Bassora, we shall be able to send dispatches 
to and from India at all seasons; but being excluded from anyone 
of them, there will be an anxious interval of some months in every 
year, when we shall mutually be ignorant of what is passing in 
the different countries."
al-Dhahab.1 This treaty followed the previous arrangement entered
2into between James Bruce and the same Bey in 1773.
The idea of utilizing the overland routevia Egypt sprang up
in the middle of the eighteenth century when events in India
called for swifter communications with Europe than by the Cape
route. The East India Company had occasionally used the overland
route from Aleppo to the Persian Gulf through Baghdad for emergency
messages, but this route became insecure. By the second half of the
18th c. there was disorder in the Pashalic of Baghdad; moreover,
the uncontrolled Beduins of the Muntafiq in lower Euphrates threat-
-  3ened routes of communication and were a perpetual menace to Bapra.
It seemed inevitable that the alternative route through Egypt and 
the Red Sea must be considered. Events in Egypt contributed to 
that end. During the second half of the eighteenth century Ottoman 
suzerainty in Egypt was ineffective, and there emerged strong and
"^Hoskins, British Routes, pp. 7-8; idem, ’’The Overland Route to India 
in the Eighteenth Century”, History. N.S., IX, Apr. 1924-Jan. 1925. 
pp. 303-305; for a detailed information sees P. Charies-Roux,
Autour d’une route - 1’Angleterre. l’Isthme de Suez et l'flgypte au 
XVIIIe siecle. ch. II, pp. 29-49.
^Hoskins, British Routes, p. -9; Bruce, I, App. ccxcix-ccci.
3H. Dodwell, The Fomider of modem Egypt, pp. 3-4. The Muntafiq 
occupation of Bagra in 1787 was looked upon as closing this route 
for urgent despatches. (Hoskins, op.cit., p.40). On the Muntafiq 
see: Stephen H. Longrigg, Four centuries of modem Iraq. Oxford,
1925, pp. 204-206, passim.
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ambitious Beys such as ‘All Bey and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab.
Once ‘All Bey became the absolute master of Egypt and established
a kind of protectorate over the §ijaz, he thought in 1770 to bring
the trade between India and Europe back to its old route through
the Red Sea. Later Abu al-Dhahab maintained the policy of his
2predecessor and opened the port of Suez to Christians. In 1776, 
1777 and 1778 ships were arriving at Alexandria from England, and 
at Suez from India, at the same time, and the old prohibition 
soon became a dead letter. This explains how the interest of the 
British travellers in the shorter and quicker route via the Red 
Sea was revived.
George Baldwin played a remarkable rfile in advocating the 
Suez route. In 1773 he resigned his consulship in Cyprus, and in 
the following year was in Egypt. French activities in Egypt, which 
culminated in the treaties of 1785* were an alarm signal to the 
British. Any success of Prance in Egypt and the Red Sea appeared
3to open up a sinister prospect for English interests in India.
^See P. M. Holt, "The ’Cloud-Catcher* - *Ali Bey the Great of 
Egypt", History Today. IX, 1, Jan. 1959* pp. 48-58.
2Baldwin, Political Recollections, p.4* "I was at Grand Cairo ir 
the time of Mehemed Bey:M Baldwin accounts, "he gave me every sort 
of encouragement to persevere in my scheme: he told me, *if you
bring the India ships to Suez, I will lay an aqueduct from the 
Nile to Suez, and you shall drink of the Nile water*."; see : 
Hoskins, British Routes, pp. 8-13; Charles-Roux, L*Angleterre, 
pp. 20-49; Wood, op.cit., pp. 167-168.
3Charles-Roux, op.cit., p.178.
British officials opposed the French wish to induce the Porte
to allow France the two ports of Suez and Jeddah Therefore,
the British government appointed Baldwin as Consul-General in
the following year. His mission was to open communications with
India through Egypt and to report on all French activities.
Baldwin, who may have had a personal interest in re-opening the 
2Suez route, contributed two main things. He drew the British 
government’s attention to French activities and designs on 
Egypt; and he also emphasized the importance of the Suez route 
as the swifter one for despatches and trade. But the British 
Foreign Office did not acoept these assumptions and once more 
abandoned the Consulate in Egypt, in February 1793, because it
3was an unprofitable expense. Nevertheless, Baldwin stayed on 
in Egypt and in 1794, independently of the British government, 
concluded a treaty with the ruling Beys of Egypt. But Britain 
had no interest in Egypt. The country was suffering from political 
unrest, and the British had no commercial establishment in any 
part of Egypt.^ Baldwin left Egypt in 1796, the last British
18.
Hoskins, op.cit.. p.30; Charles-Roux, op.cit., p.l8C.
^ e  had been engaged in mercantile operations in the Levant since 1760.
3Charles-Roux, op.cit., p. 315; Shafik Ghorbal, The Beginnings of the 
Egyptian Question and the rise of Mehemet Ali, p.2; see also Hoskins, 
"The Overland Route”, History, IX, pp. 305-316; R. Bullard, Britain 
and the Middle East, pp. 28-29••
Hoskins, British Routes, pp. 47-48.4.
Consul before the French expedition. To sum up: apart from
the proposals for opening trade between India and Egypt, Egypt 
did not enter into British schemes of expansion. HIt was the 
active, far-seeing and ambitious statecraft of France which 
opened up new arenas of strife and ambition, while Britons 
followed, doubtfully at first, but in the long run doggedly.”1
I
France was not slow, as Britain was, to interest herself
in Egypt. French interests in Egypt have been dealt with by many 
2historians. The early French interests in the Suez route can 
be dated to 1584. While Britain and Holland competed over the 
supremacy of the Cape route in the seventeenth century, France 
was highly interested to revive the Suez route to give her the 
best chance of competing with her rivals. During the reign of 
Louis XIV many projects appeared advocating the Suez route. Those 
in favour of this route were French ministers, economists and 
merchants. In 1676 the German philosopher, Leibnitz, presented 
his Concilium Aegyptiacum to Louis XIV, in which he suggested the
^Quoted from Ghorbal, op.cit.t p.3.
2Eg.j, Charles-Roux, L'Isthme et le Canal de Suez; F. Charles- 
Roux, Les Origines de I1expedition d'ggypte; idem , "France, 
Egypte et Mer Rouge, de 1715 a 1798”, cah. hist, eg., Ser. Ill, 
fasc. 2, 1951, pp. 117-195; M. Kassim, The History of the Suez 
Canal Concession 1854-1866, unpubl. M.A. thesis, London, 1924;
C. W. Hallberg, The Suez Canal, its history and diplomatic imi ^ rt~ 
ance; J. Marlowe, The m aking of the Suez Canal; Hoskins, "The 
Overland Route...", History, IX, pp. 302-;>18.
19.
conquest of Egypt to assure France’s military preponderance over 
all European Powers, to control the Eastern trade and to protect 
the Eastern church, Leibnitz emphasized in his memoir that "Egypt 
is the link which connects Asia with Africa; the mole-interposed 
between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea; the granary 
of the East & the natural emporium of both India & Europe."^ French 
interest in the Suez route was derived from France's status as a 
Mediterranean Power, strongly established in the Levant and in 
Egypt. Under Louis XV the idea of a campaign against Egypt was 
broached, but without effect. During the Russo-Turkish war (1768- 
1774), France looked upon Egypt as her share if the Ottoman Empire 
were to be partitioned. However, the activities of British traders 
in Egypt, as explained earlier, aroused French suspicion. In 1777, 
Mure, the French Consul-General, reported to Paris that Britain 
had designs on Egypt. French representatives did not quite see the 
difference of attitude between British officials and British trad­
ers. Nonetheless, French interest in the Suez route had increased 
considerably and in the last quarter of the eighteenth century
many projects appeared recommending the construction of a canal or
2a conquest of Egypt. However the French government was not in a
^The "Consilium Aegyptiacum" or the Egyptian project, an unpublished 
memoir by Leibnitz, enclosed in Stoddart's letter to Palmerston 
dated London, 23 Feb. 1850 in F.0.78/842.
2See: Hallberg, op.cit., pp. 52-54; J. E. Swain, The struggle
for the control of the Mediterranean prior to 1848, A study of
Anglo-French relations, pp. 14-22.
position to consider these projects. The revival of a shorter 
route to India was reconsidered after the restoration of peace 
in 1783. In 1785, a French agent concluded treaties with the 
Beys of Egypt; and these would have re-opened the Red Sea route
for Indian trade had not the Porte at once resolved to vindicate»
its own authority and ®nt an expedition which overthrew the Beys
and, for the moment, re-established Ottoman authority.^
The closing years of the eighteenth century witnessed a
decline of French interests in the Levant. The first setback was
felt in the loss of privileges of the French East India Company,
and another was the maltreatment of French merchants in eastern
markets. To redress this, in 1793 revolutionary France decided to
re-open her consulate in Egypt which had been suppressed since
1777. The new Consul, Charles Magallon, was an ardent supporter
of the seizure of Egypt by France. In 1795 Magallon wrote "Masters
of the Red Sea, we should not be long in giving the law to the
2English and in ousting them from India..." Magallon*s views 
guided the attitude of the French Directory and culminated in the
3French expedition of 1798. In the decree of the French Directory
^H. Dodwell, "The Exclusion of the French, 1784-1815", The Cambridge 
Hist, of the British Empire. IV, p. 327; Hoskins, British Routes, 
p.29; Hallberg, op.cit., pp. 54-55.
2Charles-Roux, L*Angleterre, p.342 cited in Hoskins, op.cit.,p.52.
3On its origins see: F. Charles-Roux, Les Origines de l1expedition
d*&orpte; Ghorbal, op.cit.. ch. I.
21.
of 12 April 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte was charged to take over Egypt, 
to expel the English from all their possessions in the Orient, es­
pecially from their Red Sea trading-stations, and to have a canal 
cut through the Isthmus of Suez.^ But Bonaparte*s expedition could 
not realize his saying **la puissance qui est mattresse de l*Egypte 
doit l'Stre a la longue de l*Indett. The French occupation of Egypt 
did not last long. By her naval supremacy, Britain locked the 
French in Egypt and cut their communications with their motherland. 
Finally, Menou capitulated and concluded the treaty of evacuation 
with the British on 2 September 1801. The Anglo-French treaty of 
peace, signed at Amiens on 27 March 1802 concluded the final chapter 
of the first direct French attempt to reach India and to threaten 
the British existence there.
The landing of Bonaparte's expedition in Egypt was the begin­
ning of a new era. It had far-reaching consequences. The old regime 
collapsed and a new order was ultimately established under the Al­
banian officer, Muframmad *Ali. It also brought into existence the 
so-called 'Egyptian Question'. The French invasion had uncovered 
the importance of Egypt's strategic position. It demonstrated to 
the British that a hostile power could cut their shortest line 
of communication with India, Egypt was at the head of this overland 
link; and from that head began Napoleon's scheme of approaching
A full translation of the decree is in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the 
Near and Middle East, I, pp. 61-62.
India by way of the overland route across Syria, Iraq and Persia.
George Baldwin*s warnings of the dangers of a French establishment
in Egypt, once overlooked, proved their accuracy. Prior to the
French conquest he wrote
"France, in possession of Egypt, would possess 
the master-key to all the trading nations of 
the earth. Enlightened as the times are, in the 
general arts of navigation and commerce, she 
might make it the awe of the eastern world, 
by the facility she would command of transport­
ing her forces thither, by surprise, in any 
number, and at any time; and England would 
hold her possessions in India at the mercy of
France."2
Yet, although the Egyptian Question was a part of the Eastern 
Question, it took a new and different line from the latter. One 
of the most important characteristics of the Egyptian Question 
was the interest shown by the Great Powers in Egypt*s geographical 
position.
2. The development of British Interest in the Overland 
Route in the early 19th century:
When the eighteenth century ended, the overland passage was 
still undeveloped. The dispatches of the British government and the 
East India Company usually followed one of two routes: that round
^Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841. 
London, 1951» I, p.276; H. P. al-Najjar, al-Siyasa wa 1-istrati.jiyya 
fi al-:harq al-awsat. Cairo, 1953, pp. 182-186.
Baldwin, Political Recollections, p.79 quoted in Hoskins, op.cit. 
pp. 33-34.
2
the Cape or that by way of Egypt and the Red 3ea. Furthermore, 
there was little thought of developing either of the shorter 
lines, the Red 3ea or the Persian Gulf, for public nails. The 
Cape route was the channel for commerce between Britain and 
India. The overland journey from Alexandria to Euez was indeed 
one of the major difficulties which hindered any regular opening 
of the Red 3ea route.^ The advent of Mufcannad *Ali and the auto­
nomous status which he acquired was a major contribution to its 
development. He resumed the ambitious schemes of *Ali Bey, 
one of which was the re-opening of the overland link through 
his territory. Individual efforts, similar to Baldwins, did 
not cease in the nineteenth century. The organisation of the 
overland route was the work of one man, 'Thomas Fletcher ,/aghom
(1500-1851). He was a pilot in the service of the Bast India
Company in Bengal. In 1827 he was chosen by a committee of merchants
to forward the project of a steam communication between England and
India. From this greT.f his great interest in the project to establish 
the overland route. He resigned from the Indian pilot service in 1829 
in order to devote the whole of his energies to establishing an over­
land mail line through Suez. In 1835 he began to organise the Egyptian 
passage and set himself up in the business of transporting mails,
24.
■\j. K . Sidebotoom, 'The _ Overland Ilail, p. 1;>.
passengers and goods from Suez to Cairo. Two years later the 
East India Company appointed him as their deputy agent in Egypt.1 
He wrote in 1837 "I felt convinced that that country ought to be
the road to India; .... and I will never content myself till I
2 _find it the high road to India.” Muhammad *Ali never hindered
3Waghom's efforts but lent him every support possible. In point 
of fact, Waghorn roused British public opinion,and made known 
the advantages of the Red Sea route.
Britain's interest in developing a shorter route to India 
was a turning point in the revival of the Suez route. But it was 
not until the eighteen-thirties that the British government evinced 
an ever-growing interest in this route. This was in the time of 
Palmerston, the most dominant figure in British foreign policy for 
thirty-five years. The circumstances connected with this sudden 
change will be discussed later. However, this does not imply that 
Britain had no other interest in Egypt during the first three de­
cades of the nineteenth century. Egypt was destined to become a 
focal point of Anglo-French rivalry. As a result of the French ex­
pedition, the British began to take precautionary measures. The
H^. Addison, "Thomas Waghorn and the Overland Route", Royal Central 
Asian Journal, XLV, Apr. 1958, Pt II, pp. 179-185; Sidebottom, 
op.cit., chs. IV, V, VI and VII; see also ch. I; B. Cable, A 
hundred year history of the P. & 0., ch. X; P. E. Clunn, Lieut. 
Waghorn... Pioneer of the Overland Route, pp. 1-6.
2T. Waghorn, Egypt as it is in 1837* p. 26. In 18358 he wrote another 
pamphlet: Egypt as it is in 1838.
A. F. C. do Cosson, "The Overland Route across Egypt to India", 
Bengal Past & Present, X, Jan.-June 1915» pp. 211-221; see also: 
Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth Century> PP* 221-223.
3
belief that "the possession of Egypt by any great European power
would be a fatal circumstance to the interests of this country"-’
became the ultimate concern of the British government during the
whole of the century. The failure of Bonaparte's expedition did
not terminate his schemes concerning Egypt. Cne of the measures
taken by the British government was to secure the frequent and safe
transmission of despatches through the Ottoman dominions in Europe
2and <sia, and in this it succeeded. The fact that the Egyptian
route could no longer be relied on urged this decision, “t can
probably be said that the British government was uninterested, at
3 ‘that time, in the Suez route on political grounds. Ilu&amnad Eli's 
expansion towards the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, during the
Arabian campaign might have originated the British distrust of 
4his policy. Yet, the other side of this lac1: of interest can. be 
se.en in Hoskins's words: ’’the character of the new era beginning
with the treaties of Vienna was determined not so much by cabinet
1Henry Dundas, British Secretary of War in 1793,quoted by GhorbalIop.cit.,p, 
2Hoskins, British Routes, p. 06.
3Sidebottom, op.cit., p.14.
rcf.Dodwell, The Pounder of modorn Egypt, pp. 55-61; also J. 3.
Kelly, "Mehemet ~cAli's Expedition to the Persian Gulf 1837-1340", Pt.
I, Middle Eastern Studies, l/4,July 1965, pp. 350-381; Abdel Ilamid 
El-Batrik, "Egyptian-Yemeni relations (1819-1340) and their implications 
for British policy in the Red SeaM, Political and Social change in 
modem Egypt (ed. P. M. Holt) to be published by Oxford University Press, 
London.
officers and Parliamentary speakers as by a host of inventors whose
combined efforts vastly speeded up industrial life and produced
new problems and new relationships"."^ Nevertheless, the most probable
object was to keep that route dead and closed against all competition
which could endanger British supremacy in the east.
The plan for organizing connection by steam, between Britain
and Bombay, by way of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea dates from
the eighteen-twenties. By 1822, a series of campaigns was launched
in England and India for the accomplishment of steam communication
2linked with the- overland route through Egypt. The Anglo-Indian 
merchant houses in the Indian Presidencies, Calcutta, Madras and
3Bombay, were greatly interested in steam connection with Britain.
This scheme also had the support of the local governments in the
4same Presidencies. Furthermore, the Egyptian route was recommended
by travellers who journeyed to and from India through Mesopotamia
5and Egypt.
^"Hoskins, British Routes, p.86.
^Hoskins, op.cit., pp. 89-93.
3G. S. Graham, "By steam to India", History Today, XIV/5, May 1964,
pp. 301-312.
4For example see the support of W. C. Bentinck, the Governor General 
of Madras for Steam Navigation with India in the Asiatic Journal,
XIV, N.S., No. 59, Nov. 1834, pp. 156-158.
^The most illustrative article on travellers is Rashad Rushdi's "English 
travellers in Egypt during the reign of Mohammad Ali", Bulletin of the 
Faculty of Arts. Cairo Univ., XIV, pt. II, Dec. 1952, pp. 1-61. See 
also the works of the following travellers: Mrs. Colonel El wood,
Narrative of a journey Overland from England to the Continent of Europe 
Egypt and the Red Sea, to India... in tne years 1825» ltJ2b, itt'd l and 
~   (cbht.)
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The interest of the public in England and India had a number 
of reasons. The French expedition, undoubtedly, revealed the need 
of a shorter route to India. But the aftermath of the Napoleonic 
wars was a period of protecting commercial interests on one hand, 
and developing the channels of communications on the other. The 
Industrial Revolution and consequent commercial growth in Great 
Britain tended to make British possessions in the east more appre­
ciated.1 India's economic importance to Great Britain increased.
In 1814, the year the trade was opened, the export of cotton manu­
facturers to India was 817,000 yards. The amount rose from 
1,355,476 in 1815 to 7,127,661 in 1819 to 23,658,426 in 1824, and 
from 45,016,850 in 1827 to 51,833,913 yards in 1832. Consequently, 
the value of cotton exported in the above duration increased from
£201,182 to £3,238,248; and the value of all exports from Britain
2inlhe same period increased from £1,874,690 to £4,674,673. On
s
the other hand, British imports from the East increased enormously.
In 1790, imports amounted to 27,000 tons, and exports to 26,400 tons.
But in 1817 eastern imports were raised to 80,7000 tons and exports 
to India and neighbouring countries to 109,000 tons.
The Cape route was not a feasible one for speedy aid cheap
(cont.) 1828, 2 vols., London, 1830; Lieut.-Col. Fitz-Clarence, 
Journal of a route across India through Egypt to England, in 1817-1818, 
London, 1819; the Asiatic Journal, III, N.S.,pt. 1, pp. 196-206.
1See H. L. Hoskins, "The Growth of British iiterest in the route to 
India", Journal of Indian History# II, pp. 165-177.
^Evidence given by Major Charles Franklin in P.P., 1837 (539), VI,p.97. 
^Hoskins, British Routes, p.87.
communications. Therefore steamships were given, after certain 
improvements, a chance to cut the long distance of the Cape route.
This attempt was the outcome of the campaigns launched both in 
England and India.^ Although there was a preference for the 
overland route, the insistence upon the Cape route outweighed this 
desire, partly because it was quite safe, so long as the British 
fleet dominated the seas. The shorter routes, either through Egypt
2or Mesopotamia, were subject to the whim of the Pasha or the Sultan. 
Believing that Bombay was the only presidency that could benefit 
from the opening of the Red Sea route, Calcutta and Madras furnished 
the necessary funds for building a large steam vessel to gamble on 
the long journey round the Cape. The Enterprise was the first 
vessel built in England designed exclusively for the service on 
high seas; and it sailed for India in 1825. This attempt was a 
reed disappointment. It proved that rapid communication by steam 
vessels round the Cape was unobtainable, but it did suggest the 
feasibility of opening one of the shorter routes.
1G. S. Graham, op.cit., History Today, pp. 301-302.
S ’. Sheer, The Cape of Good Hope versus Egypt. London, 1839» p.14;
Graham, op.cit.. p.302. This route was still argued until the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. In 1851, a select committee was 
appointed to discuss steam communication with Australia, and re­
ported that the line favourable to British interests was that via 
the Cape: see P.P.. 1851 (372), XXI, pp. xi-xiii.
3Hoskins, "First Steam Voyage to Suez", Bull. Geog. Soc. of Philadelphia . 
XXIV/4, pp. 179-188; idem. "The First Steam Voyage to India", Geog. 
Review. XVl/l, pp. 108-116.
Henceforward, Bombay began to press for a steam line by 
way of the Red Sea and Egypt, or by the way of the Persian Gulf, 
Mesopotamia and Syria.^ Its successive governors spared no 
effort in advocating the opening of the overland route for re­
gular communication. Members from the marine department were 
sent in 1829 to examine the nature of the Red Sea, and to work for
the establishment of coaling stations at Aden, Jedda, Cosseir 
2and Suez. Difficulties in the Red Sea arising from winds would
no longer hinder navigation, since the steamship was independent 
3of the wind. Another vessel, the Hugh Lindsay, was built at 
Bombay for a voyage to Suez. On 20 March, 1830, she made her 
first journey to Suez by way of Aden, Jedda and Cosseir; and in due 
course "foretold the decline of Britain's main highway to the East".^ 
The practicability of the Red Sea route was finally demonstrated.
Before long the British government began to show signs of 
interest in the means of access to the East. The interest in a 
shorter route to India was one of the reasons for Britain's policy 
of maintaining "the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire".
^Hoskins, op.cit.: Asiatic Journal. XXIV, pp. 719-722; XW, pp. 40-42
^Hoskins, op.cit.: Bull. Geog. Soc.. XXIV, pp. 179-188.
3P.P.. 1831-1832 (735-11), Ft. II, App. No. 25.
^P.P.. 1834 (478), XIV, App. 17, p.112; Graham, op.cit.. History
Today, pp. 303-305.
Apart from Hoskins's extensive account in his British Routes, there 
are also economic historians who attempted to place Palmerston's
(cont.)
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Prior to 1833 British policy In the Middle East was largely defensive. 
But in consequence of the political situation, resulting from the 
French occupation of Algiers in 1830, the Russian threat to control 
the straits and Muhammad ‘Ali's conquest of Syria in 1831# Britain 
had to play an active role. Palmerston opposed any move that woull 
contribute to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. If nature 
had given Muhammad ‘All the Egyptian highway to the East, the Euphrates
route must be kept away from his control.^* These considerations in-
2terested Palmerston in the alternative route through Mesopotamia.
Steam Navigation with India was one of the factors that formed, to 
some extent, Palmerston's policy. As far as British interests were 
concerned, the Ottoman Empire possessed the two overland routes to 
the East, and therefore its regenerations very essential. Thus, 
it was the geographical position of the Ottoman Empire that deter­
mined British foreign policyin the Middle East after 1833.
By the thirties, a connection with India by means of steam was 
widely discussed both in India and Britain. It was the subject of 
correspondence with the consular officers in Egypt during the early
(cont.) policy in its true economic setting. Those are: Swain,
op.cit., V. J. Puryear, International economics and diplomacy of 
the Near East. A Study of British commercial policy in the Levant, 
1834-1833S F. E. Bailey, British policy and the Turkish reform 
movement. A study of Anglo-Turkish relations.1826-1853. chs. I, II; 
idem, "The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-50", J.M.H..
XII/4, Dec. 1940, pp. 449-484.
of. H. C. P. Bell, Lord Palaeraton. New York, 1936, I, 179.
Bailey, British policy, pp. 66-67.
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part of 1829. On 16 November that year, one of the East India 
Company*s brigs was despatched from Bombay to Cosseir with two 
boxes of correspondence and nine passengers.^ The Bombay business­
men continued to press the British government and Parliament in 
support of the Red Sea route. In January 1832, the House of 
Commons appointed a committee to investigate "the present State 
of Affairs of the East India Company, and to inquire into the
2State of Trade between Great Britain, the East Indies and China".
One part of this inquiry was to get information on trial steam 
voyages up the Red Sea, the survey in Egypt and the preliminary
3investigations of the Euphrates river as a possible route to India.
This Committee made no recommendations to Parliament. Although
the Committee received much valuable information, it could not
produce upon the evidence any detailed statement because of the
4.approaching termination of the session. Nevertheless, the Suez 
route had been much debated in the House of Commons. Earlier in 
1830, Lieutenant Prances Rawdon Chesney (1789-1872), of the Royal 
Artillery, had made a tour of inspection in Egypt and Syria, which 
led to two important results. He proved that the Suez Canal would
32.
^Stoddart to Palmerston, Report for the year 1845, on the commercial
navigation of Alexandria, dated 30 June 1846, ch. Ill, in P.0.78/663.
2P.P., 1831-32, (7->5-11) X, Pt. I 4 II.
^P.P.. 1831-32, X, Pt. II, App. No. 25.
^P«P., 1831-32, X, Pt. I, p.xxxv.
be a perfectly feasible undertaking from the engineering point 
of view. It was on the strength of this report that de Lesseps 
was first led to attempt the enterprise. The second was his 
exploration in 1831 of the Euphrates Valley, the matter that 
interested the British government in opening the alternative 
route to India through ^yria and the Persian Gulf.^
Although the Egyptian route did not assume any regularity 
until 1838, the railway was looked upon as the most effective means 
of establishing communication across Egypt, However, its con­
struction depended, to a great extent, on the state of relations 
between the British government and the Viceroys of Egypt, This 
is the starting point from which the subject of the present thesis 
has emerged.
P, R. Chesney, The Expedition for the survey of the River Euphrates
and Tigris ; idem. Narrative of the Euphrates expedition; see
also; Dictionary of National Biography, X, 195-198.
Chapter I
MUHAMMAD *ALI AUD TKE STJB2-CAIR0 
RAILWAY PROJECT (1833-1648)
"In the present state of our relations with 
the East, and especially with China, it is 
obviously our interest to encourage every 
enterprise which may have for its object to 
facilitate our communication with our estab­
lishments in those countries  It is clear
then that the establishment of a railroad, if 
practicable, between those two points, cannot 
fail of being highly advantageous to Great 
Britain."
Aberdeen to Barnet^ No. 14 
of 31 Oct. 1843 in P.O. 141/10
"I would beg your Lordship to bear in mind 
that I long ago ventured to express an opinion 
that the Pasha was not sincere in the desire 
he expressed to meet the views of Great Britain 
by carrying out the undertaking /the railway/”
Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 17 
of 7 May 1845 in P.O. 142/13.
”As Prance opposes, openly, and Austria, 
secretly, the construction of a rail-road,
His Highness will not for the present lend 
a favourable ear to the scheme.”
Murray to Palmerston, No. 68 
of 24 Dec. 1847 in P.O. 78/708
1. The First Stage of the Egyptian Railway 
Muhammad ‘All was highly favourable to the establishment of 
steam communication through his territory. He was as anxious for 
it as the English themselves, because he imagined that its estab­
lishment would divert trade from the Cape route to the Red Sea,
The influx of travellers and merchandise passing through Egypt 
would undoubtedly open up new commercial spheres. The revenues 
extracted from corn and other commodities pels sing by the overlfimd 
route would probably give him a considerable sum of income.
Coincidentally, the Egyptian link began to gain popularity 
because of its rapidity and the opportunity it afforded for visit­
ing Egyptian antiquities. Chesney pointed out in his letter to 
the British Ambassador at Constantinople that once the difficu lties 
in crossing the Isthmus of Suez were overcome, the Suez route would 
be still quicker.^" Muframmad *Ali realised that unless the route 
was safe, he would suffer more thsm Einyone. Consequently conveyance
through Egypt became as secure as in the most civilized parts of 
2Europe. He organised a camel service to transport coal between
P.P., 1831-1832, (735-11)# X, Pt. II, App. No. 25, Chesney to Sir 
Robert Gordon, 2 Sept. 1830, pp. 753-756; Chesney, Narrative of 
the Euphrates expedition. App. I, pp. 364-373.
2J. Bowring, Report on Egypt and Candia, P.P.. 1840, XXI, p.72;
A. E. Crouchlely, The Economic development of Modem Egypt, p.78;
A. Anderson, Communications with India, China, &c. via Egypt.
The political positioncf their transit through Egypt, p.12; M. Rifaat, 
The Awakening of Modern Egypt. London, 1947, p.41.
Cairo and Suez; and in 1819# he opened the Mafcmudiyya Canal for 
navigation between Alexandria and al-*Aff. Since the desert portion 
between Cairo and Suez was the most uncomfortable part of the journey# 
Muhammad ‘All thought of facilitating transport by means of a railway.
a) The origin of the idea:
The idea of constructing a railway first came from Thomas Wag- 
horn# the promoter of the overland route through Egypt. In 1832, 
he brought before Muhammad ‘All the advantages which would accrue to 
Egypt if a railway were established over the desert from Cairo to 
Suez. The whole camel system would be replaced by a modern means 
of transport which would facilitate the conveyance of corn to Arabia, 
coed to Suez, auid passengers to end from India. He pointed out to 
the Viceroy that the adoption cf this redlway would yield a vast re­
venue from the 50,000 pilgrims who would pass annuedly over it to 
and from Mecca.^
Chesney's findings about the possibility of cutting a canal
revived a hope long felt by French scientists. A group of Saint-
2Simonians, headed by Enfantin, came to Egypt in 1833 to complete
1T. Waghorn, Overland guide to India by three routes to Egypt, p.72.
2Saint-Simonians, Comte de Saint-Simon (d. 1825) who was called the 
founder of French socialism. Among his less visionary schemes were 
the ideas of cutting canals through the isthmuses of Panama and 
Suez. He seems to have been less interested in ■ftie Suez Isthmus.
But the idea was earnestly taken up by Prosper Enfantin, one of 
his disciples, who in 1833 attended by a small group of followers 
arrived in Egypt for this purpose.
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the study made during the French occupation for establishing
direct communxation between Suez and the Mediterranean.^ Muhammad
‘-li himself was in favour of a canal direct from Cairo to Suez.
The Pasha's wish led to correspondence between tie Foreign Office
and the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India. Although
the India Board did not think that the execution was very near,
"they anticipate none but desirable consequences from the accom-
2plishment of such a work". But this scheme had been superseded
by two new projects; the first for a direct canal between the
two seas, recommended by Enfantin; the second for the proposed
3railway line, presented by Thomas Galloway." These two projects, 
with the plan of constructing a Barrage across the Nile, were 
presented to the Grand Council of Cairo on the 28th, 29th and 31st 
January 1834. The Council agreed on the Barrage project and on
3 Feb. 1834, a French engineer in the Pasha's service was com-
< - 4missioned by Muhammad Ali to begin this work.
J. Lajard de Puyjalon, L'influence des Saint-Simoniens sur la 
realization de l'Isthme, pp. 69, 71; F. Charie3-Roux, L'^gypte 
de 1801 a) 1862~, vol. VI, pp. 238-239 in Histoire de la nation 
egyptienne, J. Charles-Roux, L'Isthme et le Can&l de Suez, I, p.175
pJ. Neill to J. B. Macaulay, 9 Aug. 1833 encl. in the India Board 
letter to Backhouse, lo Aug. 1833 in F.G. 97/411 (Luez Canal).
^Thomas Alexander Galloway (d. 1836), an English engineer and the 
son of Alexander Galloway, the railway manufacturer, was em-
(cont.}
It seems that Galloway's project, despite the Grand
Council’s opposition, had won Muhammad *Ali*s favour. Before the 
council was due to meet, Campbell, the British Consul-General int
Egypt, reported to the Foreign Office about the measures taken 
by the Viceroy for a railroad from Cairo to Suez. He adds, "as 
these operations would occupy the Pasha's mind (which requires 
occupation), and that they would also require all the money he 
could dispose of, it is to be hoped that these plans will be a 
good guarantee for his future conduct".^ The French Consul- 
General in Egypt also reported that, in spite of the recent pub­
lication of a memoir by one of the St. Simonians and the calculations
( made to the Pasha about the canal, Muhammad *Ali preferred the
railway. A statistical table haul recently been published in England, 
evaluating the wealth which would shower on Egypt from the profits 
of the transit duty on merchandise exported from India for Europe
by way of the Red Sea* Naturally Muhammad *Ali was very impressed
2by these advantages.
(cont.) ployed in Muhammad ‘All's service for steam engine estab­
lishment in Egypt. He was the chief protagonist of the Suez-Cato
railway.
4 -Lajard de Puyjalon, op.cit.. p.75; M. F. Shukri, Bjna 4 dawlat
Migr' Muhammad 4 All. pp. 44-45•
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Campbell to Palmerston, 1 Jan. 1834 in F.O. 97/411; The Asiatic Jour.. 
OCV, N.S., Nov. 1834,p.176) reports that the French scheme of cutting a 
canal had been abandoned in favour of the railway.
^imaut to Due de Broglie, No. 166, 6 Mar. 1834, M.A.E., C.P.,too.4.
By now the subject of steam-communication with India via 
Egypt was widely discussed by the commercial bodies as well as 
the authorities in Bengal. Therefore both urged upon Campbell 
to enter into this subject with Muhammad *Ali, who promised to do 
everything in his power to promote the objects in question. The 
success of this object was a matter in which Egypt was deeply in­
terested. Campbell cquainted the Bengal government that two 
civil engineers in 1he service of Muhammad ‘Ali, Thomas Galloway and 
Wallace, were surveying the ground between Cairo and Suez for 
laying a double railroad. This was for the purpose of conveying 
goods by means of carts attached to locomotive engines. Campbell 
comments "in this case I shall suppose that a considerable sum 
might be saved to the enterprise by Steam vessels in the article 
of coal".^ It would then be sent direct from Britain to Alexandria, 
from which it would be transported to Cairo in boats, and thence 
to Suez by the railroad. Consequently, transport and costs would 
be easy and cheap.
Campbell wanted to know Muhammad ‘All’s intentions regarding 
the railroad, which had become an object of some interest to the
mercantile community in Britain as well as in India. He informed*
the Viceroy that communications with India would be materially 
assisted by the construction of the Suez-Cairo railroad. Muframmad
^Letters from Campbell to both secretaries to the Bengal and Bombay 
governments, ends, in Campbell to Palmerston, 18 Mar. 1834 in 
P.O. 78/245; 1.0. P.R. (Egypt and the Red Sea), vol. 10.
‘All replied that this railway had already been surveyed by 
Galloway, and he intended to give directions regarding it very 
soon.^ Campbell then told the Pasha that Mthe speculators in the 
intended steam-communication would ask, not what was intended to 
be done, but was already done, and that no moment would be more 
favourable for the railroad than the present one, as the steamers
to and from India would enter into operation at the same time.
2The Pasha without any hesitation said it would be done."
On the following day, Muhammad *Ali sent for Galloway and
gave him directions to go to Britain, with the orders and funds
3to obtain the iron for the railroad. The Pasha did this when he 
had learned through various channels about the British government’s 
intentions to establish a steam-communication with India
4via Egypt and the Red St&, or Syria and the Euphrates. On 
22 December 1834 Galloway had an interview with the Duke of 
Wellington, the British Foreign Secretary, and seven days later, 
he submittedin writing the substance of his verbal communication.
In his letter, Galloway explained the difficulties connected with 
the proposed route from Alexandretta in the Mediterranean to Bir
^Campbell to Palmerston, No. 38 of 9 Aug. 1834 in F.O. 142/6.
2Campbell, No. 38 of 9 Aug. 1834 in F.O. 142/6 .
*3Campbell to Palmerston, No. 44 of 1 Sept. 1834 in F.O. 142/6; 1.0.
F.R.(Egypt and the Red Sea) (Campbell to Peter Auber, 2 Sept. 1834 
in vol. 10.
^Galloway to Wellington, 2§ Dec. 1834 in F.O. 141/2.
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on the Euphrates. These difficulties, in his vie*, were due to 
three main factors: the inconvenience to travellers; the
liability of contracting malignant fevers; and above all the 
uncertainty of protection for persons or property against the 
wandering tribes of Arabs Hwho may be said to entirely rule those 
parts and over whom the Pasha had no control". The Egyptian route, 
on the contrary, even under its present conditions, did not offer 
these inconveniences and annoyances; moreover, it was secure 
and safe. In regard to distance,the Egyptian route did not exceed 
the other route, being about 200 miles by water from Alexandria to 
Cairo; while the land distance between Cairo and Suez was just 
about 80^/10 miles, "but which will be very much reduced and in­
creased facilities afforded by the execution of the plans at present 
under construction".^
Galloway made it clear that the construction of a railway 
was subject to the British government's decision to establish steam- 
communication with India via Egypt and the Red Sea. He informed 
the British government that Muframmad *Ali would immediately cause 
to be laid down a double line of railway instead of the single one 
which was under execution across the Suez desert. Furthermore, he 
would also extend this railroad from Cairo to Alexandria. In return 
for his readiness to establish this additional line of railway,
41.
1Backhouse to Campbell, 1 Apr. 1835 in P.O. 141/2; Galloway to 
Wellington, 29 Dec. 1834 in F.O. 141/2.
"which would be achieved by British skill and British material", 
Muhammad *AlI. had two demands to make. He would not ask the 
British government for any assistance, pecuniary or otherwise, 
but a promise to adopt the line of the route via Egypt and the 
Red Sea. Secondly, that all goods passing through Egypt would be 
subject by treaty to "a transit duty or toll, for the safe delivery 
... on board any vessel at Alexandria... or Suez - His Highness will 
guarantee, which guarantee could not be given either as regards 
persons or property by the route of Syria and Euphrates". Muhammad 
*Ali, therefore, looked for an assurance that he would get an ade­
quate return from the railway.*
The British government did not take the initiative in building 
a railway or call upon the Pasha to do so. What Britain had hoped 
was that Muhammad *AlI would render every facility in his power to 
the overland route for the mutual benefit of the two countries.
When the British government had decided to establish a regular com­
munication by steam vessels between Malta and Alexandria for the 
conveyance of passengers and despatches from January 1835, Camp­
bell was only instructed to state to Muhammad *Alj. that his govern­
ment adopted this arrangement "with the additional object of keeping 
up a speedy and regular communication with the British possessions
*Galloway to Wellington, 29 Dec. 1834 in F.O. 141/2; W. D. Holmes, 
Report on Steam communication with India via the Red Sea. London, 
1838, p.29.
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in India by way of the Red Sea.
At the time of Galloway's proposal, it seemed that the
Foreign Office preferred to wait for the results of the Euphrates
expedition. Galloway was informed that a Committee of the House
of Commons had desired the establishment of overland communication
with India by way of the Euphrates, and the government was now
in the course of adopting measures to carry that scheme into
execution. Moreover, as the Treasury would decide whether any
other scheme should be adopted, it was not a subject upon which
2the Duke could give any opinion. The Treasury welcomed the
establishment of communication with India by the Red Sea route,
but it advised the Foreign Office to inform Galloway that this
subject was still under the deliberation of the British government
and of the Indian authorities, and that "an early intimation /would/
3be made to Galloway Bey of the result.” Moreover, whenit was decided to 
establish communication by the Red Sea, the British government would con­
sider with Muhammad Ali what duties it might be expedient to levy upon
4goods conveyed through Egypt by the intended railroad. The British 
government would not, therefore, commit itself to such an undertaking,
43.
Palmerston to Campbell, 1 Nov., 1834 in F.O. 78/244; Campbell 
to Falmerston, No. 66 of 18 Dec. 1834 in F.O. 142.
2
Wellington to Galloway, 9 Jan. 1835 encl. (2) in Backhouse to 
Campbell, 1 Apr. 1835 in F.O. 14l/2.
'"'Treasury, Minute Book, 29/363, 1st Division, 3 Mar. 1835.
4T.29/363.
while an expedition was being despatched to the Euphrates to 
ascertain whether that might not be the best route for steam- 
communication with India.^ Besides, the -Treasury found it useless
to give a final word on Galloway*s application while the Red Sea
2route was still undes examination.
Did Muhammad *Ali authorize Galloway to negotiate with the 
British government on the subject of transit duty? This raises 
one of the questions closely connected with the construction of 
the railway in its early stage. The details of Galloway’s mission 
were not discussed in full with the British CDnsul-General in 
Egypt. Campbell only knew about the projected line, but Mu am ad 
*Ali never informed him that Galloway would discuss with the Duke 
of Wellington the question of transit duty. When the Foreign Office 
transmitted to him the correspondence concerning this project, 
Campbell answered that he neither knew of, nor had the Pasha
requested him to communicate to his government the intended visit
3of Galloway and its object.
Having been informed about this matter, Muhammad *Ali asked 
Baghug Bey, Minister <f Commerce and Foreign Affairs (mudir Piwan 
al-Ti.iara al-Migriyya wa’l Umur al-Ifrinkiyya). to state to Campbell
^Treasury to Viscount Mahon, 5 Mar. 1835 encl. in Backhouse to 
Campbell, 1 Apr. 1835 in F.O. 141/2.
2W. W. Forbes to E. Stanley, 7 Apr. 1835 encl. in Backhouse,
1 Apr. 1835 in F.O. 78/257.
^Campbell to Wellington, No. 14 of 22 May 1835 in F.O. 142/6.
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that he had not instructed Galloway to enter into any arrangements 
with the British government relative to transit duties; and if he 
had wished this to be done he would have made the communication
through him or through Samuel Briggs.* Baghug Bey was ready to
2put this fact in writing to Campbell in the Pasha's name. Campbell 
thought that the Pasha might have expressed to Galloway his hopes 
that a scale of transit duties would be agreed to by the British 
government "such as would make it an object for the Pasha to extend 
this line of railroad". Having been deeply interested in the pro­
ject, Galloway might have construed this as an authority to obtain 
a promise from the British government relative to transit duties. 
Furthermore, Galloway originally might have undertaken the pro­
motion of the overland route because he had intended to be nominated 
in Egypt as the agent for tie Steam Navigation Company to be estab- 
lished between England and India.
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He was appointed as British Consul at Alexandria in 1803. He 
resigned this office in 1810 and established a commercial house there.
For more information see: F. S. Rodkey, "The efforts of Briggs and 
Company to guide British policy ii the Levant, 1824-1841", J.M.H., 1933, 
pp. 324 and following.
^Campbell to Wellington, No. 14 of 22 May 1835, in F.O. 142/6.
Campbell to Auber, 2 Sept. 1834 in 1.0. F.R. (Egypt and the Red Sea), 
vol. l'O. Campbell warned the Court of Directors of the East India Company 
not to appoint any person receiving salary from Muhammad ‘All to this 
post. From his dependence on the Pasha, Galloway could not be an 
independent agent.
b) The Euphrates Expedition: Opposition of Muhammad *All
and Russia;
Before a final decision could be made on the establishment 
of communications via the Red Sea, the suitability of the Euphrates 
had to be given a thorough triad. This was a project which found 
support not only from the leading members of the government, such 
as Lord Palmerston, but also from King William IV. A Select Com­
mittee of the House of Commons was appointed in 1834 to consider 
this subject and recommended on 14 July a grant of £200,000.
Chesney undertook the survey of the Euphrates river.
The obvious motive behind launching the Euphrates expedition 
was to check any Russian move towards the Euphrates and Persian 
Gulf. The question of rapid comm\*nication was of little importance, 
as Chesney pointed out to the Select Committee, when compared with 
the paramount one of forming a barrier against Russia, based upon 
a more extended and beneficiad commerce to Britain, to her Eastern 
colonies, and to Arabia.^" This route would consolidate British
relations with Persia to protect the Bombay commerce, which was
2adl in that region and not in the Red Sea. This route was also 
taken into consideration from the mercantile point of view. It 
was 284 miles shorter and took two days less than the Egyptian 
route. Chesney stated that the Egyptian route did not offer any 
advantage beyond those of speedy and safe communication, but it
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V p . .  1834 ( 478) XIV, pp. 393-394, pasein. 
2P.P.. 1834 (378) XIV, Ev. by T. Peacock, p.385.
would be properly organised if a canal was to be cut across the
Isthmus.^- An Egyptian railway could be easily established, but
he doubted it paying because Egypt had very little commerce with
India, while on the Euphrates route Britain would have both transit
2and local commerce. By the Euphrates, coal could be transported
much more cheaply by the Persian Gulf than to the Ports of the
Red Sea, and passengers using the Euphrates could find a variety
of means of proceeding whether by land or by sea. Moreover, it
was in the interest of the Bombay Presidency to establish this route,
for it was natural that the Bengalis should wish Bombay to be the
3direct port of communication with London.
As to the tranquility and safety of the Egyptian route, it
wDuld be very much bound to the question of profit and loss. If 
the traffic through Egypt were enough to pay for the expense of
keeping the country in order and also leave Muhammad *Ali a profit,
he woul&tmdertake and guarantee this safety. If the profit was not
4 * -rso high, he would ask for higher duties. In addition, Muhammad All
would not like to make Egypt the channel of such an important com­
munication, for it would draw the attention of Europe to her. Conse-
P.P., 1834 (478) XIV, Ev. by Chesney, p.398.
^P.P.; 1834 (478) XIV, Ev. by Chesney, pp. 423-424.
•X
'"P.P., 1834 (478) XIV, App. No. 4, an extract from the Bombay Gazette's
article on the reasons for preferring the Euphrates (7 Aug. 1833,
pp. 626-28).
4P.P., 1834, (478) XIV, App. No. 4.
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quently, he would secretly make difficulties and intrigues to 
hinder steam transport through his territory.^
Muhammad ‘All was not as dangerous as the Russians to British 
interests in the Middle East. If the question was whether Con­
stantinople should belong to Russia or Muframmad *Ali, it might be 
in the interest of Britain to assist the latter against the former, 
who sought to dominate the Straits to get access into the Mediterra- 
nean. Despite the reciprocal dislike between Russia and Muhammad 
‘All, the Euphrates expedition gave both a common reason for re­
conciliation and joint counter-action. When the future of the ex­
pedition was stillin the air, Ibrahim Pasha gave some hints to 
Campbell about it. He believed that communication by the Euphrates 
would be uneasy and expressed his optimism in the prospect of 
steam navigation being established by way of Egypt.
However, Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador at Constantin-
i
ople, was instructed to get the Porte*s consent to the arrangements
4connected with the Euphrates route. He was ordered to ask the 
Porte to direct the Ottoman authorities in the districts through
1831-2 (735-11), X, Pt. II, App. No. 25, Letters from 
Chesney to Sir Robert Gordon, 2 Sept. 1830.
2Palmerston to Bligh, No. 5 of 28 Feb. 1834 in F.O. 78/472,
Pt. I, fols. 75b-76b.
•z
Campbell to Palmerston, 16 July 1834 in F.O. 78/246.
^Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 42 of 23 Aug. 1834 in F.O. 78/234.
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which the expedition was to pass to render the most effective
assistance to the attainment of its object; and to obtain the
issue of a ferman for this purpose.^ The British jonsul-General
in Egypt was also instructed to make the necessary communication
with Muhammad *Ali on the subject, and request his co-operation
and support in furtherance of the undertaking. Muhammad Ali
would perceive that the establishment of this regular communication
would promote the welf cure of the people and the general interests
of the country itself, and this also would cultivate the goodwill 
3 i *of England. Muhammad Ali acquainted Campbell that in his present 
relations with the Porte he did not think it possible to do anything 
relative to the navigation of the Euphrates without the sanction
4of the Porte. The Porte granted a ferman of protection for the
5British steamships on the Euphrates on 29 December ]834. Despite 
this ferman, Muhammad 4 Ali did not feel hia^elf at liberty to de­
viate from the reply he had given to Campbell on 3 December 1834.^
49 .
1Palmerston to Ponsonby, 13-Sept. 1834 and Wellington to Ponsonby,
No. 17.of 28 Oct. 1834 in F.O. 78/234.
2Palmerston to Campbell, 1 Sept. 1834 and Palmerston to Campbell,
16 Sept. 1834 in P.O. 78/244; Palmerston to Ponsonby, 13 Sept.
1834 in P.O. 78/234.
3
Palmerston to Campbell, 1 Dec. 1834 in F .O .  7 8 / 2 4 4 .
4Campbell to Palmerston, No. 63 of 8 Dec. 1834 in F.O. 14^/6.
5For the text of the ferman see; H. Hertslet, A complete collection of 
the Treaties and Conventions.... etc.. London, 1 8 7 7 ,  X I I I ,  pp. 8 3 8 - 8 3 9 ;  
an English translation is to be found in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the 
Near and Middle East, I, pp. 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 .
^See footnote 4 .
The attitude of Muhammad *Ali led Campbell to wonder "whether 
H.H. has been swayed by any suggestions from other quarters, •••• or, 
if this repugnance proceeds from the idea that the communication 
with India by the Euphrates, may be prejudicial to that by Egypt 
and the Red Sea, which is an object of more immediate interest to 
him".'*" But Campbell was very soon able to discover the real reason 
for Muhammad ‘Ali's refusal to assist Chesney. This, as Campbell 
concludes, "had its origin in the same views and for the same motives 
and... at all events, Egypt would be benefited by being the sole 
channel of communication by the Mediterranean, between Europe and 
India" . 2
In order to overcome any obstacle raised by Muhammad *Ali,
Ponsonby took the necessary steps to get him a ferman from the
Ottoman Porte. The Porte declined to send Muhammad ‘All a personal
and specific ferman on the subject of the Euphrates because he was
3regarded with suspicion. Ponsonby carried on attempting to get 
this ferman, and the Porte insisted that the fermans already given 
were directed to all the authorities great and small and therefore 
to Muhammad ‘All. "Why" asks the Porte, "does Mehemed Ali, who 
treats the Porte with contempt demand from it permissinn to do a
1Campbell to Wellington, No. 3 of 27 Feb. 1835 in P.O. 142/6.
^Campbell to Wellington, No. 5 of 24 Mar. 1835 in P.O. 78/257.
3Ponsonby to Wellington, No. 27 of 18 Jan. 1835 and No. 31,
25 Feb. 1835 in P.O. 78/252.
thing agreeable to England? It is impossible Mehemed Ali can 
believe that he wants authority from us to act on this occasion, 
and therefore, we conclude that he is induced to require it by 
some concealed motives."'1' So Ponsonby resolved to duplicate and 
forward the additional ferman, addressed also by the Porte on 29
Dec. to all its own officers in the area and concluded in tiie
2same terms of the original ferman, to Campbell to show it to Muhammad 
*Ali. Although the ferman was general and not in the name of 
Muhammad *Ali, Ponsonby did so partly becausedt was the only way 
the Viceroy could be made cognisant of the will of the Sultan, aid 
partly because it was impossible for him to persuade the Porte to
*7
address a direct ferman to M u h a m m a d  4All. Ponsonby*s last effort 
was to threaten to present an official note in the Turkish language 
to the Sultan himself complaining of the refusal of his ministers 
to do what was necessary for the performance of their engagements 
and for the gratification of the British government and nation.^
But when he discovered later that Muhammad *Ali was persuading 
the Porte not to grant fermans to the British government, he took
1Ponsonby to Wellington, No. 46 of 24 Mar. 1835 in P.O. 78/252.
2See footnote 5 , p. 4-9-
3Ponsonby to Wellington, No. 70 of 18 Apr. 1835 in P.O. 78/253. 
^Ponsonby to Wellington, No. 75 of 1 May 1835 in P.O. 78/253.
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the strongest measures to frustrate his attempt and to prevent the 
total ruin of the expedition.^
Ponsonby insisted that Russian intrigues and domination were,
2in his confirmed opinion, the true cause of these difficulties.
He discovered the causes of the continuous refusal of the Porte to 
grant a ferman to Muhammad ‘Ali. The Reis Efendi held himself bound 
by the alliance between Russia and the Porte to communicate Ponsonby*s 
demand to the Russian minister. No sooner had Bouteneff, the Russian 
Ambassador at the Porte, learned that the original fennans were really
granted that he expressed his dissatisfaction to the Reis Efendi in
3the strongest manner.
While Ponsonby was straining every nerve to get the ferman for 
Muframmad ‘Ali, the latter sent two messengers with letters to the 
Porte setting forth the dangers to the Ottoman Empire which would 
attend the execution of the British plans. He desired the Porte not 
only to refuse the issue of the ferman required by Britain, but also 
to order him not to aid the project. These letters were the conse­
quence of Russian influence. When Bouteneff knew of the granting 
of the first ferman he wrote to the Russian Consul in Egypt to urge
4the Pasha to defeat the English plan. It is obvious that Muhammad 
‘Ali would not in any way tolerate the development of any other route,
Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 91 of 20 May 1835 in P.O. 78/253.
pPonsonby to Palmerston, No. 101 of 10 June 1835 in P.O. 78/253.
3Ponsonby to Palmerston, No.116 of 30 June 1835 in P.O. 78/253. 
^Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 116 of 3^ June 1835 in P.O. 78/253*
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but the one through his own territory. The outcome of the expedition, 
if successful, would defeat the whole enterprise planned by him to 
revive the overland route. He had already expressed his views through 
Galloway, that the Euphrates route was impracticable and unsafe. Now, 
both Russian and Egyptian opposition combined to defeat the British 
plan. Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russiai Ambassador in London, directed 
Bouteneff in Constantinople to urge the Porte against it. These 
directions exactly corresponded with those set out in Muhammad ‘Ali's 
letters to whom they had been dictated by Duhamel, the Russian Consul- 
General in Egypt. 1 Very lately, Bouteneff had made a confidential 
communication that the Pasha was ready to throw every obstacle he 
could in the way of the expedition's success, provided the Porte would 
order him to do so. The same communication was made to the Porte by
a
Musa, Muframmad ‘Ali's political agent at Constantinople.
Finally, Ponsonby accepted the additional ferman to avoid any 
misunderstanding between the Porte and Britain, and to show the Reis
Efendi that it was Muhammad ‘All, not the Porte, who was hostile to
3Britain. He asked Pisani, the dragoman in the British Embassy, to 
write a conciliatory letter to the Kfihya Bey, the deputy of the Grand 
Vezir, acquainting him wilh the fact that Muhammad ‘All aimed at creating
1Pcnsonby to Palmerston, No. 161 of 6 Sept. 1835 in F.O. 78/255.
2Ponsonby to Palmerston, (Secret) 6 Nov. 1835 in F.O. 78/256.
3Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 116 of 30 June 1835 in F.O. 78/253.
a misunderstanding between the Porte and the British government. 
Pisani was also to ask the Kfihya Bey "why Mehemed Ali himself 
sought to establish a road for the British communication with India 
through his own territories, if he entertained the opinion that 
such a thing must be dangerous; Mehemed Ali wanted an iron rail 
road to be established - the communication he wished would have been 
up the Nile and across the Isthmus of Suez - that is to say through
the heart of his territories and by his capitals. Why ^ain is it
2only now that Mehemed Ali has discovered this danger?"
At last the crisis came to an end. The Porte issued a ferman 
to Muhammad *Ali on 24 December 1835» but a long time elapsed 
before he consented to afford Chesney all requisite assistance 
and support. Tkis rews arrived in London when Palmerston was on the 
point of instructing Campbell to express to Muhammad ‘All the great 
surprise and displeasure of the government at the manner in which 
he had acted, and emphasising that they could not allow the under­
taking to be defeated by the Pasha or his subordinate authority.
This situation, however, helped Palmerston to form an opinion as 
to the motives behind the Pasha’s delay. The Pasha was desirous to 
make the operations of Chesney upon the Euphrates a means of obtain- 
a ferman from the Sultan, specifically acknowledging him as Pasha 
of Syria, secondly, the Russian government, jealous of the growing
^Ponsonby to Pisani, 13 May 1835» encl. in No. 116 of 30 June 1835 
in P.O. 78/253.
2Ponsonby to Pisani, 15 May 1835 in P.O. 78/253.
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commerce of Gt. Britain in the Levant, and desirous of preventing 
any political intercourse with India, persuaded the Pasha to oppose 
it. Thirdly, he supposed that the Pasha desired to drive communi­
cation with India to the line of Egypt. ’’But it is unnecessary to 
say, that the British Government cannot submit to be so confined 
i i its choice of lines of communication, merely because it may suit 
the local interest of the Pasha of Egypt.
c) The First Setback of the Egyptian Railway;
The offer to build a ailway came at the same time as arrange­
ments for the Euphrates expedition. Although the negotiations for 
its construction were protracted, and the British government did 
not give Muhammad *Ali a definite answer, the undertaking was going
on with some vigour. The shipments of machinery, iron bars and
2rails were carried on with great activity. Galloway had placed 
the first order for rails with his father, Alexander Galloway, and 
five ships loaded with necessary equipment arrived from Cardiff at
3Alexandria in 1835. Mimaut, the French Consul General, wrote to 
his government that the rails had started arriving from England 
and were being kept in store. But he hastened to add that the plan 
had been put <ff; and he would not be surprised that, because of the
^"Palmerston to Campbell, 1 July 1835 in F.O. 141/2.
T^he Times, 2 Oct. 1835; Asiatic Jour.. XVIII, N.S. Pt. II, p.193.
R. Cattani, Le regne de Mohamed Aly d ’apres les archives Russes en 
feypte, II, pp. 4&-47; L. Weiner. L'figypte et ses chemins de fer, 
p.61; one third of the whole line had been sent to fcgypt: P.P..
1837 (539) VI, Ev. by A. Galloway, p.450.
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actual state of his relations with England, Muhammad *Ali might 
be less interested than hitherto in the Suez railway. 1
Why had the project been put off? Whilst it was progressing, 
some steps had been taken for the accomplishment of steam-communication 
by way of Egypt. But neither the British government nor the East
i
India Company wanted to involve themselves in political complications, 
so the route via Egypt was left to private enterprise. Several London 
merchants wrote to ask Palmerston to instruct the British Consul 
General in Egypt to afford every assistance in his power to Thomas 
Waghorn, who was about to leave England for Egypt to establish
agencies at Alexandria, Cairo and Suez for the acceleration of
2mails. Waghorn condemned the Euphrates venture, and called attention 
to the greater advantage of the Suez route. He petitioned the House 
of Commons on 23 July 1835, hoping that the House would prevent 
a useless expenditure of money. In addition to the advantages of 
the Suez route over the Euphrates, he said that "His Highness the 
Pasha of Egypt has publicly signified his intention to construct 
a railroad from Cairo to Suez, at his own expense, to shew his co­
operation with British interests in this truly important under- 
3taking." .But even these attempts did nothing to encourage the
^imaut to Thiers, No. 230, 10 May 1835, M.A.E., C.P. tom. 5.
‘"Merchants of London to Palmerston, 2 Oct. 1835, encl. in Palmerston 
to Campbell, 24 Oct. 1835 in P.O. 141/2; The Times. 2 Oct. 1835, 
Asiatic Jour.. XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, pp. 192-193.
^Asiatic Jour.. XVIII, N.S., p.276 (for the full text of the 
petition; The Times, 24 July 1835; Journal of the House of Commons. 
XC, 1835, p.482.
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government to adopt Galloway's proposals.
The first setback which the project suffered can be attri­
buted to the manner in which Galloway dealt with the question. 
Galloway was not a diplomat, and so his mission seemed to be a 
sort of commercial bargain. The inclusion of this crucial point 
of transit duty was highly impolitic. A contemporary, unofficial 
opinion hoped that someone would point out to the Pasha the ex­
treme impolicy of imposing, for example, 2 or 3 per cent, on 
goods. By adopting this measure, the Cape route would remain 
the cheaper and Muhammad ‘Ali would prevent Egypt from deriving 
immense revenue and commercial importance.^ Campbell also hoped
that the Pasha would adopt a more liberal system in regard to
2this subject. On the other hand, the illness of Thomas Galloway
and his death on 3 July 1836 may have been one of the factors which
3contributed to the first suspension of the railway. But this work 
might have devolved upon Galloway's brothers, two of whom were in 
Alexandria. One of his brothers asserted that the commencement 
of the work would not be delayed, and on completing this line, 
another from Cairo to Alexandria would begin.*
^Asiatic Jour., XV, N.S., 13 Aug.1834» pp. 94-95.
2Campbell to Palmerston, No. 44 of 1 Sept. 1834 in P.O. 142/6.
3Asiatic Jour., XXI, N.S., Pt. II, 1836, p.53; J. Tagher, "Mohammad 
Ali et les Anglais a Suez dans la Mer Rouge et en Abyssinie", 
cah. hist, eg., 2, Nos. 5-6, 1950, pp. 483-84.
Cattaui, op.cit., p.47.
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Political circumstances contributed much more to the delay.
The political situation arising from Muhammad ‘All's policy was
complicated. His hostile attitude towards his suzerain, in
the
addition to/increasing French influencem the Mediterranean, 
upset the balance of power in the Middle East. Ever since the 
seizure of Algiers in 1830, France had continued her efforts to 
have a footing in Egypt "the thoroughfare to Asia and perhaps 
the key to universal dominion". French agents in Egypt had remark­
able influence on Muhammad 41I, especiaJfy M. Drovetti who remained 
in Egypt from the evacuation of the French forces in 1801 until 
1828. His devotion to Muhammad‘All*s cause was so entire that 
he was admitted to councils concerned with the organization of Egypt 
ian resources under French auspices.^ By his advice, youths were 
sent to Paris for education; the organisation of the army, the 
navy and the medical establishments were entrusted to Frenchmen 
such as Colonel Seves and Clot-Bey.
Chesney’s Euphrates expedition postponed for a time the 
adoption of the route via Egypt and the Red Sea. After it had 
proved the unsuitability of the Euphrates for navigation, attention 
in Britain reverted to the Red Sea route which lacked only a 
sufficient quota of ocean steamships and an arrangement with 
the Viceroy of Egypt to be made effective. During the Survey of
58.
^Stoddart to Palmerston, Report cn Egypt, 9 Feb. 1847 in F.O. 78/710.
the Euphrates, the examination of the Red Sea and tiie adjacent 
ports continued; and the search for safe and convenient stations 
was taken into consideration.^ Accordingly, on 10 June 1837 a 
Select Committee, the third in succession, was ordered "to inquire 
into the best means of establishing a communication by steam with 
India by way of the Red Sea".
The Egyptian railway question was again considered by this 
Committee. Evidence was taken of the hostile attitude of 
*Ali, and the possibility that any ruler of Egypt might interrupt 
British communications. Waghorn testified that the Pasha repeatedly 
emphasized that he would never oppose the British government;
moreover, he clearly perceived it was in his interest to support
2 3steam communication established with Egypt. Alexander Galloway
indicated that Muhammad *Ali or any one of his successors would support
4wery liberal measure that could be suggested. Major Head, in the 
service of the East India Company, said jt was to the interest of 
Egypt to have that means of communication because "Egypt is a very 
impoverished country, and the money which would be spent by passengers
^.P.. 1837, (539), VI, pp. 390-395 , 429.
^P.P. 1837 (539), VI, Ev. by Waghorn, p.394; Ev. by T. Peacock, p.443.
3He was a civil engineer and the father of Thomas Waghorn. He stayed 
in Egypt for some time when Muhammad *Ali wanted to consult him 
upon the propriety of forming a railway between Alexandria and al- 
Aff to replace the canal in that direction. This proposed portion 
was about 50 miles in a straight line (see his Ev.. P.P.. 1837, pp. 449-50).
^P.P.. 1837, VI, Ev. by Galloway, p.451.
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passing through would be of immense benefit to the people".^
Briggs explained to the Committee that it was unlikely that
any other European Power could cause the Pasha to deviate from
his policy towards England, which aimed at friendly intercourse.
If he did deviate, Britain could rely on the power she possessed
2in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean. All the persons 
who gave evidence on Egypt agreed that the material Muhammad 
*Ali had ordered for the railway was a genuine proof of his 
good faith.
In the evidence given by Alexander Galloway about the railway , 
he explained in detail the circumstances leading to its delay.
First, the British government had not given the Pasha any counten­
ance in the measure. Secondly, Muhammad *Ali had not got what he 
hoped. The Viceroy was anxious for the British government to ex- 
pres a disposition to pay a mileage fee, such as they themselves 
should fix. He thought that 6d a ton per mile for 80 miles would 
be an adequate remuneration for Muhammad *AlI. But as to the con­
veyance of passengers the Pasha made no stipulation.
The failure of the Euphrates expedition encouraged Galloway 
to suggest that if this Committee could express any opinion, or
60.
V p .. 1837, VI, Ev. by Head, p. 479.
2P.P.. 1837, VI, Ev. by S. Briggs, p.510.
^P.P.. 1837, VI, Ev. by Peacock, p.443; Galloway, p.451; Head, p.479.
give Muhammad *Ali any encouragement, he would proceed with the 
undertaking, for he lad already about £200,000 worth of material, 
with engines and apparatus. He informed the Committee that the 
Pasha could easily accomplish tiis work, since the hire of labour 
was rather cheap in Egypt; about 6d a day for a strong man. Ex­
cluding labour, the engines, iron and work for the line would 
cost £600,000, that is to say £7,500 per mile. The length of 
time occupied in crossing the desert would no longer be a problem. 
MIf railways were laid down judiciously in Egypt, and steamers 
from Adfa /al-*AJf7to Cairo established, we should be enabled to 
perform the distance from Alexandria to Suez in 24 or 30 hours, 
instead of which it now generally averages from eight to ten days." 
Muhammad *Ali would never contemplate asking more than 6d., but 
Galloway believed he would be satisfied with 3d. per ton a rnile.^ " 
The Select Committee reported to the House on 15 July 1837, 
approving the current arrangements entered into between the British
gpvemment and the East India Company for the establishment of a
2monthly steam communication from Suez to Bombay. But no further 
action was taken in regard to the railway, either on the part of 
the British government, or on the part of Muhammad *Ali. So the 
Suez railway, long in discussion, became a subject for speculations.
^P.P.. 1837# VI, Ev. by Galloway, pp. 449-450. Taking it at 80 
miles at 6d. it would be 40s. a ton, and at 3d.. 20s. for the whole 
distance.
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2P.P.. 1837, VI, p.387.
Dr. John Bowring, a member of Parliament sent to Egypt in 1838 
by Lord Palmerston to report on its progress, sums up the question 
in his report. The project did not offer many engineering diffi­
culties, but the quantity of goods and the number of travellersi
passing through could not furnish anything like an adequate return 
for the outlay. "But considerations of the vastness of the under­
taking and the uncertainty of its financial results have inter-
/
fered to prevent its progress - though contracts have been already 
entered into by the Pasha's government for the rails of which the 
road is to be constructed."^ CampbeE, on the other hand, attributed 
the suspension of the project to the unsettled question of steam 
navigation, whether it was by the way of Egypt or not. He stated 
to Bowring that "my opinion is, that a railroad between Cairo and 
Suez will be for many years needless and superfluous; and the 
accumulation of sand upon it would render it almost impossible to 
keep it in a fit state for constant use; moreover, it is not pro­
bable that Egypt will ever be a channel for heavy merchandize
2between Europe and India;..." Even Duhamel, the Russian Consul- 
General, thought that its construction was impossible because of the
many obstacles which faced it. If a railroad were completed, he
1J . Bowring, Report on Egypt and Candir. P.P.. 1840 (277), XXI, p.61 
2Report by Campbell to Bowring, 18 Jan. 1RH8. P.P. 1B40, XXI, App. A
p.190.
doubted its ability to divert the Indian trade from the Cape route.*
Although a railway was urgently needed to bridge the land
portion of the Egyptian passage, the time was not yet ripe for its
execution. Firstly,the period from 1833 to 1841, witnessed enormous
political disturbances, in which this question was a marginal one.
Secondly, the French idea of cutting a canal through the Isthmus
of Suez was from the outset to raise -the issue of an alternative
scheme. Finally, until 1839 nothing definite was accomplished in
2establishing communication with India by the overland route.
The acquisition of Aden in 1839 was the corner-stone in the definitive 
establishment of the Suez route for the regular transportation of 
mails and passengers to and from India. But this took place when 
the political future of Egypt and Muhammad *Ali were still unde­
cided. The British government had no enmity to the Pasha, because 
the order and security he established in Egypt were more valuable
3to Britain than to any nation. Nevertheless Palmerston thought 
it was not reasonable to support Muhammad *Ali to retain wrongfully 
what he had got possession of dishonestly because of communications
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^Cattaui, op.cit., II, p.387. Report on Egypt by Duhamel to 
Nesselbrode, dated 6 July 1837.
2P.P.. 1843 (30l)x:xXV,pp. 2,3. By 3 July 1839* the Court of Directors, 
with the approval of the Admiralty, Treasury and Post Office Depart­
ments, sent to both the Bombay and Supreme Indian Governments a 
list of "Regulations for the establishment of a Monthly Communication 
with India".
3Lord Beauvale to Hodges, 12 Nov. 1839 in F.O. 14l/5.
with India.^
"If he were entitled to determine whether we should 
or should not pass through Egypt and Syria with air 
Indian correspondence and travellers, his own interest 
would decide him to encourage us to pass, unless he 
were swayed the other way by some hostile foreign in­
fluence. But he has no right to say yes or no; he 
is the subject of the Sultan and if the Sultan gives 
us leave the Pasha cannot refuse to let us pass."2
During Commodore Sir Charles Napier*s meetings with Muhammad ‘Ali 
in Alexandria in 1841 the latter observed that he was now ready 
to do everything Britain wished. According to Napier, Muhammad 
‘All was under the impression that Britain was opposed to him 
either cutting a canal through the Isthmus or establishing a rail­
road . On this point Napier could give him no positive opinion, 
but he felt quite certain that "he /fiufcammad ‘All/will do anything
3we wish in reason, and would become our vassal if we required it".
Palmerston's policy towards Muhammad ‘Ali caused dissatisfaction 
amongst his colleagues, particularly Lord Clarendon who believed 
that Britain's interest lay more in the direction of Egypt than 
of Turkey because of arerland communication with India. See:
Sir Herbert Maxwell, The Life and Letters of George William Frederick 
Fourth Earl of Clarendon, I, p.190.
B.P., Palmerston's reply (8.3.40) to a letter from an English 
traveller in the Levant dated 15 Feb. 1840 on Muhammad ‘All and the 
Eastern Question. The traveller said (item 33 of the letter)
"The Pasha knows that he is in great need of us and we ought to 
feel that we stand in great need of him and his influence. We want 
him to facilitate our intercourse with India, either by the Euphrates 
or the Red Sea, to make either or both secure and permanent."
^Commodore Napier to R. More O'Ferrall, 21 Jan. 1841 encl.(l) in 
Sir Jchn Barrow to J. Backhouse, No. 157 of 10 Feb. 1841 in 
F.O. 406/5, Pt. *11 (Private and Confidential;.
2. The Second Diplomatic phase of the Egyptian Railway 
(1841-1848).
About eight years elapsed before the idea of constructing 
the Suez-Cairo railway was revived. Defeated and confined to 
the limits of the Pashalic of Egypt, Muhammad ‘All began to 
develop the resources of the country to consolidate his status.
The failure of his political adventures did not cause him to 
abandon his interests.* However the proceedings of Britain 
appeared to him during his conflict with the Sultan, he resolved
never to throw the slightest difficulty in the way of the communi-
2cations with India. His conduct, as Sir Robert Peel put it
before the House of Commons "was dictated by wisdom, and a genuine
3 iappreciation of his own true interest”. Muhammad Ali, however, 
was still attached to his idea of building a raihay, and took it 
up each time there seemed a favourable occasion.
With the incorporation cf the Peninsular and Oriental Steam
4Navigation Company by Royal Charter in December 1840 a new era 
of transit through Egypt began. The Charter included an undertaking
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*See: al-Ayyubl, Muhammad *All, pp. 134-135.
2T. Waghorn, The acceleration of Mails between England and the East 
Indies and vice versa, p.16.
^Hansard, 3rd series, LXVTII (24 Apr. 1843)# p.883; grateful thanks 
were presented from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce to Muhammad Ali 
for the services which he had rendered to the overland route during 
the crisis of 1839-40, dated 2 July 1841 encl. in Barnett to the 
Secretary to the Bengal Cham, of Comm., 30 Sept. 1841 in P.O. 14l/8, 
Barnett to Aberdeen, 30 Sept. 1841 in P.O. 78/451.
^B. Cable, A hundred year history of the P. & 0., p.43s / C. .tf.N Crawley, —   (cont.;
that within two years, the P. & 0. would establish a mail service 
with steamers between India and Egypt. In 1841 the Company deputed 
Arthur Anderson to enter into an arrangement with Muframmad *Ali 
for permanently securing the transit through Egypt.^ Finding 
that any negotiations with the Viceroy might be both ill-timed 
and unlikely to attain any practical result, Anderson proceeded to 
Constantinople, to wait until the settlement of the Eastern Question 
and to seek the advice of Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador, on 
this matter. When he returned to Cairo, he wrote to Palmerston about 
the vast benefits which would result to Britain from communication 
between the two seam by a ship canal. Palmerston admitted that a
canad would be highly advantageous to commerce amd prosperity of
2the world, but it seemed to him bootless speculation.
However, Anderson offered his proposals to Muhammad *AlI 
for improvements to the overland route which would guarantee the 
diversion of merchandise, amounting in value to £10 m. sterling, 
from the Cape route to Egypt. It was necessary: (a) that the road 
across the desert from Cairo to Suez should be improved amd cleatred 
of the atones which rendered carriage travelling on it difficult and
(cont.) "The Mediterranean”, New Cambridge Modem History, X, p.431; 
Stoddart to Palmerston, 30 June 1846 in f7o . 78/663.
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A. Anderson, The political position of their transit through Egypt, 
p. 17; see also John Nicolson, Arthur Anderson, a founder of the 
P. & 0. Compamy, Lerwick, 1932, ch. IV.
o
Anderson to Palmerston, 20 Feb. 1841 in F.O. 97/411: B.P.. Ponsonby 
to Palmerston, 26 March 1841, Palmerston to Ponsonby, 25 April 1841.
In 1841 Anderson advocated the Ctnal in his Obs ervations on the practi­
cability of  a ship canal through the Isthmus of Suez.
and disagreeable, and; (b) that the road from Qina to Qugayr
should be made fit for coaches to use. The execution of these 
proposals, as Anderson stated to Muhammad *Ali, would afford em­
ployment to many thousands of Bed uins and their camels. More­
over, approval would narrow the misunderstanding between him 
and the British government, which was interested in facilitating 
this communication.* Muhammad ‘All agreed to the proposals, 
and signed an agreement which authorised the P. & 0. to under­
take the transit of goods for one year, paying to him half per
2cent as a transit duty instead of three per cent. The Company 
was also given the privilege of navigating the Nile and the 
Majimudiyya Canal. When the P. & 0. requested the Foreign Office’s 
opinion on that arrangement, Lord Aberdeen, the British Foreign 
Secretary, declined to express any because it was avowedly an 
experiment for a period of twelve months. What the British 
government really hoped to achieve was to secure to British com­
merce the benefit of an easy and cheap transit through Egypt, 
by means of a treaty with the Sultan, rather than by private 
arrangements which might be liable to interruption either from 
a change of policy on the part of the Pasha of Egypt or from the
*A memorial from Anderson to the Pasha of Egypt, dated 10 Sept. 
1841 in F.O. 14l/8.
^P.F.. 1851 (605) XXI, App. 4 , pp. 1057-1959; Annual Reports 
of the P. & 0., (30 Nov. 1841), I, p.10; Reply from Boghos 
Bey to Anderson, 15 Sept. 1841, encl. in F.O. 141/8; also 
Anderson, The political position, pp. 16-27.
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disapprobation and intervention of the Ported
Nevertheless, the number of passengers increased considerably
from 573 in the first year to 800 in the second year 1842.
Although facilities of conveyance had increased by placing
two iron steamers on the Nile and the Matimudiyya Canal, the
transit between Cairo and Suez was not on the same footing as
2that between Alexandria and Cairo. As the transit of goods 
and travellers became one of the sources of revenue to the Pasha*s 
Treasury, he gave it his utmost attention. The Egyptian govern­
ment was considering the different means of transport from Suez 
to Alexandria by carriages and camels to Cairo, by a boat canal 
to and across the Delta, by a railroad to Cairo, or by a railroad 
directed to Alexandria, or by a ship or a boat canal from Suez
3to the Mediterranean. He established a line of telegraph across
the desert between Cairo and Suez at the request of the agent of
4the Oriental Company. Barnett notes "I am happy to be able to 
bear testimony to the readiness shewn upon all occasion by His 
Highness to facilitate our communications with India through Egypt"
^Canning to James Allan (Secretary to the P. & 0.), 30 Nov. 1841, 
encl. in Aberdeen to Barnett, No. 6 of 30 Nov., 1841 in P.O. 14l/7
2Annual Reports of the P. & 0. (4th Report of 30 Nov. 184l), I, p.9.
3Hekekyan Papers, II, Add. 37,449,' fols. 9-10.
4Annual Report* of the P. <Sb 0. (30 Nov. 1842), I, p.9j A. A. Paton, 
History of the Egyptian Revolutions. 2nd ed., London, 1870, ii, p
68.
5Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 50 of 5 Dec. 1842 in P.O. 142/13.
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The stream of passengers and merchandise passing through 
Egypt encouraged Muhammad *Ali to return to the idea of construct­
ing a railroad, although the French Consul-General had been very 
active in endeavouring to persuade him to carry into effect the
plan of a ship canal.^  Early in 1843# he talked with Hekekyan
Dry
about the state of Egypt and said "that the/Docks were finished
- that he intended to build the Barrages and have a railway direct
2franSuez to Alexandria”. Since the first suspension of the pro­
ject, the remainder of the order contracted with Messrs. Galloway 
had not been completed. In 1837 Baghug Bey requested the House of 
Galloway & Co. at Alexandria to suspend the shipment of the remain­
ing rails and machinery; and in August 1838 he requested that 
the order be annulled. On both these occasions Messrs. Galloway 
explained that this request could not be complied with unless a 
fair compensation was made. Muframraad ‘Ali informed them that 
should the undertaking be renewed at any future period, it would
4be again placed in their hands. On 9 September 1843, he ordered 
Messrs. Galloway in Egypt to supply the necessary material and 
machinery for the line, and to superintend its building as planned 
by their late brother Thomas Galloway in 1834 and as described in
^"Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 3 of 17 Jan. 1843 in F.O. 142/13.
‘"Hekekyan Papers, II, Add. 37,449# fol. 113 b (24 March 1843)# Hekekyan 
then suggested to Muhammad ‘Ali that a Canal from Suez to Alexandria 
direct should be made.
''Alfred A. Fry to Bruce, 28 Apr. 1856 in F.O. 141/30.
^Galloway to Barnett, 29 Nov. 1843 in F.O. 141/8.
the report of the Committee of the House of Commons of 1837. 1
The departure of V. Galloway had to await Muhammad ‘Ali’ 3 
official confirmation. But a few days after he had given his 
orders for the resumption of the project, Artin Bey, Minister 
of Commerce and Foreign Affairs, requested Messrs. Galloway on 
behalf of the Viceroy to defer Galloway’s departure and suspend 
the order until the Pasha had returned to Cairo to make the 
necessary arrangements for this work. A period of silence 
passed without any news from Artin Bey, although they had written 
to him on the subject. Later on, the Viceroy changed his mind 
and allowed W. Galloway to proceed immediately to Britain to
take the necessary steps with the British government for the
2speedy construction of the line.
Galloway explained to Sir Robert Peel the extreme importance 
of this undertaking to the interests of the government and the
people of England, and requested his concurrence, and that he
would instruct the British Consul-General in Egypt to support and
countenance the project, should it, from any unforeseen circumstance,
3be suspended. Barnett was instructed to employ his best endeavours
^Messrs. Galloway to Sir Robert Peel, 14 Oct. B43 encl. in Aberdeen 
to Barnett, No. 14 of 31 Oct. 1843 in F.O. 14l/l0: P.P.. 1837
(539) VI, App. No. 2, p.588.
^Galloway to Barnett, 29 Nov. 1843 in F.O. 14l/8.
'"'Galloway to Peel, 14 Oct. 1843 in P.O. 14l/l0.
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to defeat any opposition either overt or secret, and to encourage 
Muhammad ‘Ali to complete this project.^" In reply to Ke ssrs. Gallo­
way's letter inquiring about the government's opinion, Barnett 
informed them about the government's consent for establishing the 
railroad. He asked them to furnish him with an outline of the
plan submitted to Muhammad .‘Ali, together with the estimate of
2the probable cost of laying the line. The plan presented to
Barnett was the outline originally proposed by the late Thomas
Galloway and modified afterwards by ihe engineers in London and
3presented by them to the Committee of the House of Commons.
The only estimate they had ever given was for the rails, because
it was very difficult to give an accurate estimate of the cost
of public works in a country where everything was in the hands
of the government. But they thought it might be completed at a
comparatively trifling expense "less than the cheapest Rail-Road
in Germany or Belgium inasmuch as there is no ground to purchase,
nor bridges, viaducts or Tunnels to make, and which constitute
4the principal expense of Rail-Roads in Europe**. They calculated 
that the rest of the rails necessary from England would cost 
£60,000 as there were already 21 miles of rail in Egypt.
1Aberdeen to Barnett, No. 14 of 31 Oct. 1843 in P.O. 14l/l0.
^Barnett to Galloway, 24 Nov. 1843 in P.O. 14l/l4.
3See footnote 1, p.70. Details of this modified plan are enclosed 
in the Parliamentary Papers in a condensed form.
^Galloway to Barnett, 29 Nov. 1843 in P.O. 141/8.
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Barnett conversed with Artin Bey on the subject but Artin 
appeared to be aware that a communication had been made by 
Messrs. Galloway to the British government soliciting their 
support for the plan. Artin admitted that on his return from 
Europe, and on learning that Muhammad *Ali had given an order 
for the rails, he advised the Pasha for the present to suspend 
that order. He remarked that Muhammad ‘Ali was too ready to adopt 
hastily any scheme that was proposed to him, without previously 
examining the expense and the resulting advantages, or having 
due consideration of the embarrassed state of his own finances.
The £60,000 estimated by Galloway was only for rails, and did 
not include the cost of locomotives, the salaries of the English 
engineers, nor the laying and maintenance of the railroad.
Artin, however, was of opinion that the project was impracticable 
as Egypt had not got the timber required for the work; and water 
would have to be carried the whole distance between Cairo and
o 1buez. Artin suggested that Barnett should be instructed to 
make some proposal to Muhammad ‘All, securing to him a certain
annual remuneration for the conveyance of the Indian mails by
_ 2 railway between Cairo and Suez. Barnett promised to report this
"^Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 42 of 1 Dec. 1843 in P.O. 142/13; 
Aberdeen Papers, Add. 43, 186.
2Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 42 of 1 Dec. 1843 in P.O. 142/13;
although Hekekyan had no official status in this matter, he
expressed a similar view in his papers when he talked about
the project. He thought that the two or three hundred travellers
who would use the railway would not pay its expenses of first cost, repairs and police. And as it would be a more expensive
(cont.)
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conversation to Aberdeen*
The proceeding with the work was interrupted once more.
The French c onsul-General happily reported the abandonment of 
the project to his government.^ The question of remuneration 
was the main reason foi*interruption. Another was probably the 
Pasha's confusion over the total costs. Barnett thought that 
"Galloway /was/not in the best odour with the old Pasha, for
he /had/made a good many jobs out of him, and /wanted/in
2my opinion to stick another into him”. The project suffered 
also from endless discussions cn its practicability, and the 
alternative of a canal. Lord Aberdeen supported the railway on 
condition that it were practicable from the engineering point 
of view. Barnett had his own views on the project, which he 
openly expressed to his government. Messrs. Galloway, he said, 
•committed an errqr in supposing that any danger existed in the 
transmission of mails across the desert by the present means.
(cont.) matter them it was generally supposed to be "it being 
necessary to carry the line over bridges of great length and 
numerous to be built.... that it would be (bona fide) a work 
for the accommodation of the British government and that it 
would be necessary to enter into arrangements with the govern­
ment and treat in the manner in which the Egyptian government 
should be remunerated." See: Hekekyan Papers, II, Add. 37,449»
fols. 224-225.
^Benedetti to Guizot, No. 11, 22 Sept. 1843* M.A.E., C.P. tom. 16. 
^Barnett to Bidwell (Private), 18 December 1843 in F.O. 78/542.
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Only one accident had occurred in seven years.* He gave the 
opinion that Ma greater danger is to be apprehended from negli­
gence, and perhaps from wilful obstruction, along a line of 
Rail-road traversing an uninhabited country for a distance of 
above eighty miles, and it may not be unworthy of the consideration
of H.M.'s Government whether a Canal between Cairo and Suez
2might not be preferable to a Rail-Road”• The attitude of 
Stoddart, the consul at Alexandria, was similar to Barnett*s.
A railway would not seem to be of great utility because ’’circum­
stanced as this country is, the result would probably be a mere
tram-way, or, at least a very incomplete establishment, and
3consequently a slow rate of travelling”.
Prance's opposition was significant. Although the Marquis 
de La Valette, the French Consul-General in Egypt, had no in­
structions from M. Guizot, the Foreign Minister, on the subject,
he was convinced that the feeling in prance would be very strong
4on the question. La Valette had been regularly informed of all 
the Pasha's resolutions relative to the railway. He reported 
that a few months previously the Pasha had ceased to support it 
when one of the East India Company's agents made him a proposal
1Barnett to Aberdeen, 1 Dec. 1843 in F.O. 78/541; Aberdeen to Barnett 
(Confidential) No.7 of 21 Oct. 1843 in F.O. 78/542.
2Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 42 of 1 Dec. 1843 in F.O. 142/13.
3Stoddart to Aberdeen, No. 8 of 23 Mar.1844 in F.O. 78/584.
4
Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 10 of 9 Mar. 1844 in F.O. 142/13.
of 25 million Francs if he. would decide to have the railway 
constructed.^ La Valette made known to the Pasha that he knew 
of the proposition, and indicated to him the serious and iv- 
calculable inconveniences which would result from hisadhesion 
to the English project. He urged the Pasha not to welcome ex­
clusive propositions because they would soon give i*y to ex-
2orbitant pretentions and embarrassments. Thus, France was 
capable of dissuading Huframmad *Ali from commencing the railway.
The railway question was resumed several times during the 
negotiation of the Postal Convention between the British Post 
Office and the Egyptian government. 'The idea of a Postal Con­
vention first came from Dr. Bowring, who suggested that Sir
3Henry Kardinge the new Governor-General of India,' should discuss 
this question with Muhammad *Ali during his visit to Egypt.^
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There is no reference to such proposition in the British archives.
La Valette is probably referring to Vaghcrn’s proposition;
and if so, Yfaghorn. proposed a financial help from some European
bankers and not from the East India Company.
^La Valette to Guizot, ITo. 29, 12 Feb. 1344, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 16.
La Valette adds, ’ any repugnance that the Pasha had always shown 
for any establishment erected on the Egyptian territory, in a foreign 
interest, was, .... a sufficient guarantee in ordinary circumstances, 
against the tentatives of the India Company. But it was to be 
feared that at the moment of financial embarrassment, the Pasha 
can get enticed by the enormous sum which has just been proposed 
to him and to which one will not fail to raise to a more considerable
figure to reach the proposed aim”.
3He was the first Governor-General of India who went out by way of 
Egypt and the Red 3ea.
4Peel /apers, CCCLXXVI, Add. 40,566, Transit of R n^ rlish and Indian 
Mails,‘'Passengers, and Merchandize, through Egypt ^Confidential), 
fol. 155.
According to Hardinge's instructions from the Foreign Office,
Muhammad ‘Ali was to undertake on behalf of himself and his 
successor a safe, regular and expedient conveyance of mails be­
tween Alexandria and Suez.^ The Convention was not proposed 
because the government was dissatisfied with the way the transit 
was performed, but to ensure its maintenance after the Pasha's
death, because his successor might take measures prejudicial to
2British interests in regard to it. The British government intended 
to make these arrangements with Muhammad‘Ali through an agent sent 
by the Post Office, in order to avoid making a formal treaty with 
a vassal of the Sultan.
Until August 1844, Messrs. Galloway had neither begun the work 
on the line, nor received the final approval of Muhammad ‘Ali.
The news of the British government's intention to conclude a Postal 
Convention encouraged them to contact Lord Aberdeen once more on 
the subject. They urged the British government to take advantage 
of the proposed negotiation to advance the scheme in which they 
had an interest. Accordingly, Lord Aberdeen instructed Barnett 
to inform Artin Bey that the government did not propose directly to 
interfere in the matter of the railway, of the practicability or 
impracticability which they did not profess to be able to judge;
^Aberdeen to Hardinge, Memo, for Comm, with Muframmad ‘All on the 
Transit of the Indiun Mails through Egypt, 6 June 1844 in F.O. 78/585; 
Aberdeen to Barnett, No.7 of 13 Aug. 1844 in F.O. 14l/l0.
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^Aberdeen to Barnett, No. 7 of 13 Aug. 1844 in F.O. 14l/l0.
that the government took the deepest interest in every plan which 
might facilitate and accelerate the transit of mails and passengers, 
amd, finadly, that the Pasha alone would judge whether and how such 
a measure might be rendered practicable amd advantageous.^
The first time Muhammad ‘Ali broached this subject with Bar­
nett was during an interview with him on the Postad Agreement.
The Viceroy adluded to an extract from a French newspaper, which 
he had seen, of coail produced and the quantity of iron made in the 
different countries of Europe. This subject gave Barnett the oppor­
tunity to madce some observations on the extent of railroads con­
structed in England. Then he further asked him when did he meam 
to commence the railroad to Suez? Muframmad ‘All replied that its 
commencement depended upon Britain, it could be begun tomorrow.
He added that the British government "would lardly wish that I
2should be a loser by the undertaking". But Barnett found it in­
advisable at that moment to pursue the subject further. He assured 
Aberdeen that,once the success of the Postal Convention was secured, 
he would take an early opportunity to bring the question of the 
railroad more fully under the ^asha’s notice. In a further communi­
cation, Barnett said that if the Pasha eigreed on the first proposal
77.
^Aberdeen to Barnett, No. 8 of 26 Aug. 1844 in F.O. 14l/l0. This 
was also a reply to Artin's suggestions (see above, ..72 )
23arnett to Aberdeen, No. 22 of 14 Oct. 1844 in F.O. 142/13.
of the Postal Agreement, it would relieve him of all responsibility
for the conveyance of the mails, and would place at his disposal
annually a certain sum of money which he might very appropriately
2devote to the railway project.
Having lost hope that the railway w>uld be fully supported by 
the British government, John Alexander Galloway began to defend the
73.
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1Bourne, the Post Office negotiator, was furnished with two draft 
proposals_for tie convention. He was tstructed to press upon Muh­
ammad *Ali proposal No. 1, Hnamely of allowing the transport of 
the mails to remain with the British Post Office. By so doing,
Mehemet Ali will relieve himself from all responsibility as to 
the sufficiency of the means of transport, and the punctuality 
by which it shall be effected", (see: Aberdeen to Barnett, No.
7 of 13 Aug. 1844 in F.0.14l/l0.) These modifications were 
proposed by the British government, first because much misapprehension 
having arisen as to the views of H.M.’s government in proposing to 
enter into a postal agreement with Muhammad *Ali it would be better 
to make as little change as possible in the existing arrangement 
for conveying the mails; secondly because H.H., should he take 
upon himself the whole responsibility of their safe and speedy 
transmission across Egypt,might through the negligenoe of his 
servants, or from other causes not now to be seen, he exposed to 
disagreeable discussions with the Post Office and eventually per­
haps with H.M.*s government, (see Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 16 
of 18 Sept. 1844 in F.O. 78/582; Peel Papers, Add. 40,566, fols.
160—160b). If Muhammad *Ali insisted on the means of conveyance 
being provided by the Egyptian government, proposal No. 2 was framed 
to meet these circumstances. It stipulated that the Mails should 
be placed under the special charge of an officer of the British 
government, who should accompany them through Egypt, according to 
the system adopted with the Indian Mails transmitted through France. 
(Peel Papers, Add. 40,566, fols. 157-158.)
2Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 24 of 6 Nov., 1844 in F.O.78/582.
project publicly in Britain by issuing a pamphlet on this subject.^- 
He thought that the attitude of the government discouraged the en­
thusiasm shown by the Pasha, because he had undertaken this work on 
condition that the government would agree to pay a fair sum for its 
use, to get sufficient revenue to justify the costs of the project.
In so doing, the government was losing a most favourable opportunity
of overland communication with India, "more especially when the ad-
2vanced age of His Highness (76 years) is considered". It seems as 
though Galloway aimed at forming a pressure group, in support of 
the project. His appeal was likely to find a response among in­
dustrialists and manufacturers. The introduction of railways gave 
rise to vast expansion in the metal trade and to a much greater 
demand for coal. Moreover, rails and other component parts became 
an article of export and British financiers were deeply interested
3in railway construction abroad. A shorterore efficient and more 
speedy means of transport to India and the East would serve the 
economic needs of the industrial society . A constant stream of 
raw materials was necessary for the new factories; manufactured 
goods had to be speeded to the markets to make wiy for new production; 
and the exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods, especially
4where food-stuffs were also involved. So the execution of the rail-
^Observations on the proposed improvements in the Overland Route via 
Egypt, with Remarks on the Ship Canal, the Boulac Canal, and the 
Suez Railroad /Galloway, Observations, in later references.7 He 
was the brother of the late Thomas Galloway.
2Galloway, op.cit., p.15; Asiatic Jour., 3rd Ser.,III, p.427, 546;
IV, p.207.
^Sir Ernest Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1815-1870,Oxford, 1962, p.41.___________________________________________________  (cont.
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way would correspond, no doubt, to the increasing political, 
commercial and domestic interests of Britain. This railroad, if 
immediately constructed, would serve the new arrangements due to 
begin on 1 January 1845 by the establishment of a system of bi­
monthly communication with India.^ Consequently, 48 days would
2be saved in traversing the desert per year.
An appen} similar to Galloway’s was made to the government 
by the Westminster Review. To give the ?asha support for the railway 
would open the way to new markets in India and China instead of 
the ones closed against their trade on the Continent, and would 
also facilitate the way of merchants and capitalists in the plains 
of Asia. This would be a great achievement for the government to 
accomplish because "seldom has it been the good fortune of a 
government to enjoy so fine an opportunity of effecting an invaluable 
national object by measures so obviously beneficial and so easily 
attainable. t
"These labours peace to happy Britain brings,
These sure imperial works, and worthy Kings."
80.
(cont.)
4Bailey, British policy and the Turkish reform movement, p.64.
^Asiatic Jour.. IV, p.207.
2T. Waghom, Overland guide to India, p. 73; Westminster Review, 
XLII, 1844, pp. 428-436.
Westminster Review. XLII, p.436.3
Galloway and the writer of the article in tiie Westminster 
Review asked the government to defeat any attempt on the part of 
Foreign Powers to stop the project. The Westminster Review also 
drew the government’s attention to an article extracted from the 
German Universal Gazette and published by The Times of 1 Nov. B44, 
which denounced the project because the miserable financial state 
of Egypt could not face a costly undertaking at the Pasha's own 
expense. "Why millions should /aic/ be spent and thousand of 
Fellahs withdrawn from the cultivation of the soil to save the 
British ten hours of time and a few shillings of transport charges 
which the poor Bedouin is earning at present with his faithful 
dromedary?”  ^ A hostile spirit was equally evident in the two 
French papers, the Journal des Debats and the Constitutionnel, 
the organ of the two parties of Guizot and Thiers. They attacked 
the railway because it would be a British monopoly. Furthermore, 
Britain wanted to establish herself militarily in Egypt, take
possession of the port of Suez, and construct a railway to trans-
2port her troops and munitions to India in a short time.
Galloway submitted his views to the public ±i the hope that 
some steps would be taken immediately to urge the government's
^Westminster Review, XLII, p.430.
2 _Le Journal des Debats, 17» 19 Sept. 1844; Le Constitutionnel,
13 Nov.4 18 S©pt. 1844. It adds "Ici la politique apparait,
et on reclame le droit de prendre pied sur la mer Rouge, a un des
bouts de la ligne, et attendant l'heure ou on pourra prendre a
1'autre bout, sur la Mediterranee."
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co-operation with the Viceroy of Egypt, and accelerate a measure 
of such importance to Britain. He also called upon the government 
to consider the recent statements of the Duke of Wellington and 
Sir Robert Peel, in both houses of Parliament, about the stake 
that Britain had in the East. He added "Whatever tends to faci­
litate our intercourse with those realms is a material ingredient 
in the political and commercial greatness and security of England. 
An opportunity now presents itself of carrying out a plan eminently 
calculated for that object.”^
Although the answers given to him by Barnett were not en­
couraging, Muhammad ‘All proceeded with the plan. He ordered 
Thurburn, an English merchant, to engage a civil engineer from
England for the purpose of surveying the line and make an estimate
2of the cost of its completion. Thurburn informed Barnett about 
these new steps and said that a Mr. Walker was ready to enter 
into an engagement with the Pasha to undertake the work. But 
Barnett doubted that the Pasha would remain many days in the same 
mind. He had almost daily some new project in view, such as his 
favourite scheme for the Barrage, which Barnett was afraid might 
supersede the railroad. This led Barnett to inquire privately 
from Addington, Under-secretary in the Foreign Office, whether it 
would be possible for the government to make an advance of money
^Galloway, Observations, p. 17.
pBarnett to Aberdeen, No. 29 of 14 Dec. 1844 in F.O. 142/13.
to be laid out on the railroad, on account of the Post Office 
charge. But the unsettled opinions of Muhammad ‘All made 
Barnett uncertain whether it would even be prudent to advance 
a large sum for one object, which might perhaps be applied to 
another.* Muhammad ‘Ali*s immediate suspension of all further 
proceedings until he received the ratification of the Postal 
agreement from England added more doubt about his intention.
Barnett was inclined to think that Muhammad ‘All took up this 
subject at the moment when the postal negotiation was going on 
because he knew that it would be agreeable to the British govern­
ment. Furthermore, it might divert public attention from the 
measures he was about to take to monopolize the whole of the 
transit.^
..3y 1845 news from Egypt was that the railway had been nearly 
abandoned; and the plan proposed by M. Mougel, the French engineer, 
to open a canad between Cairo and Suez had replaced it. It appealed 
to the British government from the earlier repeats of Barnett that 
Muhammad *Ali was just amusing himself and others with this project. 
While he wanted to build a railway, his finad object was to secure 
a revenue to be levied on mails, at least a guaranteed rate of 2*/2d.
*Barnett to Addington (Private), 18 Dec. 1844 in F.O. 78/582.
^Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 2 of 17 Jan. 1845 in F.O. 78/623.
3The Times. 2 Jan. 1845; Asiatic Jour.. 3rd Ser. VII, p.439.
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1 2 per letter, Artin Bey proposed to James Emerson Tennent that
the British government should give a guarantee of £50,000 extending 
over five years, and not to exceed £10,000 in any one year, against 
any loss by the undertaking, Tennent was of opinion that all the 
present difficulties would be got rid of were the British govern­
ment to press upon the Pasha the advantage of the railway from 
Suez to Cairo in the first instance, and eventually from Cairo to 
Alexandria. The Treasury shared Tennent's opinion but there Tes 
great doubt whether the Pasha was in earnest in proposing the 
project and whether he did not prefer the immediate gains derived
4from his independent establishment of carriages and horses. But 
the situation concerning the transit through Egypt was becoming 
difficult because of the new measures taken by the ^asha. He 
objected to the clause in article six of the Postal Conventinn, 
giving travellers the liberty to select their own means of convey-
5ance across the Isthmus. Furthermore, he was taking into his own
84.
^Galloway, Observations, p.14.
^He was a member <f the Board of Control of the East India Company, 
and the Secretary of the Government <f Ceylon. It was thought by 
the French Consul- General that on his way back to his ^ post he was 
charged by the British Post Office to felk to Muhammad Ali on the 
transit question. Barrot to Guizot, No. 4, 4 Sept. 1845, M.A.B.,
C.P., tom. 17. He also reported that in his conversation, he in­
sisted on the necessity of constructii^ a railway. Barrot to 
Guizot, No. 13, 19 Oct. 1845, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 17.
3Tennent's letter to Peel, dated Alexandria, 23 October 1844 is re­
ferred to in the Minute of the Treasury dated 27 February 1845 
'on the Transit... through Egypt' (see: Peel Papers, CCCLXXXVI, Add.
40,566, fol. 177b;.
i
4Peel Papers, CCCLXXXVI, Add . 40,566, fol. 177b.
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hands the transport of passengers between Cairo and Suez by-
settingup the "Egyptian Transit Company".^ The Treasury minutes
recommended, then, in regard to the railroad, to inquire from
the Pasha whether he was prepared to adhere to the proposition
made by him to Tennent, and if not, whether he had any other
proposition to make on the subject.
However, new steps were taken by the Pasha. On the arrival
of John Alexander Galloway in Egypt in January 1845# the ^asha
immediately commissioned him to prepare an estimate of the cost
2of completing the Suez line. This new measure meant that the
negotiations entered into between Thurburn and Walker, the civil
engineer, for the work of surveying the line, were considered
at an end. But Barnett was still doubtful. He wrote to Aberdeen
that the question whether the Pasha was sincere in the desire
3of executing this work might shortly be decided. John Galloway
85-
(cont.)
^Aberdeen to Barnett, No. 2 of 17 Jan. 1845 in P.O. 78/623;
Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 16 of 5 May 1845# in P.O. 14^13.
^Aberdeen to Barnett, No. 3 of 18 January 1845 in P.O. 78/623.
Egyptian Transit Company: The proposal contract between the 
P. & 0. and Hill and Co., the company in management of transit, 
meant that the transit would probably be still ii the hands of 
an English establishment. In March 1843# Turbum borrowed from 
Muhammad *Ali £20,000 with which to undertake the transit, and 
Hill and Co., being called on either to sell or to return the 
risk of being overpowered by an establishment under the immediate 
protection of the government, disposed of their business and stock 
to Thurburn, who gave to his new agency the title of "Transit 
Company". In 1846 Muhammad *Ali finally dispossessed Thurburn 
of all control in transit matters and the "Transit Administration" 
succeeded this company. (Walne's report cn the state of the transit, 
encl. in Murray to Palmerston, No. 32 of 6 June 1847 in P.O. 78/707.)
(cont.)
had finished his survey and submitted to the Pasha a plan and 
estimate of the oost of laying the line. The Viceroy want into 
a minute examination of all the details of Galloway*s plan. He 
asked him to proceed to Alexandria and await his decision. But 
Barnett noted that "the adoption by the Pasha of Mr. Galloway's 
proposals has, I fear become less probable than when I had last 
the honour of writing to Your Lordship on the subject".^ He 
confirmed his previous information about the Pasha's desire to 
build his Barrage, when he sent to Paris M. Mougel to submit 
his plan to the Council of Civil Engineers there. He also promised 
M. Mougel that should the plan be approved, the Barrage would be 
immediately commenced under his superintendence. However, the 
Pasha could not undertake two major works at the same time. The 
number of hands needed for the Barrage would render it impossible 
for him, even had he the inclination,to commence upon a railroad 
until the Barrage was completed.2 But the information the French 
ConsulHCeneral had from Artin Bey, as well as from the persons 
around the Pasha, and indeed the language of the Pasha himself, 
convinced him that the Pasha had thedntention of connecting Cairo
(cont.)
2Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 4 of 29 Jan. 1845 in P.O. 78/623;
The Illustrated London News. No. 146, VI, p.130 (l March. 1845).
Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 10 of 18 March 1845 in F.O. 78/623; 
Benedetti to Guizot, No. 9# 2 Feb. 1845, M.A.E., C.P. tom 17.
^Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 13 of 12 Apr. 1845 in F.O. 78/623. 
2Barnett, No. 13 of 12 Apr. 1845 in P.O. 78/623*
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with Suez by a railroad only after the completion of the Nile 
Barrage, which was more highly beneficial to Egypt.^
Lastly, Artin Bey notified John Galloway that the Pasha had
declined for the present to commence the railroad. The reason
2he gave was the high price of iron in England. On learning
that, Galloway proposed to Muhammad *Ali to complete the railroad
3at his own cost upon certain conditions, but this proposal was 
rejected. In due course, Galloway appeared to think that Barnett 
had not given him that support to which he was entitled, according 
to Aberdeen’s instructions. But since Barnett's return from 
England, he had frequently spoken both to the Viceroy and to 
Artin Bey on the subject. Barnett always looked upon the question 
"as secondary to the more important object which H.M. *:• Govt, had 
in view, and /he had/guarded ^im/self from committing H.M.'s Govt. 
, by urging the measure on the Pasha as a speculation which was 
likely to be advantageous to him in a pecuniary point of view".^ 
Accordingly, Aberdeen reported to the Treasury, in connection 
with the refusal of the British government to ratify the Postal 
Agreement, that the railway project had for the present at least
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benedetti to Guizot, No. 9, 2 Feb. 1845, M.A.E., C.P., tom.17.
^Barnett to Aberdeen, No. 17 of 7 May 1845 in F.O. 78/623.
3See Memorandum in App. I, pp. 370-72.
^Barnett, No. 17 of 7 May 1845, in P.O. 78/623.
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been abandonedBenedetti, the French Consul-General,
believed that the desire to shorten the desert by means of a
railway, though often manifested by the Pasha, had never been
serious. The Pasha openly modified the language which he had
always used on this question, and began to recognise that the
2railway would be an expensive and unfruitful work. Meanwhile,
the British agent was very eager to know the Pasha’s decision on
the railway. When Barnett learned that M. Mougel had made proposals
tothe Pasha of a very advantageous nature on the part of an
3English company to lay down the railway, he talked to Muhammad 
‘Ali about this mediation and asked him if he was disposed to
A 4 mmconsider those proposals favourably. Muhammad Ali answered 
that when the Barrage was completed, he would then determine 
whether it would be more expedient to make a railroad, or a canal 
from the Nile to Suez. Barnett thought that this vast undertaking 
was a new manoeuvre on the part of the Pasha. By adopting it, 
he wished to have a pretext for declining either to make a rail­
road, or to undertake the canal.
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^Aberdeen to Barnett, No. 12 of 6 June 1845 in F.O. 14l/l0. 
2Benedetti to Guizot, No. 16, 24 Mar. 1845* M.A.E., C.P. tom. 17.
3Nothing is known about the nature of these proposals and whether 
Mougel mediated on behalf of Galloway or other company.
^Banett to Aberdeen, No. 44 of 1 Nov. 1845 in F.O. 78/623.
While the negotiations with the British government did not
advance the railway, French and Austrian opposition was highly
effective. Both were hostile to British interests and both
supported a ship-canal across the Isthmus as a counter-poise
to the railway. Austria followed this policy because she thought
that if the commerce of India and China were diverted from the
Cape route to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, Trieste would
become a great emporium for the commerce between Asia and Europe.
France, on the other hand, was anxious for the construction of
the Suez Canal because it would place her as a military and
naval power in the Medi terranean much nearer to India than
Britain would be.^ Day after day, French fears were increasing
as they saw the growing importance of Egypt to the English.
Barrot, the French Consul-General told Hekekyan that if the Pasha
would not take to himself the transit through Egypt, he should
abdicate, ’’because the French could not remain his friends if
he did nothing for himself and the English who had a finger in
2Egypt would by and by put in their hand”. As they pressed upon 
Muhammad *Ali to monopolize the transit, they did the same in 
respect of the railway. French influence over Egypt and the Pasha’s 
ministers, such as Artin Bey, helped them to do this. This was
"^Palmerston to Murray, No. 17 of 27 May 1847 in F.O. 407/3.
2Hekekyan Papers, III, Add. 37,450, fol. 104.
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•
emphasized by the Marquis de La Valette1s letter to the government
on the railway question. He says that "he could never shew his
face in Paris, lere he to permit the construction here of a
Railroad".^ Not only de La Valette but also his successor,
Benedetti, drew the attention of the Viceroy to the enormous ad-
2vantages of opening a canal.
Muhammad *Ali, despite this opposition, was desirous to benefit 
from the transit through Egypt. He attempted to blame French policy. 
He acquainted the French Consul-General that the cause of the 
difficult position in which he found himself was principally due 
to the repugnanee of the French government to the construction of 
the Suez-Cairo railway. However, Muhammad ‘Ali soon changed his 
language, and described this opinion as a joke when Barrot demon­
strated to him quite evidently "that the repugnance <f the King’s 
government had no other motive than the real and logical interest 
it takes in him, and I told him that if he had in the present state
of things so many difficulties in remaining master of the territory
\that had been left to him, to permit the construction of a railway 
across the desert would mean delivering himself tied hand and foot
3to the demands of English interests11.
^Stoddart to Palmerston, No.8 of 29 Aug. 1846 in F.O. 78/661 B; 
Stoddart to Palmerston, 9 Feb. 1847, in F.O. 78/710.
^Benedetti to Guizot, No. 8, 17 Jan. 1845; No. 10, 4 Feb. 1845, 
M.A.E., C.P. tom. 17.
Barrot to Guizot, No. 'a>8, 25 Mar. 1846, M.A.E., C.P. tom.18.
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3
Mufcammad *Ali did have an interest in constructing railways 
throughout his territory. Before his visit to Constantinople 
in 1846, he was considering two lines, one from Alexandria to 
al-‘AJ?f and the other from Alexandria to Cairo directly. After 
his return from Constantinople, he talked to Hekekyan about the 
projects he wished to accomplish and said "we must now think 
of nothing but improvements in our interior  I will first lay
down a railroad between Alexandria <5t C a i r o W h e n  Barrot,
that
the French Consul-General, knew/the Viceroy's imagination had 
been occupied with these two railway projects, he reported to 
Paris for instructions. This document is of invaluable importance 
because it sheds more light on the vie ws of the French repre­
sentative connected with the construction of railways in Egypt 
generally, v/ith regard to the line frcrn Alexandria to Cairo,
Barrot said that its construction along the edge of the desert 
would be useless. Such a railway would leave all the products 
of the delta outside this new line, while a railway to al-*A$f 
would open a rapid transport to all the products of Upper and 
Lower Egypt. On the other hand, Barrot added that the construction 
of one or the other of these railways would lead subsequently to 
the realisation of the Suez railway project which the King's 
government had opposed. Nevertheless, it seemed to Barrot that
91.
^Hekekyan Papers, III, Add. 37, 450, fol. 157.
to prevent Egypt from ejoying the great facilities that railways
offered to commerce, industry and the population in general. France,
therefore, would evidently depart from "her r61e of enlightened
and intelligent friend of Egypt'1, and her resistance to projects
of incontestable utility could result in the substitution of
another influence to hers. He accordingly thought
"si la question de ces chemins de fer vient 
a §tre discutee nous devons (sans aucun doute)
§tre les premiers a engage le Vice-Roi a donner, 
le plus C6t possible a l'Egypte les avantages 
qui doivent resulter pour elle de ces grandes 
voies de communication dont le monde civilise 
et la Prance en particulier, se sont enrichis, 
depuis quelques armees. II sera facile, d'ailleurs, 
de faire comprendre a Mehemet-Ali la grand differ­
ence qu'il y aura toujours entre des voies destinees 
a faire arriver rapidenent et a peu de fraix, au 
port d'embarquement, les immenses jroduits que 
donne l'Egypte, produits que 1'achevement du barrage 
est destine a tripler, et un chemin de fer du Caire 
a Suez qui ne serait d'aucun avantage pour la popu­
lation du pays et qui n'offrirait d'utilite qu'a une 
tres faible portion du commerce et a une nombre tou- 
jours limite de voyageurs d'une seule nation.
' Prance would go the wrong way if she made use of her influence
“^Barrot to Guizot, No. 55, 18 July 1846, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 18.
Another period of discussions and correspondence on the 
railway began with the appointment of Charles Augustus Murray, 
as the British Consul-General in Egypt in June 1846. For about 
a year the lonsul-G eneral did not receive any directions from 
the Foreign ( ffice. As soon as te settledin Egypt, he irote to 
Palmerston on the subject of communications with India and 
their present condition under Muhammad 4 Ali. So long as France 
determinedly opposed the railway, supported by the agents of 
the Great Continental Powers, Murray considered it completely 
impossible that this project could be urged with reasonable 
prospects of success. Nevertheles, Murray enquired whether this 
railway was so highly desirable for British interests as to be 
pressed as a matter in which the government was interested, or 
to be considered as an affair between Galloway (or any other 
private person or company) and the Pasha.1 Murray asked for in­
structions not only because Galloway had stron^y urged it upon 
him, but because he was convinced "from all that I have read 
and heard since my arrival, that nothing has been more prejudicial 
to the influence of the British Consul here, than occasionally 
pressing unpalatable measures upon the Pasha, which have afterwards
Hlurray to Palmerston, 4 Nov. B46 in F.O. 97/408.
94.
1been abandoned as unnecessary or impracticable.”
Palmerston acknowledged the importance of a railway, but 
he instructed Murray to say whenever the subject was mooted 
that ”Her Majesty’s Government would be glad to see that under­
taking commenced; and you shall point out the advantages which 
it would produce to Egypt by its tendency to draw commerce as
well as passengers through Egypt, and by the employment it
2would give to Egyptian labour.” Palmerston was not likely 
to enter upon the construction of the line so long as Muhammad 
*Ali was engaged in an expensive operation for damming the Nile. 
But Murray was instructed to inform him that when he decided to 
construct the line, he ought to know that it would be at his own 
expense•
The idea of the canal gained ground when Muhammad ‘All,
,9
in order to satisfy public opinion both in Prance and Austria,
* » 0 '*)afforded the Societe d*etudes du Canal de Suez' the opportunity 
to survey the Isthmus tf Sue*. When Murray asked for instructions 
in regard to the canal, Palmerston was of opinion that he should 
remain entirely passive on the subject, and to say that he had 
no instructions from his government either to support or to oppose
1Murray Murray to Palmerston, 3 Jan.
1847 in P.O. 97/408.
3 »The Societe was formed in 1847 comprising of three national groups 
French, British and Austrian.
"Palmerston to Murray, No. 4 of 8 Feb. 1847 in P.O. 97/408.
the canal; but the government realised that the commercial
advantages to'be derived from a c anal would be at tained nearly
as well and at a much lower cost in time and money by a railway
across the desert.^ Hurray, however, was to avail himself of
the first favourable opportunity to suggest to the Pasha the
2greater practicability of a railroad.
On the other hand, Palmerston sent a copy of this despatch 
to Lord Cowley, British Ambassador at Constantinople, who entered 
confidentially with Refid Pasha, the Grand Vezir, into the reasons 
why a railroad would be preferable, and asked him to tell the
Pasha that the Sultan would rather see a railroad constructed
3than a c anal. Refid answered that he had lately had some con­
versation on the subject with Kfimil Pasha, Muframmad *Ali»s son-in- 
law. Muhammad *Ali desired him to tell the Grand Vezir that he bad 
been urged by Foreign Powers to construct a canal either 
at his own expense, or at that of a company established for the 
purpose. The Viceroy had turned a deaf ear to all propositions 
for a foreign company. He requested that if any offer from 
foreigners were made to Constantinople, the Porte should equally 
discourage the idea. Although Refid was of opinion that several 
years would elapse before this could commence, he informed Lord
Palmerston to Murray, No. 17 of 27 Hay 1847.in F.O. 97/4^8.
Murray to Palmerston, No. 44 of 9 July 1847 in F.O. 97/408.
3Cowley to Palmerston, No. 215 of 3 July 1847, in F.O. 97/411.
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Cowley that he would take everyOpportunity of stating the
Porte’s preference for a railway to a canal. ^ He further assured
Lord Cowley thatas long as he remained Grand Vezir, no canal 
2would be cut. When §evket Bey, private secretary to the
Sultan, was sent on a special mission to Muhammad ‘Ali, he was
furnished with instructions to speak to him in the sense desired
by the British government. But to Re§id*s surprise, Muhammad
‘Ali answered that he was against both projects, and would not
4£ve permission for either.
3. Conclusion;
Mutiammad ‘All had finally abandoned one of his favourite 
projects. An attempt to find out his motives of declining to 
commence this work is worthwhile. Was it due to the state of 
his finances, or his fears of external domination; or because 
of the jealousies of the other European Powers?
Barnett pointed out in one of his private letters that he 
had no doubt the Pasha would see about the work if it were made
5worth his while. The British government supported the railway,
■'"Cowley, No. 215 of 3 July 1847 in P.O. 97/411.
^Cowley to Palmerston, No. 259 of 31 July 1847 in P.0.97/408.
Cowley to Palmerston, ^o. 287 of 1 Sept. 1847, in P.0.97/408.
^Cowley to Palmerston, No. 358 of 17 Oct. 1847 in P.O. 97/408.
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^Barnett to Bidwell, (Private), 18 Dec. 1843 in P.O. 78/^42.
but this was not sufficient to induce Muframmad ‘All to execute 
the work. He wanted a financial guarantee to be sure that he 
would not be the loser. Hekekyan himself notes in his papers 
that the best way of executing the railway was for England and 
Egypt each to furnish half of the necessary capital.1
Muhammad *AlI failed, however, to conclude a formal agreement
concerning the costs of work. At the same time, his exhausted
finances could not meet the expenses of the line; particularly
2as they were mostly devoted to the completion of the Barrage.
The question of money was solved when Thomas Waghorn assured him 
verbally about financial help from some European bankers and in 
a further letter, he reassured him that Messrs. Rotschilds, the 
financiers of Europe, could find him the money either in London, 
Paris or Vienna for the construction of the line. "Money if 
wanting, is to be had, and the execution of a railroad from 
Cairo to Suez will send your name to posterity greater than any
7
act that I can remember in modem history". Muhammad *Ali also 
turned down Galloway’s proposals when he offered to build the
4railway at his own expense on certain conditions.
hekekyan Papers, III, Add. 37,450, fol. 275. He discussed this 
subject with a group of Austrian engineers during his visit to 
Vienna. He also suggests that ’’should the receipts for a year 
be less than the interest of the capital laid out the deficit 
should be paid to Egypt by the English government. On the con­
trary, the overplus of the receipts should be paid to England 
on account of the repayment for advances made to make up former 
annual deficits in the receipts."
^’.;alne to Lyons, 14 June 1847 in F.O. 97/408; see also: al- 
Barrawi and ‘ulaish, op.cit.,p.83; Lahifcah, op.cit., p.2^6.(cont.;
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As far as the Suez railway is conoemed, French intrigues 
were the insurmountable barrier to its accomplishment. What was 
the aim of French policy ±1 Egypt? The setback which France had 
suffered after 1841 did not make her abandon her own interests. 
Egypt remained as one of her centres of «tivity along the African 
coast. On the other hand, the betrayal of Mufcaxpnad *Ali by 
France did not affect his attitude towards her; it was *Abbas I 
who remembered this humiliation and took revenge. French tradi­
tional policy had never changed. It aimed at the interruption 
cf the overland communication with India, and striking a deadly 
blow at the political and commercial interests of Great Britain. 
After the pacification of the Levant, the Comte de Chabot was 
■Sent to take charge of the French Consulate-General, with in­
structions to soothe the irritation of Muhammad *Ali, to reassure 
him for the future, and to counsel the line of policy best cal­
culated to repair his stability. From 1843* French policy in 
Egypt was pursued with a greatly augmented activity. She had 
already conferred on her representative the mnk of political 
agent which Britain had taken from her in 1841. The Marquis de 
La Valette, an able man, was appointed as France’s political 
agent. The Due de Montpensier, Louis Phil ippe's son, visited
(cont.)
T. Waghorn to Muhammad *Ali dated Cairo, 18 Oct. 1844
(The Times. 5 Nov. 1844); See App. II , pp. 373-75.
4See App. I, pp.370-72.
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Egypt in August 1845. The visit of the French prince was made 
to strengthen French influence in the Mediterranean, in Tunis, 
Tripoli, Egypt and Greece.1 Not oily French agents, but also 
French employees in Egypt played on Muhammad ‘All's fears.
They tried to convince him that Britain had aggressive views
2upon Egypt as the half-way house to India. When Waghom's 
offer was known in France, the French press carried on a campaign 
of attacks upon the project as an obstacle to the realization of 
the canal.^ M. Perodeaud, Muhammad ‘.111*8 political agent
in Paris, conveyed to him the views of the French government, 
that the canalization of the Isthmus should be given the first
4place.
^Stoddart to Palmerston, 9 Feb. 1847 in F.O. 78/710.
^Waghorn to R. Stephenson, 13 Mar. 1847 in F.O. 97/411 (Suez 
Canal); Merruau, L*Egypte contemporaine. p.93. He says *'the 
cabinet of the Tuileries knew that they had to be on their 
guard against the consequence of an even purely industrial 
intervention of England in foreign countries”; see also: 
al-Ayyubi, op.cit., p.136.
Le Journal des Debats, 8 Nov. 1844 published a full translation 
of Waghom's letter in The Times. Le Journal des Debats. 26 Nov. 
1844; "Lorsqu'ils soutiennent qu'en poursuivant cette enterprise, 
l'Angleterre ne ferait rien qui ne ftlt dans son droit; et que 
les capitalistes Anglais peuvent employer leur argent a deux 
travaux publiques dans les domaines de Mehemet-Ali, sans qu'on 
puisse raisonnablement en conclure que le cabinet de Londres
convoite l'Egypte, ils sont dans le vrai,...... " See also:
Le Constitutionnel, 8 Nov., 13 Nov.; 29 Nov. 1844.
Abdin Arch, uncatalogued Doc., Cit. in J. Tagher, "Mohammed Ali et 
les Anglais a Suez", cah. hist, eg., 2, 1950, pp. 489-490 (28.2.45.
4
Prance took every precaution to defeat the railway project.
Barrot, the F r e n c h  Consul-General, warned the Fasha not to charge 
an English engineer to construct a steam vehicle on the Suez desert, 
because after its construction, he would recommend the railway 
saying to him, "continuez, vous §tes sorti de votre systeme si 
arriere; faites encore un pas, voici une voiture a vapeur sur 
le route de Suez; Vous avez de rails sur les lieux depuis dix 
ans, faites un chemin de fer."^ Prance also viewed any action 
taken either on the part of the Pasha or the British government 
as a renewal of activity. Such actions were the projects of 
Murray*s voyage with the Pasha to Upper Egypt and Alexandria; 
the sending of ten young people for education in England; the re­
ception of Lord Dalhousie, the Jovemor-G eneral of India; certain 
words of the Viceroy; and lastly, Lord Palmerston's invitation 
to Muframraad ‘Ali to visit England. Barrot assumed that Palmerston 
ended his despatch of the invitation by expressing the hope that 
Muframmad ‘Ali would no longer refuse the establishment of a railway. 
The opposition of Prance, however, to this railroad "has ever been 
of the most determined nature. Its existence, or its non-existence, 
seemed the point on which her policy turned; and eventually it became
3a question involving ter support to her hostility."
1Barrot to Guizot, No. 90, 6 Dec. 1847, M.A.E., C.E, tom 19.
2Barrot to Guizot, No. 91, 16 Dec. 1847, M.A.E., C.P.tom.19.
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^Anonymous, The Present Crisis in Egypt. No. 1, p.5; see also Barnett
to Aberdeen, No. 10 of 9 March 1844 in P.O. 142/13.
Muhammad *Ali viewed the question as one which would affect 
his relatinns with Europe much more than his local interests. He 
said to Murray "Why should I quarrel with the other great Powers 
to advance the interests of England a l o n e . H e  admitted to 
the French Consul-General that he would not like to make either 
the canal or the railway; but if all the governments agreed on 
one or the other, he would accede without hesitation to the wish
pwhich was expressed to him. As the situation ies absolutely 
in his hands, he was happy that he could lean upon England for 
refusing the canal, and upon France and Austria for opposing 
the railway. In the face of such rival interests,the project was 
abandoned. Vaghom wrote to Muhammad *Ali in his letter that 
"whether Your Highness makes a railroad between Cairo and Suez, 
or not, it will come,..as certain as these lines are written”.
His prediction was realised.
By the middle of the nineteenth century both the British 
government and British public had come to realise the significance 
of the construction of a railway through Egypt. 'Hie number of British 
passengers across the Isthmus of Suez was well over 3,000 in 1847.
A British traveller, who made observations in Egypt, Arabia and 
Syria, enumerated, in a report to the Board of Trade in 1849» the
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^Murray to Palmerston, No. 68 of 24 Dec. 1847 in F.O. 78/708. 
^B&rrot to Guizot, No.91, 16 Dec. 1847, M.A.E., C.P. tom.19.
great advantages of a railway across Egypt, and showed how it 
would also develop the resources of the countries bordering the 
Red Sea. In urging the British government, he said "with all 
these facts before us, and such testimony from men who have 
continually trafficked in the East, I cannot but believe that 
the British Government would do well so consider the matter, 
and if the ancients could afford the expense of making a deep, 
and broad canal, across the Isthmus, and the present American 
Government can at their own expense lay down a rail-road across 
the Isthmus of Panama for the purpose of reaching California 
it certainly would appear much more advantageous for the British 
Government to endeavour to carry out this project, when we con­
sider thBt they have the Indian Empire at the further extremity, 
and regions on the route to the right and left, whose commercial 
resources are fer more valuable than many Califomias" However, 
the railway project did not terminate with Muhammad ‘All's reign, 
but survived it, to be one of the major questions which shaped 
the state of affairs during the reign of ‘Abbas gilmi I.
1 A Report on the railway across the Isthmus of Suez presented by E. 
Macdonald to Henry Labouchere, dated July 1849, in P.O. 97/411.
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Chapter II
‘ABBAS I AND THE "YEXATA QUAES TIP'1 
OP THB RAILWAY, 1848-1854
"C’est Abbas Pacha .••• un jour dans un sens, 
et le lendemain en sens contraire. II y a *quelques jours, - il me disait que le chemin 
de fer etait sa folie a lui, comme le Barrage 
etait un folie de son grand pere, et depuis il 
a declare a un de mes collegues que le chemin 
de fer ferait la fortune de 1*Egypt© et que, 
plus tard, il solliciterait de la Porte, 
l’autorisation de le pousser jusqu’a Suez.”
Sabatier to Minister of For.
Affs. No. 24, 30 April 1853,
M.A.E., C.C. (Alex.), tom. 34.
’’One would really suppose from the vast import­
ance attached at Constantinople to the con­
struction of this Egyptian railway, and from 
the manner in which the plan has been discussed, 
that no person in that capital had ever before 
heard of a railroad, and that the one now under 
consideration was the first thing of the kind 
ever made in the world, instead of railroads 
being, as they now are, the common means of 
locomotion all ove r Europe and North America, 
and even in some of the West Indian Islands.
There cannot be a more striking instance of the 
backwardness of the intellectual and social con­
dition of Turkey than the fuss which has been made 
about so common an undertaking."
Palmerston to Canning, No. 223,
23 Aug. 1851 /No. 86/in F.O.
424/7A.
"Egypt has many memories for me  I kept
the cursed tanzimat (legalised anarcly) out of 
it, in spite of Sir Stratford Canning and the 
Sublime Porte; and I brought the railway into 
it, in spite of French and Turkishintrigues."
Murray in H. Maxwell,
The Hon. Sir Charles Murray, 
pp. 244-245.
1. Abbas’s refusal to construct a Railway and 
the French opposition:
The mental disorder of Muhammad *Ali rendered him unfit to 
rule, and on 1 Sept.1848, the Sublime Porte reluctantly invested 
his son, Ibrahim Pasha, with the government of Egypt. ^ However, 
the prospects of an unsettled political situation seemed in­
evitable, because Ibrahim became seriously ill. Although the 
succession was ruled by provisions in the ferman of 1841, passing
’5n a direct line, from the elder to the elder, in the male race
2among the sons and grandsons”, the members of the family were
all at variance with each other.' On 22 October 1848, Abbas
Pasha, the successor apparent to the Viceroyalty, left Egypt on
board a British steamer for the ^ijaz, on the pretext of seeking
a change of air. Being the President of the Council and the head
of the Transit Administration, ‘Abbas would not have left Egypt
- - 4unless there had been a misunderstanding between him and Ibrahim.
This situation aroused the suspicion of the British and 
French Consuls-Ganeral in Egypt who wrote to their respective 
governments about the serious consequences of the situation. Murray
^Canning to Palmerston, (No. 74 Confidential), 18 Aug. 1848, in 
F.O. 78/734; copy of the ferman is enclosed in Canning to 
Palmerston, 13 Sept. 1848 in F.O. 78/735.
2Text of ferman in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the ^ear and Middle East, 
I, p.121.
Murray to Palmerston, No. 43 of 4 Oct. 1848 in F.O. 78/757. There 
were three claimants to the Viceroyalty, Afcunad Bey, Ibrahim's son,
3
(cont.)
the British Consul-General, urged Palmerston to settle this 
question to avoid anarchy, civil war, or foreign ocupation, which 
could endanger the very existence of the British Indian Empire.
The situation, Murray thought, could be resolved by one of three 
likely ways. Egypt could be re-annexed by the Porte. France could 
step in and occupy Egypt, using the plausible excuse that she was 
protecting the rights of the family. A British occupation would 
maintain, at all risks, the security of Anglo-Indian communications. 
But Palmerston wanted the decision on the succession to be left 
to the Sultan.^ Barrot, the French Consul-G eneral, recognized 
the incontestable right of ‘Abbas, but he feared the intentions 
of the Sultan towards the succession. This could mean that the 
Porte would reduce Egypt to an ordinary pashalic of theempire, 
and this would be fatal to the tranquility of the country. He 
said that if this was true, France should paralyse the execution 
of such a measure. Moreover, the Porte should be convinced that,
(cont.) Sa‘id Pasha as Muhammad ‘All's next son, and ‘Abbas Pasha, 
the eldest surviving member of the family; see also Barrot to 
Bastide, No. 31, 21 Oct. 1848, M.A.E., C.P., tom.20.
^Murray to Palmerston (Private), 4 Oct. 1848 in F.O. 78/757;
Barrot, No. 31, 21 Oct. 1848, tom. 20; Mme Ol^mbe Audouard,
Les mysteres, pp. 136-137; ' Rafi‘i,‘Asr Isma*i,, I, p.10.
"^Murray to Palmerston (No. 30 confidential), 6 July 1848 in 
F.O. 142/16; Palmerston to Murray, No. 24, 28 Oct. 1848;
No. 27, 28 Nov. 1848 in F.O. 14l/l5.
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in these circumstances, Britain would intervene to secure her 
communications with India.^ Nevertheless, ‘Abbas's position 
was firm. Whatever the intentions of the Porte, it consented to
the recognition of ‘Abbas as the lawful ruler, and he was sum-
- - - 2moned from the §ijaz on Ibrahim's death on 10 Nov. 1848. On
5 Pec. the Eatt-i Jerif of his nomination was read in Cairo amid
3the cheers of the townspeople.
The conveying of *Abbas to and from the $ijaz was a gesture
t - 4of British friendship which Abbas acknowledged and appreciated.
It aimed at increasing British influence with the Egyptian govern­
ment. Murray was not an admirer of ‘Abbas nor did he expect much 
from his capacity or intelligence, but he thought he would be less
107.
■^ Barrot to Bastide, No. 31, 21 Oct. 1848; No. 37, 4 Dec. 1848;
Barrot to Lamartine, No. 1, 18 Mar. 1848, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 20.
^Artin to Murray, 12 Nov. 1848 in P.0.195/278. Sa‘id headed the 
council until Abbas's return; Ibrahim intended to exclude both 
‘Abbas and Sa‘id in favour of his own son A^mad, and in a secret 
note he urged the Sultan to set aside ‘Abbas's claim. This letter 
was not without effect, but ‘Abbas had the support of "the council, 
the army and the majority of all classes in Egypt". Canning to 
Palmerston, 14 Sept. 1848 in P.O. 78/735; Barrot to Bastide,
No. 33, 5 Nov. 1848; No. 37, 4 Dec. 1848, M.A.E., C.P., tom.20;
Murray to Palmerston, No. 54 of 5 Dec. 1848 in F.O. 78/757; Murray 
to Palmerston, No. 50 of 6 Nov. 1848 in F.O. 195/278; The Illustrated 
London News, No. 347, XIII (9 Dec. 1848); No. 349, XIlTT23 Dec.
1848).
" M^urray to Canning, No. 27 of 6 Dec. 1848 in P.O. 78/757. He already 
made himself popular by releasing the citv youths who had been 
forcibly seized as conscripts under Ibrahim.
^ ‘Abbas to Murray, 22 Oct. 1848 in F.O. 78/757.
under French influence than his two predecessors.1 Palmerston 
instructed Murray to express to ‘Abbas, on his arrival in Egypt, 
the conviction of the British government that the more friendly 
and intimate the intercourse between Britain and Egypt, the more 
this would conduce to the interests of both countries, and he
stated that he would give every enccuiagenent and facility in his
2power to improve the arrangements for transit through Egypt.
This Murray had already done, and ‘Abbas was anxious to facilitate
the Transit Administration. The thorny question of the Suez
railway was still in the offing; but ‘Abbas's accession offered
an opportunity to renew the question. Palmerston asked Murray
to rec amend to ‘Abbas the expediency of making a railroad from
Alexandria to Suez. This he was to do unofficially, pointing out
that if this railroad vere not made, some other line might entirely
4divert the stream of passengers and merchandise from Egypt. When
Murray received these instructions ‘Abbas was at Constantinople
5for his investiture.
1Murray to Palmerston, No. 52 of 15 Nov. 1848 in F.O. 142/16; Murray
to Palmerston, No. 54 of 5 Dec. 1848 in F.O. 195/278.
^Palmerston to Murray, No. 28 of 6 Dec. 1848 in F.O. 14l/l5.
"Murray to Canning, No. 27 of 6 Dec. 1848 in F.O. 195/278.
^Palmerston to Murray, No. 29 of 21 Dec. 1848 in F.O. 14l/l5.
^Murray to Palmerston, 5, 16 Jan. 1849 in F.O. 78/804.
At Constantinople, Sir Stratford Canning, the British Am­
bassador, was preparing to settle with ‘Abbas the questions of 
the Sennar monopoly and the Transit arrangements through Egypt, 
which had been outstanding since the time of Muhammad ‘Ali.
Although Canning was willing to show confidence in the government 
of Egypt, he preferred to uphold the Sultan's authority and to 
rely upon its occasional exercise for the vindication of British 
interests there through the execution of commercial treaties. 
Canning welcomed ‘Abbas's attitude towards Britain,'*’ although 
with some reservations as to his character and tastes, and to 
the still predominant influence of Artin Bey, who was more than
2 i •a little partial to France.1" Even before ‘Abbas went to Constantin­
ople, Murray's reports on Egypt were not promising. Sami Pasha, 
one of the leading officials in Egypt, passed his opinion of ‘Abbas 
to Murray, which he, Murray, passed on to Canning. Sami believed 
that ‘Abbas, being inexperienced in public affairs, would from 
the outset be compelled to turn to Artin Bey. The first thing 
to happen in that case would be the introduction of a large 
number of French officers into the Egyptian army, Sami thought 
that it would be better if the Porte maintained its control over 
Egypt. The provisions of the Hatt-i ^erif should be enforced. These
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^ ‘Abbas, on his request, brought Canning a letter of recommendation 
from Murray.
Canning to Palmerston, No. 6 of 4 Jan. 1849 encl. in Canning to 
Murray, No. 1 of 8 Jan. 1849 in F.O. 14l/9.
2
included the regular payment of tribute, an equal balance of
foreign relations and, not least, acceptance of the will of
the Porte. Although Murray knew that Sami and the other officials
were biassed against *Abbas, he advised Canning to support the
Porte's authority if French officers were put in charge of the
troops. Re added "the efficient commander in chief of the
army is a Frenchman by birth, and the Foreign Minister is a
Frenchman by adoption, it only remains to officer the Troops with
Frenchmen in order to make Egypt another Tunis, as a preliminary
to its becoming another Algiers".^
On meeting ‘ Abbas, Canning was inclined to change his
opinion. *Abbas assured him that the improvements already cora-
2menced in the transit by the selection of a new foreign super­
intendent were to bo continued and furthered on his return to 
Egypt by the introduction of other foreigners and tie establishment 
of more commodious post houses. Canning then broached to *Abbas and 
Artin the question of constructing a railway. After discussion 
with them lie wrote to Palmerston that a railway did not seem to be 
among the more urgent items for consideration, but "it's /sic/ utility 
is recognized, and if funds were obtainable, in pa*t at least, 
from England, Your Lordship's urgent recommendations might, perhaps
^Murray to Canning (confidential), 17 Dec. 1848 in F.O. 78/757.
S'or these improvements see: Palmerston to Murray, 31 Jan. 1849
in F.O. 78/804; Murray to Palmerston, No. 9 of 24 Feb. 1849 
in F.C. 142/16.
■^Canning to Murray, No. 2 of 15 Feb. 1849 in F.O. 141/9.
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succeed in hastening the accomplishment of that desirable object".^ 
What was the real policy of ‘Abbas? Despite the fact that 
the Sultan loaded ‘ Abbas with honours and dignities, he intended
to curtail the powers formerly exercised by Muhammad ‘All, and
2to bring Egypt under his immediate supervision. So the Sultan’s
power in the Egyptian government increased considerably, but only
• i •  3 i ^through the disposition of Abbas." Abbas was a loyal Ottoman
subject and a devout Muslim. He was fully prepared to admit that
4Egypt was only a province of the Ottoman Empire. At Constantinople
he expressed his intention to reduce his army and navy, and talked
of presenting a ship annually to the Sultan in addition to the
tribute. He also promised to dismiss the French engineer super-
vising the additional fortifications of Alexandria.' On his
return from Constantinople, he made a great show of his devotion
to the Sultan when he mourned
"Egypt is no more a Turkish country; this is a 
Christian country. The representatives of the 
European Powers bring their power to influence all 
the acts of the government. My grandfather be­
lieved himself an absolute sovereign, and was to­
wards us, his servants, and his children. But he 
was the slave of consuls-general. Well then, if 
I must be governed by someone, I had rather be 
governed by the chief of all Muslims, than by Christ­
ians whom I hate."6
■^Canning to Palmerston, No. 28 of 5 Feb. 1849 in F.O. 78/772.
2Murray to Palmerston, No. 8 of 19 Feb. 1849 in F.C. 142/16.
Canning to Palmerston, No. 98 of 23 March 1849 in F.O. 78/774.
(cont.)
By this statement he put forward his three main political
objectives: closer relations with the Porte; reaction
against European influence; and a break with the traditions
of Muhammad *Ali. *Abbas could not forget that the superior
«
genius of his grandfather had been forced to submit to the 
Sultan. He was anti-European and opposed western penetration.^ 
French influence fell to its lowest ebb. His close association 
with Muhammad ‘All during the Syrian crisis had taught him 
how frail were the promises of F r a n c e .
Within the frame of ‘Abbas's general policy, could Britain 
achieve the construction of the railway? ‘Abbas sometimes showed 
a disposition to temporise between his prejudice and his interest. 
The transit through Egypt was well-kept and the macadamized road 
in the desert between Cairo and Suez was progressing'"' ‘Abbas’s
(cont.)
Sr. Pruner to Ayrton, letter dated 9 Jan. 1850 in P.O. 78/842 
(Pruner was ‘Abbas's German physician); Benedetti to Tocqueville, 
No. 1, 17 Apr. 1849, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 21 (a detailed document 
on Abbas's relations with the Sultan); ‘Abbas was reported to 
have denounced Muhammad ‘Ali's attitude towards the Suita n and 
said "je suis parfaitement resolu a. demander a Constantinople les 
conseils et les directions qui me seront necessaires". 'Benedetti 
to Tocqueville, No. 31, 6 Dec. 1849, M.A.E, C.P., tom. 21.)
Canning to Palmerston, No. 28 of 5 Feb.1849 in P.O. 78/772.
S. Charles-Roux, L’Egypte de 1801 a 1882, VI,p.243 in Histoire 
d e la nation egyptienne.
^Before his accession, he was thought to have formed the so- 
called "Turkish or bigoted party", of fanatical elements, which 
"should oppose itself to the inroad of European adventurers and
(cont.)
112.
absurd! ties and caprices did not affect in any way British 
interests or commerce; moreover personally Murray was on 
very friendly terms with him.^ The views and measures 
adopted by ‘Abbas led the Directors of the Peninsularft Oriental 
Company to hope that further measures might be effected by 
sending a mission to discuss the matter with ‘Abbas. Having 
officially consulted Palmerston, the Company sent Sir John Pirie,
pthe Deputy Director of the Company, to Egypt.
Pirieavailed himself of the introduction of the subject 
of the Indian transit to press the question of the railway on 
‘Abbas’s attention. Murray seconded him and both dealt with 
the question, first, as a more effective agency for improvii^- 
communication; secondly,as ultimately the most economical one; 
thirdly, as the surest method of advancing the common interests 
of Britain and Egypt. Furthermore, the capital required for con­
struction could be found at once in Britain, under reasonable 
guarantees. At this juncture ‘Abbas had to be very careful. He 
had the project of the Barrage on hand and oilier unfinished public
(cont.) improvements”. (St. John Bdyle,’’Egypt under Abbas”, 
Sharpe’s London Magazine, XIV, 1851, p.71.)
2 The Times, 25 Sept. 1849.
^Murray to Palmerston, 6 July 1849 in F.O. 78/804.
^Howell to Palmerston, 22 Jan. 1849; Addington to the Director of 
P. & 0., 24 Jan.1849 encl. in Falmerston to Murray, No. 2 of 24 
Jan. 1849 in F.O. 14l/l5; for details on this mission, the Com-_ 
pany's address of congratulation on Abbas’s succession and ‘Abbas’s 
letter to Pirie, see: Annual Reports of the P. & 0., I, pp. 4-5.
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works which were likely to involve him in a vast expenditure 
of money and labour. *Abbas considered it unwise for the time 
being to undertake a new enterprise of such a vast character, 
because his policy was to effect economics and conserve the re­
sources of Egypt. He also refused the cession of the scheme to 
a company of individuals because the peculiar position of his 
government in reference to the Foreign Powers was such as to 
render any step of this kind questionable.^- Pirie, nevertheless, 
formed the opinion that the construction of a railway was but 
a question of time.
The P. & 0. sent the Foreign Office an account of Pirie*s 
interview. With reference to the allusion which *Abbas had made 
to tie Barrage, Palmerston instructed Murray to report to him
on the progress of the work and the practicability of completing 
2it. Murray agreed with Pirie that some day or another a railway 
through Egypt would be made and it was only a question of when. 
But he reported that Pirie had misconstrued the language and 
intentions of ‘ Abbas, who could not do otherwise than give a 
polite reception to a deputy. It was quite evident to Murray, 
who understood his language and countenance, that the subject
^Pirie to the Directors of the P. & 0., 17 March 1849 encl. in 
Palmerston to Murray, No. 9 of 5 Apr. 1849 in F.O. 14l/l5.
The work was almost discontinued (Palmerston to Murray, No. 9. 
of 5 Apr.; Murray to Palmerston, No. 24 of 19 Apr. 1849 in 
F.O. 78/804).
2
was distasteful to ‘Abbas. The only expression he used that 
could admit a favourable construction was Bakalim (we shall 
see), with which Turks dismissed a question under circumstances 
which did not admit of a direct refusal. Furthermore ‘Abbas 
would not listen for a moment to the suggestion of making a 
railway by means of funds raised in England or elsewhere. Murray 
believed the matter required some further explanation on his part 
"for His Highness /had7 taken up the opinion that the railroad 
would immensely increase the influence exercised by England over 
Egypt, and that it /was/easy to understand that the impression 
would be materially strengthened if English capital were offered 
for its construction".^
Though French influence was in decline, it did not cease 
so long as Artin Bey, France's adopted son, continued to serve 
under *Abbas. Cn learning of Pirie's arrival and his intention 
to ask for a railway concession, Barrot immediately sent Benedetti, 
the French Consul in Cairo, to urge ‘Abbas to reject this plan.
In a report to his government Barrot summarized the arguments he 
had used. He stated that the railway would not bring a return of 
one per cent of the capital. There must therefore be a strong 
political interest present under the pretence of a commercial
^Murray to Palmerston. No. 23 of 19 Apr. 1849 in F.O. 142/16.
2
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Cf. Barrot to Bastide, No. 37, 4 Dec. 1848, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 20.
interest, so zealously to pursue an undertaking, which was like 
an English sword piercing Egypt’s heart, and a mortal blow at 
Muslim power in that country. He believed that ‘Abbas as a 
Turk, and as a Mulsim should oppose this plan with all his strength.
However ‘Abbas emphasized that Egypt was not wealthy enough to 
afford the luxury of a railway. He reminded the Consul that in 
no European country had concessions of this nature been granted 
to foreigners; Egypt would therefore not build the railway and would 
not allow others to do so.^
‘Abbas's refusal of the English offer to build a railway 
encouraged French representatives to continue their systematic 
campaign for shelving this undertaking indefinitely and for cutting 
instead a maritime canal. In 1850, in an audience with the French 
Consul-General, ‘Abbas said that England pressed him more and more 
every day to construct a railway, complaining sometimes of the 
delays, sometimes of the inconveniences and sometimes of the ex­
penses which arose out of the present transport system. ‘Abbas 
declared that he was going to improve this system even at the price
1Barrot to Minister of For. Aff., No. 56, 17 Mar. 1849, M.A.E., C.P., 
tom. 21. He said that Pirie arrived at Alexandria accompanied 
by MacDonald, an English engineer, talking of a railway as if the 
concession was decided upon. Artin gave him the most positive assurances 
that ”il s'opposerait de tout son pouvoir a ce que la concession edt 
lieu et que, si autre son attente, Abbas-Pasha avait la faiblesse de ceder 
ce serait lions certainement contre son avis tres nettement exprime."
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of other sacrifices but one of his ambitions was to give his name 
to the opening of a canal, if Prance, Russia and Austria would 
support him in agreement with the Porte. ”To England," he adds,
"one would give as a pretext that before starting new major works 
in Egypt, I must devote myself to those already underway,
especially the Nile barrage."'*’ Nevertheless, the Quai d’Orsay
2showed no sign of interest in the matter.
It is hard to decide whether *Abbas was sincere or bluffing
the French Consul-General. It is certain that Egypt was ceasing
to be the satellite of France. The French representative himself
viewed with jealousy the remarkable advantages enjoyed by Murray,
who was always on top of French agents. He also reported Murray’s
3unceasing demands for the construction of the Suez railway.'
Cordial relations developed between *Abbas and Murray who aimed
_ 4at countering trench influence. "Abbas seems not to be a very en­
lightened governor, but he is evidently a good Turk." This Palmerston
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■^ Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs, No. 3, 1 Feb. 1850, M.A.E.,
C.P., tom. 21.
2Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 49f 9 Juillet 1850, M.A.E., 
C.P., tom. 22. This was_due to the political instability in France. 
Few months earlier *Abbas asked Le Moyne whether he lnd received 
any communication from his government on the Suez Canal (Le Moyne, 
No. 27, 25 Apr. 1850, tom. 22).
3' Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 35» 20 May 1850, M.A.E.,
C.P. tom 22.
4Murray was still suspicious of French designs on Egypt because 
Soliman Pasha was occupied in Lower Egypt with inspecting and 
strengthening fortificatinns. Murray thought that it could only be 
intended for one of two objects: either to enable the Egyptian
Viceroy to resist, if necessary, his sovereign the Sultan, or to
considered a great political merit which made amends for a 
multitude of faults. He preferred ‘Abbas to Muhammad *Ali 
because ’’Egyptian civilization must come from Constantinople, 
and not from Paris, to be durable or consistent with British 
interests of a most important kind".'*' During the first year 
of his reign, ‘Abbas stood firmly against any European influence, 
because Europe had dominated too long in Egypt. Egypt's salvation 
was in Constantinople.
i
2. ‘Abbas's Difficulties: His Entente with Britain and
the construction of the Railway:
‘Abbas continued to show the highest respect for the Sultan
and was ready to prove his devotion in different ways. When the
Austrian Cbnsul-Gjneral attributed the tranquility of Egypt to
his good administration, he replied that it was not due to him but
2to the high intelligence of the Sultan. He made considerable
(cont.) cut off England from her Indian communications (see; 
Murray to Palmerston (separate and confidential),16 Dec. 1849 
in F.O. 78/804).
^B.P., Murray to Palmerston (Private),10 May 1849; Palmerston to 
Murray, 30 Aug. 1849.
^The Times, 20 May 1850.
presents and presented the ^ultan with the steam-frigate Sharqiyya.^
The Sultan sent ‘Abbas three full length portraits, which were es­
corted on their way to Cairo by four battalions of troops and by
military and naval bands of music. These portraits were to be sus-
2pended one in each of the three principal offices in Cairo. Moreover,
‘Abbas incurred the serious displeasure of France by his endeavour to
get A^ unad Pasha, Bey of Tunis ,to accept the Tan^imat, and not
3to declare his independence.
But ‘Abbas’s harmonious relationship with the Sultan was dis­
turbed by his internal policy and administration. Since his return 
from Constantinople, ‘Abbas turned his attention to those who had 
offended him years ago. A number of leading officials in his ad­
ministration were dismissed, or exiled and their properties ruined
• «#
by so-called long outstanding government claims. Among those sent
out of Egypt were Sami Pasha and his son §ub^i Bey, whom ‘Abbas
accused of being the cause of many feuds and quarrels in Muhammad ‘Ali's 
4family. All the wheels of internal administration were clogged, and 
no real business was transacted excepting the constant change of 
appointments; whereby no officer felt assured that he would be in
^He sent in May 1849 a squadron of 2,000 seamen to Constantinople 
to be at the Sultan's disposal. (The Times, 24 May 1849)
2The Times, 4, 17 June 1850.
3 _ —The Times, 1 July 1850; I._Sarhauk, Haqa’iq al-akhbar ‘an duwal al-bibar,
I, p. 437; II, p.263; Sami, III, Pt. 1, p.32; Canning to Palmerston,
No. 215 of 4 July; No. 225 of 19 July 1849 in F.O. 78/777; Gilbert 
to Palmerston, No. 18 of 17 June 1850 in F.O. 78/840; Benedetti to 
Minister of For. Affs., No. 13, 16 Feb. 1849; No. 4, 30 Apr., 6 Dec., 
1849, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 21.
(cont.)
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the 9ame office tomorrow. The members of ‘Abbas's family were 
in constant conflict with him. Secret complaints were sent to 
Constantinople, especially by the adherents of Ibrahim Pasha’s 
family who hoped for a change on Afcimad Bey’s arrival from France.^*
The exile of Kfimil Pasha, a relative of Re§id Pa3ha, the Grand
Vezir and the husband of Najli Hanlm, Muhammad ‘All's daughter,
2added more complications to the situation. The Ottoman cabinet 
contemplated the removal of ‘Abbas at the first favourable oppor­
tunity; but the Porte's desire for a more complete re-establishment 
of its authority in Egypt was not justified at the time." Abbas 
sent Artin Bey to the Porte to settle this natter, where Artin
| mmsounded Canning as to the possibility of Britishaipport for Abbas. 
Artin did not obtain from the Porte enough to satisfy ‘Abbas's 
expectations. ‘Abbas was required to send Kfimil's wife and her 
sister to Constantinople. The conflict was intensified by the 
Egyptian exiles at Constantinople who were cooperating with Re§id 
for ‘Abbas's deposition. They selected Artin as their active agent
(cont.)
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 12 of 5 March 1849 in F.% 78/804. A 
list of these persons is in the Hekekyan Papers, V, Add. 37, 452, 
fols. 32-33. /
^Murray to Palmerston (No. 28 confidential), 7 May 1849 in F.O. 142/16.
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 52 of 5 Oct. B49 in F.O. 78/804.
"'Canning to Palmerston (No. 44 confidential), 5 Feb. 1850 in F.O.78/817 
Canning to Palmerston (No. 82 confidential), 14 March 1850 in F.O. 
78/818. K&mil, Minister of Public Instructions, was banished to Aswan 
from where he managed to proceed to Constantinople. Hostilities were 
caused by his close friendship with Sami Pasha and his son. Thq farced separation of Itfimil from his wife was a strong case against /vbbas.
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in Egypt. Although he identified himself with French policy in
Egypt, Artin pretended to enter into ‘Abbas's views and remained
as his minister.^ But ‘Abbas was becoming more and more estranged
from him, and when several considerable deficiencies were discovered
in the accounts of the Ministry cf Commerce, the head of which he had
2been, Artin fled to Constantinople on 14 September 1850.
This was the gloomy situation in which ‘Abbas found himself.
Tie realized that France would never forgive his antagonistic 
policy, and supposed that French intrigues had been set on foot 
at Constantinople to replace him by another member of the family, 
presumably A^mad Bey, who would be more favourable to French in­
terests. Fe also supposed that Artin would proceed to Constantin­
ople where he would work with his enemies and the French for his
•T
downfall.^ To protect himself and his throne, ‘Abbas looked for 
an ally, and resolved to establish an entente with Britain.
On 19 September 1850, ‘Abbas sent for Walne, British Consul 
at Cairo, and talked to him about his fears. In return for friend­
ship with Britain, ‘Abbas hoped to have the support cf the British
121.
A^iion., The present crisis in Egypt, p. 18; Bayle, op.cit., p.73.
2The Tines, 4 Oct, 1850; Gilbert to Palmerston, TTo. 19 of 18 June 
1850; 7 Aug. & 21 Sept. 1850 in F.O. 78/840. The reception given
to Artin, when Abbas had sent him to Constantinople, offended the 
Viceroy fsee: Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., Nos. 40 and 43#
5 Juin, 20 Juillet 1850, M.A.S., C.P., tom 22.).
Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., Nos. 70 and 75, 18 Sept.,
22 Oct. 1850, M.A.E., C.P., tom 22. ‘Abbas knew that the French 
agent helped Artin to get out of Egypt and he blamed him for so 
doing.
government and consequently of Canning at Constantinople, to guard 
him against the insinuations of Artin, and to improve his re­
lations with the..Sultan.‘Abbas, as Walne described, entered im­
mediately into the question of the railway. He feared that he 
had caused offence when he declined to accept the proposal made 
by Sir John Pirie. Excluding financial and physical difficulties, 
‘Abbas attributed this to French opposition which was so great that 
he could not resist it. He authorized V/alne to communicate to 
Palmerston his conclusion that he was prepared to make a regular 
and efficient railway between Alexandria and Cairo. Two views 
guided him; he took into consideration the means of the treasury 
and the chances of profitable returns; moreover, he intended to 
conciliate the interests of the British with those of other nations 
and the actual necessities of Egyptian commerce. V/alne added 
that ‘Abbas was not going "to make railroads for his own accommodation, 
or because the Egyptian Treasury has any surplus funds to employ in 
such operations, but because our Government has expressed a wish to 
that effect”.^
The new evidence given in this confider.tial despatch has really 
reversed the traditional view, as Dr. Helen A. Rivlin has recently 
stated. She consequently argues that "it was ‘Abbas who offered 
the railway in return for British support rather than the other way 
round and that he did not ask for help to prevent the application
122.
^Valne to Murray (Private and Confidential letter), 20 Sept. 1850 
encl. in Murray to Palmerston, 9 Oct. 1850 in F.O. 78/841.
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of the Tangimat to Egypt but only that he be protected from the 
intrigues of his enemies’1.1 Despite this a controversial point 
still remains as to whether the initiative over the construction of 
the railway came from ‘Abbas or from Walne. The writer agrees with
Dr. Rivlin that the railway offer antedates the application of the
-  -  2 Tangimat as will be shown later, but in the light of new informa­
tion the first part of her hypothesis could be revised. It is not 
necessary to assume in this respect that most of the diplomats 
had often gone beyond the limits of their instructions. Murray 
had pressed the construction of this railway upon ‘Abbas even 
before Palmerston’s despatch of 21 December 1848, and much more 
since that date "as the greatest boon that he could confer upon 
commerce, and as an undertaking that could not fail ultimately
to be productive of the greatest credit, honour, and advantage
3to himself". Rivlin has overlooked the most essential document
which reveals the real circumstances of the original proposal.
It can be seen now that the circumstances in which ‘Abbas invited
Walne encouraged the latter to press the idea once more. Walne
himself wrote later on :
"His Highness having last Autumn been pleased to consult 
me as to some difficulties in which his Government was 
then involved, I availed myself of this favourable oppor­
tunity to suggest a project ^the railway/which I con­
sidered well calculated to improve the relations of the 
Vice-Roy with the HrttiBli Government, and which when carried 
into effect, would be not iess advantageous to the general
1"The Railway question in the Ottoman-Egyptian crisis of 1850-1852", 
MSJ, XV/4, 1961, footnote 69, p.385. The traditional view is 
represented in: El2, Vol. I, p.13; Charles-Roux, L’flgypte de
1801 a 1882, vol. VI, pp. 245-247; A. Sammarco, Des regnes de
(cont.)
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internal commerce of Egypt than to the overland 
communication with India. My views were at once 
adopted; and, as soon as political circumstances 
seemed to warrant, a preliminary survey was made 
by a distinguished Engineer then travelling in the 
country, whose report, made through me to the Pasha, 
proved in every respect favourable to the scheme 
proposed.
Later on in 1859, Colquhoun, the British Consul-General, wrote to
the Foreign Office, in connection with the abolition of the packet
agency in Cairo held for 22 years by Walne in consequence of the
completion of the railway, that "I have made enquiries of persons
well conversant with what passed here during the last fifteer.
years, and it is their opinion that Mr. Walne's personal influence
over the late Abbas Pasha contributed in a large degree to i iduce
Abbas Pasha to set on foot and successfully carry out, the Railway
2from Alexandria to Suez". Thus the railway was originated at 
Walne's suggestion and by his counsel.
‘Abbas wanted the British government to appoint and send him 
two engineers to carry out the project, but preferred to wait until 
he was sure rf the intentions of the British government. In October 
1850, Robert Stephenson, the railway engineer, went to Egypt but 
without any idea of investigating the project of the Isthmus railroad.
(cont.) Abbas, de Laid et d'Ismail (1848-1879), vol. TV, pp. 14-17 
in Precis de l'histoire d'&gypte.
See below^pp./itf-^V ; there are two still more recent works, and 
although they are based on archival material they overlook the 
fact that the applicationcf the Tangimtt was put forward after the 
construction of the railway had been offered; A .A . R .  Mustafa, 'Tome 
aspects of Egypt's foreign relations under Abbas I with special
reference to the Tanzlmftt dispute", The Annals of the Faculty of 
Arts. Ain Shams University, VIII, 19©", PP* o9-'/C; M. F. Shukri,
(cont.;
However Walne asked him to meet ‘Abbas, who wished to have a con­
ference with him on the railway from Alexandria to Cairo. ‘Abbas 
remarked to Stephenson that he proposed to build the railway in 
two sections, and to start with the first one from Alexandria 
to Cairo,to avoid unduly wounding French susceptibilities. Later 
the other section, from Cairo to Suez, would be constructed.^
This, however, was only a tentative consultation which did not 
amount to a definite confirmation.
As soon as Murray, on leave in England, received Walne's 
communication, he wrote to Palmerston on the subject. He also 
received a private letter from ‘Abbas written in Turkish, over 
his personal signature. It told of his desire to throw himself, 
as far as he could, oil English protection. Murray informed Pal­
merston that it was their best policy to support *Abbas; moreover,
a railway from Cairo to Alexandria would be more beneficial both
2to Indian communications and to Egypt. Palmerston instructed
(cont.) Migr wa’l-Sudan, pp. 29-38.
•z
^Murray to Palmerston, Ho. 14 of 15 June /No. 5l7in F.O. 424/7A.
^Walne to Johnson dated 3 Mar. 1351 encl. in Johnson to Melville, 
Secretary to the India House, dated 5 Mar. 1351 in I.O., F.R. vol. 15.
p
Colquhoun to Russell (Separate) 13 Nov. 1859 in F.O. 76/1468.
Walne had this to say when he became a sufferer of the railway: "it
is but due to myself to represent to Your Lordship thst it is mainly 
to my personal influence with Abbas Pasha, aid to my active interven­
tion in 1850, during the absence of Her Majesty's Agent and Consul 
General, that Her Majesty's Government and the public are indebted for 
the establishment of that line of Railwav from Alexandria to Cairo...” 
(Walne to Stanley, 14 June 1859 encl. (2; in Walne to Colquhoun, 11 
Nov. in F.O. 78/1468). (***+ \
Canning at Constantinople to dissuade the Porte from displeasing
‘Abbas and from appointing Sa‘id Pasha or any other person instead,
since *Abbas was "friendly to Great Britain and not inclined to
.become a tool for the promotion of ambitious and encroaching views
on tie part of France with respect to Egypt".1
Since his arrival at Constantinople, Artin had reported Abbas
t> be opposed to the Sultan's reforms, and as even inclined to hail
2with pleasure the accession of AbdUlaaie to his brother's throne.
Artin joined the Constantinople party which tried to influence the
3Porte against the Viceroy. On 31 October 1850, the Porte requested 
« - - 4Abbas to introduce the Tangimat into Egypt. The deterioration 
in Ottoman-Egyptian relations took place when Re§id was led to 
promulgate the high-sounding programme of reform to win the goodwill
5and support of the European Powers.'' Canning's policy at Constantinople
126.
(cont.)
P.P.. 1851 (605) XXI, pp.900-908
Tlurray to Palmerston, 9 Oct. 1850 in P.O. 78/841. ‘Abbas's relation 
with Murray was at its peal:. On the latter's return from London, ‘Abbas 
ordered his poet to compose a poem of praise congratulating him on h±5 
arrival.^The jjoet also praised Palmerston and the British nation.
(see: diwan Ali al-Darwish, al-Isha r bi-framid al-asha r, Cairo,
1867, pp. 154-1590 * _______________
^Palmerston to Canning (ho. 275 Confidential) 21 Oct. 105C in F.( .78/317.
^Canning to Palmerston, TTo. 309 of 19 Oct. 1350 /]Jo. 37/in F.C. 424/7A.
^Hekekyan Papers, Add. 37,452, fol. 14.
^Valne to Canning, 14 'lev. 1850 in F.C. 352/33; B.P. , Walne to Canning, 
(Confidential) 14 Nov. 185') Walne to Murray (Confidential) 17 Nov. 185r 
Murray to Palmerston, 3 Pec. 1850, with undated translation of ‘Abbas's 
reply to the Porte's letter of 24 Dhu’l £ijjah 1266/13 Oct. 185 .
Lewis, The emergence of modem Turkey, p. 113; cf. II. Temperley, (cont.)5
was to demand reform as the reward of his support and British friend­
ship. The policy of the two men combined in a proposed alliance be­
tween the Ottoman Empire and Britain in 1849; and the Gultan author­
ized Re$id to submit the question of reform to a council of ministers 
including Jeyh-tTL-Islfim.“ Thus motivated by hatred and revenge,
Rejid used the Tangimat as an instrument to humiliate Abbas. ' 
Palmerston supported *Abbas who was inclined to assume the role 
of subordinate of the Sultan and friendly towards Britain.^ V/hen 
the Tangimat became involved, Canning was instructed to continue
supporting ‘Abbas against the intrigues of his enemies at Constan- 
not
tinople but/to support him in resisting the application of the 
-  -  4Tangimat to Egypt. Palmerston could not with consistency urge 
the Porte to exempt Egypt from the Tangimat. Britain befriended
127.
(cont.) England and the Pear East, the Crimea. 2d ed., London,
1964, gp. 241-243.
. L. Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, IT, pp. 2C6-227; Canning 
to Palmerston (No. 363 most confidential) 26 Nov. 1849 in P.0.78/782.
2 -----On the Tangimat see: G. Baer, "Tanzimat in Egypt - the Penal Code”,
BCGAS. XaVI/i , 1963, pp. 29-49; Rejid's ultimate object was probably 
to get rid of the hereditary government vested in Muhammad ‘All's family 
and to have the revenues and patronage of Egypt immediately dependent 
upon the Porte. (Murray to Palmerston, Mo. 2 of 17 Peb. 1351 in F.C.
142/ 16).
■7
Palmerston to Canning, Ho. 290 of 13 Nov. 1850 in P.O. 73/816;
B.P., Palmerston to Canning (Private) 8 Dec. 1850.
^Palmerston to Murray, Ho. 1 of 20 Jan. B51 in P.O. 14l/l7; Murray to 
Palmerston (Private & Conf.) 6 Peb. 1851; Palmerston to Canning, No.
45 of 20 Peb. 1851; Palmerston to Murray, No. 1 of 20 Peb. 1851 
/So. 7/in P.O. 424/7A.
‘Abbas in his difficulties by good offices; but British officials 
in Whitehall, Cairo and Constantinople had different views as to 
the application of the Tangimat to Egypt. Murray went too far in 
his support of *Abbas against the Tangimat; he said he would persuade 
him to accept it so long as it was not extended to deprive h?ja of 
the rights granted to him by the ferman of 1841. He wanted Palmer­
ston to support ‘Abbas in maintaL .ing these rights, and told him that 
it was impossible for ‘Abbas or any other Viceroy to govern Egypt, 
with Sennar and the Sudan, with the limited powers entrusted to him 
by the Tangimat. Murray stressed that he was not cajoled or misled 
by. ‘Abbas’s flattering attentions but he was acting for the sahe 
of British interests. ‘Abbas, he said, sought British support and 
felt that his existence depended upon it.^  On the other hand, Sir 
Stratford Canning viewed the Eg}]±ian question in relation to the 
general political 3tate of the Ottoman Empire . It was impossible 
for Canning to renounce for ‘Abbas' 3 sake his long standing policy 
of reforming the empire. He aimed at avoiding any decided appearance 
of a separate understanding between ‘Abbas and the British government 
which would no doubt be a cause of jealousy at Constantinople. Re 
sought to remove ‘Abbas's mistrust <f Re§id, and to reconcile him to 
the gradual admission of the fultan’s general system of administration.
^Hurray tc Palmerston (Private & Conf.) 6 Fob. 1851; Murray tc 
Canning (Secret & Conf.) 14 Feb. 1851 encl. (l) in Murray to 
Palmerston, ho. 2 of 17 Feb. 1851 /no, 8?in F.C. 424/7 .
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^Canning to Palmerston, Vo, 54 of 20 Feb. 1851; No. 94 of 19 Mar.
1851 in F.O. 424/7A.
Canning had his own policy for Turkey and knew it to be the right 
one. Yet, Murray believed that both Canning and the Porte were 
misled by misrepresentation on the state of Egypt. He, therefore, 
decided to send Walne to Constantinople to give Canning the right 
information.* Between these two extremes, Palmerston successfully 
managed to maintain the principle of reform and to obtain a railway 
in Egypt.
It was therefore political factors altogether which led to 
the creation of the Egyptian railways and gave rise to their estab­
lishment. Meanwhile *Abbas kept these agreements such a profound 
secret that they had begun to be implemented before their contents 
were revealed. The French Consul-General in Egypt reported to his 
government the continuous meetings between the British representative
4 •§ 2and Abbas, but he was completely ignorant of what was discussed; 
and he remained uninformed of ‘Abbas’s decision until March 1851. But 
‘Abbas's fears of Ottoman hostilities and his great need of British 
support led him to impress on Walne that the French Consul-General 
urged him not to make the railway and to throw himself whole-heartedly 
upon the protection of France, the ancient faithful ally of Egypt.
129.
*Murray to Canning (Private) 29 March 1851 in F.O. 352/34 Pt. I.
2Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No.. 86, 30 Nov. 1850, M.A.E., C.P., 
tom. 22.
3 4 mmAbbas claimed that Le Moyne appeared to be acquainted with his in­
tentions of making a railway and reminded him that "France was the 
only country that had really the power and inclination to support 
him, that the fleet of England were widely dispersed, and her armies 
insignificant in point of number..." (B.P., Murray to Palmerston, 
(Private) 21 Nov. 1850). As no information on this interview exists 
in the French Archives, it would seem that this was a product of (cont.)
On seeing Le Moyne, the French Consul-General, on 12 March 1851*
‘Abbas informed him that he had decided to make a railway which, 
in accordance with instructions given to his predecessor, Le Moyne 
did not oppose. At his request ‘Abbas gave him an assurance that 
the management of the railway would not go out of the hands of 
the Egyptian government and that the transit of mails and goods 
would not be granted as an exclusive privilege to any power.^
This was not enough to allay Le Moyne’s suspicions, particularly 
as he foresaw the continuation of the line as far as Suez. He de­
cided to remain in unofficial opposition. He believed that Britain 
would reap the greatest benefits, as the railway would mainly improve 
the route to India. The Porte would also consider the stretch from 
Alexandria to the Red Sea dangerous. He wondered whether the partial 
independence granted to the Viceroy in 1841 included matters relating 
to the vital political and general interests of the Otcoman Empire
2and if, in that case, the Porte had the sole right to decide at first. 
Aupick, the French representative at Constantinople, thought the same 
and added ’’cette concession une fois obtenue, on provoquerait un 
rapprochement entre le Sultan et le Vice Roi et le chemin de fer
3serait le prix de 1 * intervention officieuse".
(cont.) ‘Abbas’s imagination.
1Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 116, 13 Mar. 1851* M.A.E.,
C.P.,tom 23.
2Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 131* 17 Apr. 1851* M.A.E.,
C.P.,tom 23.
■^ Aupick to Minister <f For. Affs., No. 155* 25 Feb.; No. 157, 15 Mar . 
1851* M.A.E., C.P. (Turquie), tom 305.
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French policy in Egypt was hesitant and the despatches of 
the French agent received no reply for several months. In 1851» 
‘Abbas sent a French engineer to Paris with instructions to offer 
carte blanche to the French government, promising that if they 
assisted him in obtaining modifications of the Tangimat, he would 
refuse permission for the railway. Louis Napoleon and his govern­
ment flatly refused because the railway would be useful to Egypt 
and the world.* ‘Abbas, on the other hand, informed Murray and 
showed him a confidential letter from the French representative 
at Constantinople offering him support and promises which he thought 
were not vague or unauthorized. ‘Abbas added:
2"I have now told you the two particulars in which I 
wish the support of the British Government, and in 
return for which friendly services I am ready to pro­
mote her interests by all means in my power. France 
is soliciting me - I am soliciting you - you may act 
as you think best, but do not afterwards blame me if 
you refuse me your support, that in self-defence I 
turn towards France."
Convinced of ‘Abbas's sincerity, Murray reported to Palmerston 
that Le Moyne, after having exerted in vain all his means to prevent
*N. W. Senior, Conversations and .journals in Egypt and Malta. I, 
pp. 28, 142, 164; see also Merruau. L'figypte contemporaine, pp. 100-101.
2 -  -  These were the introduction of the Tangimat and the summoning of
Muhammad ‘Ali Bey, a junior member of his family to Constantinople.i
•Z
Murray to Canning (Secret & Conf.) 14 Feb. 1851 encl. (l) in Murray 
to Palmerston, No. 2 of 17 Feb. 1851 /no. 8 _/in F.O. 424/7A.
the construction of the railway, told the first interpreter of 
‘Abbas that should this railway be undertaken, he should insist 
upon French engineers being employed either in its construction or 
maintenance. ‘Abbas knew that the newly appointed French minister 
at Constantinople, La Valette, and his first secretary, Benedetti, 
had both served in Egypt, and would do all in their power to injure 
him in the esteem of the Porte. So he asked Murray to inform Palmer­
ston that so long as he w>uld afford him his steady and friendly 
support, he would neither fear nor care what they could do.* Murray 
also took into consideration the attitude of ‘Abbas's family, who 
gathered at Alexandria and corresponded with Kfimil and others at 
Constantinople. They all had a leaning to France and dec 1 sired that
i •  pAbbas had sold Egypt to Britain in agreeing to make a railroad. 
Palmerston, therefore, wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris 
hoping that the French government would instruct her Consul-General 
in Egypt to abstain from throwing any further impediments in the way 
of the railway. Louis Napoleon agreed with the Ambassador that it 
was desirable on both sides "to check the tendency which distant 
agents sometimes showed to act upon feelings of traditional rivalry, 
and to imagine that because a measure was evidently advantageous to
132.
*Murray to Canning, No. 5 of 23 Mar. 1851 encl. (l) in Murray to 
Palmerston, No. 8 of 1 Apr. 1851 /no. 20/in F.O. 424/7A.
Murray to Canning, No. 6 of 27 Mar. 1851 encl. (2) /in no. 207in
F.O. 424/7A.
one of the two Powers, it must necessarily be injurious to the other." 
The Porte seemed to have known about the railway,since Mukhtar
2Bey, *ho was sent on a mission to Egypt concerning matters in dispute,
*7
was commissioned to dissuade ‘Abbas from making the railway. Mukhtar's 
language conveyed that ‘Abbas could not, with propriety, commence 
such a work without first obtaining the Porte's sanction, "a suggestion" 
as Murray comments, "which was in fact introducing the edge of the 
wedge which /was/intended to be driven home by the Tan$imat"f ‘Abbas 
replied that in no previous work of internal improvements had either 
Muhammad ‘Ali or Ibrahim asked the Porte's permission. Furthermore, 
if he made this railway, he did so without neglecting any other of 
his financial obligations; he deserved "not the reproof but the appro­
bation of the Sultan and His Majesty's European allies".
3. The Alexandrifr-Cairo Railway contract as a "fait accompli": 
Murray found himself fighting the battle of the railway ab­
solutely alone. He learned that the representatives of all other 
European Powers, had instructions, either secret or open, to oppose it.
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1
^Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby- No. 159 of 21 Apr. 1851; 
Normanby to Palmerston (No. 122 conf.) 28 Apr. 1851 /nos. 27 and 321 
in P.O. 424/7A.
2The Times. 20 May 1851; Hekekyan Papers, Add. 37,452, fols. 42, 54.
3La Valette to P.O., No. 3, 15 Mai 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom 305; Alison 
to Canning, 31 July 1851 encl. in Canning to Palmerston, No. 236 of 1 
Aug. 1851 /no. 747in 424/7A; also cf. P. Mourier, Des interSts
Europeens en Orient, pp. 41-46.
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 9 of 17 April 1851 /So. 3j7in P.O. 424/7A.
Fearful that ‘Abbas, being a man of no firm and energetic character, 
would hesitate ,to commence the undertaking, Murray insisted on his keeping 
the promise, and gave him assurances of British support.'*’ Seeing that
until its actual commencement he would be allowed no rest from remon-
m 2 8trances, ‘Abbas decided to send Nubar Bey, his first secretary and
interpreter, to London armed with full powers to make the necessary con­
tracts for the railway materials under Robert Stephenson’s advice.
Earlier, on 1 March 1851» Murray wrote, on behalf of ‘Abbas, to Stephenson
3 f -•»to consult him as to the preliminary steps to be taken. Thus, Abbas 
took official steps to put into practice his intentions of making a
4railway.
The controversy over the railway entered a new phase when the
»
Porte stepped in, claiming the right to authorize its construction.
Canning did not know that Mukhtar was instructed to talk to ‘Abbas 
about the railway. But at the beginning of May, he received information 
from Malta that orders had been sent from Constantinople to forbid its
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^Murray to Palmerston, 17 Apr. 1851 /no. 347 No. 10 of 2 May 1851 
/no. 367in F.O. 424/7A; Murray to Canning, No. 8 of 1 May 1851 in 
F.O. 142/16.
Later Nubar Pasha (1825-99) an Armenian Christian who ibs brought to 
Egypt by his uncle Baghug Bey, Muframmad ‘Ali’s foreign minister. He 
was promoted to high posts after his return from France in 1849» and 
later ran the railway under Sa‘Id. (For a full biography see:
J. Tagher, "Portrait psychologique de Nubar Pacha", cah.hist.eg.. I, 
nos. 5-6 (1949), pp. 353-72; A. Holynski, Nubar Pacha devant l’histoire, 
Paris, 1886.
3Murray to Stephenson, 1 March, 17 Apr. 1851; Stephenson to Murray,
24 March 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9, Pt. 2; P.& 0. Ann. Reports, I, p.9.
4The Times. 24 March 1851.
construction and that ‘Abbas had applied, under impression of
alarm, for the presence of a British steamer at Alexandria.
The Porte denied all knowledge of any such order;1 but Re§id
remarked to Canning that the Viceroy of Egypt was clearly not
at liberty to make a railway without permission from the Porte,
and the Porte alone was entitled to authorize the adoption of
this measure on the Viceroy's application. The Grand Vezir
added that his only wish was to have his sovereign respected
2and Egypt well governed. Re§id based his argument on the narrow 
interpretation of the clause of the ferman of 1841, granted to 
Muhammad ‘Ali, that "... thou, thy children, and they descendants 
... ye shall apply for orders on all matters of importance which
3concern those countries..."
Canning told Re§id that it was far from clear that *Abbas was 
at all bound to ask the Sultan's permission. The argument Canning 
used was that the payment of a fixed annual tribute to the Porte, 
coupled with the grant of an hereditary internal administration, 
seemed to leave...the Viceroy at liberty to improve the province, using
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*Canning to Palmerston (ifo. 151 Conf.) 5 May 1851 /no. 37/in 
F.O. 424/7A.
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 165 of 17 May 1851 /no. 38/in 
F.O. 424/7A.
Eurewitz, Diplomacy, I, pp. 122-123.3
its own resources to do so. He informed Re§id that the Porte, 
having raised the question of authority, would place itself in 
the awkward position of having either to counteract the very legi­
timate wishes of Britain, or to dissatisfy the Powers who opposed 
the railway.^ He drew Re§id's attention to two previous cases,
the Barrage and the Postal Convention, in which Muhammad ‘Ali did
2not apply for permission or ratification. Re§id insisted on per­
mission being sought, but he disclaimed any ground of objection 
to the railway which he promised to sanction, in defiance of any
opposition, not only from Alexandria to Cairo but to Suez provided
3the work were carried on with Egyptian money. The Porte’s in­
sistence, as Canning conceived, was because of its jealousy of the 
support and goodwill which ‘Abbas was likely to obtain by meeting 
the wishes and interests of Britain. So guidedty general interests 
in both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, Canning wrote to Palmerston 
that British influence would be put to hazard if their advocacy of 
‘Abbas’s interests were not kept within the limits of the ferman of 
investiture. Consequently he did not welcome Nubar’s mission to London 
of which he only knew through Re§id and Mukhtar.
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 165 of 17 May 1851 ^ no. 3§7^n F.O. 424/7A.
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 174 of 19 May 1851 /no. 3^7in P.O. 424/7A.
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 188 of 4 June 1851 / n o A jJ Canning to
Murray, No. 9 of 26 June 1851 encl. (2) in P.O. 424/7A;
Canning to Murray, No. 8 of 18 June 1851 in P.O. 14l/l8; B.P., Canning
to Palmerston (Private) 5 June 1851.
Furious at *Abbas, Re§id announced his intention to protest 
against his assumed right of independent decision, and intimated,
i
if the Porte were ’’pushed to the wall'1, to appeal to all the Powers 
signatory to the settlement of 1841. To prevent the immediate 
execution of this design, which would commit the Porte irrevocably, 
and increase ‘Abbas's irritation, Canning undertook to apply 
privately through Murray for a suspension, if necessary, of the 
intended plan, until the Sultan's demand could be brought under 
Palmerston's consideration.^- Canning objected to Re§id's proposal 
to write at the same time to ‘Abbas. Explaining the whole situation 
to Murray, Canning hoped thathB, Murray, would have nodifficulty 
in cooperating with him during the time required for referring 
to Palmerston and receiving his instructions. "His Majesty's 
/the Sultan/ consent might, I think," he wrote, " be given with 
the approval of the Foreign Office, in such manner as to guard the 
Viceroy's rights to a separate internal administration, and to
secure to him eventually the fruits of this politic reliance on
2the cordiality and support of Great Britain". However, Canning 
succeeded in obtaining the Sultan’s sanction for suspendhg the 
protest in order to liquidate the difficulties between the Viceroy
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 188 of 4 June 1851 ^o. 4.27in F.0.424/7A. 
Canning to Murray, No. 6 of 4 June 185l/encl. in no. 4%7in F.O. 424/7A.
and the Sultan without more disturbance. But from his constant dis­
cussions with Re§id on the subject, Canning became convinced that 
the concluding paragraph of the ferman afforded a sufficient justifi­
cation of the Porte’s demand. He was assured that when Muhammad ‘Ali 
visited Constantinople he had applied personally for the Sultan’s 
permission to construct the Barrage. Nevertheless, he suggested to 
Murray that ‘Abbas could frame his request so as to avoid the estab­
lishment of an embarrassing precedent.
French representatives at Constantinople were, to some extent, 
behind the Porte’s insistence. France, which had stood as champion 
of Egypt in 1841, stood as the champion of the Porte at the beginning 
of the 1850*s. Nubar’s mission to London offended the French re­
presentatives both in Constantinople and Cairo, who reported ‘Abbas’s 
purpose to solicit Palmerston’s help by constructing a railway from 
Cairo to Alexandria.^ As the Ottoman Cabinet seemed firmly resolved 
to oppose the railway concessi :n, La Valette reported that he would
neglect nothing to keep it in this frame of mind to prevent the diffi-
2culties which would inevitably arise from such a construction. Ad­
mitting that the creation of a railway between Cairo and Alexandria 
might be useful, Re§id declared that the railway could only be set
*La Valette to Minister of For. Affs.,No. 3, 15 May 1851, M.A.E., C.P. 
tom. 305? Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 132, 20 Apr. 1851, 
M.A.E., C.P., tom.23.
"La Valette, No. 5, 15 May 1851.
up with the authorization of the Sultan; it could neither be con­
ceded to a foreign company, nor financed by means of a foreign loan, 
Re§id informed La Valette of Canning’s attempts and intervention.
On Canning’s attitude, La Valette said that he had always given 
his support to the Porte so long as in Egypt one had remained deaf 
to the pleas of a British agent.^ He added that in 1841, it did 
not depend on Britain that the hereditary concession granted to 
Muframmad 4Ali was hedged with most rigorous restrictions. Now ‘Abbas 
undertook to build a railway and Canning immediately modified his 
conduct. Re§id assured Lur, the first dragoman of the French Em-
i
bassy, that the Sultan was in complete and entire agreement with 
the Ottoman Cabinet's resolution to oppose the railway. Re§id asked 
Lur "You seem reserved... could it be that you do not have the same 
interest that we take in this affair amd the same care that we bring 
to it?" According to La Valette's instructions, Lur assured Re§id 
that they shared his opinion and on the railway they never ceased and
would never cease to speak the same language in Alexandria as in Con-
2stantinople. La Valette thought it his duty not to let Re§id suppose 
that the French could today express an opinion contrary to that which 
they had always expressed.
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La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., No. 9» 4 Juin 1851, M.A.E., C.P.,tom. 
305.
1
2La Valette, No. 9, 4 Juin 1851.
While in London, Nubar met Palmerston to plead the cause of 
* Abbas. As to the other matters in dispute,*^ Palme is ton told Nubar 
that ‘Abbas ought to be careful to keep himself with the obligations 
of the ferman of 1841. As to the railway, Palmerston thought that 
‘Abbas had every right to make one if he chose without asking per­
mission of the Porte; but if the Porte deemed its permission nec­
essary it had only to send that permission. He also discovered from 
Musurus, the Turkish Ambassador in London, that there was something 
more than a feeling of etiquette on the part of the Porte; that 
Russian, Austrian and French intrigues were at work upon Ottoman 
jealousy to prevent the execution of the railway. He asked Murray, 
therefore, to encourage ‘Abbas to go on and wrote "we will back him
up with all our influence and means at Constantinople, and as right
2and good sense are on his side he need fear nothing". Palmerston’s 
support had already been won. Earlier, he wrote to Canning that if 
these intrigues were to succeed, and if ‘Abbas were to be replaced 
by a pro-French candidate, "the Porte would soon find that they had 
been doing the work of others, andlhat they had been led blindfold 
to establish a dangerous foreign influence in an important province
3of the Turkish Empire, instead of having therein a loyal vassal".
^These were the reduction of the army; the question of ‘Abbas’s family; 
forced labour and the Tangimat (Palmerston to Canning, No. 77 of 
9 July 1851 /no. 50/in F.O. 424/7A). On Nubar*s mission see: Hekekyan 
Papers, Add. 57,452, fol. 44; also Sammarco, op.cit.. p. ; _Charles- 
Roux (op.cit.. p. 246) says that itwas Nubar who convinced ‘Abbas to 
seek support in London; ‘Abbas to Palmerston, 15 Jumada II 1267/17 Apr. 
1851 in F.O. 78/877.
B.P., Palmerston to Murray (Private) 7 May 1851, Murray to Palmerston, 
(Private) 20 May 1851.
(cont.)
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Having been informed of the Porte*s demand, it seemed to Palmer­
ston that the Porte was setting up a pretension which was founded 
neither upon right nor upon precedent. He expressed his great sur­
prise to Musurus. Palmerston said that Egypt was differently circum­
stanced. The detailed administration was left to an hereditary Pasha 
according to the settlement of 1841» which.did not entitle the Sultan 
to require the Pasha to ask his prior sanction to undertaking works, 
either public or private, unless such works should have an important 
political bearing. He argued that the Porte had adopted a new position. 
There had been no interference when Muhammad ‘Ali had spent millions 
of pounds on establishing manufacturers and the Barrage. The Porte 
had turned a blind eye when Ibrahim began and *Abbas continued the 
building of the gigantic system of fortifications. Palmerston said 
that the Porte had not dared to interfere with Muframmad *Ali*s internal 
politics but it reserved its assertion of prerogative until a railway 
was proposed and "to which the only real objection is that it would 
be productive of convenience to the best and most ustful and most dis­
interested friend and ally of the Sultan**.^ Palmerston told Musurus 
that he could not see that "this was a matter in regard to which the 
Pasha was at all bound to ask permission. It was for the Porte and 
‘Abbas to settle the question of etiquette as they could . Palmerston
(cont.)
^Palmerston to Canning, No. 108 of 25 Apr. 1851 /no.30/in P.O. 424/7A.
^Palmerston to Canning, No. 176 of 9 July 1851 /no.477in P.O. 424/7A. 
Palmerston declared in the House of Commons Abbas*s right to make a rail­
way without permission. (Hansard, 3d. Ser. CXX, pp. 30-40); B.P.
Canning to Palmerston (Private)' 5 June 1851.
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Ialso repeated to Canning his views, adding that the railway would 
neither affect the position of European maritime Powers towards each 
other, nor the foreign relations of the Ottoman Snpire as would a ship 
canal through the Isthmus.^
In Cairo, Murray's views differed in some respects from those 
of his superior at Constantinople. Murray's only means of obeying 
Canning's instructions was to forward his despatch to the Foreign 
Office leaving Palmerston to make his own decision. This he resolved to 
do because no actual work on the railway had been commenced in Egypt, 
but plans were only being made by Nubar and Stephenson in London.
Murray told Palmerston that *Abbas was surprised and grieved to find 
that Sir Stratford Canning was not yet authorized to hold language 
more firm and explicit. Furthermore, in communicating Canning's 
instructions to ‘Abbas, Murray was counteracting and nullifying the
suggestion that he had been pressing upon ‘Abbas even before 21 December
21B48 'both privately and officially'. The French in Constantinople 
tried to bring about a coup to counteract the railway project, but
3Murray was able to thwart ±. However, if, after all these preliminary 
steps, the British government thought fit to refuse to support ‘Abbas's 
rights against the arbitrary pretensions of the Porte, Murray said that
■^Palmerston to Canning, No. 195 of 24 July 1851 /no. 5§7in F.O. 424/7A. 
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 14 of 15 June 1851 /no.5 lJ±n F.0.424/7A.
•z
Encl. (2), the Egyptian Commissioners to Abbas, in /no.5l7 F.O. 424/7A; 
Ends. (6), Edhem Pasha to Xbbas, 8 Shaban 1267/8 June 1851, and (7), 
^dhem to Abbas 9 Shaban 1267/9 June 1851, in Canning to Palmerston,
No. 224 of 10 July 1851 /no.66/ in F.O. 424/7A; Canning to Murray,
No. 13 of 7 July 1851 in F.O. 14l/l8.
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his position in Egypt would be a most painful one as he should thus 
become the unwilling instrument of fulfilling the prophecy made to 
the Viceroy by the French agent On the other hand * Abbas seemed 
determined not to allow the Porte to diminish or cripple his authority. 
To concede this precedent would open the way for interference with 
future internal improvements. ‘Abbas declared that if one official 
letter written by either of his predecessors codld be shown, applying 
for the imperial permission to make any internal improvement, he was 
prepared to write a similar letter immediately. Whatever it might 
be, ‘Abbas told Murray that "I have pledged my word to make the
2railroad, and I will keep my promise if it costs me my Pashalic.”
Murray pointed out to Canning that it was Palmerston who was in a 
position to delay the commencement of the railway by personal communi­
cation with Nubar, the Egyptian agent on the spot. Yet Murray told 
Canning that he believed his government would not accede to the Porte*s 
pretension for several reasons. This sanction had never before been 
required or obtained for any internal work since theferman of 1841.
The government had always instructed him to continuing pressure with 
•
^Murray wrote that the French Consul-General gave ‘Abbas ”a warning 
(almost in the tone of a threat), against making the railroad, and 
prophesied to him that England would for her own interests drag 
him into this difficulty with the Porte and with the old allies of 
his family, and then would leave him unsupported to get out of it as he 
could”.
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Murray to Palmerston, No. 15 of 27 June 1851 /no.52/in F.O. 424/7A.
regard to the subject of the railway with the Viceroy of Egypt,
without reference whatever to the Porte. Lastly, Nubar had informed
‘Abbeus from London that Palmerston considered such opposition to the
railway unjust and out of place.^
More decisive action followed. After the preliminary arrangements
between Nubar and Stephenson in London, the latter sent Borthwick to
Egypt to conclude, on his behalf, an engineering contract for the
2Alexandria-Cairo railway. To present everyone with a fait accompli.
regardless of Canning’s instructions and without receiving Palmerston’s
orders, Murray advised ‘Abbas to sign the contract at once. Then,
‘Abbas oould reconcile the Sultan to the matter by writing a most
deferential letter, to accounce the commencement of the work, hoping
3it would receive the Sultan’s protection. Consequently, on 12
July 1851, Stephan Bey, acting on behalf of ‘Abbas, signed and executed 
... /
the contract with Borthwick. ’’The Rubicon being now passed",
Murray recapitulated to Canning the circumstances and the motives 
that guided his conduct. He did not want to make the Viceroy "a 
laughing-stock and a by-word in England"; and he had executed Pal­
merston’s instructions to press the railway project upon ‘Abbas to 
... . . 5the best of his ability. As he wrote to Palmerston, had he adopted
1Encl.(l), Murray to Canning No. 11 of 22 June 1851 /in no. 52/in 
P.O. 424/7A.
2Stephenson to Murray, 20 June 1851 in P.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
3Murray to Canning, No. 17 of 23 July 1851 and Murray to Palmerston,
No. 19 of 17 July 1851 in P.0.142/16. »
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 18 of 16 July 1851 /no. 6l/in P.O. 424/7A; 
for a copy of the contract see encl. (3) in Murray to Canning. No. 19 
of 25 July 1851 in P.O. 195/348; The Times. 29 July, 1851; Le 
Constitutionnel. 18 Oct. 1851. (cont.)
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a contrary course, the result would not have improved ‘Abbas's 
relations with the Sultan. Nubar, acting under instructions received 
long ago, had signed contracts in London for the delivery of 1C,000 
to 12,000 tons of rail. If later ‘Abbas had declined to sign the 
contract with the agent of Stephenson in Egypt, the latter would 
have withdrawn from the transaction offended and disgusted.. There 
would have remained the complete absurdity of railroad material 
purchased, but no engineering department to organise the work. This 
would have given the Porte exactly the right opportunity for finding 
fault with ‘Abbas.^
4. ‘Abbas versus the Sultan: the 1st’idhan dispute and the
dissension between Canning and Murray:
However, the railway was not to be continued to Suez. Murray 
did not advocate it, because it would be of ise only to Britain, and 
it would not pay Egypt 2°/o interest. To facilitate Canning's 
mediatorial exertions, Murray persuaded ‘Abbas to write a respectful letter 
to the Porte. But ‘Abbas's letter was far from being conciliatory. True, he 
ftdlcwBd >fufciammad ‘All's exHiplfi in saying that the railway, when finished, would
(cont.)
^Murray to Canning, No. 17 of 23 July 1851 in F.O. 142/l6> Murray to 
Palmerston (No. 20 Conf.), 2 Aug. 1851 /no. 8l/in F.O. 424/7A. Murray 
wrote Mwhef her right or wrong, prudent or imprudent, the Viceroy 
had gone so far in respect to the Rail-Road that he had no choice but 
to complete the contracts..." (Murray to Canning (Private) 19 July 1851
• in F.O. 352/34 Pt. i).
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Murray to Palmerston (No. 20 Conf.) 2 Aug. 1851 /no. 8l7in F.O. 424/7A.
be named after the Sultan, as had been the Barrage and the Mafrmudiyya 
Canal, But he deemed himself bound to obtain previous authorization 
only if he were to construct a railway between Cairo and Suez, because 
it would yield no advantages for the internal good of the province 
and would have a great political bearing.^
The question of authority became a crucial issue not only 
because of the conflict between the Porte and ‘Abbas, but also because 
of the discrepancy of opinions between Canning and Murray, ‘Abbas 
adopted Murray's advice but at the latter's own responsibility. Murray 
did not steer his course according to Canning's instructions, although 
he knew that Canning would be greatly disappointed. He did not deny 
the Porte's right to »new a privilege but believed ‘Abbas was entitled 
to use the power exercised by his predecessors, until a formal announce­
ment of the Porte's intention to curtail it (by enforcing the disused
P _clause of the ferman) was made to him. Palmerston saw in ‘Abbas's 
action no breath of the Sultan's authority. Pearful of Ottoman hter- 
ference, Palmerston however instructed the Admiralty to send some 
ships of Admiral Parker's squadron to visit Alexandria, to give en­
couragement and moral support to ‘Abbas. This was an indication of the
interest which the British government took in the affair of the railway,
__ •»
and of a friendly feeling towards ‘Abbas. Palmerston's decision,
^ ‘Abbas to the Grand Vezir, encl. (l) in Murray to Canning, No. 19 of 
25 July 1851 in P.O. ©5/348.
^Murray to Canning, No. 17 of 23 July 1851 in P.O. 142/16.
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Palmerston to the Admiralty, 4 Aug. 1851 encl. in Palmerston to Murray, 
No. 14 of 4 Aug. 1851 in P.O. 141/17; Palmerston to Canning, No. 204 
of 4 Aug. 1851 /no. 63/in P.O. 424/7A.
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when it became known in Egypt, brought some re lief to Hurray, 
and much more to ‘Abbas, whose cause was becoming desperate. He 
was constantly being told by those who were violently anti-British 
that Britainwould not scruple to sacrifice him.^ Now the question 
is: what was Prance*s reaction to the contract? Would the Porte 
and Canning ooncede victory to ‘Abbas and Murray?
a) The French reaction:
The clamour did not subside as soon as Murray expected. The 
French reaction to the railway contract was inconsistent. In Paris, 
Louis Napoleon gave Britain assurances of friendship and cordiality 
because he did not suppose the British meant to monopolize trans­
port. He admitted that some other Powers, particularly Austria, 
were incessantly urging France not tote blind to what was going on
under her eyes, and content to let Britain get complete possession
2of Egypt. Meanwhile in Constantinople and Cairo the opposition 
of French representatives was strong. This opposition was mainly 
due to the composition of the French legation in Constantinople.
At its head, La Valette always claimed that his former residence in 
Egypt enabled him to know the precise merits of the railway question; 
that it would only benefit Britain. He looked upon the railway as a
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 24 of 18 Aug. 1851 and No. 22 of 6 Aug.
1851 /nos. 88 and 8^2 in F.O. 424/7A.
The Marquis of Normanby to Palmerston (Secret and Conf.) 11 Aug.
1851 and Palmerston to Normanby, No. 579 of 14 Aug. 1851 /nos. 72 and 
727 in F.O. 424/7A.
2
step that nothing could justify, and gave his reasons. First 
of all, ‘Abbas had no right to make it without the authorization 
of the Sultan. Secondly, the railway would be unprofitable for the 
inhabitants and the transport of produce. Thirdly, the cejital 
invested in the railway would produce no benefit and it was doubtful 
whether the receipts would be sufficient to cover the costs of 
working. Finally, the railway would become the source of anxieties 
and complications which it was very prudent to prevent.^* Thus, 
he claimed that his opposition was merely of a moral character.
Four days after having discussed with ‘Abbas the disadvantages 
of building a railway, Le Moyne learned of the contract from M. 
D'/mstacy, the Swedish Consul-General in Egypt. The news heightened 
his opposition. He prophesied that the Cairo-Suez railway would 
follow that of Alexandria and added "en un mot Influence de l'Angle- 
terre est tout puissante en ce moment en Egypte et menace de ce
•z
changer en protectorat." In French eyes, ‘Abbas's decision of 12 
July condemned him as a rebellious vassal, who had acted without 
authorization from his suzerain. He had openly thrown himself into 
Britain's hands; and he had alienated himself from the other four 
Great Powers. This was a fine opportunity, which France should not let
*La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., No. 14, 23 June 1851, M.A.E.,
C.P., tom 306.
2Canning to Palmerston, No. 239 of 4 Aug. 1851 /no. 76/ in F.O. 424/7A.
3Le Moyne to La Valette, No. 40, 13 July*1851 encl. in Le Moyne to 
Minister of For. Affs., No. 154, 18 July 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 23; 
also Le Moyne to La Valette, No. 38, 2 July 1851 encl. in Le Moyne 
to Minister of For. Affs., No. 52, 3 July,* tom. 23.
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escape, to urge a decree of dethronement against ‘Abbas.^ It remained, 
therefore, for French representatives strongly to defend the Sultan*s 
authority and the treaty obligations of 1841 which ‘Abbas had violated. 
Le Moyne considered the railway as neither more nor less than "la 
Question d*Orient". He repeated to ‘Abbas*s interpreter that the 
Barrage and the canals in Egypt were made by permission of the Sultan. 
He believed that Britain’s main objective was to undermine the Porte’s 
position in Egypt. He alleged that Britain would reverse her policy 
and prevent the application of the Tangimat to Egypt. The only course 
left for France was to cooperate with the other Great Powers in order 
to expose Britain’s real policy towards Egypt. As a result, Britain
would abandon both ‘Abbas and Murray rather than jeopardise her larger
2interests in the Ottoman Empire. Stephen Bey, Egypt’s Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, gave some assurances to Le Moyne about the railway. 
The railway, he said, had no political bearing so long as it was not 
extended to Suez. In addition, ‘Abbas had no intention of alienating 
the other Great Powers, especially France, with whom he would always
3remain on good terms. But this did nothing to stop the stubborn 
opposition of the French representative. Huber, the Austrian Consul- 
General in Egrpt, was in general agreement with Le Moyne about the
^Le Moyne to Min. of For. Affs., No. 154 18 July 1851 and Le Moyne to 
La Valette, No. 41, 14 July 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 23; Delaporte 
to Min. of For. Affs., No. 96, 6 Aug. 1851, M.A.E., C.C. (Le Caire), 
tom. 29.
*Wbar to ‘Abbas’s Private Secretary, 19 July 1851 encl. in Murray 
to Canning (No. 22 Conf.) 8 Aug. 1851 in F.O. 195/365.
An extract from Le Moyne to La Valette, 30 July encl. in Le Moyne to 
Minister of For. Affs., No. 158, 31 July, M.A.E., C.P., tom 23.
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question of authority.^
The Quai d’Orsay had considered La Vallette's language so far
excellent in every respect,
"Vous avez parfaitement raison de penser," wrote the 
French Foreign Minister, "que le gouvt. de la Re- 
publique ni peut ni ne veut changer la politique 
jusqu*a present suivie en ce qui conceme le projet 
du chemin de fer a construire du Kaire a Suez et 
vous saurez comme vous le dites tres bien, appuyer 
au besoin la resistance de la Porte sans vous sub- 
stituer a elle dans la lutte ou elle est engage 
avec 1tAmbassade britannique, ce qui aurait 11 in­
convenient d'interesser 1*amour proper de Sir Strat­
ford Canning et peut fitre mfime de son gouvt, a un 
resultat auquel ils tiennent deja si fortement pour 
d'autres motifs,"2
La Valette emphasized that he maintained this line of policy and 
his efforts always tended to prevent a collision between the parties. 
However, he did report the feelings which he discovered in some 
members of the Ottoman Cabinet whose expectation had, perhaps, 
been disappointed by his counsel of moderation. La Valette analysed 
the situation thus: Re§id had the sympathies neither of Russia nor
of Austria; the principles amd ideas of which he was the representa­
tive in Turkey obliged him to give all his confidence to the British 
Ambassador and to the French legation. But Britain had taken, by 
the attitude of her agents in Egypt, a position which could not fail 
to arouse the deepest mistrust in the Porte. The ministers at Con-
^Le Moyne to La Valette, 21 July 1851 encl. in Le Moyne to Minister 
of For. Affs., No. 156, 22 July 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom 25.
^Minister of For. Affs. to La Valette, No. 18, 27 June 1851, M.A.E.,
C.P. (Turquie) tom. 506. Despatches from the Quai d*0rsaiy are ex­
tremely difficult to decipher.
stantinople thought that Prance, on the contrary, should be, if 
not disinterested, at least disposed to share in the irritation which 
‘Abbas had aroused. They had been not a little surprised at the 
language La Valette had adopted. La Valette claimed that he had 
succeeded in forestalling violent measures for the ruin of ‘Abbas, 
an object which the Ottomans relied on Prance's moral cooperation 
to achieve. The principal members of the Divan had perhaps under­
stood the necessity of conciliating Britain.^ He knew that the 
Ottoman ministers thought that, as soon as the Porte showed less 
hostility to the railway, Britain w>uld be less favourable to ‘Abbas, 
and he would not be surprised to leam that Sir Stratford Canning 
himself had pointed this out.
rfoen the news of the contract arrived, La Valette found Re§id 
surprised and irritated. La Valette reported the failure of Canning's 
good offices to find a peacef ul and satisfactory solution for the 
railway question. He was told by Canning that Palmerston's resolutions 
on this subject seemed to him irrevocable. However, La Valette under­
stood that the conciliatory language which he had held in Constantin­
ople did not flatter any interest, any passion, and one must welcome 
any proposition which would permit the Divan to get the better of 
‘Abbas's resistance to the Tangimat, even at the price of an eventual 
concession concerning the railway. He saw that Rejid's deference 
to Canning, and the weakness and blindness of ‘Abbas, had led to
151.
^La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., No. 24, 15 July 1851, 
M.A.E., C.P., tom.506.
the strange situation in which both were placed. ‘Abbas, La Valette 
said, was paying the price for an assistance for which he henceforth 
had no guarantee. Meanwhile Turkey was struggling with two alter­
natives: either to give consent by silence with regard to ‘Abbas's
action which the French considered as an act of rebellion; or to 
intervene and find herself confronted with England. "Now the silence 
will be an admission of inability and the Sultan appears resolved 
to never submit to an humiliation." Having e xposed the anxieties 
of the Ottoman Cabinet, La Valette admitted he was unable to understand 
the spirit of his government's instructions. Fearing to see the 
Porte resort to an imprudent act, he reminded the Sultan's ministers 
of the project which they had take n the initiative to make an appeal 
to the Great Powers, and suggested the idea of substituting a canal 
for the railway.* La Valette had no authority to talk about the 
Suez Canal suggestion.
Meanwhile, the Quai d'Orsay's line of policy was being dispatched 
to La Valette. It seemed to the French Foreign Minister,Baroche, 
from the information he was able to piece together, that the interests 
of Russia and Austria coincided with those of France in opposing 
the British project. Yet France was not assured of assistance in a 
struggle to wreck the railway project. He assumed that the Continental 
Powers might perhaps take pleasure in seeing Britain and France struggling
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*La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., 4 Aug. 1851 and also La Valette, 
No. 24, 15 July 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom.306.
against one another on the Egyptian Question; and hoping to prolong 
this misunderstanding, they would not hurry to intervene. He 
pointed out a more cautious line. He instructed La Valette to 
oppose the railway, not openly, but from behind the scenes. La 
Valette was left to judge by the dispositions in which he would find 
his colleagues. He was instructed not to lag behind if they were 
disposed to act in order to sustain the resistance of the Porte.
In case of need he should arouse their zeal but not to place him­
self too far ahead of them.1
La Valette asserted that he had always counselled prudence and 
moderation. He had constantly in mind all the inconveniences which
would result for the French from a hostility which ascribed to them re-
2sponsibility for the resolutions taken by the Divan. La Valette 
was in constant touch with Reg id who informed him of the latest 
developments in the railway question and in Palmerston's attitude.
When Regid asked his opinion, La Vedette was greatly embarrassed 
and replied that he had foreseen this great difficulty for a long 
time; that he had urged him three months ago to take hold of the 
Egyptian Question before it openly became an English question.
Moreover, he always told him that the French government desired, 
in the interest of Turkey, a peaceful solution and he viewed with
^Minister of For. Affs. to La Valette, No. 21, 28 July 1851, M.A.E., C.P., 
tom. 506.
2La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., 24 Aug. 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom 506. 
Both La Valette and his Foreign Minister deplored the astonishment 
produced at Constantinople by the position takenV France . This 
astonishment, according to La Valette, was explained by the character 
of the Grand Vezir, the antecedents of the questinn and the rOle
(cont.)
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sorrow that they were further away than ever to understand one another.^ 
On the other hand, he told Canning it was unpleasant that ‘Abbas*s 
precipitancy placed the Porte in a difficult position. He also
2reminded Canning of his friendly attitude which still continued.
La Valette did not conceal his opposition to the railway from Canning,
but pointed out to him that anything approaching to intimidation
3was remote from his thoughts.
Nevertheless, La Valette aimed more particularly at procuring 
a reference to the Five Powers in his conversation with Canning.^
To what extent vas this effective? Russia abstained from all inter­
ference in this question. Neither La Valette nor his government were
5igiorant of Russia*s attitude. La Valette himself remarked that 
the conduct of M. de Titoff, the Russian envoy at Constantinople, 
had been full of precaution and reservation. La Valette asked Re§id 
if it was true that Titoff had conveyed to him Russia’s assurances 
of an absolute and effective support. Re§id replied that Titoff had 
informed him officially that the Porte had, in the Tsar*s opinion, 
right on its side in the struggle with ‘Abbas, but Titoff was left
(cont.) played by France in 1840. (See: Minister of For. Affs., 
to La Valette, No. 22, 7 Aug. 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom 306.)
^La Valette to Minister<f For. Affs., 24 Aug. 1851.
2La Valette, No. 39, 24 Aug. 1851.
■X
Canning to Palmerston, No. 239 of 4 Aug. 1851 /no. 76/in F.O. 424/7A. 
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 278 of 17 Sept. 1851 /no. lO^in F.O. 424/7A.
5La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., No. 37, 14 Aug. 1851, also Minister 
of For. Affs. to La Valette, No. 21, 28 July 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom.306.
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discretion to act according to circumstances.1 The British Ambassador
in Russia learned that France had attempted to induce the Russian
government to oppose the railway. However, Nesselrode, the Russian
Foreign Minister, had nothing against ‘Abbas, and all he knew was
that Palmerston had offered considerable support to ‘Abbas. British
policy was well explained by the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg.
Palmerston, he said, afforded ‘Abbas some support in the railway
question because he considered that ‘Abbas had the right to undertake
such a public work. Yet Palmerston had no wish that ‘Abbas should
glide into independence, or, in defiance of the Porte, arrogate to
himself such a right of sovereignty as the independent exercise of
2capital punishment, the Qigag. The Russians, however, had no fear
that the differences between the Porte and ‘Abbas would lead to any 
3 -serious results. Ali Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, informed 
Canning that Russia had addressed a despatch teher Consul-General in 
Egypt hoping that ‘Abbas would acknowledge his error and pay due obe­
dience to his lawful sovereign. But Canning discovered that Titoff's 
account of the despatch was somewhat less unilateral than the Ottoman des­
cription. Titoff gave no indication of siding with ‘Abbas either.
Indeed, Canning found Titoff totally ignorant of the signing of the
^La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., No. 39* 24 Aug. 1851.
2See below, p. 176.
^Buchananto Palmerston (No. 37 Conf.) 19 Aug. 1851 /no. 827in 
F.O. 424/7A; Cte. Asten Sackinsy to Comte Orloff TP&rticuliere)
14/25 Pec. 1851 in F.O. 352/34 Pt. II.
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railway contract.1 Nesselrode assured the British Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg that the Russian government had had no part in the 
railway affair. On the other hand the Porte haul made no overtures 
to Russia. The language which was \sed to the representatives of 
other Powers was also used to the Russian envoys "That were Abbas 
Pasha to refuse compliance with the contents of the Firman of in­
vestiture, and establish the railway without applying for permission 
and obtaining the Sultan's sanction, they would then submit the case 
to the European Powers to decide whether the pretentions of the 
Porte were well-grounded.**
Prussia had committed herself to a different view. When Stephen­
son first surveyed the ground for the railway in 1850, the Prussian 
Consul-General informed *Abbas that wood for sleepers was to be 
obtained more cheaply and of a better quality in Prussia than else­
where. *Abbas consented on condition that the price and the quality 
of all materials should be first approved by Stephenson. The Prussian 
Consul-General sent official communications home, and advertisements
i
appeared in many of the Prussian newspapers asking for tenders for 
the supply of timber. Stephenson advised the use of iron sleepers 
because they were much cheaper than wood; but recommended that if 
wood were required, it should be imported at a lower price from Norway,
banning to Palmerston, No. 261 of 25 Aug. 1851 /no. 3 l ] No. 278 
of 17 Sept. 1851 /no. lO^in F.O. 424/7A; Seymour to Palmerston,
No. 49 of 20 Oct. 1851 /no. 1227in F.O. 424/7A.
2Symour to Palmerston, No. 56 of 21 Oct. 1851 encl. in No. 520 dated
4 Nov. 1851 in F.O.145/419.
Ends. Q) and (2) in Canning to Palmerston, No. 359 of 26 Nov. 1851 
/no. 154/ in P.O. 424/7A.
Sweden or Trieste.^" No contract, therefore, was given to Prussia.
This decision might have offended the Prussian Consul-General,
although he told Le Moyne, when this engagement was still ii force,
that he had informed ‘Abbas that this railway was prejudicial to
2the financial and political interests of Egypt. Prussia’s 
opposition would have been effective if this question had lasted 
longer, and had been brought before the Powers.
b) The Porte’s reaction:
In Constantinople, there was an outcry against the signing
of the contract. An acute crisis of right and dignity had developed,
the result of which could not reconcile the differences between 1Abbas
and the Sultan. Furthermore, the action taken in Cairo put Canning
in a very embarrassing situation, and completely paralysed his means
of serving ‘Abbas. ‘ Abbas brought himself into immediate conflict
with the Sultan. He announced the conclusion of the contract to
the Grand Vezir without any such attempt to obtain the Sultan’s
permission as had been expected of him in order to comply with the
terms of the ferman.
"Considering the state of the Sultan’s feelings 
towards Abbas Pasha on other questions, and the 
opposition made to the project of a railway in Egypt,
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Murray to Palmerston (Ho. 20 conf.) 2 Aug. 1851 /no. 8l/in 
P.O. 424/7A? Hekekyan Papers, V, Add. 37,452, fol. 55.
2Le Moyne to La Valette, No. 40 of 13 July 1851, encl. in No. 158, 
M.A.E., C.P., tom. 23.
by Prance openly, by another Great Powers secretly,”
Canning wrote ”1 thought there was room for con­
gratulation in the prospect thus offered of obtaining 
our end with so slight a sacrifice on the Viceroy’s 
part, and none at all on ours, but on the contrary, 
with decided advantage toour general policy in this 
part of the world.
Canning understood that the Porte wDuld revert to its former in­
tention of protestation, and would reserve the adoption of any 
stronger measure till later. He had no doubt that the French
Ambassador would encourage the Porte not only to protest but to
2appeal to the Five Powers.
Though put immediately in possession of Murray's explanations
and of Palmerston's arguments in so far as they supported ‘Abbas's
view, Re§id firmly informed Canning that neither he nor the Sultan
could condone the insulting manner in which ‘Abbas had acted. The
railway itself was not in question. He maintained that Muhammad ‘All
had asked leave for the Barrage; and that no other work of great
public importance had been constructed in Egypt sinoe 1841 except
the fortifications, which had been commenced some time before.
Re§id declared his intention to summon ‘Abbas to revoke the contract,
and to abstain from renewing it until the Sultan * s permission should
3be officially granted. In such circumstances, Canning wrote to
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 236 of 1 Aug. 1851 /no. F.O. 424/7A.
2Alison to Canning, 31 July 1851 encl. in Canning to Palmerston,
No. 236 of 1 Aug. 1851 /no. 747in F.0.424/7A.
Canning to Palmerston, No. 237 of 4 Aug. 1851 /no. 7^7with encl.
Alison to Canning, 3 Aug. 1851 in F.O. 424/7A.
Palmerston, MI hope, though I cannot yet engage my word, that the
Porte will be reasonable enough to afford him /"* Abbas/ a decent
bridge for passing Mr. Murray's Rubicon**.1
When Edhem and Hayreddin, the Egyptian Commissioners, waited
upnn the Grand Vezir with ‘Abbas's letter and instructions, Regid
informed them that the Porte was by no means prepared to accept
their master's announcement that he lad concluded the railway con-
2tract without permission. They informed Regid that the first 
materials for the railway had been imported as far back as Muhammad 
‘All's time; so to all appearances a precedent had already been 
established because of no opposition having been made at that timei
to those preliminary measures. But Regid confirmed that the only
means of bringing the railway question to a satisfactory conclusion
was by addressing an ist’idhan in the full form of the ferman to
the Porte giving full explanations respecting the funds which were
3to be applied to the undertaking. The Egyptian Commissioners saw 
the dilemma in its true light, and were ready to concur with Canning 
ii advising ‘Abbas to adopt the course best calculated to spare him 
the perils of an open collision with the Porte.
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 240 of 5 Aug. 1851 /no. I j J ln  F.O. 424/7A.
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 248 of 19 Aug. 1851 /no. 9^7in F.O. 424/7A; 
The Times, 18 Aug. and 19 Sept. 1851; Le Constitutionnel, 20 Sept. 
and 18 Oct. 1851.
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Canning saw that whether collision or foreign intervention 
were to result from ‘Abbas’s continued resistance, much eventual 
hazard would ensue, not only to the parties themselves, but most 
probably to European interests also. Canning dismissed any sinister 
interpretation of the Porte’s demand. The repeated assurances, 
given to him by Reg id in the Sultan’s name, left no room for any 
doubt. As ‘Abbas had already admitted the principle of asking per­
mission for a railway between Cairo and Suez,^ the same principle 
might be applied to the railway from Cairo to Alexandria. He 
added "the times of Mehemet Ali no longer exist, and the issue of 
a conflict between Egypt and Turkey would now be more likely to turn
on the moral, than® the military or naval relations of the respect-
2ive parties". A majority of the Ottoman State Council, when called 
to deliberate upon the question at issue, expressed their opinion 
that ‘Abbas- had violated the conditions of the ferman, and ought to
be deposed. But owing to the full exertion of Canning’s influence,
the tone of the Porte’s declarationi«bls moderated, and the execution 
of its final intentions postponed. Canning persuaded the Porte to desist
^Nevertheless, Canning criticized the clause characterizing the Cairo-Suez 
railway as unprofitable and having a political bearing. He said that 
this clause stood in striking contrast with the terms in which Pal­
merston had described the railway to Musurus in London, (see above, 
p. ) Moreover, it might be quoted in opposition to British in­
terests when wishing to obtain the oompletion of the railway to Suez.
(Canning to Palmerston, No. 242 of 5 Aug. 1851 /no. 727 ^  P.O. 424/7A.)
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from its intention of requiring that the contract should be 
cancelled, and to be content with insisting on permission being 
requested previous to the comnencement of the work. Consequently 
the policy of sending a Vezirial letter written in moderate terms 
in reply to ‘Abbas*s letter was adopted by the Council.^ Canning 
told Murray that the subsequent conduct of the Porte towards ‘Abbas 
would depend upon his decision in this respect. He added Hmy belief
iis, that if he resists the Sultan s demand it will be difficult,
2if not impossible, to prevent his immediate deposition**. But if 
‘Abbas were to write a new letter in proper form, Canning promised 
to use whatever influence he still had at the Porte to bring about 
an amicable agreement on the question cf the Tangimat. Thus Canning 
afforded ‘Abbas an opportunity of reconciling his position towards 
the Porte. On the other hand, British influence in Constantinople 
would have considerably diminished, had not Canning successfully 
intervened. He explained to Palmerston the real situation. Re§id 
deplored the manner in which the long-standing policy of Britain 
towards the Ottoman Empire lad been apparently eacrified without 
necessity to a partial interest and to the pretensinns of a provincial 
governor. Although Canning's counter-argument to these assumptions 
had little effect upon Regid's mind, he continued his argument to
^Canning to Murray, Noe. 19 and 23 of 16 and 23 Aug. 1851# ends.
(l) and (5) /in no. 9^7 i*1 ^.0. 424/7A; Canning to Palmerston,
No. 260 of 25 Aug. and No. 237 of 4 Aug. 1851 /nos. 96 and 75/in 
P.O. 424/7A.
o
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Canning to Murray, No. 19 of 16 Aug. 1851 encl. (l)/in no. 927
in P.O. 424/7A.
reconcile these adverse views.^
On 5 September 1851, Hayreddin Pasha embarked for Alexandria 
with the Vezirial letter to ‘Abbas, and the conferences for the 
adaptation of the Tangimat to Egypt were suspended. ‘Abbas was 
blamed for his precipitancy in authorizing the signature of the 
contract without applying for ihe Sultan’s permission. He was 
reminded of the admonitions which previously had been conveyed 
to him, and of the obligations distinctly imposed by the ferman 
of investiture. He was made more fully aware of the conditions which 
the Sultan attached to the construction of the proposed railway;
and he was peremptorily called upon not to commence the execution
of that enterprise without the sanction of the Supreme government.
It was plainly stated that the Sultan's permission would not be
granted unless the Viceroy showed that the revenues of Egypt, 
after paying the appointed tribute and defraying the expenditure of 
all the administrative departments, left a surplus sufficient to 
provide for the cost of -the railway. Neither would the Imperial 
permission be accorded except under the condition that ‘Abbas should
not employ forced labour, nor seek a loan, nor give over any part
2of the undertaking to a company. In a statement accompanying the 
letter, Regid gave Canning a pledge ensuring the construction of the 
railway if the stated conditions be complied with.
■^Canning to Palmerston, No. 255 of 24 Aug. 1851 /no. 95/in P.O. 424 /7A.
23ncls. (l) Regid to ‘Abbas, 6 Dhu’l-Qa‘da 1267/2 Sept. 1851, (2) State- 
ment accompanying the Grant Vezir's letter, (3 ) Canning to Murray No. 24 
of 3 Sept. 1851, (4) Canning to Regid 4 Sept. 1851, in Canning to 
Palmerston, No. 263 of 4 Sept. 1851 /no. 102/in P.O. 424 /7A; Le Moyne 
to Minister of For. Affs., No. 170, 7 Oct. 1851, M.A.S. C.P., 
tom 23; La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., No. 41, (cont.)
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The conditions required by the Porte had acquired a certain
extension not indicated in the earlier communications on the subject.
To Canning, they seemed however to come under the same principle,
namely, the prevention of foreign entanglements, and -tile protection
of Egypt from additional or unnecessary burdens. Canning informed
Palmerston that it was for ‘Abbas now to withdraw from the position
which he had assumed without sufficient attention to the consequences.
No real difficulty appeared to impede the fulfilment <f the Porte's
conditions. Canning learned from Abbas's commissioners that *Abbas's
original motive for entering into a contract without permission was
to secure British support in favour of his views about the Tangimat.
Through Edhem Pasha's official acquaintance, Canning believed that
‘Abbas's own plan for carryfag out the building of the railway was
altogether independent of those projects to which the Porte objected,
that is foreign loans or companies formed no part of this plan.1
He trusted that Palmerston's concurrence in the question of permission
would allow ‘Abbas sufficient latitude. Canning admitted that there
were ample grounds for Palmerston's surprise at the difficulty of
2introducing railways into any part of the Ottoman Empire, and ob­
served that "Turkey is still immeasurably behind the smallest States
(cont.) 4 Sept. 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 306.
^Enel* (l^ Regid to Canning, 1 Sept. 1851 in Canning to Palmerston
(Private and Conf.), 7 Sept. 1851 /no. 1027in P.O. 424/7A; see
also Canning, No. 263 of 4 Sept. 1851.
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of Christendom in point even of common roads, and that the 
Sultan and his Ministers have nevertheless engaged from the beginning 
to sanction the Egyptian Railway when placed an a proper footing.”1 
He repeated that in addition to the question of authority there was 
that of influence. The Porte had reduced the influence of Prance 
by means of ‘Abbas, and was unwilling to have another foreign in­
fluence, especially of a consular description, established by the
2same means in its place. Re§id promoted British influence as much 
as he could with regard to Russia and his own power, but at the same
time looked upon the same influence in Egypt as hostile to the inter-
3ests of the Sublime Porte.
5. ‘Abbas’s Submission and the Sultan’s Ferman:
Would Murray persuade ‘Abbas to comply with the Sultan’s re­
quisition? Since the signature of the contract, Murray had not re­
conciled himself to Canning’s attitude. Canning’s language vexed 
and alarmed *Abbas, who expected the British Ambassador to support
4his rights. Murray criticized Canning’s conduct, saying that he had 
entirely accepted Regid’s views, which were instigated by Artin.
Not only had Canning openly declared these to the Egyptian Commissioners
1Canning to Palmerston, No. 277 of 17 Sept. 1851 /no. 10§7in P.O. 424/7A.
^Canning, No. 277 of 17 Sept. 1851.
3Hekekyan Papers, Add. 37,452, fols. 45, 56.
^Lockwood to Richards (Conf.) 11 Aug. 1851 in P.O. 14l/l9 Pt. I;
Murray to Palmerston, No. 24 of 18 Aug. 1851 /no. 88/in P.O. 424/7A
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at Constantinople, but he also wrote to him (Murray) admitting that 
his opinion differed from Palmerston*s.1 He wondered what he should 
say if ‘Abbas were to ask him: "Sir, what am I to think of you
English? You tell me one thing as being the sentiments of Lord Palmer­
ston and of Her Majesty’s government, and the Ambassador communicates
to my Commissioners and myself, through you, sentiments exactly
2opposite - which am I to believe." Murray was completely satisfied 
with Palmerston* s language to Musurus, Amid the feeling of triumph, 
he reminded Palmerston of the necessity of making an early arrangement 
with the Egyptian government for the conveyance of Indian passengers, 
goods and mails by the railway. He entertained little doubt that 
the Porte, finding itself "compelled with good grace to concede its
constructinn", would next be desirous of insisting on the right to
3regulate its internal arrangements. But Palmerston had changed his 
mind and decided to back Canning when he learned of the bad impression
made at the Porte by ‘Abbas’s step. He observed to Murray that it
would be wiser for ‘Abbas to yield to the wishes of the Sultan, and
to apply for the permission which had been promised beforehand. Pal­
merston resolved to do so because the Porte had made no objection to 
the construction of the railway, and onlystood out upon a point of
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 25 of 4 Sept. 1851 /no. 100/in P.O. 424/7A. 
^Murray, No. 25 of 4 Sept. 1851.
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form and etiquette. Moreover, a comparison of dates showed that 
Muhammad ‘All had asked permission for the Barrage before the work 
was actually begun.^ ‘Abbas had already, in his letter to the Porte, 
felt himself bound to ask permission for a railway from Cairo to
Suez; and the admission made by ‘Abbas in regard to the one,
2might in all reason apply to the other.
Palmerston thought that although the British government had
every desire and intention to give ‘Abbas all fair and proper support,
yet the extent of that support must find its limit in the difference
which existed between the relation in which the British government
stood in regard to ‘Abbas, and in the relatinn in which the Sultan
stood towards him. The Sultan was unquestionably the sovereign of
‘Abbas, and the interference of a foreign government between a sovereign
and his subjects could not go beyond certain limits. He summed up
his view to Murray as follows:
"The question at issue was thus brought down to one 
in which no direct interest of Great Britain was 
concerned, and which simply regarded a point of eti­
quette between the Sultan and his vassal, and an inter­
pretation of a vague phrase in the Firman of investi­
ture.
Upon such a question the position of the British Government 
was necessarily very different from that in which that 
Government would have stood if the discussion had turned
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^Palmerston to Murray No. 16 of 18 Aug. 1851 and No. 17 of 23 Aug. 
1851 in F.O. 14-1/17; see also Le Constitutionnel. 19 Oct. 1851.
2Faimerston to Murray, No. 20 of 19 Sept, 1851 in F.O. 14l/l7.
upon the questions of railway or no railway, and 
Her Majesty’s Government could not hold out to the 
Pasha any expectation of physical aid and if he were 
to be involved in a rupture with the Sultan upon 
such a question as this on which the^difference be­
tween him and the Sultan now turns."
Murray immediately passed on Palmerston’s opinion to ‘Abbas, 
and succeeded in obtaining ‘Abbas's promise to request the Sultan's 
permission. Murray felt it was not his duty to argue with Palmer­
ston any more than it was that of ‘Abbas to argue with his sovereign. 
Nevertheless, he tried to prove to Palmerston that the verbal per­
mission asked by Muhammad *Ali was a recent product of Re§id's 
imagination. He disapproved of the conditions contained in the 
Vezirial letter which were not only foreign to previous usage and to 
the ferman, but were also directly contrary to the opinions which 
Palmerston had expressed on the obligations of the respective parties. 
‘Abbas’s great difficulty was going to lie in satisfying the Porte 
that Egypt was solvent enough for him to build the railway, yet not 
disclosing each and every item of expenditure for his internal ad­
ministration. In order to prove a surplus he would have to present 
some form of detailed accounting. With the existing system of taxation 
and the great extension of produce and commerce, ‘Abbas would be able 
to meet the expenses of the railroad without either borrowing money 
or increasing taxation. But suppose, Murray argued, that ‘Abbas re­
quired some additional supplies; had the Porte any right to prevent
^Palmerston to Murray, No. 21 of 27 Sept. 1851 /no. 1057in P.O. 424/7A.
him from re-imposing for two or three years that portion of the 
established taxation which he had remitted in 1850? Or were they 
entitled to forbid him to follow the practice uniformly adopted
the Porte's demand because it had not previously discussed the 
right of the Egyptian government to employ forced labour on all
Vezirial letter. He was ready in pursuance of Palmerston's 
advice to ask permission; but such conditions as those were not 
contained in the ferman of hereditary government. He adds "is it 
not as clear as the sun, that the meaning of this peremptory tone 
is to prevent the construction of the railroad, and to meddle and 
to interfere in the revenues and internal affairs of Egypt?” It 
was not his intention to borrow money from abroad, or to turn over 
the enterprise to a foreign company. But should there not be suffi­
cient money, and should the people, who, he claimed, were in arrears 
to the amount of 300,000 or 400,000 purses, be made to pay up a 
certain portion on account, it could not be said that this was the
to borrow certain sums from the merchants at Alexandria, 
which he repaid when the state of the market enabled him to sell 
government produce to the best advantage.
labour is fully discussed in Ch. V.
by Muhammad ‘All whenever he incurred any extra expenditure?^
2Again in the matter of compulsory labour, Murray disapproved of
7
public works; yet labour was paid under *Abbas.
‘Abbas wrote to Palmerston on the points stipulated in the
•*
Murray to Palmerston, No. 27 of 15 Sept. 1851 /no. 1107and No. 28 
of 18 Sept., enclosing Muhammad ‘Ali’s letter to the Porte 25 Rabi* 
1263 /no. Ill/in P.O. 424/7A.
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imposition of a new tax or an augmentation of the actual taxes; 
the people would, in short, have paid a part of their debt. So 
the conditions imposed by the Porte were to render him unable to 
construct the railway.^" Thus, ‘Abbas would only ask for permission 
and if the Porte would not be satisfied with the conditions accepted 
by him, ‘Abbas would apply to Palmerston to know what course to 
pursue.
Murray was still distrustful of the Porte*s intentions and
accused it of considering the railway as a private amusement, and
not a work for public benefit. He urged upon Palmerston that no
time was to be lost because Stephenson and his engineering staff
were expected by the next Calcutta Steamer; and they had already
received an instalment amounting to £16,000.
"Their employment in the construction of the Egyptian 
Railway" he wrote, "has been at least known to if not 
sanctioned by, Her Majesty*s Government; the honour 
of England is therefore to a certain extent implicated 
in the carrying out this undertaking.
It results, therefore, that unless some very strong 
representations are addressed to the Sublime Porte 
on this subject, a serious dilemma must ere long 
arise. Either England must submit to the humiliation 
of seeing her first civil engineer and his staff re­
maining for an indefinite period idle at Alexandria, 
unable to commence a work for which they have received 
part payment, or else if they commence the work, 
according to their contract, the Viceroy will thereby 
incur the risks and penalties attaching to an act of 
overt disobedience to the Sultan*s orders.
^ ‘Abbas to Palmerston, 21 Sept. 1851 encl. (l) Murray to Palmerston,
No. 29 of 19 Sept. 1851 /no. 112/in P.O. 424/7A; Nubar to Palmerston, 
3 Oct. 1851 C n°- 1327in ?*0. 424/7A.
Tlurray to Palmerston, No. 28 of 18 Sept. /no. 11^ in P.O. 424/7A.
Murray used the same arguments with Canning. *Abbas seemed quite 
determined not to accept those clauses of the letter which would 
be made the ground for fresh disputes and difficulties. If there­
fore the Porte transgressing the limits of the ferman, insisted 
upon these clauses as necessary conditions of granting permission 
to construct the railway, it might assuredly be considered by the 
British government "as a subterfuge adapted to obstruct its con­
struction without openly forbidding it".^ He hoped that Canning 
could induce the Porte to accept a letter asking permission accord­
ing to the purport of the ferman. Meanwhile, he had used all his 
ability to persuade ‘Abbas to give a conciliatory tone to the letter 
about to be written; and also to avoid any overt or public commence­
ment of the railway until a reasonable time had been allowed for 
the receipt of the reply from Constantinople. However, by the end 
of Sept. 1851# ‘Abbas wrote his letter in the most unambiguous 
terms, agreeably to the concluding clause of the ferman. So the 
letter, as Murray thought, could not fail to prove to the representa­
tives of the European Powers that ‘Abbas had done all that could be
demanded of him according to the terms of the ferman or the usage
2of his predecessors. If further obstacles were thrown In the way of
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^Murray to Canning, No. 27 of 23 Sept. 1851 in P.O. 195/365.
Murray to Canning, No. 29 of 30 Sept. 1851 in P.O. 142/16; Le Moyne 
to Minister of For. Affs., No. 170, 7 Oct. 1851# M.A.E.* C.P., tom. 
23; The Times, 18 Oct._1851. Hayreddin left Egypt for Constantin­
ople on 2 Oct. with_‘Abbas's letter of permission- An undated French 
translation of Abbas's letter is enclosed in Murray to Palmerston, 
No. 30 of 5 Ocf. 1851 /no. 117/in P.O. 424/7A.
the railway, it would be a breach of the promise made to Canning
by Re§id, and ‘Abbas would then be compelled to go on with the
work in order not to forfeit the contract made with Stephenson.^
Palmerston did not accept MuiTay’s arguments. ‘Abbas could
have no difficulty in giving the assurances required by the Porte,
because they appeared to be in strict conformity with his intentions.
Moreover, it could not be supposed that the Porte could have meant
to require ‘Abbas to produce his accounts in corroboration of these
assurances. The costs of the fortifications and the Nile Barrage
had been paid for out of the surplus revenue of Egypt; and this
fact was^sufficient proof that the expense (f the formation of this
2railway could be defrayed from the same sources. Canning, on the
other hand, observed with anxiety that ‘Abbas took exception at
3 i -the Porte’s stipulated conditions. If Abbas’s pretensions were 
justified, it would lead to serious consequences. Consequently, Can­
ning met Re§id and informed him that the Porte’s conditions had in some 
respects made an unpleasant impression at Cairo. Re§id confirmed 
that the Porte had no intention of looking into the details of ‘Abbas's 
financial administration, but all he required on that point was an
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 30 of 5 Oct. 1851.
2Palmerston to Murray, No. 23 of 11 Oct. 1851 in P.O. 14l/l7;
Palmerston to Murray, No. 22 od 29 Sept. 1851 /no. 1067 in 424/7A.
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Canning to Palmerston, No. 296 of 5 Oct. 1851 /no. 116/in P.O. 424/7A.
explicit assurance of ‘Abbas*s ability to provide for the expenses 
of the railway out of the ordinary revenue of Egypt. He did not 
object to *Abbas*s obtaining supplies in advance from the merchants, 
according to the practice prevailing both in Constantinople and 
in Egypt; the Porte*s objection was limited to taking up money 
on loan. In the same manner Re§id did not exclude the compulsory 
employment of the peasantry on works of public utility. He only 
required that their labour should not be entirely gratuitous.* 
Accordingly the Ottoman Council accepted ‘Abbas*s reply to the
2Grand Council’s letter and the ferman of permission was prepared. 
Finally, in Dhu’l-gijja 1267/Oct. 1851, the Sultan granted ‘Abbas 
a ferman authorizing the immediate construction of the railway 
under the following conditions
1. That the inhabitants of the places along the line 
must not be obliged to work free of charge on this 
work but must be paid a moderate wage and given 
the bread they need;
2. That new taxes should not be imposed to build
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 300 of 10 Oct. /no.1247and No. 301 
of 15 Oct. 1851 /no. 12^7in F.O. 424/7A.
2Canning to Palmerston, No. 304 of 15 Oct. /no. 106/and No. 312 of 
17 Oct. 1851 /no. 127/in F.O. 424/7A; Palmerston to Murray, No. 26 
of 8 Nov. 1851 /no. 134/in F.O. 424/7A; Le Constitutionnel. 10 
Nov. 1851. It comments that if this news were true, Britain wmld 
have got her double object, preventing a rupture between Turkey and 
Sgyptf and obtaining the railway; La Valette to Minister of For. 
Affs. No. 47, 14 Oct. and No. 50, 24 Oct., M.A.E ., C.P., tom. 307.
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this line, nor the existing one increased;
3. That only the surplus remaining after payment
of the tribute due to the Porte and other in­
ternal expenses, should be devoted to this 
construction;
4. That the setting up of a foreign firm to build
this line should not be allowed, and lastly;
5. No foreign loan should be raised to meet this
1expense.
Canning, thus, found little difficulty in reconciling Rejid
to the very few passages in ‘Abbas*s letter which were at all
2calculated to give umbrage. This conflict, having been terminated
in the manner which Canning liked and defended, he wrote to Murray,
*’it must be no less satisfactory to you than to 
any who may have partaken your apprehensions, to 
find the Porte has accepted the Viceroy's simple 
declaration of his intention to construct the rail­
way out of the ordinary revenue of Egypt, instead 
of requiring a financial exposition <f the means by 
which that intention is to be carried into effect.
It can hardly be denied that the Sultan and his Mini­
sters have thereby proved the sincerity of their 
earliest assurances expressed to you from the beginning 
by me.’,;>
■^Canning to Palmerston, No. 319 of 29 Oct. 1851 /no. 1357in P.O.
424/7A; ends, (l)jj’rench translation of the ferman, (2) the 
Grand Vezir to *Abbas 3 Mu^arram 1268/27 Oct • 1851, (3) another 
letter of the sane date, in Canning to Palmerston, No. 324 of 
4 Nov. 1851 /no. 140/in P.O. 424/7A; H. Nahoum, Recueil de Firman3 
imperiaux Ottomans, adresses aux Valis et aux Khedives d'Egypte, 
pp. 255-6; The Times, 18 Nov. 1851; La Valette to Minister of For. 
Affs., No. 52, 30 Nov. 1851, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 307.
2Canning to Murray, No. 29 of 29 Oct. and No. 30 of 29 Oct. 1851, both 
ends. (4/ and (5 ) in Canning to Palmerston, No. 324 of 4 Nov. 1851 
/no. 140/in P.O. 424/7A. Canning believed that two matters contributed 
powerfully to the removal of any unpleasant impression at the
(oont.)
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And to Palmerston, he comments,
"from first to last it was not a question 
of railway or no railway, but of a railway to be 
regularly, or of one to be surreptitiously obtained.
On the one side was a transaction securing much 
benefit to British commerce without prejudice to 
British policy or to British character; on the 
other an act which might have frustrated the 
accomplishment of its own object, at the same 
time that it compromised not only our influence 
throughout Turkey, but the Sultan’s expressly reserved  ^
right, and even the security of the Viceroy's position."
Having received no ferman within a month after the departure
of Hayreddin for Constantinople, Murray became worried about the
possble delay of permission. He asserted that the blame for the
new complication which might arise if ‘Abbas was obliged to commence
the work before the arrival of permission would fall upon the Porte 
^ 2
and not on Abbas. Stephenson's staff of engineers did arrive 
in Egypt on 5 October; and they remained doing nothing but awaiting 
the Sultan's sanction.^ But the arrival of the ferman on 4 November
(cont.) P o r t e t h e  passage of the Sultan's troops through 
Egypt and ‘Abbas's mediation to settle a long-standing claim of 
the Sharif of Mecca. These troops, sent to strengthen control 
over Arabia, were afforded every facility by ‘Abbas. £20,000 of pay due 
to them, which the Porte had been unable to disburse, were paid to 
them in cash. 2,500 camels were also employed to convey their luggage 
and ammunitions to Suez. (Murray to Palmerston, No. 29 of Sept. 1851 
in P.O. 78/876.) ‘Abbas's role in settling the Sharif's claim is 
far from clear.
Canning to Murray, No. 29 of 29 Oct. 1851 encl. (4) /in no. 1407 
in P.O. 424/7A. ____________
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 325 of 4 Nov. 1851 /no. 14j/in P.O. 424/7A.
^Murray to Canning, No. 34 of 2 Nov. 1851 in P.O. 195/365] Murray to 
Palmerston, No. 35 of 3 Nov. and No. 37 of 4 Nov. 1851 /nos. 136 and 
137/in P.O. 424/7A.
The Times, 18 Oct. and 1 Nov. 1851; Murray to Canning, No. 34 of,(cont.)
pleased everyone, and *Abbas gave orders for the immediate commence­
ment of the work.1 Thus there was no further necessity for the 
presence of the British war-ships, which had arrived at Alexandria
on 15 September to give ‘Abbas moral support in case the commencement
2of the railway should be impeded by any interference from without.
6. Conclusion:
So long as Muhammad *Ali and Ibrahim lived, the Porte, under 
a wholesome dread of their stem and warlike character, completely 
refrained from interfering in the internal administration of Egypt. 
The tribute was paid, and the ferman cf investiture was laid upon 
the shelf, the Divans never troubling themselves with the examination 
or construction of its stipulations. No sooner had *Abbas become 
Viceroy, them the Porte, believing him to be weak in character and 
inexperienced in government, made its plans and began to put them
3in operation.
(cont.) 2 Nov. 1851 in P.O. 195/365.
Murray to Palmerston, No. 38 of 7 Nov. 1851 /no. 13§7in P.O. 424/7A; 
The Times, 18 Nov. 1851.
^Murray to Capt. Russell, 4 Nov. 1851 in P.O. 142/l7j Murray to 
Canning, No. 34 of 2 Nov. 1851. The ostensible purport of the 
visit of these ships was to bring an engineer charged to examine 
Cleopatra's Needle which had been given by Mufcammad ‘Ali to the 
British nation; see the comment of the French papers on this visit! 
Le Constitutionnel, 18 Oct._1851. An editorial article on the 
situation in Egypt and ‘Abbas's policy, 7 Nov. 1851.
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■^ Murray to Palmerston, No. 40 of 26 Nov. 1851 /no. 15l/in P.O. 424/7A.
The vexed question of the railway had just been settled.
Canning trusted that this most desirable reconciliation was a
good augury for the arrangement of the remaining question of
the Tangimat.^  In November 1851 the negotiations were resumed.
‘Abbas still needed British support to persuade the Sultan not
to deprive him of the power of inflicting capital punishment - the 
- 2Qigag - a power without which it was impossible to quell in­
subordination, or to rule Egypt advantageously. In exchange for 
the railway he expected a very effective return through British 
good offices at Constantinople. This had become his real hope.
Prance would never forgive him for makingthe railway in opposition 
to her repeated remonstrances. The representatives of the other 
Great Powers were all angry with him for the predominance of British
•X —
influence in Egypt, but so long as Murray remained in Egypt, ‘Abbas's
rights were strongly defended. Murray hoped that Canning wcxild
succeed in persuading the Sultan to be content with the tribute
and the acknowledged vassalage of Egypt, and to leave its internal
4administration in the hands of its hereditary governor.
^Canning to Palmerston, No. 312 of 17 Oct. 1851 /no. 127/in P.O. 424/7A.
2See Baer, "Tanzimat", BSOAS. XXVl/l, 1963, pp. 32-38.
^Murray to Granville, 16 Jan. 1852 in P.O. 142/18; Murray to Granville, 
16 Jan. and 19 Jan. 1852 in P.O. 78/916.
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^Murray to Palmerston, No. 38 of 7 Nov. 1851 /no. 138/in P.O. 424/7A.
Until the Qigag question was settled in mid-July 1852^ the 
railway was occasionally put forward as a pretext to resist the 
application of the Tangimat. ‘Abbas claimed that as soon as the 
Egyptians, the Beduins and the adjacent tribes heard that this 
power had been taken from him, they would begin to be disobedient.
It would be impossible then either to make the levy in time or collect 
the full amount due. Consequently, not only would difficulties ensue 
in raising the funds sufficient for constructing the railway, but 
owing to the feebleness of the executive power it would be im­
practicable to collect from the different provinces the number of
2men requisite to continue the work. The construction of the railway 
being exposed to these serious difficulties and delays, its completion 
could be made almost impossible. Murray was unable to foretell with 
any certainty if the enforcement of the Tangimat would defer or prevent 
the completion of the railway. However he was certain that the tran­
quility of Egypt could not be ensured, and this could affect the
3Anglo-Indian Mails passing through the country. However, the con­
struction of the line was carried on uninterruptedly.
Canning to Malmesbury, 12 March 1852 in F.O. 78/891; Canning to 
Malmesbury, 4, 5# 6 and 12 May and de Redcliffe of 19 May and 17 June 
in P.O. 78/892; Rose to Guilbert, 6 July 1852 in P.O. 78/893; the 
ferman containing the details of the settlement is enclosed in Rose 
to Malmesbury, 25 Aug. 1852 in F.O. 78/895.
A
‘Abbas to Murray, 23 Rabi‘ Awwal 1268/16 Jan. 1852 encl. in Murray
to Granville, 16 Jan. 1852 in P.O. 195/365.
3Murray to Malmesbury, 22 March 1852 in F.O. 142/18 ; the memorial of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Bombay to Granville, 1 April 1852 in F.O. 78/918;
Rose to Malmesbury, 14 April and (Conf.) of 21 Apr. 1852 in F.O. 78/916.
At the same time Murray was assisting the agent of the East India
(oont•)
VDid the achievement of the Alexandria-Cairo railway satisfy
British interests? In a motion made in the House of Commons by
the Managing Director of the P. & 0. Company (who was M.P. for Orkney
and Shetland), there was criticism of the insubordination among
British diplomats and tie way they had acted in the dispute between
*Abbas and the Porte. He informed the House that * Abbas felt this
keenly and was indignant at the manner in which British diplomacy had
advised him to subject himself to the Porte by asking permission.
The result would be seriously detrimental, as ‘Abbas would repudiate
any intention of continuing the railway to Suez. The railway for
which permission had been asked and obtained was not, after all,
the railway which they required for communications with India.
Because of this unfortunate circumstance, the greater part of the
overland route was indefinitely postponed, instead of commencing
the railway at Suez at the same time as at Alexandria.^ The building
of the railway was of the greatest service to the P. & 0., and they
did everything they could, giving moral amd material encouragement
of the Pasha of Egypt to forward the project. This included loans
2and finamcial backing to am extent of about £100,000. Thus, the
(conf.) Company to make a contract with ‘Abbas for the caurrying 
of Anglo-Indiam Mails through Egypt. (i.O. P.R., vol, 15; State 
Papers, vol. 57» pp. 778-780).
^Hansaird, 3rd Ser. ,CXX, pp. 33-34; Anon., The Egyptian Railway. 
or. the interest of England in Egypt, pp. 37- 41.
B. Cable, op.cit., p. 153; P. & 0. Ann. Reports, I (13th Ann. Rep. 
of 6 Dec. 1853) f p. 12 and (27th ha&f-yeau?ly Rep. of 12 June 1854;,
p. 6.
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Company's activities did not end with Pirie's mission. At 
the beginning of the conflict with the Porte with regard to the 
railway, Hayreddin Pasha, the Director of the Egyptian Transit, 
wrote to Pirie on 18 Feb. 1851, requesting him to communicate 
with Palmerston on the question. The Directors of the company 
lost no time in doing so; and they informed ‘Abbas that they would 
at all times feel pleasure in being made the channel of communication 
between him and the British government, either with reference to the 
railway, or in any other way in which he might be interested.1 
The Directors welcomed the commencement of the Alexandria-Cairo 
railway; and they agreed to submit to a reduction of £20,000 per 
annum of the Mail money, payable under the new contract, on the 
completion of the railway throughout from Alexandria to Suez.
Nevertheless, Britain emerged triumphant from the long drawn 
out controversy of railway versus canal, a controversy which indeed 
involved two distinct lines of policy. After the settlement of the 
railway question Canning requested Murray to assist in establishing
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The Company's Secretary wrote to Hayreddin that in a conversation 
between one of the Company's Managing Directors and Palmerston, the 
latter intimated that "the British government would support the 
interests of Egypt to the utmost of its power, and that H.H. the 
Viceroy would not carry out a measure which would be so certain to 
command the hearty cooperation and even the protection, if required, of 
Gt. Britain than the speedy establishment of a railway between Alex­
andria, Cairo, and Suez, affording as it would to this country such
incalculable advantages, both politically and commercially." (B.P.,
P. & 0. to Hayreddin, 24 March 1851, encl. in Canning to Palmerston, 
(Private) 31 May 1851; Palmerston to Canning, 9 July 1851). Palmerston 
said that he did not exactly authorize Wilcox to send such a message.
^P. & 0. Ann. Rep.. I (25 half-yearly Rep., 28 May 1853), p.7.
more friendly relations between ‘Abbas and the French Consulate 
than those which had existed for some time past. Itwas extremely 
difficult for Murray, even with the best intentions, to succeed 
in his task as a peace-maker. La Valette continued writing from 
Constantinople, attacking the railway project, the British and 
‘Abbas. As long as he remained there, he would not fail to do 
everything in his power to embroil ‘Abbas more and more with the 
Porte.^ Murray also still had his apprehensions that the Porte 
encouraged intrigues to weaken the resources of ‘Abbas, to make 
it impossible for him to govern, and to raise Sa‘id to the Vice­
royalty. This result would be agreeable to Prance, who would in
2all probability be disposed to support it as a fait accompli.
Britain had instituted the railway against the will of the 
French representatives. Le Moyne foretold that ‘Abbas would not
delay granting Britain a concession for the other railway between
3Cairo and Suez. Having been rebuffed in counteracting British 
influence, Le Moyne sought to replace ‘Abbas by Sa‘id, French-
4educated and therefore more susceptible to French influence.
^Canning to Murray, 12 Nov. 1851 encl. in Murray to Palmerston, 19 Nov. 
1851 in P.O. 78/876.
2Murray to Malmesbury, No. 22 of 20 May 1852 in F.O. 78/916.
^Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 224, 8 Sept.1851, M.A.E.,
C.P., tom. 23.
F. Charles-Roux, op.cit.. pp. 247-248.
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Prom the beginning, La Valette was anxious to tighten the bonds 
of vassalage and did allhe could to obstruct ‘Abbas in making the 
railway. He had welcomed the Porte’s letter of September 1851 
and announced that the Porte followed the line which he had always 
indicated to it. His action was guided by his conviction that the 
construction of a railway in Egypt at the solicitation and in the 
interest of Britain would become the souroe of serious embarrassments. 
So, in the interest of Turkey and inthe view of the diverse influences 
disturbing the Orient, Prance could not regard passively such 
concession. He asserted that Prance could only intervene by means 
of counsel. La Valette added that he had often told the Ottoman 
Ministers and Sir Stratford Canning that Prance interpreted the 
Hatt-i Serif of 1841 in favour of the sovereign rights of the Sultan. 
The day the Porte and ‘Abbas agreed on the railway concession, Prance 
would no longer deplore an act which was a great fault, and both 
would not delay to regret it.^ When ‘Abbas asked for permission,
La Valette claimed that he did not hesitate to urge Reqid to consider
2this request favourably. Yet La Valette could not have acted con­
trary to his instructions. The Quai d'Orsay had always advised the 
course of moderation in order to avoid disturbing Anglo-French
1La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., No. 41* 4 Sept. 1851, M.A.E., 
C.P., tom. 306.
2 1
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La Valette to Minister of For. Affs., No. 47, 14 Oct. 1851, M.A.E.,
C.P., tom. 307.
relations. Moreover, the French government did not instruct its 
representatives, at this stage, to encourage construction of the canal.^ 
The Quai d'Orsay did not blindly follow its representatives in 
Cairo and Constantinople. Napoleon III sent Count Bacciochi, his 
private secretary, on a special missinn to Egypt to invite *Abbas
2to re-establish the former cordial relations between Egypt and France.
‘ Abbas explained to the French envoy that he had had reasons to com­
plain of the conduct of Prance, or of her agents, in several matters.
But he was row willing to forget the past and he was anxious to be,
for the future, on as friendly terms with France as with all other
3Powers. It was felt in Paris that a change of Consuls-General might
T 4lead to better relations, and Sabatier replaced L® Moyne. Before he 
left for Egypt, Napoleon III remarked to him that his predecessors
5in Egypt had attached importance to a mass of trivial questions.
He instruqted him to avoid anything which might have the appear­
ance of jealousy of Britain on the part of Prance, and to 
observe discretion in his relationships with Sa‘Id.^ Sabatier was
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The first active interest shown by the French Foreign Minister 
dated 1 June 1853, when he wrote confidentially to the French Consul- 
General in Egypt to seize any opportunity to promote the idea. He asked 
for details about costs on the overland route, terms of the railway 
concession and the results of Linant*s survey in the Isthmus. (Drouyn de 
Lhuys to Sabatier, No. 8, 1 June 1853; Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No.
29, 15 May, 1853, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 25.) The Egyptian government had 
already agreed to Sabatier*s demand and allowed Linant to start his 
survey. Sabatier to Minister of For. Affs., 27 Dec. 1852; Report 
from Linant de Bellefonds about his survey in M.A.E., C.P., tom. 25;
The Tines, 8 April 1853; cf. Marlowe, The making of the Suez Canal, p.56.
2Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 229, 7 Oct. 1851, M.A.E., C.P., 
tom. 24; Murray to Malmesbury, 15 Dec. 1852 in F.O. 78/917.
(cont.)
Paget to Malmesbury (No. 2 Conf.), 2 Jan. 1853 in F.O. 78/966.
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ready to cooperate with his British colleague and told him
"if you want a Railway from Cairo to Suez I shall make no opposition
to it. It is true you will profit more by it than we shall, but
after all, it will be for the common good of all". He emphasized
that he would be the first to approve of its execution and had
spoken to ‘Abbas in that sense on his alluding to the subject in
conversation,1
What were the motives behind ‘Abbas’s Anglophile policy? He
informed Sabatier that:
"mes ennemis ont fait de moi d*aboard un tigre, un 
imbecille /sicJ ; puis ils m’ont accuse d’Stre 
vendu a 1* Angleterre, Je ne suis et je ne veux At re 
ni anglais ni franqais, parce que je comprends tres 
bien qu'il est de mon interAt d'Atre soutenu par ces 
deux puissances. Je m'efforcerai done de les traiter 
l'une et 1*autre aveo la mAme balance, precisement 
pour ne pas les mecontenter. Vous pouvez l’ecrire a 
Paris et vous verre* par la suite si je suis sincere.
Voila la Prance et voila 1*Angleterre.... mais pour 
le bien de l’Egypte je dois rester au milieu. En ce 
qui me conoeme personnellement je suis Egyptien et 
je resterai Egyptien, mais je tiens comme par la passe 
a Atre 1*ami de mes amis et l'ennemi de mes ennemis".
(cont.)
^Sabatier to Minister.of Pb^. Affs*, No. l#.V7 0ct. 1852, C.P., tom 24. 
The Times, 29 Oct. 1852.
^Bruce to Clarendon (Separate & Conf.), 16 March 1854 in P.O. 142/19.
^Paget to Malmesbury (Private & Conf.), 3 Jan. 1853 in P.O. 78/966; 
Drouyn de Lhuys to Sabatier, 19 March 1853t M.A.E., C.P., tom. 24.
1 Paget to Malmesbury (Conf.), 3 Jan. 1853? Bruce to Clarendon (Separate 
& Conf.), 16 March 1854 in P.O. 142/18.
2Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 2, 2 Nov. 1852, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 24.
It seems that there Is much truth in this statement. ‘Abbas 
looked to Britain as his natural and most sincere ally. Through 
her friendship, which he secured by constructing the railway,
‘Abbas overcame his enemies and retained his throne. This railway 
had served some purposes, and its extension to Suez would have 
been put forward to serve others if *Abbas had lived.
Having succeeded in preserving the personal status of the 
Viceroy as prescribed by the ferman of 1841, and in strengthening 
his relations with the Sultan during the Crimean War, ‘Abbas 
aimed at changing the order of succession in favour of his son Ibrahim 
Ilhaml. It seems that he had some greater ambitions. During his 
conflict with the Porte in 1851, Regid accused him of writing letters 
to the Arabs of the gijaz, the Wahhabis and the tribes near Aleppo 
and Baghdad, and sending men to persuade them to revolt. ‘Abbas 
dismissed this charge as "a malicious falsehood". Murray believed 
that -this tale may have arisen from his dealings with the Beduins 
of Arabia and Syria for the purchase of Arab horses, of which he 
had been passionately fond sinoe his youth.^ Nevertheless, it was
not impossible that he fed his vanity and ambitions with the antici-
2pations of the rise of an Egypto-Arabian monarchy. In these views,
^Enol. (2) in Murray to Palmerston, No. 29 of 19 Sept. 1851 /no. 1127 
in P.O. 424/7A.
2Hekekyan (VII, Add. 57454, fol. 559) assumes that ‘Abbas might have 
intended to become Caliph. This, however,makes him no exception to 
the rest of his family. On the family’s interest in the Caliphate see : 
Elie Kedourie, ’’Egypt and the Caliphate 1915-1946", Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 1965, pp. 208-48; Albert Hourani, Arabic thought 
in the liberal age. 1798-1959. London, 1962, pp. 261-262, 269-270.
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he was encouraged by the predictions of a certain shaykh in whose 
knowledge of future events ‘Abbas had great confidence. ‘Abbas 
had never mentinned this subject in the conversations he had with Bruce, 
the British Consul-General who succeeded Murray. On one occasion he 
said, when talking of the extension of the railway to Suez, that 
he would be prepared to begin it when the line to Cairo was finished, 
but he had an object to attain which was of great importance to him; 
and that he would expect Britain to assist him. Bruce expressed 
the readiness of the British government to assist him in all legitimate 
objects. But Bruce learned afterwards from one of ‘Abbas*s confidential 
servants about his intentions.^
After his death many facts came to light to prove that he had 
aspirations inconsistent with his position as a vassal which must 
sooner or later have brought him into collision with the Sultan. He 
might not wish to see the Russians extend their influenoe at Constan­
tinople, but he was anxious that the safety of the empire should be due 
to the allied Powers alone (Britain and France), and that it should be 
made patent to the eyes of Europe that the empire could no longer form 
any barrier to the ambition of Russia, or provide any solid basis for 
the regeneration of Islam. The shaykh persuaded him that the Ottoman 
dynasty was approaching its end. He applied to the Porte to change
mm mm •  2his titel of Wall to that of al-*Aziz. He also requested the sultan
■^ Bruce to Clarendon, No. 22 of 30 May and No. 35 of 17 July 1854 in 
F.O. 142/18.
2Cf. Isma*il in art. "Aziz Migr** in El2, p. 825, by B. Lewis.
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to bestow on him as a grant Jabal Shammar, on the pilgrimage road 
from Baghdad to Mecca.^ If ‘Abbas were disappointed in his designs, 
Bruce wrote "the great weight of his hatred would have been directed 
against England whose support he considered himself entitled to on 
account of the preference he had evinced towards her, and in consequence 
of the obligation he had conferred on her by constructing the Railway. 
Who knows whether in despair of the West, he *ight not have looked to 
the Horth? " In his arrangements connected with the Transit, Bruce 
said, ‘Abbas had shown sufficientlyUiat he had no intention of promoting 
the development of the traffic through Egypt. Several circumstances 
convinced Bruce that the Alexandria-Cairo railway lould have been made 
subservient to his schemes of monopolising the produce of the interior 
in his own hands, and that, as under such a system the enterprise would
not have answered financially, he would have made use of its failure as
2an argument for postponing its extension to Sues.
Thus, ‘Abbas believed that governments as well as individuals 
had their price and that by holding out tffers favourable to their 
particular interests, he might prevail on them to disregard all general 
considerations drawn from the advantages of not disturbing existing 
arrangements. H© never believed that Britain and Prance were acting 
sincerely together in the affairs of the East, and could not comprehend
186.
■^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 39 of 13 Aug. 1854 in P.O. 142/18.
2Bruce to Clarendon, No. 39 of 13 Aug. 1854.
to their general system. He thought he might ensure the support
of the former in the question of succession whatever view might be
taken of the question in Prance by professing a particular friendship
for Gt. Britain and by forwarding the railway, the importance of which
undertaking to her interests he considerably over-rated. ‘Abbas’s
oareer is to be judged from Bruce's words:
"it may be safely assumed,my Lord, that when the 
Vice Roy of Egypt betrays a disposition to throw 
himself into the arms of any one Foreign Power 
he has at heart personal objects inconsistent with 
the subordinate position he ought to occupy as a 
Vice Roy of Egypt."!
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that their policy in Egypt would naturally be made subordinate
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 59 of 15 Aug. 1854.
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TIG COMPLETION CF THE TRAITS-ISTHMUS 
RAIL LIIIK UNDER KUBAMMAD SA ‘iD 
1854 - 1858
Chapter III
"The world will have the satisfaction of 
feeling that not only will the railroad 
from Alexandria to Cairo be fully carried 
out, but likewise the line projected so 
long ago as 1834, by our countryman Gallo­
way Bey from Cairo to Suez across the de­
sert (which is even more necessary than the 
other for the transit through Egypt) will 
be successfully completed."
The Illustrated London Hews, 
No. 696, vol. XXV, 5 August, 
1854
1. The Railway between the rival scheme of the Canal 
and the alternative route of the Euphrates:
The temporary disappearance of French influence in Egypt 
was the right time to revive the railway project. Before ‘Abbas*s 
sudden death at Banha on 13 July 1854 the first section had been 
opened. This was from Alexandria to Kafr al-‘lg on the side of the 
Nile opposite Kafr al-Zayyat. The Kahya Pasha, Elfy Bey, concealed 
the death of ‘Abbas and everyone was refused admittance to the 
citadel. No council was called and no notice was given to Sa ‘ id 
Pasha, the suocessor according to the terms of the ferman. The 
Kahya1s object was to hold the succession of Sa‘id Pasha in abey­
ance; to ultimately refer this matter to Constantinople in the
hope that these delaying tactics would give time for intrigues 
which would eventually result in ‘Abbas's son, Ilhami, succeeding 
instead of Sa‘id Pasha.'*'
Mahmud Bey, the Egyptian acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
called upon Bruce, the British Consul-General, voicing disapproval 
of the attitude assumed by the Kahya. Without loss of time Bruce 
decided to proceed to the citadel and requested the French Consul at 
Cairo, Belaporte, who took the same view, to accompany him. Bruce
did so because he believed that there was a hope entertained by the
Kahya and his adherents that he, Bruce, might be inclined to support
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 35 of 17 July 1854 in F.O. 142/18.
them in any course calculated to promote their pretensions on
behalf of Ilhami, "his father being represented as favourable to
the English, while Said Pasha was supposed to prefer what were
called French interests".^ However these hopes were in vain and
Sa‘id, not Ilhami, was chosen to succeed 4Abbas.
The joint action of the French and British representatives
in Egypt was indeed to uphold the order of succession conceded to
the members of the family by the ferman of 1841; but what would be
the future of British interests under Muframmad Sa‘id? Would these
interests suffer at the hands of a man who identified himself with
French policy and interests? Sa‘id always claimed that his French
education was no fault of his but that his father sent him to France
when he was young. He had done all the great favours for which the
French Consul was always asking; but the British agent was more 
2 <-discreet. Sa id was said to tremble whenever he saw Sabatier, the
French Consul-General, and he openly confessed that "he could not 
3help it". Sabatier, himself, gives us a very clear picture of 
the situation in Egypt on Sa‘id's succession. On the death of Abbas 
the influence of the British Consul-General had ceased to exist 
for some time. Sabatier adds, "we had resumed our place, a good 
place in the councils of the Egyptian Government, and I myself was
^Bruce to Stratford de Redcliffe, No. 16 of 20 July 1854 in F.O. 195/412.
^Bulwer to Russell, No. 124 of 15 Dec. 1862 in F.O. 198/27.
3"Baron de Malortie, Egypt: Native rulers and foreign interference.
London, 1882, footnote 510, p.69.
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on a very intimate footing".^” On 22 December 1854, Sabatier invested 
5a *id with the insignia of the Legion of Honour, on behalf of the 
French Emperor, and added "in conferring on Your Highness-this great 
distinction..,. Napoleon I I I  .. is... anxious to express his deep 
interest in Egypt itself, and in the glorious but arduous work of 
reorganisation and reform bequeathed to Your Highness by your father 
of illusfrious memory. Your Highness is aware that in carrying out
this work the encouragement and, if need be, the support of the Em-
2peror will never fail you..."
The construction of a canal for uniting the Mediterranean and 
Redd Sea was much discussed before and during the construction of the 
Egyptian railway. The scheme however did not really coalesce until 
the appearance of Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had been very intimate 
with Sa'id, when young. On the receipt of the news of Sa‘id*s accession,
de Lesseps at once hastened to Alexandria to submit his canal project,
3which had been superseded by the railway. On 50 November de Lesseps 
obtained a concession from Sa‘id; and his plan received consent from 
the Viceroy on condition that it met with no opposition from any of 
the Great Powers. The French government denied most positively that 
it had any interest whatever in the scheme, but acknowledged that it
"^Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 100, 51 Dec. 1854, M.A.E., C.P., tom.25.
2de Lesseps, The Suez Canal, Letters and documents, p.45.
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3See above footnote 2, p. 19.
approved of such as being likely of great mercantile utility, and 
would view completion of the project with satisfaction.
The British government, on the other hand, steadily opposed 
the canal for various reasons:
1. The vast capital outlay required to build the canal could 
not produce a profitable return, so the idea could be 
prompted by political reasons.
2. Such a vast expenditure would greatly embarrass Egypt financially.
3. The canal once made, Egypt would be completely separated from 
'Turkey', and might declare its independence whenever it pleased.
4. If war were to break out between Prance and Britain, France 
would at once seize both ends of the canal, whereby it would 
be available to Prance but denied to Britain. In addition, 
during a time of peace Aden was only lightly garrisoned, and 
before British reinforcements could arrive the French could 
take it easily if they controlled the canal. Then again, a 
French squadron proceeding down the Red Sea would sweep British 
commerce east of the Cape, and probably take Mauritius.
5. It would be a suicidal act on the part of Britain to assent 
to the construction of this canal, even if a railway were not 
in progress towards completion.^
The British opposition entered its toughest phase at the begin­
ning of 1855. On 30 January Aberdeen's government was overthrown and
F.O. 198/27, pp. xxxi-xxxii; Clarendon to Cowley, No. 761 of 18 July 
1855 encl. Clarendon to Green (No. 10 Conf.), 5 Nov. 1855 in P.O. 142/27.
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on 6 February Palmerston formed an administration. There is no need 
here to repeat Palmerston's attitude towards the question of the 
Isthmus of Suez, which has been explained in the preceding chapters.
In short, although Lord Clarendon was the Foreign Secretary in Pal­
merston's administration, the latter appears to have exercised a very 
close supervision over foreign affairs. Palmerston was still convinced 
of the necessity, from the point of view of British interests, of 
maintaining Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt as defined in the ferman 
of 1841; he was still deeply suspicious of French designs on Egypt 
and was irrevocably opposed to the cutting of a canal. Again Palmer­
ston had always considered a railway across the Isthmus more practical 
as well as much cheaper. In reply to a question asked in the Commons 
in 1857, Palmerston said
"for the last fifteen years Her Majesty's Government 
have used all the influence they possess at Constantin­
ople and in Egypt to prevent that scheme from being 
carried into execution... It i3 founded... on remote 
speculations with regard to easier access to our In­
dian possessions, which I need not more distinctly 
shadow forth, because they will be obvious to anybody 
who pays any attention to the subject... That scheme 
was launched, I believe, about fifteen years ago. as 
a rival to the railway from Alexandria by Cairo to Suez, which 
being infinitely more practicable and likely to be 
more useful, obtained the pre-eminence."!
In Paris, Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador, informed
Walewski, the French Foreign Minister, that the British government
had no object in view with reference to Egypt but the rapid trans-
2mission of their correspondence to India. The ques tion of the
^Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLVI, pp. 1043-1C44.
2Cowley to Clarendon, 4 June 1855 in F.C. 78/1156.
railway was one of the main British objections to the canal. Lord 
Cowley told the French that this scheme would take a long time to 
complete and would interfere with, or delay or even entirely prevent 
the completion of the Cairo-Suez railway. This would be extremely 
injurious to British interests in India. He added that the British 
government wanted no ascendency, no territorial acquisition in Egypt. 
All it wanted was a free and unmolested road to India, ’and the 
continuation of the railway would give that thoroughfare rapid, 
while the continuation of the present political condition of Egypt 
as a dependency of the Turkish Empire gives them that thoroughfare 
free and secure’1.^
The French government acknowledged that the political import­
ance of Egypt with regard to Britain consisted in the freedom <f 
transit to India, and that France was more disinterested than Britain 
in that respect. The French openly admitted that through Egypt was 
the shortest and most direct route from Britain to India and should
be open constantly to her; that "on anything which relates to this
2important interest she can never give way". No doubt Napoleon III 
wanted to act together with Britain in the East as they both agreed 
in wishing to uphold the Ottoman Empire. It had never escaped 
Napoleon that Egypt had been an object of some difference between 
the two governments. He understood that the British only wanted the
194.
de Lesseps, Letters and documents, p.14”.
^Clarendon to Cowley, No. 606 of 18 June 1855 in F.O. 78/1156.
2
railway for their communications with India, and he had pointed out 
to those who seemed to forget that Britain, not Prance, possessed 
extensive territories in that country.* The British seemed to fear 
that the vast outlay in money, time and labour would only retard com­
pletion of the canal. The French government thought that if the two 
schemes were committed at the same time to private enterprise, there 
night be reason to fear that the canal would attract the shipping 
of the world, and then the railway could not possibly pay its way.
This would create an even heavier loss for the first section from 
Alexandria to Cairo had already proved a financial burden on the 
Egyptian treasury. According to the arrangements made by the Viceroy
to continue the railway, as will be explained later, this objection
2in the French point of view was unfounded.
During this period (1854-1858), three projects for communication 
with India were put forward for consideration. Two of them were 
through Egypt, the much discussed railway from Alexandria to Suez 
and the Suez Canal. The third was to link the Mediterranean coast to 
the Persian Gulf by means of a railway through the Euphrates Valley.
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S. L. Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, pp. 236-237: Memo of a
conversation on 10 Mar. 1853 between Sir Stratford Canning and 
Napoleon III in ^aris.
2de Lesseps, op.cit., p.144; de Lesseps (The Isthmus of Suez question, 
p. 16) says ’’far from being retarded by the canal project, the railway 
will, on the contrary, be indebted to this very design, for its speedy 
completion; for it can only obtain sufficient returns from the activity 
occasioned by a considerable maritime commerce across the Isthmus of 
Suez.”
French hostility to the Egyptian railway justified British intolerance 
of a navigable waterway. The railway was useful as a political pawn, 
but the Euphrates project soon took its place. The promoters of this 
project assumed that this railway would speed up communication far 
beyond the possibilities either of an Egyptian railway or a Suez Canal.
They believed that The Euphrates would afford an undoubted advantage 
as an alternative route. Moreover, this line would have a greater 
political value than that through Egypt. It would tend to neutralize 
French influence in Egypt and Syria, and would forestall Russia in 
her design of reaching the Persian Gulf. The promoters tried to get 
the support of the British government, and nothing was left undone to 
show the advantages derived from the construction of the line.^
In 1857, Palmerston announced in the Commons that by the Euphrates 
railway "a considerably increased facility in the conduct of our com­
mercial and political intercourse with that empire must be the result.
We should also have the advantage of an alternative route in competition
with the line of railway from Alexandria to Cairo, thence to Suez,
2and down by the Red Seal1 The British government undertook to give 
diplomatic support at Constantinople for the securing of a concession 
from the Ottoman government. Later for political reasons Palmerston 
considered it wiser to abandon this project and it rested for the time being.
^Hoskins, British Routes, pp. 519-320, Ch. XIII; V. Bamforth, British 
interests in the Tigris and Euphrates, unpubl. M.a . thesis, London, 1948;
W. P. Andrews, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley route to India. 1857; 
idem. A letter to Palmerston, on the political advantage of the Euphrates 
Valley Railway, London, 1857. ' -----------------
2Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLVII, p. 1676.
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2. The prolongation of the railway from Cairo to Suez
In October 1854, shortly after Sard’s accession and in 
accordance with Clarendon's instructions^ Bruce informed Sa*id that 
Britain was duly interested in the development of the resources and 
commerce of Egypt and of the improvement of transit through it.
Sa‘id replied that he had an equal if not greater interest. He 
assured Bruce that he had decided to carry the line of railway from 
Cairo to Suez "as soon as possible, the more so, as he lad always 
been of opinion that it was the most important link of the chain
destined to connect the two seas, and the one that ought to have been
2executed at first."
After making tie final arrangement of the Suez Canal concession,
de Lesseps went, at Sa‘id's request, to explain the arrangement to
3Bruce. Sabatier reports that his British colleague while reserving 
the opinion of his government, had yet shown himself personally 
favourable to the project. He claimed that Bruce told him that he 
could not understand the opposition of his predecessor (Murray) of an 
enterprise of such great interest. The first dispositions were not 
long in being modified and the change was first shown by the proposal 
addressed to Sa‘id of prolonging the railway from Alexandria to Cairo
4as far as the Red Sea.
^Clarendon to Bruce, No. 45 of 12 Aug. and No. 50 of 13 Sept. 1854 in P.O 
78/1034.
2Bruce to Clarendon, No. 42 of 13 Oct. 18-54 in P.O. H2/18.
3de Lesseps, Letters and documents, p.27.
^Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 100, 31 Dec. 1854, M.A.E, C.P., tom.25.
However, Bruce immediately reported to the Foreign Office
the proposal made by de Lesseps for the formation of a company for
cutting a canal through the Isthmus of Suez. Bruce abstained from
giving any objections against it but he urged Sa‘id not to commit
himself to any such scheme. He thought it advisable to bring forward
a proposal for the extension of the railway to Suez, the money for
which would have been found by the contractors of the Alexandria-
Cairo line, and the repayment of which would have been spread over a
period of three years. The future of this line was still very shaky.
\lbbas until his death had shrunk from the expense which continuing
the railway would impose on the Egyptian treasury. 5a‘Id declared
emphatically that his financial difficulties would not allow him to
think of carrying out this work for some time yet.^ Bruce knew of
Sa‘id's invincible repugnance to any scheme which would impose a
financial burden on Egypt, because he was being pressed from all sides
to discharge the debts left by ‘Abbas's administration. Moreover,
from the nature of his position in Egypt 3a‘id found it difficult
to obtain a loan large enough without applying to Constantinople. Bruce,
in any case, did not have the authority to urge such a step on Sa*id
in the absence of instructions from London because of the financial
2and political condition of the Ottoman Empire.
"^Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 98, 6 Dec. 1854, M.A.E., C.P., tom. 25. 
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 49 of 3 Dec. 1854 in F.O. 142/18.
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The Egyptian government hoping to sweeten Britain about the
1 «-canal, showed its inclination to support her. Sa id expressed his 
readiness to do business. The whole line could be leased for a long 
term to a company, subject to the condition it was extended to Suez.
There was also to be part repayment of the money already expended on 
the line by *Abbas. To Bruce this seemed the best proposition made 
yet. Though the line would remain exclusively in government hands,
2he did not think it would always remain so. Bruce thought all parties 
gave their approval not only because of any advantage to them, but be­
cause of the immediate financial advantage to Egypt, who owned the 
larger part of the work. He counted on this pecuniary interest "as
two guarantees of Said Pasha’s sincere wish that His proposal may
3meet with success".
Sa*id's terms were to lease the railway on the same terms as the
4canal, i.e. 99 years with a view to its completion. According to 
Sabatier, a universal company was not acceptable to Bruce. Bruce 
reported that Mugfcafa Bey (Sa'id's nephew and Ibrahim Pasha's son) 
was prepared to undertake the work and fulfil the conditions. Bruce 
thought if Sa‘id could be persuaded to agree to this, it would be
possible to manage the company. This would ensure that British interests
^"Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 100, 31 Dec. 1854, M.A.E., C.P., tom.25.
2Even those most bent on a canal could not object to a proposal which 
emanated from their own.
3' Bruce to Clarendon, No. 49 of 3 Dec.
^Bruce to Stratford de Redcliffe (Private) 9 Dec. 1854 in F.O. 195/412.
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would get fair consideration without giving offence to the French and 
make sure of the line being finished within a reasonable time.^
There was another proposal made by Hugh Thurburn, a British 
merchant resident in Egypt and the founder of the Egyptian Transit 
Company during Muhammad *Ali's reign. Thurburn wanted something to 
be done by the British because the line between Cairo and Suez most 
probably would fall into the hands of a French company headed by de 
Lesseps. He informed Bruce that if the Viceroy would accept his terms, 
he would be able to form a company amongst his friends to carry out 
the line. To sum up Thurburn's terms, they were as follows: He would
pay for 99 years' lease of the line from Alexandria to Cairo at 
£35r000 annually, the same to be made good in half-yearly instalments 
from the time the line was open and ready to be worked officially.
This sum would represent to the Pasha a capital of £700,000 upon which 
he would be receiving 5°/° interest annually. This was a higher rate 
of interest than railways in general yielded in Britain. He would, over 
and above this sum, pay to the Pasha's government in the shape of a 
bonus the sum of £100,000 in return for a concession of the line from 
Cairo to Suez, which the company would complete within six years time,
entirely at their own expense and risk. He stipulated that the ferman
2should detail these conditions.
As far as the documents show, Bruce did not communicate Thurburn's
^Bruce to Clarendon (Private), 16 Dec. 1854 in F.O. 195/412.
(cont.)
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gmm Iproposal to Sa id. About the time this proposal was presented to Bruce,
Charles Murray, the former British Consul-General in Egypt, whose
efforts contributed to the establishment of the Egyptian railway, was
in Egypt on his way to Persia. He visited Sa‘id who was reluctant to
see him, but de Lesseps begged him not to hurt Brucefs feelings.^ Bruce
admitted that he had had the benefit of Murray’s advice, in connection
with the company to be formed by the Viceroy to undertake the continu-
2ation of the railway. Later, Bruce revealed that he was opposed to 
a proposal made to obtain a lease <f the railway for a company, in 
which the British element was predominant. There is no doubt that 
Bruce was referring to Thurburn's proposal. Thurburn himself mentioned 
that Murray took a deep interest in the matter. Indeed, Murray warmly 
backed the proposal because he had beoi persuaded by the advocate of 
the scheme that the railway would otherwise pass into the hands of the
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(cont.)2Thurburn to Bruce, 6 Dec. 1854 in P_.0. 14l/l9 Pt. 2. Thurburn also 
offered to make a contract with Sa‘id for the construction of the 
Suez line under some conditions. It was proposed that the first 
section of twenty miles should be completed in March 1856, when the 
first call for money should be made on the government (say to the 
amount of £100,000 or £120,000). The whole line should be finished 
in March 1857 when there should remain in the government's hands 25°/o 
of the whole contract to be liquidated in the course of another year, 
the whole closing in March 1858. The intrrmediate payments between 
March 1856 and 1857 were to be regulated to produce this result (Memo, 
as to the railway from Cairo to Suez encl. in Thurburn, 6 Dec. 1854).
■^de Lesseps, op.cit., p.43.
23ruce to Clarendon (private) 16 Dec. 1854 in F.O. 195/412.
French. Bruce comments
"I was not blind to the consideration which has 
escaped their notice, that if I had not influence 
to keep it from being given to the French, I 
shculd be less able to induce 'the Viceroy to 
give it to the English. But I refused to present 
it on the grounds, that such a concession was con­
trary to the policy of the Porte, and contrary, I 
believe, to the general interests of Trade."!
V/hat was the attitude of the French representative towards
the continuation of the railway? Sabatier favoured the Suez Canal
scheme as much for Egypt's interest as for speedy communication.
He believed the concession made for the canal would solve the problem
of continuing the railway. °abatier reminded the Foreign Minister
of the details of the two undertakings since the accession of ‘Abbas.
The French interest was general trade, the British interest was
speedy communication with India. However, now things had changed,
relations with the Porte were good, and the new Viceroy was fully
alive to the situation, though supposedly impartial. Sabatier added
that Sa‘id offered interest and help to any enterprise which would
further the interests of his country.
Having given the canal concession to the French, Sa‘id could
not refuse the request from the British to continue the railway.
Under the surface calm there was hidden opposition based on the
comparative merits of the two undertakings. Sabatier had no doubts,
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^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 21 of 13 Apr. 1857 in F.O. 142/20.
he declared, that time would prove who was right. For him, it was 
the canal that would meet the general interests of Buropean trade.
He allowed that the railway would be a quicker route to and from 
India, but financially the margin between receipts and expenses would 
be so small that he advised no one to invest money in such an under- 
taking.'*' Sabatier did not overlook Bruce’s attitude to the canal 
concession and request to continue the railway. Had Bruce obeyed 
instructions from his government or had he tried to minimise the blow 
of the French gain by announcing success in gaining the railway con­
cession? The Frenchman said that opinion in Cairo was that the railway 
was a mad project. No one any longer discussed the dangers it might
present to Egypt, "but no one, not even the Viceroy, will examine the
2political aspect of the project”.*- Sabatier knew nothing of Thurburn's
proposal, but he reported Murray's visit to Egypt with an interesting
3comment."
On 4 December 1854, Sa‘id had written asking the Sultan for 
his approval for both the canal and the railway. The British Ambassador 
in Constantintople was still Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (formerly Sir
^Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 98, 6 Dec. 1854, M.A.E., C.P., tom.25.
2Sabatier tc Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 100, 31 Dec. 1854, M.A.E., C.P., tom.25.
3Sabatier said that Murray urged the construction of the railway from 
Alexandria to Cairo and if "towards the end of his mission all this 
insistence could not obtain a continuation as far as Suez, his failure 
which is very careful to conceal was even more woundingfbr a friend of 
the Viceroy. The reputation of the agent was in no way affected. Already 
the railway was nearly finished between Alexandria and the Nile and 
before leaving Egypt Mr. Murray could see the first locomotives in 
operation." (Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 100, 31 Dec. 1854.)
203.
Stratford Canning) who was feared by Ottoman ministers because of his 
domineering personality and unhesitating threats to invoke the vast
powers of the government he represented.'1’ Stratford de Redcliffe met
Re§id and recommended that he should actively support the railway and ' ■
discountenance the canal. The Ambassador thought that if Sard's income
could not be stretched to cover the progress cf the railway, the Porte
2would not object to it being carried out by a company. His opinion
had weight at Constantinople.
3a‘id*s letter, requesting the Porte's consent to lease the
Alexandria-Cairo railway to a company, was laid before the Sultan. The
Porte wished the railway completed; and did not doubt that if Egyptian
revenue allowed it, Sa‘id would make every effort for the completion of
the portion from Alexandria to Cairo even before the appointed time, and if
necessary for the extension from Cairo to Suez. The Porte had no objection
to it being leased to a foreign company and informed Sa‘id that refused
during ‘Abbas's reign was because the latter's administration had In­
'Sspired no confidence. The Porte requested specific details about the
4 i -contract and company undertaking the work. Sa id informed the Porte 
that there were companies wanting to undertake the extension of the 
railway to Suez, but the contract had not been drafted and the subject 
was being yet under consideration. Sa‘id agreed to prepare and forward
^de Lesseps, Letters, p.80. His colleagues frequently spoke of him 
as "Sultan Stratford".
pStratford de Redcliffe to Clarendon (No. 21 Conf.) 11 Jan. 1855* and 
F.O. to Redcliffe (No. 76 Conf.) 25 Jan. 1855 in F.O. 78/1156; de 
Lesseps, op.cit., p.129.
•T
Rejid's reply to Sa‘id, enol. in Redcliffe to Clarendon (No. 105 most conf.) 
12 Peb. 1855 in P.O. 78/1156. (cont.)
the contract for the Grand Vezir's inspection on the issue of the
Imperial sanction.^
Regid told Sa‘id that Stratford was of opinion that the Suez
Canal might not be free from inconvenience and therefore could be
useless, while the railway was perfectly sufficient. Regid also
informed Sa *id that the Ambassador had charged the British Consul-
2General to make other important observations to him. The French 
Consul-General always suspected the intentions of Bruce. In January 
1855, - abatier wrote that the British government still attached 
the same importance to the railway project, and would be grieved 
to see it abandoned in favour of another enterprise. Sa‘id would 
not oppose the setting up of an international company on the lines 
of that of the canal. Sabatier knew that discussions had taken place 
in Cairo between Bruce and Lee Green, the Director General of the 
Transit. His information, although he was not quite sure of it, was 
that the plan for the organisation of the company was already being 
prepared in secret with a view to call later on, for the issue of 
shares to the capitalists in London. Sabatier did not worry about 
these secrets because, as he said, they were not worth worrying about.
"If the railway," he adds, "is continued as far as Suez, everyone 
will benefit except the shareholders. It is therefore of little
, (cont.) ^Regid to Sa‘Td in Redcliffe, 12 Feb. 1855.
The Valee of Egypt to the Grand Vizier, 27 Feb. 1855, encl. in Redcliffe 
to Clarendon, No. 197 of 16 Mar. 1855 in F.O. 78/1156.
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importance to us that the shareholders should be English rather
than French."'*' To these assumptions the Quai d'Orsay replied that
it certainly had no objection to this plan and the support given
2to it in England, provided it did not exclude the canal scheme.
No plan of this kind had ever been referred to by Bruce himself.
However, Sa*id had second thoughts about handing the railway
to a foreign company. It was not until May 1855 that Sa*id decided
upon the prolongation of the railway as far as Suez. He bad begun
to realize, either because the administration oflhe Transit had
produced more satisfactory results over the last few months, or
because the increasing volume of passengers between India and Europe
through Egypt might seem to ensure the financial success of the 
3operation. De Lesseps wrote that Stratford de Redcliffe*s persistent 
opposition and the opinion he had expressed that the railway ought 
to be sufficient for everything, ”or, to speak more correctly, ought 
to serve the English interests only” gave Sa*id matter for reflection.
°a id thought there would be danger in the future he £ave UP
the milway, traversing the centre of Egypt, to a company of which 
the English would be the real masters.^ Sa*id, however, undertook
^Sabatier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 105, 25 Jan. 1855, M.A.E., C.P., tom.26.
2Minister of For.Affs. to Sabatier, No. 3, 13 Feb. 1855, M.A.E., C.P., tom
26.
3 -abatier to Walewski, No. 110, 19 May 1855, M.A.E., C.P., tom.26.
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to carry out this railway at his own expense. He announced his
intention to give notice of the steps which were to be taken "so
as to give due heed to English interests".'*’ Sabatier commented that
once the decision was made speed was necessary to prevent the formation
of any rival company or the making of further demand. A9 a preliminary
step, 3a*id had given a written authority to Briggs & Co. of Alexandria
to buy rails for about a quarter of the distance and one of the
partners had started for England to place the order. Mouchelet, one
of Sard's engineers, was commissioned to commence the surveys and
2the embankments on the Suez line without delay.
Before making these decisions, Sa‘id saw Sabatier because he was 
very preoccupied with the reception which this project would have in 
Prance. He remembered the opposition of the French Consulate General 
to the railway between Alexandria and Cairo; he possibly might have 
feared that the continuation as far as Suez might be regarded at that 
moment as a renunciation of the cutting of the Isthmus. Hence, he 
found himself obliged to repeat several times that the canal between 
the two seas (which he called his great project) was still nearest 
to his heart. In his opinion the two projects must function side by 
side, and that only their completion would assure Egypt her commercial 
prosperity, "a natural consequence of her geographical position and
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Bruce to Clarendon, No.15 of 21 May 1855 in P.O. 142/18; Benedetti 
to Walewski, No. 12, 26 Sept., M.A.E., C.C., tom. 35; see below p. 258.
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her resources."^ Sabatier answered Sa‘id that the Consulate General
of Prance had never been a determined opponent of any useful project.
Even under ‘Abbas, the "hostility" of Le Moyne had taken the form of
expressing a preference for the canal, a preference which the French
could not abandon because it was founded on more general interests.
Sabatier assured Sa‘id that he could rely on French sympathies and
need not fear that France would object. He begged Sa‘id not to judge
the future by the past. The Emperor was neither selfish nor exclusive.
In 1852 when Sabatier left France for Egypt he had an audience with
the Emperor who told him:
"je ne comprends pas qu'on se soit oppose a la 
construction de chemin de fer. Toute entreprise, 
qui au ra pour but de rendre les communications 
plus promptes, et de faciliter les relations 
commerciales, ne doit jamais vous trouvez parmi 
ses adversaires. Je desire, au contraire, que 
vous la sou teniez de toutes vos forces."2
The certainty of French approval had a very good effect on the mind 
of Sa‘id. He hoped, moreover, that once the railway was in course of 
execution, Britain would show herself less hostile to the canal 
project - but this hope was just an illusion.
As the Porte had issued a ferman to ‘Abbas giving him authority 
to carry out the railway project, in the case of Sa‘id it was not con­
sidered necessary. Yet he could not order the beginning of work on
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2Sabatier, No. 110, 19 May 1855.
the Suez Canal because the Porte's official sanction had not been 
received, (Consequently, de Lesseps complained that neither the Porte 
nor Britain thought of raising the-smallest objection to the absence 
of Imperial authorisation in the matter of the railway.)'*' Even when 
Sa‘id proposed handing over the construction of the railway to a 
foreign company there was no protest from the Porte, though this was 
contrary to the stipulation in the ferman issued to ‘Abbas. It seems 
that "tiie Porte trusted that Sa‘id*s judgment and experience was sound.
The influence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe cannot be ignored. He 
was pressing the Porte to let Sa‘id push on with the railway in order 
to divert him from the Suez Canal project to which Britain was strongly, 
opposed.
Thus Sa ‘id had publicly expressed his determination to commence
the work. Bruce's attitude towards this jailway was not as Sabatier had
said. He dealt with this question when circumstances arose. Bruce was
aware that Sa*id was not as forward for perseverance as he was for
ardour in the commencement of a new work. His desire to finish the
railway increased but he avoided pressing this affair on Sa‘id in such
a manner as would deprive him, Sa ‘id, of the gratification of claiming
2its execution as his spontaneous act. The only safe guarantee for 
the termination of the work, Bruce said, was to appeal to Sa‘id's vanity. 
The Pasha's position and circumstances were not yet such as to enable
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2Bruce to Clarendon, No. 15 of 21 May 1855 in P.O. 142/18.
Bruce to impose it on him. The British government approved Bruce*s
proceedings and learned, with satisfaction, of the continuation of the
railway. Clarendon advised Bruce to see if he could obtain an estimate
of the probable increase In revenue.. If this figure were presented
to 5a‘id by someone whom the Viceroy trusted, it would do much to
secure the completion of the railway.'*'
Sa‘id*s intentions of extending the railway to Suez were serious.
Rtlyssenaers, the Dutch Consul-General and de Lesseps* friend, told
Green, the British Consul at Alexandria, that Sa‘id observed to him
that the British government was rot convinced that these intentions
were serious. Green did not believe that any doubt need be entertained
on this matter as the engineers were working on the line, and the rails
ordered from England were on their way to Egypt. Green informed Clarendon
that Sa‘id declared that he would not only have this railway made, but
2it should be made with all practicable speed. No doubt Sa‘id realised 
the advantages of rail communication. In Bruce's presence the Director 
of the transit handed to Sa‘Id a paper including the returns of the 
Transit Administration for one month which showed a net profit to the 
Egyptian government of £15,000. Sa‘Id was very pleased with the results#"^ 
and stated that as soon as the month of Ramadan was over he intended 
to put 6,000 men to work on the Suez railway.
"^Clarendon to Bruce, No. 19 of 5 June 1855 in P.O. 141/26; Clarendon 
to Green, Nos. 1 and 2 of 16 and 31 Aug. 1855 in P.O. 141/27.
2Green to Clarendon, No. 4 of 6 Aug. 1855 in P.O. 142/20.
These returns were from the Alexandria-Cairo line. Green to Clarendon 
Nos. 6 and 12 of 20 Aug. and 7 Sept. 1855 in P.O. 142/20; Green, No. 16 
of 20 Sept. in P.O. 78/1123.
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Bruce did his best to keep the work going on without interruption 
in order to speed up communications with India. He avoided, as far as 
possible, pressing too many demands upon Sa‘id. At the beginning of 
1856 Mr. Holton, agent for the P.& 0. Company, began urging Sa‘id to 
reduce the fares for the journey through Egypt. His argument was that 
local fares on the Alexandria-Cairo line had been reduced. Bruce con­
sidered this was unreasonable, his objection being that Sard's line 
to Suez was to facilitate transit to and from India. However, once 
construction was complete Bruce thought then would be the opportunity 
to thoroughly discuss transit charges and duties. He aimed to get 
rid of the latter once for all.1 He wrote to Anderson, Managing 
Director of the P. & 0., requesting him to not let his agent "higgle 
about little advantages”. Bruce also reminded him of Sa‘id*s double 
expense. Not only was he financing the Suez line but was maintaining 
the horse and camel establishments at Suez also.
The P. & 0. Company were not the only ones making overtures.
The agent of the British Post Office in Egypt complained that there 
was no improvement in the time taken in carrying the mail, even though 
the Cairo-Alexandria railway had been opened. When Bruce heard of all 
these complaints he feared that Sa‘id would be annoyed and might refuse 
to continue the Suez line. He hoped that orders would be given requiring
the complainants to discuss their problems with him before going to the
2Egyptian government.
Lee Green to Bruce, 12 Sept. 1856, encl. (l) in Bruce to Clarendon,
No. 40 of 18 Sept. 1856 in F.O. 78/1222; Clarendon to Bruce,
No. 34 of 8 Oct. in F.O. 141/29.
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Bruce was alive to the situation in Egypt and knew well the 
channels through which British interests could be best served. He hid 
had to contend with difficulties and obstacles to forward the cause of 
railways in Egypt. Bruce resolved to work through and not in opposition 
to Lee Green, the then Director of the Transit. Sa‘id, influenced by 
the jealousies of the people around him, decided to confine the railway 
to the portion already completed between Alexandria and Kafr al-‘lg. 
Bruce and Lee Green decided to give him an exhibition of its results 
to convince him of its utility. They opened to local traffic as much 
of the line as was finished, trusting that the receipts would prove the 
mistake of those who asserted that the line would not pay. Sa‘id then 
decided that the revenue derived should be applied to furnish what was 
requisite for further railway work. Bruce, moreover, did not support 
any proposal made to the government to lease the railway to a company. 
Bruce counted much on Lee Green's assistance in extending the railway 
to Suez. Green was able to convince Sa*id that the expenses and diffi­
culties of the existing Transit through the desert were so great as to 
render it indispensable that the line should be completed without delay. 
It was to his suggestions that the order to commence the Suez railway 
was given in May 1855.'*’
So, Green's assistance was really needed at a time when French 
influence was at its peak. Bruce never complained of French influence,
212.
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but it was nonetheless true that his difficulties were seriously increased 
by the fact that Sa‘id's entourage consisted almost exclusively of 
Frenchmen, such as Clot Bey, Mcugel Bey and Pastre, who can be designated 
as the "Egypto-Prench party”. There were persons of other nations, 
such as Riiyssenaers, the Dutch Consul-General, whose views were identical 
with theirs. Bruce believed that these men were, at heart, oppoeed to 
to the extension of the railway to Suez, as being likely to prove pre­
judicial to their favourite canal scheme. Although de Lesseps had always 
declared that he considered the milway necessary, he introduced, in his 
first pamphlet on the Suez Canal,1 calculations to show that as a financial 
operation the railway would be a failure. Bruce believed that de Lesseps 
and his friends lost no opportunity of pressing this argument on Sa‘id, 
and they could not have chosen their ground better, "for the Railway 
being the continuation of a scheme begun by his predecessor, holds out
no bait to his vanity, and it is by financial considerations that he
2has been guided in undertaking it."
Whatever Bruce's efforts the opposition suddenly produced a 
very serious (but a purely technical) objection. It disputed the 
course of the line, a matter which could effect progress and efficiency. 
Bruce attributed this to the badly thought out plans of Sa‘id's en­
gineers. Mr. Rouse, Chief Engineer of the Alexandria-Cairo line,
1de Lesseps (The Isthmus of Suez question. App. I, p.40) says that “the 
railway, by itself, was not sufficient; it would never acquire any 
substantial importance, and would only be assured of its revenues 
when it would become the auxiliary of the Suez Canal.
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Iproposed a counter scheme. This was that the line should run from Banha 
to al-Zaqaziq along Wadi al-Tumaylat. Sa‘id discussed it with Mouchelet, 
but he had already given orders for pushing on with work on the existing 
line. When Stephenson arrived in Egypt, he became interested in Rouse's 
proposal and suggested that it be re-considered before the present 
line was carried further. On the condition that Bruce went with him, 
Stephenson was willing to go to Cairo to discuss the subject with the
Princes and other members of the council, Sa*id being in Upper Egypt.
However, Bruce declined as he did not think that the line would have 
steep gradients, or that he would be justified in stopping the work.^ 
Both Stephenson and Rouse criticised the lack of water along 
the route, the absence of which would make working the line more ex­
pensive. Bruce, however, wrote to Clarendon about the consideration 
which weighed most with him in this.
"Said Pasha having once begun, is pledged to carry 
out this Railway to Suez; but if it had to be 
begun de novo, and he were called upon to decide 
whether the ^resh-Water C$nal or the Railway were 
first to be carried through Wady Tomilat, I feel 
no confidence that his decision would be in favor 
of the latter. My position with reference to the 
Canal would be seriously compromised; at present 
his financial embarrassments enable me consistently, 
to urge the completion of the Railway, and to oppose 
the commencement of the Canal at the came time; 
but, were the two plans to be discussed simultaneous­
ly the argument would be in favor of the advocates 
of the Canal, as they would represent, that it 
would affor d a means of communication, and contri­
bute to the productiveness of Egypt by the irrigation 
of the neighbouring lands.”2
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1These were the reasons which made Bruce think that under existing cir­
cumstances the real question at issue was whether it was better to 
have this railway or none, and not, whether they could substitute an 
easier line for the present one. The Foreign Office entirely approved 
these reasons,^ and referred Bruce’s despatch to the Board of Trade 
for an opinion. In reply, the Board said that it appeared from that 
despatch that the steepest gradient on Mouchelet's line presented no 
serious impediment to traffic. Under these circumstances the Board saw
no reason whatever to object upon this ground to the line in question
2between Cairo and Suez.
Bruce had put a stop to any further proceedings about the railway 
via Wadi al-'J'umaylat. As the subject had been mooted, and the direct line 
from Cairo to Suez had been condemned as incapable of accommodating a 
large traffic, Bruce wrote to Lee Green in Jan. 1857, hoping that he 
would prevail on Mouchelet to examine the ground thoroughly and select 
the line which would give the easiest gradients out of Suez. Mouchelet 
had already re-made a careful and detailed examination and reported to 
Bruce that the line presented no more severe gradients than were to be 
found on that part of the road which had been finished and over which
3Bruce had already travelled. Bruce thought that tie line would accommodate 
all> the traffic, and that it was desirable under the circumstances to 
push on the construction as rapidly as they could.
1Clarendon to Bruce, No. 12 of 7 Mar. 1857 in F.O. 141/51.
2Letter from the Board of Trade (dated 12 Mar. 1857) encl. in Clarendon 
to Bruce, No. 14 of 17 Mar. 1857 in F.O. 141/51.
^Bruce to Green (Private) 12 Jan. 1857, encl. in Bruca to Clarendon,
No. 22 of 16 Apr. 1857 in F.O. 78/1513.
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During November 1857, a pamphlet of anonymous authorship was 
published in London entitled Railways in Egypt; communication with 
India. Its object was to prove that the Cairo-Suez line was im­
practicable, and recommended that it should be abandoned and a new 
line commenced from Banha to Suez through Wadi al-Tumaylat. This 
proposed line was not original as it had been proposed by Rouse. The 
anonymous author pointed out the reasons why he criticised the present 
line. He stated that complete absence of water, and total sterility 
of soil were not the only difficulties. The gradients were also ex­
ceedingly disadvantageous. The author of the pamphlet accused the 
narrow policy of the Egyptian administration of keeping plans and 
sections of Egyptian railways somewhat in the nature of state secrets.
In this state of affairs, no one cared tomake too close an inquiry.“ 
Furthermore, so little in every respect was the Suez line adapted 
to the purposes of traffic; the writer added that it could be supposed 
that it had been started from Cairo "in true Turkish fashion ‘Ala
bab Allah” (at the mercy of providence),” without previously ascertaining
2by what route, and under what conditions, it was ever to reach Suez.
The writer continued by explaining how different the alternative line 
through Wadi al-^umaylat would be. It was argued that the water flow 
from the Nile along the canal of the Wadi could be carried on to Suez 
by continuing the canal along the railway. This water would admit of
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sufficient cultivation to maintain the people employed locally on 
the railway and their families. Moreover, command of water would 
make this valley fertile enough for the growth of rice, com, cotton 
and fruit. Political]# the continuation of the railway to Suez by 
this route would give a much better access to the Sharqiyya province, 
which had always had reputation for turbulence. Moreover, Arabs 
approaching Egypt by that frontier would be effectually controlled.1
In conclusion, the writer of the pamphlet asked that the 
question should be dealt with while it was yet in its comparative 
infancy. He suggested that the British government should depute a 
properly qualified person to report on the state of communications 
with India through Egypt. The result might enable the British govern­
ment to make such friendly suggestions to the Pasha of Egypt as the 
2case required. The writer added "Turks, Arabs, native Christians,
and Europeans join in the same prayer; and it is only natural that
the nation which has the most positive interest in securing the right
working of Egyptian Railways should speak out for the whole, and insist
3upon their proper administration. That nation is England."*" This 
pamphlet was circulated in Egypt. Green, the acting British- Consul 
General, identified it as the product of Frederick Ayrton,^ and who
1Anon., op.cit., pp. 62-64.
2Anon* op.cit.. pp. 90-91.
3Anon., op.cit.. pp. 91-92.
^Frederick Ayrton Q812-1873) an English officer in the British army 
who was closely associated with Egypt. He studied civil engineering 
in 1832 and was selected an associate of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers in 1835. He worked in Aden in 1840 as an executive engineer 
on the fortifications. He entered himself at the Middle Temple, and
(cont.)
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had presented a memoir to Green in favour of the same course as that 
he advocated in this pamphlet. Green informed the Foreign Office 
that the arguments used in the pamphlet were groundless. The writer of 
the pamphlet had not made actual survey, and the data was quite in­
correct. Green told Clarendon that it was impossible to read this 
pamphlet without perceiving the handle it would afford those surrounding 
Sa‘id. By quoting it they would turn him against the Railway, for 
it was an undertaking which was continually subjecting him to annoyance.
Nevertheless, the progress of the Suez railway was rapid and 
satisfactory. Sa‘id showed no inclination to abandon the construction
of the line. Green was satisfied with the good faith Sa‘id had dis-
pplayed from the first on the subject. Yet, no one was certain when 
the railway would be opened. By April 1858, unsatisfactory reports 
reached Green respecting the progress of the work. He was told that 
there were hardly any men now employed on the works, that the rails 
and the sleeper chairs had been taken away for other lines, and there
(cont.) in 1846 was called to the Bar. Having taken to the study 
of Arabic_whilst at Aden, he devoted himself to that until 1851, 
when Abbas I, hearing of his qualification, appointed him as his 
secretary. Abbas, moreover^ confided to him the supervision of 
the education of his son Ilhami. After ‘Abbas’s death, Ayrton 
continued to assist Ilhami until the latter*s death in I860. He 
then occupied himself occasionally as a consulting barrister in 
the consular courts. He took a great interest in the railway system 
in Egypt, which was commenced at the time of his arrival there, and 
anonymously published this pamphlet. (Boase, Modern English Biography; 
Min, of proc. of Institution of Civil Engineers, 1874, xxxviii, 
p p . 306-308.) In 1857 he presented a memo, toGreen on the proposed 
Fresh Water Canal from the Nile through the Isthmus of Suez and its 
relation to the projected Ship Canal based on a ... personal estimation 
of the ground between Cairo and Suez (encl. in F.O. 78/1317).
1Green to Clarendon, No. 69 of 1 Nov. 1857 in F.O. 78/1314.
G^reen_fco_Jj[^ f^lprir>n 1857 in F.O- 142/20.------
was no prospect of the line being finished immediately. He, therefore, 
asked the Director of the Transit for some explanations before speaking 
to the Viceroy on the subject.^ He was assured that the Egyptian 
goyemment would not relax its endeavours to complete the railway.
He attributed the extreme uncertainty about these works partly to 
the difficulty of establishing efficient supervision of large bodies 
of fallafrin and, in a measure, to an inclination on the part of 
Mouchelet to make too light of the work before him. Although the 
question of labour was overcome, Green felt that the incapacity of 
the French engineer was rather aggravating. However unpleasant it 
may be in his position to have to complain of a Frenchman, Green 
informed the Foreign Office that he should be compelled to do so.
Six months later, on 5 December 1858, the Suez railway was
3completed and opened to traffic. The transit of the mails and 
passengers was at last effected from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean 
by rail. The construction of this line ared much to Bruce and Green, 
to whom it caused so much anxiety. Hardly three months before the 
completion of the line, Green had been earnestly assured that the 
French engineer had received his orders not to finish the works.
Green paid little attention to this report, as from the same quarters 
he had been accustomed to hear that this railway was an impossibility, 
and that, if made, no train could pass over it. He commented:
-1-Green to Nubar, 22 Apr. 1858 in F.O. 142/22.
2Green to Hammond, 10 June 1858 in F.O. 78/1401.
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"the Railway between Cairo and Suez, may not 
have been laid out on a judiciously selected 
line, and gross errors may have been committed 
in its construction, but an actual Railway how­
ever defective which admits of the Desert being
crossed with ease in a few hours, is better than 
the project of one however perfect only existing 
on paper.
We have now a Railway which has cost us nothing, 
by which our Troops can be conveyed easily from^ 
the Mediterranean to the Red Sea in ten hours.”
The building of the Suez line would have taken even longer 
if foreign political considerations to Egypt had not fastened its 
completion. One should not forget that the aim was to speed up 
English transport to India. When in May 1857 the Indian Mutiny necessi­
tated troops and minutions being rushed out to India the British govern­
ment refused a spontaneous offer of ships from the P. & 0. Company in 
order to spare French susceptibilities. Because, instead, Britain 
sent them via the Cape of Good Hope, she lost precious time. The Porte
and Sa‘id were ready to grant every facility, as had been done in
21855. In October 1857, Napoleon III offered permission for British 
troops to pass through France to Marseilles en route to Egypt and 
India. Thus encouraged, the British government instructed Stratford 
de Redcliffe to request the Sultan’s authorisaticn to send troops by 
the Egyptian line. On 5 October, the Sultan unhesitatingly granted 
a ferman for this purpose. In the same month "the first unit of 200 men was
^Green to Malmesbury, No. 196 of 5 Dec. 1858 on F.O. 78/1402.
2The Egyptian route was first used for the transport of military supplies 
and personnel during the Crimean War. P.P., 1857-8 (382) X, pp. 625- 
626, 714, 753-754; Wiener, L’Egypte et ses chemins de fer. pp. 74-76; 
Hoskins, British Routes, ch. XVI.
JP.P., 1857-8, X, pp. xix, 190.
sent to India via Egypt.1 They covered the distance from Plymouth to 
Bombay in only thirty-seven days. This made the public begin to realize 
how useful the railway was. The troops were entrained from Alexandria 
to the end of the railway which in 1857 was only complete to stationi
no. 12 in the desert. Troops and civilians covered the remaining
distance to Suez, about 25 miles, in vans. The passage through Egypt
2occupied little more than 50 hours. The last regiment which passed
through Egypt took only 12 hours from sea to sea, including stoppages
3and a march of several miles. About 199 officers and 4,894 men
4were sent through Egypt before the first of March 1858. The Egyptian
government charged £3 for transporting each soldier and £5 for an
5officer. Consequently the taking of the line greatly increased.
3. The Railway neither to be ceded to a company nor to be
given in mortgage
In April 1857 Bruce called Lord Clarendon*s attention to the 
system which had sprung up in Egypt^ of persons in the Viceroy*s favour 
obtaining exclusive privileges for the exercise of particular branches
^P.P., 1857-8, X, p.753; also Green to Malmesbury, Nos. 57 and 68 
of 12 and 28 Oct. 1857, and other documents in P.O. 78/1314; B. Cable,
A hundred year history of the P. & 0., pp. 193-194.
2Anon., Railways in Egypt., pp. 15-18; Cable, op.cit., p.194.
Green to Malmesbury, No. 196 of 5 Dec. 1858 in P.O. 78/1402.
4P.P., 1857-8, X, p.826.
"'P.P., 1857-8, X, p.753; of. Wiener, op.cit., p. 75 (Wiener says that
£5 was received for each soldier and double for an officer).
^cf. Bruce to Clarendon, No. 21 of 13 April 1857 in P.O. 142/20.
1of industry, and selling them to companies by which they were 
to be worked. For various reasons Bruce stated that it would fall 
on Britain alone to defeat these monopolies and to assert in Egypt 
the great principle of the "freedom of industry" as she had already 
asserted the "freedom of trade". To him, the question was both im­
portant and urgent, for these companies tended to overpower and super­
sede the Viceroy’s authority, and thereby gradually supplant the 
"Turkish race" in Egypt. Moreover, generally tiese companies were 
controlled by the French. As these companies were equally repugnant 
to the interests and to the policy of the Porte, Bruce thought that 
the Porte would disallow tie Viceroy’s power to confer either exclusive 
privileges on companies or individuals.
Since this was the system likely to be followed, the railway 
should be protected from speculators. One of the British concerns 
in the East was the state of communications through Egypt. Assuming 
that the railway to Suez would be completed, Bruce vented to get 
the views of his government as to the course he should pursue should 
attempts be made by speculators to lease the railway from the government. 
Bruce was very decided as to the advantage of its remaining in the 
hands of the government, and he was successful on more than aie occasion 
in preventing it from being transferred to companies.'*' At this point 
the reasons which appeared to justify his conclusions are diecussed.
They were partly political and partly commercial.
222.
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Politically, Bruce laid considerable stress on the known feelings 
of the Porte as evidenced by the ferman authorising ‘Abbas I to construct 
the railway. By articles IV and V control by a foreign company or a
foreign loan were disallowed.^ Thus Bruce considered that the railway
2was to remain in the bands <f the government. He added that a company
formed to w>rk the railway would probably seek to evade the clauses of the
ferman by placing itself under Ottoman jurisdiction. Such an arrangement 
would equally violate the spirit of the ferman, and ought, on 1hat ground,
to be opposed by the British agent. As far as communications with India
were concerned, Bruce believed that Britain ^ iould act in concert with
3the Ottoman government.
His commercial reasons depended mainly on the answers to the 
question whether the governmentcr a company ms likely to be more liberal 
in its charges for railway accommodation, and which arrangement would 
more effectually provide for the security of passengers and of the 
valuable transit cargo. He knew that the Egyptian government did not 
look upon public works, such as the Ma^mudiyya Canal, as a source of 
revenue, but was satisfied with receiving in tolls a sum sufficient for 
repairs and maintenance. Bruce hoped that when the railway was finished, 
the government would agree to adopt a tariff based on the same principle. 
Although the rates were high Bruce discouraged all attempts to revise them
^Uahoum, Recueil de firmans, p.256.
2 ««Under Sa‘id, the Porte did not obiect to this railway being handed over 
to a company, (see above, p.2oif.. )
3
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'Bruce to Clarendon, No. 22 of 16 Apr. 1857 in P.O. 78/1313.
because the progress of necessary works would suffer from any diminution 
of the receipts. However, should the government lease the railway to 
a company, the Viceroy would naturally look to receiving, in the shape 
of a bonus, or of an annual payment, some return for the heavy outlay 
he had made. The company therefore would be obliged to fix its tariff 
at the highest figure in order to meet this payment, and to realize 
the profit they would expect to derive from ttie railway considered as a 
commercial speculation.
Moreover, the transit duty on goods passing through Egypt had 
been gradually reduced by the influence of the British government from 
3°/o to V4°/o. Nevertheless it still weighed heavily on articles of 
small bulk and great value, which would probably constitute the chief 
articles of the transit trade. In this case, the Egyptian government, 
being the carrier, ought to look to its profit in that capacity, and 
should therefore abolish a duty which would check the development of 
trade. This would not be the case if the railway was handed over to 
a company. Furthermore, Bruce thought that without the active co-operation 
of the government, serious damage to the line could not be repaired, or 
the safety of the desert portion be adequately provided for. Finally, 
the moral pressure which Great Britain "as the representative of Eastern 
Trade in general, can wield, will be sufficient to introduce gradually 
such improvements as its administration may require; and will act with 
more force on the Government than it would on the Company of speculators".^
1Bruce to Clarendon, No. 22 of 16 Apr. 1857.
of the railway to a joint stock company.^ He also instructed Stratford de
2Redcliffe to request the Porte to give similar advice to tie Viceroy.
Never was a property more coveted by speculators than the Egyptian 
railway and the British Consul-Gene rad was ad ways on his guaird. In June 
1858, it was reported that some English capitalists had sought to obtain 
the railway as security for a loan. Green knew that Sabatier, the French 
Consul-Generad, had objected to such a transaction. Therefore Green 
considered this attitude would apply adso if the French, or any other, 
company desired the concession of the railway. Once more Green based 
his objection on the ferman which would also preclude its revenues
3being ceded to a company as security for loan. Malmesbury, the British
4Foreign Secretary, instructed Green to support Sabatier in his objections. 
Although this subject was not pushed further, Green decided to
inform Sa‘id of his having positive instructions from his government
5 <-to oppose any such transaction. Green referred Sa id to the attitude
of 1he British government and to the objections of Sabatier. Sa‘!d
replied that Sabatier had not mentioned the subject to him, but that he
1Emerson Tennent to Hammond, 15 May 1857 encl. in Clarendon to Bruce,
No. 26 of 18 May 1857 in F.O. 141/31.
pClarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe, No. 440 of 20 May 1857 in F.O.78/1247.
3Green to Alison, 24 June 1858 in F.O. 142/22.
^Malmesbury to Green, No. 2 of 9 July 1858 in F.O. 141/35.
c
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Clarendon instructed Bruce to use his influence to prevent the transfer
Green to Malmesbury, No. Ill of 17 July 1858 in F.O. 78/1402.
had quite given up the idea either of a loan or an issue of treasury 
b o n d s B u t  in 1859 steps were taken, in obedience to the commands
of the Sultan, for putting an end to the works for the commencement of
2the Suez Canal. The British government was informed that in this 
state of things, de Lesseps and his associates in the canal scheme 
would put forward excessive demands for the Pasha to meet. It was said, 
therefore, that the parties intended to propose in lieu of compensation 
the assignment of the railway between Alexandria and Suez. Consequently, 
Lord Russell, the then Foreign Secretary, asked Colquhou, the newly 
appointed British Consul-General, to defeat any attempt to carry out 
his scheme which would be against the conditions of the ferman of 
October 1851. Lord Russel added "the Pasha therefore by allowing himself 
to be cajoled or frightened into any agreement to assign the Railway 
to the Shareholders in Mr. Lesseps* abortive .scheme for the Canal would 
justly incur the displeasure of the Porte, while at the same time, in 
order to escape from a temporary inconvenience, he would deprive himself 
of the valuable revenue which he derives from the increasing traffic 
through Egypt". ^
Colquhoun confidentially mentioned to Sa*id the tactics that most 
probably de Lesseps and his associates would follow. Sa‘id assured 
Colquhoun that he would listen to no proposition of the kind; and he would
^Green to Malmesbury, No. 117 of 24 July 1858 in F.O. 78/1402.
2Colquhoun to Russell, No. 12 of 7 Oct. 1859 in F.O. 78/1468.
'Russell to Colquhou, No. 4 of 17 Oct. 1859 in F.O. 141/38.
throw all the onus of non-fulfilment of the scheme on the Porte,
Sa‘id added "in no case will I ever consent to place this railway
in the hands of Foreigners. I refused it to an English company (Mr.
Stephenson and Thurburn) and am resolved to keep an eitire control
over it, so you may assure the British Government”.1
However, fresh overtures were made in that respect on the arrival
in Egypt of Mr. Pastre, one of the wealthiest French merchants. It
was rumoured that some attempts were to be made to make over the
railway to the ”Compagnie Universelle”. Such appeared to have been
the case, but Sa‘id still kept his word. He is quoted to have told
an English merchant in his confidence ”je prefererai confer ma main
2droite plutCt, que de ceder mon Chemin de Fer”. True, Pastre came 
to Egypt to make a serious offer concerning the railway. On his arrival, 
he requested Thurburn to present him to Colquhoun, and he brought with 
him a letter of introduction from Britain, very strongly recommending 
him. He told Colquhoun that the Viceroy would be exposed to great 
pressure by de Lesseps and his associates, and would be urged, if 
unable to indemnify the company, to cede the railway as compension.
To encourage Sa*id to accede to this, an offer would be made of a 
considerable sum of ready money to enable him to satisfy his pressing 
creditors. Pastre was representing several large capitalists,
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1Colquhonn to Russell, No. 20 of 3 Nov. 1859 in F.O. 78/1468.
2Colquhoun to Russell, No. 75 of 11 Nov. 1859 in F.O. 78/1468.
both English and French, who had agreed to unite to frustrate this 
scheme of the Suez Canal shareholders. C. Devaux & Co. and other large 
capitalists of London, were his English supporters, and had charged 
him, as personally well acquainted with the Viceroy, to negotiate 
the purchase of the Egyptian railway.^
Pastre represented, as Colquhoun said, what was certainly the 
fact: that the mode in which the Pasha worked the railway was most 
defective; that he neglected the industrial and commercial object 
for which it was constructed; and that he offered a handle to those 
who advocated the necessity of a canal, and declared the railway in­
sufficient to satisfy the increasing demand of the Eastern trade.
On the other hand, Pastre did not fail to bring forward its many ad­
vantages. Under new management, the railway would develop the re­
sources of Upper Egypt; would extend and consolidate the legitimate 
influence of Britain in Egypt, the necessary result of material and 
commercial interest; by admitting French capitalists and some other 
personages in Paris to the subscription of the necessary capital, the 
French public might be conciliated, and the subscribers would derive 
the immediate advantages in the undertaking which the canal did not 
offer, and lastly; the canal scheme with its promoter and adherents would 
fall to the ground. Colquhoun was positively assured that Pastre was sup* 
ported by the P. & 0. Company, which was tohold a large amount of shares.
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1Colquhoun to Russell ( No. 29 Conf.) 19 Nov. 1858 in F.O. 78/1468.
In addition Pastre was also to interest one or two of the larger English 
houses in Alexandria. Colquhoun, following Foreign Office instructions, 
was extremely guarded in replying to Pastre. He informed him that 
while admitting there was very large room for improvement in the working 
and administration <f the railroad, he believed there was an insurmountable 
difficulty in carrying out his views, because of the condition in the 
ferman granted to ‘Abbas. He also refused to take any measures because 
of the known opposition of the Viceroy to ceding the railway to foreigners.1 
By I860, Sa‘id's financial position was precarious; his palace and
the Ministry of Finance were besieged by claimants. He succeeded in Sept-
2 *ember in getting a loan from French bankers to pay his creditors.
Yet, Sa‘id still needed loans and there were offerers of new ones subject
to various conditions. An English company, under Lionel Gisborne, who
3brought the transmarine cable to iigypt, offered to give Sa id within 
three weeks £lm. as a loan, provided Sa‘id would place in their hand the 
Alexandria-Suez railway for a term <f ten years. The said company would 
take over all tie rolling stock and work the railway on its own account. 
Colquhoun told the company’s agent that, inaldition to the often-avowed 
determination of Sa‘id not to remove the railway from under his own 
management, he also would feel bound not to support the proposal as the 
railway was never to be worked by private&ndividuals, or companies of what-
^Colquhoun to Russell (No. 29 Conf.), 19 Nov. 1859.
2Cf. Landes, Bankers and Pashas, pp. 106-108.
In 1856, he obtained concessions for the carrying of a telegraph line 
across Egypt in connection with laying a submarine cable from Constantinople 
to India (cf. Hoslcins, British Routes, p.376).
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ever nationality.^ In spite of this, Gisborne made repeated efforts 
to get this concession. Colquhoun was asked to increase the amount
I
offered to Sa‘id to £2m. paid down and to bear no interest, if Sa‘id 
agreed to lease the railway for the same period. Colquhoun did not 
forward the offer. Colquhoun could not close his eyes to the fact 
that ”if in the Firman... of the undertaking a proviso had been made 
that it should be purely, and entirely an Egyptian work, and that no 
European Company should be entrusted with its working; such provision
was a wise and proper one, so long as the Vice-ftoy is fair and impartial
2in his dealings with the various Governments”. European capitalists
nonetheless continued to make overtures to lease the railway during
«- - t  3the reigns of Sa id and Isma 11, but without success.
4. The settlement of Galloway^ claim against the Egyptian government.
Galloway, as discussed in Chapter One, was the first who undertook 
to construct a railway between Cairo and Suez. Muhammad *Ali gave him 
verbal and written orders and commissions for materials for a railway, 
which orders he withdrew as capriciously as he had given them. ‘Abbas, 
on the other hand, signed a contract with Robert Stephenson to construct 
the Alexandria-Cairo railway. Having found that the opportunity had slipped 
from hfa, Galloway wrote to Murray, British Consul-General, on 26 Feb.1852
1Colquhoun to Russell, No. 131 of 13 Sept. 1860 in F.01 78/1523; Letter 
from Gisborne dated 14 Sept. 1860 encl. in Russell to Colquhoun, No. 28 
of 20 Sept. 1860 in F.O. 141/42; also Landes, op.cit., p.227.
pColquhoun to Russell, No. 136 of 5 Oct. 1860 in F.O. 78/1523.
Saunders to Russell, No. 82 of 19 July 1862 in F.O. 142/26; see 
Landes, op.cit., p.227.
claiming compensation from the Egyptian government. Galloway 
stated that when finally in 1044 the railway project was given up, 
an express stipulation was made binding the Egyptian government, 
whenever the railway should be undertaking, to give him the contract 
for rails.
Murray replied that this verbal promise given to him by the 
reigning Viceroy could not, after a lapse of years, be construed into 
a legal obligation binding his successor. Murray told him that if he 
wished to establish a successful claim against the Egyptian government, 
he should produce documents to prove that the withdrawal or cancellation 
of the order for the remainder of the rails caused him anactual loss.
In the absence of such proofs, it was not in Murray’s power to call
2officially upon the Egyptian government to agree to Galloway’s demands.
Galloway stated that on two occasions he had written to inform the
administration of commerce that he could not suspend the orders for
iron already given in England without compensating the parties to whom
these orders had been ant. Murray had spoken to ‘Abbas and submitted
these demands in writing to the Egyptian government. The latter did
not consider Galloway’s claim legitimate. Murray informed Galloway that
he did not doubt his statement about the orders made for rails, but
Galloway neither showed nor named any sum that he had paid or been called
3upon to pay to these parties in the form cf compensation. Galloway then
^On ‘Abbas’s accession, Galloway submitted plans and estimates to him. 
Galloway thought that ‘Abbas refused to give him the order for the rails 
because he had identified himself too much with Sa‘id. (Alfred A. Pry
to Bruce, 28 Apr. 1856 in P.O. 141/30.)
^Murray to Galloway, 30 .Mar. and 5 Apr. 1852 in P.O. 142/17.
•^ Murray to Galloway, 4 May 1853 in P.O. 142/19.
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resolved to submit the question to arbitration, but Murray told him 
that without some such documents he could not successfully press the 
Egyptian government to accept arbitration.1
When Bruce succeeded Murray in 1853» he reviewed Galloway’s 
claim. He informed Clarendon-that it appeared that when Muhammad 
*Ali first dropped the project, in order to compensate Galloway for 
his disappointment, he commissioned him to supply whatever machinery 
he required for his various works in Egypt. When, therefore, Muframmad 
‘All again in 1843 proposed the construction of the railway, he com­
missioned Thurburn to purchase 1he materials. So this proved that 
Muhammad *Ali did not consider himself under any obligation to employ 
Galloway. Bruce was informed that the survey made in 1845 was a specu­
lation on the part of John Galloway, Galloway's brother, for which 
he received no order from Muhammad *Ali but merely permission to exe­
cute it. If these facts were correct, Bruce stated, Galloway’s claim 
fell to the ground and under these circumstances the Egyptian government
refused to consent to arbitration, alleging that the fact of referring
2a claim to arbitration was an admission that a claim existed.
Galloway's claim remained unsettled until Sard's reign. Bruce 
realised that before reopening the question with the Egyptian government, 
it must be satisfied that the claimant had a bona fide claim. The British 
government, however, could not press this demand for arbitration without
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1I4urray to Galloway, 14 May and 8 June 1853 in F.O. 142/19*
2Bruce to Clarendon, 27 Nov. 1853 in F.O. 78/966.
becoming a guarantor for the validity of the claim. The production
of such documentary proof was indispensable before his demand for
arbitration could be urged.^ In January 1856 5a‘id deputed de Lesseps
to inform Galloway that it was his intention Id put up to public tender
the remaining three quarters of the rails required for the Suez line.
Moreover, 3a‘id wished to have the particulars of Galloway’s claim
with a view to settling it amicably. Galloway accordingly sent in
such particulars. On 6 February 1856 de Lesseps wrote to Galloway
telling him that Sa‘id had taken cognisance of the claim and wished
it to pass through Bruce’s hands. Galloway's firm in London sent
2Alfred A. Fry to Egypt to terminate this long pending claim.
After a careful examination of the documents, Bruce found that 
the order was given to Galloway in writing. Galloway claimed the sum 
of £24,000 but Sa‘id thought it was excessive. Bruce succeeded in 
reaching an amicable settlement in which 2a‘id consented to give 
<£8,000 in cash as compensation for the losses incurred by the abandonment 
of machinery; and to add commission to the value of £110,000 as a sub­
stitute for that part <f the rails which remained to be supplied by
3Galloway when the work was stopped.
^Bruce to Clarendon (Separate) 27 Nov. 1855 in F.O. 142/20.
‘"Alfred Fry to Bruce, 28 Apr. 1856 in F.O. 141/30.
3Bruce to Clarendon, No. 34 of 15 July 1356 in F.O. 78/1222; Clarendon 
to Bruce, No. 23 of 31 July 1856 in F.O. 141/29; Galloway to Zoulfikar 
Pasha, 15 July 1856, enco. in Zoulfikar to Bruce, 20 July 1856, in F.O. 
141/30.
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Chapter IV
THE CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE RAILWAY
"In England, or indeed in Europe generally, 
or in North America, no limits would be placed 
on the inventive genius of an engineer, by 
any consideration as to the ability of workmen 
for conducting requisite operations; but in 
Egypt, where a prejudice exists in favour of 
employing native, and consequently unskilled 
labour, it was necessary to combine, if poss­
ible, superabundant power with the utmost sim­
plicity of management: and this has been at­
tained so completely that the Arabs, receiving 
less than four pence daily wages (out of which 
they have to purchase bread, their only provi­
sion), are quite equal to the nicest adjustments 
of this ponderous affair .... "
Quoted from Sopwith, Notes of 
a visit to Egypt, pp. 102-121 
in J. C. Jeaffreson, The life 
of Robert Stephenson. II, pp. 
175-176.
"It is a pity we cannot get the management of 
the railway into our own hands."
A comment of an English passen< 
ger five years after the com­
pletion of the railway, (see 
below p. 287, footnote 2 )
1. The Programme of Construction ofthe Alexandria-Suez Railway:
a) The Correspondence on the Programme of Arrangements:
The original plan under Muhammad *Ali was to construct a 
railway from Alexandria to Suez, but begin with the Cairo-Suez line 
to bridge the most difficult portion cf the overland route. Galloway 
was the planner of this line which he had surveyed and mapped. The 
entire length of the road, as estimated in Galloway's plan, from 
the grand depOt at Cairo to Suez, was 84 miles and the general 
character of the ground was favourable.1 Galloway's project takes 
up a large share of the diplomatic correspondence of the time. Never­
theless, there were others who were interested in the construction of 
an Egyptian railway. This is seen in the documents that another 
proposition was made by Adams & Co. in 1848, for the (instruction of 
a railway to Suez on a new and more economic basis. We do not know 
the fate of this proposition, to whom it was presented, or whether 
it was communicated to Muhammad *Ali. Apart from political opposition, 
a railway across the desert from Suez to the Mediterranean was ex­
posed to severe attacks from its opponents, as being impracticable 
from the engineering point of view. It had always been claimed that
fallow ay, Observations, p.24., P.P.,_1837 (539) VI, App. 2., p. 588; 
M.A. Sassuna, Migr vaT 1-turuq al-fradidiyya, pp. 78-84; see mapfp.^o3
^F.0. 14l/l4. It appears from the report (dated London 15 June 1848; 
that Adams & Co. were employed on the construction of the Eastern 
Counties railway in England. The report was probably presented to 
the British government, but no further evidence is extant.
no railway could be laid in any part of the desert on account of 
the shifting sand. Even if it could, no harbour could possibly 
be built on that portion of the Mediterranean coast, capable of 
affording wharfage either for steamers or merchant ships. These 
assumptions had never convinced the supporters of the line. In 
a report to the President of the Board of Trade, these objections 
were thoroughly dealt with as "on these plains, no sand ever is 
known to rest, and for this simple reason that when a substance 
almost as fine as cephalic snuff, is impelled onwards by the im­
petuosity of the desert winds, it cannot by any possibility rest 
upon smooth and polished surface, but it acts precisely as we 
find the fine snow, in a snow storm, it settles in enormous wreaths 
behind the first hill, rock or mountain that lies in its course, 
and there it remains until removed by the wind in another direction".^ 
Yet the technical objections were less effective in delaying the 
construction of the railway than the many modifications made since 
1834 in accordance with changes in external policies.
On the accession of ‘Abbas, the railway was adopted for politi- 
2 ^
cal purposes. Abbas applied to Robert Stephenson, one of the most 
eminent engineers of his time. Stephenson had already been to Egypt 
twice and had, among other things, studied the possibility of building
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^Report on the railway dated July 1849 in F.O. 97/411. 
2See Chapter II.
the Suez Canal. VThile he was in Egypt in 1850, ‘Abbas discussed 
with him the construction of a railway at first from Alexandria 
to Cairo, and not between Cairo and Suez, for political reasons.^"
In February 1851» ‘Abbas had asked Charles Murray, British Consul- 
General, to get Stephenson's advice and assistance in making the
preliminary arrangements for this railroad with the least possible
2delay. After this a period of negotiations and correspondence 
started.
In March 1851» Murray wrote to Stephenson, on behalf of ‘Abbas, 
tendering the offer of the entire superintendence of the contemplated 
railroad from Alexandria to Cairo. Murray informed Stephenson that 
‘Abbas was prepared to place full responsibility and full management 
in his, Stephenson’s hands. ‘Abbas was personally financing the 
railway project, and preferred no interference from boards or com­
mittees as there would be no subscription. If Stephenson accepted,
*Abbas required a rough but comprehensive estimate as soon as 
possible. The specific points requiring clarification were: cost
of all materials to be used; amount of labour; number of European 
employees; Stephenson’s opinion of and estimated costs of a double 
track as against a single one; and estimation of date for completion
^See above,pp. 124^ *5 ; also cf. Sopwith, Notes of a visit to Egypt, 
p. 124. The commencement with the Alexandria-Cairo line is often 
interpreted by economists as being due to purely economic reasons 
regardless_of political considerations. Dr. Lahi£ah (Ta’rikh Migr 
al-iqtigadi, p.207) wrongly believes that it was Stephenson who 
suggested to Abbas the construction of the line at first from 
Alexandria to Cairo, to transport the materials for the construction 
of the Cairo-suez line when decided upon. He assumes that the
(cont.)
of the railway. With regard to iron rails, Stephenson knew that 
the considerable quantity imported by Galloway long ago still lay 
in the government store. Wood for sleepers and stone for ballast 
would have to be brought from considerable distances and ‘Abbas 
was anxious that no time should be lost in arrivig at an approximate 
figure.1
Stephenson accepted the appointment from ‘Abbas. His idea was 
to divide the ground between Cairo and Alexandria into two districts, 
each to be superintended by a resident engineer. These engineers 
would be co-equal, one making his residence at Cairo, the other at 
Alexandria. To each would be attached a chief assistant capable 
of acting in case of illness or casual absence, and two other assist­
ants - one a competent surveyor and the other a good draughtsman, 
but all qualified to take part in the general business. In addition 
to these, there would be an accountant, with his assistant. There 
must also be a store-keeper at Alexandria to receive and distribute 
the materials imported from abroad, and a clerk to help him keep the 
necessary register. The European staff would therefore consist of 
the following: two resident engineers, two chief assistants, four
(cont.) commencement of the Suez line first would need the conveyance 
of the materials by the Nile but this would cost much because of the 
small size of the river boats.
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 2 of 17 Feb. 1851 in F.O. 78/875.
^Murray to Stephenson, 1 Mar. 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2. There is 
a letter enclosed from ‘Abbas in Turkish dated Rajab 1267.
assistants, two accountants, a store-keeper and three clerks.
Two qualified dragomans would be attached to each establishment
and as many native assistants as might be found necessary.1 Sub­
divisions for local superintendence would be spaced about every 
12 miles.^ To each of these districts there would be appointed 
one thoroughly practical man as inspector and foreman under the 
direction of the engineer, to superintend work requiring skilled 
labour, such as bridges, culverts and the permanent way. Twelve 
plate-layers would have to be added to this number. Stephenson 
suggested that the iron-way probably might be done cheaper and 
better by contractors from Europe, who were accustomed to such work.
The materials required, for the railway, were to be imported.
Stephenson preferred the use of iron sleepers throughout the perman- 
3ent way. As for the iron rails the quantity for the single perman­
ent way (with double lines where necessary) would approach 40,000 ton,
1Stephenson to Murray, 24 Mar., 5 Apr. 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
2These were in the following places:
l) Cairo to the Barrage 
2 ft 3) The Barrage to Terranch_/al-Xarrana7
4) al-farrana to Teirieh /al-Tayriyya/
5) al-^ayriyya to Kantarah Kafr Boulin /Qanfrarat Kafr Buiin/
6) Qanjarat Kafr Buiin to Ramses /Ramsis/
7 ft 8) Ramsis_to /Damanhur/
9 & lo )  Damanhur to el-Careon /al-Karyun/
11 ft 12) al-Karyun to Alexandria
The names of these places have been checked and corrected according 
to:_ Bionet Beya Dictionnaire geographique. pp. 461, 563, 564, 567; 
Filib Jallad, Qamus al-idara wa 1-qada . Alexandria, 1890, IV, pp. 1765 
1774, 1778, 1783; Mubarak, X, 51; XIII, 34, XV, 5. All these places 
were in the Butyayra province.
3See above g*. 156-57.
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but could be reduced to 500 tons if those in government store were 
equal to 40 miles of single track.1
Stephenson took into account the season when operations would 
be begun with regard to the warm weather. The proper setting out of 
the line and works might occupy about four months, during which no 
great force of men would be required. But immediately afterwards, 
it would be necessary to have at command a body of from 15,000 to 
20,000 men, whom he supposed would be marshalled by the shaykhs of 
the different towns on the requisition of the resident engineer.
This force would need to be increased from time to time as the work 
proceeded. A considerable number of camels and horses must also be 
provided for the transport of the materials.
The costs would be about £840,000, an analysis of which was: 
£^50,000 for earthwork and bridges, £280,000 for rails and permanent 
way, £10,000 for stations and rolling stock (which included ten 
engines with necessary carriages and wagons) and £70,000 for engineer­
ing superintendence and a balance of £40,000 for contingencies in­
cluding the additional force of European inspectors. The workmen 
would be paid by accredited agents of the Pasha in each sub-district, 
on the certificate of the engineer. Those payments were to be weekly 
and in the presence of the district inspector who would duly report 
to the resident engineer and so have it accounted. Stephenson wrote
Stephenson asked to be authorized to apply for tenders to a few of 
the principal houses, and such tenders should be delivered to him in 
London.
•'I may be too European in my notions on this point 
and the detail must necessarily be settled on the 
spot, although I am sure you will agree with me 
that English character must be maintained in this 
particular, and that on the completion of the works 
His Highness the 1 asha should know exactly how his 
money has been spent, and what the work has actually 
cost himM.l
Finally, Stephenson asked for £20,000 to be placed to his credit, 
or secured to him in London, to cover the passage-money and advances 
of those whom he would dispatch to Egypt and must pay in advance.
Before this programme was received in Egypt, ‘Abbas had decided 
to send Nubar Bey to England to confer with Stephenson on the con­
struction of the line with full powers to make the necessary contracts. 
Murray observed to Stephenson that it was hi^ily desirable that com­
missions for the purchase of iron, machinery and other requisites should
be handled directly in England and not through British merchants in 
2^gypt. On the receipt of the programme of arrangements, Murray laid 
it before ‘Abbas who approved it with two modifications. He thought 
that the two accountants, the store-keeper and the three clerks might 
be dispensed with, as persons might be found in Egypt capable of dis­
charging those duties. The other modification was that he preferred 
that the bridges should be made of masonry and not of iron. Thus, it 
seemed to Murray that ‘Abbas wished to take the whole responsibility of
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^Stephenson to Murray, 5th Apr. 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
^Murray to ‘-tephenson (Private), 17 Apr. 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
the cost and labour upon himself and to leave to Stephenson 
only that of the technical side. Murray regretted this "on account 
of our national reputation in Egypt, as the poor laborers will doubt­
less get much worse paid than they would if paid by us, but I fear 
this is a matter in which we can not interfere otherwise than by 
friendly remonstrance and representation".^
Stephenson did not say a word against the modifications sug­
gested by *Abbas although they considerably limited his responsibility, 
and at the same time somewhat removed the control of expenditure 
out of his hands; and the total cost was, therefore, left more un­
certain. He could not object to the use of stone or brick instead 
of iron for the bridges, as it would bring out native industry and 
talent, but iron might be the cheapest. His insistence on the necessity 
of making contracts for materials to be sent from England direct 
with the parties supplying them was certainly not to prevent the 
merchants having every fair and legitimate commission, but to avoid 
such enormous increases in price as he was informed were usual in 
Egypt. If such costs were to be allowed for procuring the materials 
it would be impossible to confine the price of the undertaking within 
the estimate which he had submitted. That was why he suggested the 
contracts. After further consideration and before he received Murray's 
letter, Stephenson revised the European staff. He added that Abbas's
1
Murray to Stephenson, 4 May 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
suggestions would require some, but no very material, modifications 
of personnel.'*' Stephenson welcomed Nubar's presence as it would 
tend greatly to remove any anxiety or difficulty. He described 
him as an * intelligent and agreeable1 gentleman.
b) The Engineering Contract for the Alexandria-Cairo Section:
Although the discussion in London between Nubar and Stephenson
was fruitful, there were some details which Nubar did not feel at
2liberty to decide. Michael Andrews Borthwick, Stephenson’s agent,
went to Egypt to explain all the details to *Abbas, and to conclude
3the contract which was signed at Kafr Magar on 12 July 1851. Stephen­
son was thereby entrusted with the planning and supervising of all 
work and buildings and to supply technicians from England, but had 
to supply all surveying and mathematical instruments, drawing mater­
ials and books at his own expense. The Egyptian government agreed to 
pay a sum of £56,000 which was split up as follows: £16,000 on 1st
August following the date of agreement, and a further five half yearly 
instalments of £8,000 each from February 1852 to February 1854. Further­
more, the Egyptian government undertook to provide the engineering 
staff with suitably furnished offices, together with stabling for 
the horses. ‘Abbas was to provide competent medical staff and all 
necessary medicines for the engineers. The staff were to be provided
^Stephenson to Murray, % May 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
2(1810-1856) see: Min. of proceedings of the Institute of Civil 
Engineers, XVI (1857), pp. 108-113.
■^Stephenson to Murray, 20 June 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2; The Times,
23 June 1851, p. 4;
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with tents for their accommodation. The government further agreed 
to supply native labour, overseers, materials, impliments etc.
Both parties agreed that if the work were delayed beyond three 
years from September 1851 for reasons beyond Stephenson's control, 
he should receive £800 for each month or part of one for the contin­
uation of his services. However, if the delay were caused by Stephenson
or his staff, he was bound to remain on the work until it was completed.
On 21 July 1851, Borthwick wrote to Murray that he was fully 
authorized, immediately on his return to England, to start recruiting 
staff. He accordingly aksed for the supply of tents. These should 
not be a casual encampment but staff houses and offices during the 
work. He thought that the resident engineers should make their head­
quarters at Cairo and Alexandria, probably in rooms attached to the
offices. Each of the four district engineers would require an encampment 
for which the ordinary military camp would obviously not suffice for
so long a period of residence. Accommodation would be necessary as
2half-way resting house.
*Abbas immediately complied with the conditions stipulated in 
the contract. On 6 August 1851, Murray transmitted to Borthwick a 
letter of credit from the P. & 0. agent in Egypt for the sum of £16,000
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See above, p. 144 ; the contract is published in Wiener, L'figypte et 
se_s chemins de fer, Appendix A, pp. 641-644.
^Borthwick to Murray, 21 July 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
as arranged on account from the £56,000. On 20 Dhu*l Qa ada 1267/
16 Sept. 1851, *Abbas issued an order to the Katkhuda Pasha for the 
establishment and opening of three offices (one at Alexandria, 
another at Cairo and the third half-way between the two) for the arrange­
ment of the special needs for the railway, and the appointment of a 
qualified and energetic mudir (director) to facilitate the require­
ments of the engineers, and to watch their work. ‘Abdallah Bey 
(known as al-Injlizi) was appointed Mudir *Amm (director-general) 
of these three offices because of his sound experience and under­
standing. He had also given orders that all the administrative 
councils of Cairo and Alexandria should follow the advice of this 
imdir and carry out his orders immediately. But if any negligence 
or delay occurred concerning the supply of the railway material, 
the mudir of the council responsible and his deputy should be referred 
immediately to Majlis al-Afrkam al-Migriyya (the Council of Judicial
•Z
Decisions) to be punished for this negligence, according to the law.
These orders were duly circulated to the councils in Cairo and Alex-
4andria. On 18 September, Nubar ordered in London the necessary
5materials, including coaches, engines and cast iron for the rails.
'Scatkhuda Pasha ro Murray, 5 Aug. 1851 and Borthwick to Murray, 6 Aug.
1851 in P.O. 141/19 Pt. 2.
2Formerly Captain Henry Collingwood Selby Rickards, an English officer 
converted to Islam. He spoke Arabic fluently. Under Muframmad Ali, 
he was in charge of the coal stores for Ihe transit at Shubra, at a 
salary of £E5. For his new post as director, he received a monthly 
salary of £E8C.(See Wiener, op.cit., p. 69; tfagsuna, op.cit., pp. 97-98.)
3See Deny, Sommaire des archives turques du Caire, pp. 123-4.
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Stephenson’s proposal was for a line to proceed almost direct
from Alexandria to Cairo, up the west side of the Delta (which was
perfectly level) by al-Karyun, Damanhur, Ramsis, al-^ayriyya, al-
'farrana, the Barrage and thence to Cairo. He selected this route
to avoid the permanent way crossing the branches of the Nile, thus
obviating the building of enormous number of small bridges over a
great many canals. It was also preferable to make this short route
because either only a ditch on each side, or a small embankment of
three or four feet high was required. Except for these, there was
little else requiring to be done; the canals were very few in number
and very narrow.^ The same line was suggested in an article written
The Builder in February 1851. The writer of the article thought
that the line should skirt the desert, avoid the more cultivated
districts and then terminate at Giza, opposite Cairo. For this line,
there were no insurmountable physical obstacles. Moreover, it could
be built efficiently at such a reasonable cost as would give guarantee
2of remuneration to the contractors.
-(cont.)
Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 170, 7 Oct. 1851, M.A.E., C.P., 
tom. 23; Stephenson to Murray, 25 Aug. 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
1P.P., 1851 (605) XXI, p. 903.
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c) The T&nfra line and Stephenson*3 subsequen t Re-arrangements: 
However, *Abbas had different views as to the course of the 
line. He wished the railway to pass by way of Tan$a so that it might 
run through the centre of the Delta, where the greaterpart of the 
produce of Lower Egypt Egypt might be easily collected for trans­
mission to Alexandria.^ Prom a letter sent from Nubar to his brother 
in Egypt, *Abbas learned that Stephenson was strongly against this 
plan. Murray informed Stephenson that ‘Abbas was aware of the 
difficulties of crossing the two branches of the Nile, but notwith­
standing was anxious that Stephenson should attempt to overcome those 
obstacles. The greater part of the opposition now offered to the 
construction of the railroad was due to its skirting the desert and 
leaving the traffic of the richest part of Egypt undeveloped. "It is 
this," Murray wrote, "which gives a plausible colouring to the argu­
ments of those who pretend that the Railway is an English job, and
not an undertaking desired, or calculated to advance the commerce
2and internal traffic of this country". When Borthwick had been told
of this a few months earlier, he said he had no objection to it.
%
However, if he did have a preference it was for the route already 
submitted to ‘Abbas. To meet ‘Abbas's wishes, he surveyed the land 
between Cairo and Kafr al—Zayyat, from there on to the Ma^mudiyya feeder 
to Fuwwah. Enough detail was accumulated to enable another report to
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^The Times, 28 Aug. 1851.
2Murray to Stephenson, 6 Sept. 1851 in P.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
be sent from England on the whole subject.^
When Borthwick arrived in London, he laid before Stephenson
the particulars of the suggested line to fanja, Stephenson informed
Murray that he had serious doubts about the bridges which could not
be allayed without further personal inspection in October 1851.
Meanwhile no time would be lost as the preliminary operations
(which would be chiefly near Cairo and Alexandria) were common to
the two lines, and for these two lines, the staff would be sent
2out by the packet boat of 20 September. He believed that crossing 
the Nile twice would involve great problems, not merely regarding 
the construction but the future working of the line. However, he 
assured ‘Abbas that the whole subject should have his serious attention.^ 
Borthwick with the assistance of Swinburne and Rouse, the two engineers 
in charge of the Cairo and Alexandria divisions, made the necessary ob­
servations of the yan^a line so that the whole matter would be ripe
4for Stephenson*s decision upon his arrival. However, the construction 
of the railway remained speculative until ‘Abbas received the Porte’s
5feiman in November 1851 signifying its approval of the railway contract.
1Borthwick to Murray, 21 July and 6 Aug. 1851 in P.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
2Stephenson to Murray, 25 Aug. 1851 in F.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
■^Stephenson to Murray, 19 Sept. 1851 in P.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
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^Borthwick to Murray, 11 Oct. 1851 in P.O. 14l/l9 Pt. 2.
^See above,pp.172-75.
Consequently the engineers started the surveys,1 but were awaiting
Stephenson's arrival before the final decision on the exact course 
2to be followed.
Having visited Egypt in December, Stephenson finally submitted 
to Murray the modified arrangements. He said that when he visited 
Egypt in 1850 the question was simply a means of communication between 
Cairo and Alexandria. Looking at the Barrage, then progressing towards 
completion, it at once solved the difficulty at tending any crossing 
of the Nile, and he had not hesitated to advise a route in which the 
Barrage could be available. But now, observing no activity in the 
work of the Barrage, and recognising the importance of opening up 
the resources of so rich and productive a district as he saw on his 
late journey through-the Delta, Stephenson came to the conclusion that 
"it /was/best for Egypt to carry the line by way of Tanta and Benha"
The Timesl8 Oct. 1851. When the construction began the engineering staff 
was arranged as follows: divided at about midway by the Nile, at Kafr
al-Zayyat, the Alexandria-Cairo railway had two separate corps of 
engineers, one for the district north, the other for the district south 
of the Nile. Borthwick acted as resident engineer and supervisor of 
both divisions. Under him were H. J. Rouse (having the ordinary con­
trol of the northern half of the line) and Mr. Swinburne (having the entire 
southern half). Rouse was assisted at his headquarters in Alexandria by 
Mr. Pringle; and at Cairo, where Swinburne had his quarters, the principal 
sub-assistant engbeer was Mr. Duff. Belonging to Rouse's corps were the 
following engineers: Mr. Anger and Mr. Bidder, Jun. (stationed between
Kengis Osman and Damanhur)^ J.H. Stanton and Joseph Harrison (appointed 
to the part between Damanhur and the Nile. Belonging to Swinburne's 
division were Mr. Fowler and Mr. Vaughan stalioned at Banha; Mr. Rushton 
and Mr. Hardcastle employed on the line between Cairo and the Nile.
In addition, there were the surveyors, Mr. Graham and Mr. Preston, (with 
Cheffins, Jun. as assistant), and the architect of the stations, Mr. Ed­
ward Baines (jeaffreson, The life of Robert Stephenson, II, p.179).
2The Times, 4 Dec. 1851.
^Stephenson to Murray, 22 Lee. 1351 in F.O. 141/19 Pt. 2.
His inspection of the new roads had completely satisfied Stephenson 
of the competence of the native labour for the embankments. When all were 
constructed, including the bridges except those of Banha, Birkat al-Sabe 
and Kafr al-Zayyat, he advised a contract with an English contractor of 
great experience for the laying of the permanent way. This part of the work 
would require a considerable amount of skilled labour, and upon its per­
fection depended the efficiency and safety of the railway. He suggested 
bringing not more than twenty English platelayers into Egypt. Under the 
guidance of these skilled men, a large number of Egyptians, probably two 
or three thousand to be paid by the contractors, would be required. Some 
of these in the progress cf the work would become acquainted with the pro­
cess requisite in the construction and maintenance of this vital part of 
the railway. It was also hoped that by the time the whole work was com­
pleted the majority of the men would be sufficiently expert to undertake 
the upkeep of the road, and consequently, very shortly after the opening of 
the line, foreign assistance, could be almost completely dispensed with.
He added
»
"in the commencement however it is essential that a few 
experienced English labourers, should be mixed with the 
Egyptians to teach them all the minutiae required to be 
known. In England even at this time very few labourers, 
comparatively speaking, are competent to the task of laying 
down and adjusting the permanent way with the necessary 
precision and solidity; it is in fact a process requiring 
some amount of mechanical judgment, combined with skilful 
manipulati ~>n. which have been acquired gradually in England 
and other countries, but in the commencement of railways 
Prance and Germany had similar assistance from England to 
that which is now proposed for Egypt.
"^Stephenson to Murray, 22 Dec. 1851.
After further thought Stephenson said that though his original 
view of the single line was correct making the single line meant half 
the work would be done and to repeat this process at a later date to make 
double line would be much more expensive. Therefore, he recommended 
that all the embankments and ordinary masonry necessary for a double 
line between Alexandria and Kafr al-Zayyut should be made. The perm­
anent way and large bridges at Banha and Birkat al-Sab‘ however should 
only carry single track for the time being. Stephenson drew up a 
sketch of the general conditions between *Abbas and any contractor 
for the laying and maintenance of the permanent way on the single 
line between Alexandria and Cairo. The Egyptian government would 
deliver materials for the permanent way to such places alongthe line, 
as would be defined by Stephenson from time to time. The government 
would aid the contractor in obtaining native labour. Then when the 
work to be executed under this contract was completed, Stephenson 
was to certify the same, and the contractor was to maintain the works 
for a period of three months, commencing from the date of such a 
certificate of completion. Furthermore, the contractor was to provide 
all native and foreign labour with all tools and implements and every 
other article requisite for the execution of his contract from his 
taking possession of the permanent way material to the completion of 
the contract.^"
^Conditions of a contract to be entered into between Abbas and...., 
for the laying and maintenance of the permanent way, encl. in 
Stephenson to Murray, 22 Dec. 1851.
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Finally, it was decided to make the fanja line. ‘Abbas 
declared that he meant to finish the railway within two or three 
years, even if it cost twice the estimate. He dealt with the con­
tractors personally, granting the necessary permits; but he declined 
to take any further part in the progress of the actual work. Edward 
Price, an English contractor, was the chief contractor of the railway. 
He started the line at both ends simultaneously supplying material 
directly.^"
But did ‘Abbas wish to construct the fan$a line to annul French 
opposition? As far back as the 19 July 1851, Le Moyne, the French 
Consul-General, asked ‘Abbas’s secretary what profit could the Delta
get from a railway which would connect Cairo with Alexandria, passing
2round the edge of the desert? Which provinces would gain by it?
On the other hand, Le Moyne criticised the line passing through the 
Delta. He reported to his government that this course would meet 
obstacles and delays which would long postpone completion. He added 
that it would be more expensive than a railway skirting the desert 
along the left bank of the Nile, as it would mean building two huge 
bridges. It would surely, he said, have been cheaper and quicker to 
cut a canal through the Isthmus of Suez.^ It did not really matter
252.
Wiener, op.cit, p.73.
2 ^
Arakel Nubar to ‘Abbas's private secretary, 19 July 1851 encl. in 
Murray to Palmerston, No. 20 conf. of 2 Aug 1851 /no. 8l7in .F.0.424/7A.
^Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 172, 19 Oct. 1851, M.A.E., C.P., 
tom. 23. Delaporte said that the direction proposed by Stephenson 
was the shortest and less expensive but "qu^ la^fanatisme et la con- 
venance personnelles de l'ancien Vice-Roi /_ Abbas/ont rejetee pour
(cont.)
i
much to the French representative which course was adopted, but he
wished to see the railway entirely abandoned in favour of-the canal.
The French representative very much disliked seeing British employees
engaged on the construction. He comments
"pour fair ce Chemin de Fer, on se servira 
d'Ingenieurs Anglais, - une fois termine /sicJ  
comme il est deja etabli pour le Transit, le 
service se fera par des Anglais, l'on ne pourra 
point confier aux mains des Habitants, l’entre- 
tien d*une Houte, d'ou depend la vie de tant de 
Personnes, il faut encore la un materiel Anglais.
L1Influence change, la Politique aussi, 1'argent 
repandu fait qu*a la Fin S.A. se trouve obligee 
de passer par la ou l'on voudra, et quelque temps 
apres, elle verra, mais trop tard, qu’elle n*est 
plus maltresse chez elle, et qu'elle s'est donne 
un maitre exigeant la ou elle ne demandait qu'un 
appuis. La Vegetation poussevite en Egypte.
Aujourd’hui c'est un Arbrisseau, demain c'est un 
arbre. Quelques Annees seulement ont suffi pour 
faire cette Transformation".1
Linant de Beliefonds, in his Memoires, criticised the course of 
the line through Lake MarvuJ;. For fear of flooding the railway em­
bankment, the drainage of all the provinces oould no longer flow into 
the lake. This, he said,had the twofold disadvantage of not allowing 
the land to be watered enough and preventing the flood waters from
(cont.) favoriser Tanta et Benha." (Delaporte to Drouyn, No. 159, 
14 Aug. 1854, M.A.E., C.C., tom. 29).
Arakel Nubar to Abbas private sec. encl. in Murray to Palmerston, 
No. 20 Conf. of 2 Aug. 1851.
.depositing enough silt.^ Furthermore, he was critical of the line
through the heights of Damanhur. He comments "on a dit que cela
etait une malice d*Abbas-Pacha contre son oncle; est-il possible
que des ingenieurs respectables aient pu consentis a un fait
semblable? Cela ne peutfetre, et ilfaut un autre motif, car
• 2en ce point certainement le trace est fautif". He thought that 
from Tan£a, it would have been better for the railway to go directly
to Suez through Wadi al-Tumaylat, instead of diverting it via Cairo
3 4across the desert to Suez. But a modern writer says that most
of these criticisms were without foundation. The scheme for periodic
flooding, introduced by Mufcammad 4Ali, disposed of those concerning
the passage of Lake MaryuJ;, and the railway benefited from serving
towns which could bring traffic to it, instead of following the
edge of the desert where it could not pick up anything.
The railwayvbs not completed in three years as was required
in the contract. When- * Abbas died in 1854, the railway had reached
Kafr al-*I$ opposite Kafr al-Zayyat. At the other end, the line
between Cairo and Banha was approaching completion, but a considerable
time would elapse before the two bridges across the Nile were
5  t-r i -finished. When Sa id succeeded Abbas, he was dissatisfied with
the manner in which the work was being conducted. A misunderstanding
^Memoires sur les principaux travaux d*utilite publique executes en Egypte,
pp. 498-99.
2Linant, Mempires, p.499*
3Linant, op.cit., p.499.
4Wiener, op.cit., p.72.
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^Bruce to Clare-.ion, No. 10 of 2 Apr. 1854 in F.O.78/1035.
soon arose between Stephenson and the Egyptian government. This 
was due to delays in work and difficulties in construction of the 
bridges across the Nile. Sa‘id's financial difficulties also played 
a part in developing this misunderstanding. He was greatly annoyed 
at the idea of having to pay £800 per month, according to the contract, 
for what he considered no fault of the government.^ To remedy this 
state of things, Lee Green, the Director of the Transit, told Borth­
wick that he was pushing on the work as far as furnishing men and 
materials. He hoped that Borthwick would also instruct the resident 
engineers to do their utmost to ensure all being finished by the 
end of 1855. One of the engineers, Mr. Rouse, also came in for 
criticism because of the methods he was adopting in his section.
His interference in the official details of the service was rejected. 
Green's opinion was that the engineers had little to do but to lend 
their assistance in details upon which the government might be ig­
norant. After making this complaint about Mr. Rouse, Green concluded 
"the time has come, when the stations and plant on the line ought 
to be handed over to us and whatever is wanting for the works
carrying on, I as Director on the part of the government ought to
2be consulted before anything is appropriated."
Borthwick referred this letter to Stephenson, who assured Green 
that he was very glad of this and "indeed only undertook the thankless
^The Times, 31 Aug. 1855.
pLee Green to Borthwick, 21 Feb. 1855 encl. in Borthwick to Bruce,
9 Mar. 1855 in P.O. 141/28.
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and ultra professional commission of signing contracts to save 
the difficulty thayseemed to present itself on the change of government, 
at the same time my opinion is what it was four years ago when in 
my first Report upon the Railway in Egypt I entered a quiet protest 
against the commercial system then existing and which I do trust is 
not to be renewed to the injury of the country and the discredit of 
those who may have the honour of giving advice to His Highness" . 1 
Stephenson stated that the Viceroy could not be more annoyed than he 
was at the prolonged execution of the works which had arisen from 
no cause within his control. The bridges and ferry were not even 
contemplated when his agreement with the government was made. About 
Rouse’s conduct, he was sure that he had done a public good and 
ought to have credit for it, even if he had erred in arrogating 
functions that did not strictly belong to him. Notwithstanding, 
Stephenson did instruct Rouse to avoid any additional responsibility 
in the working of the line. He should confine himself strictly to 
the duties of construction, retaining over the working only such 
a check that no train would be started without his previous knowledge 
and sanction> in order to have no accident arising from the state 
of the work. Stephenson also did not wish Rouse to retain any control 
over the station buildings beyond the expressed requirements of the 
government, and did not regret being freed from responsibility and 
expense, which were voluntary on his part and not contained in the
256.
^Stephenson to Lee Green, 9 Mar. 1851 encl. in Borthwick to Bruce, 
9 Mar. 1855 in P.O. 141/28.
agreement.'*' The English engineers viewed this matter as "there
is more meant than meets the eye and that English honour more than
2English interests may be concerned".
Sa‘id, however, placed the misunderstanding between the
Egyptian government and Stephenson, in the hands of the British
Consul-General and showed his readiness to abide by any decision
made by the latter. Bruce said that the line would be finished by 
3October 1855. It was not until January 1856 that the Alexandria-
4Cairo railway was completed, a distance of 210 kilometres. Trains
passed from each city each alternate day until Oct. 1856, when
5daily trains were established. Pending the construction of a 
bridge at Kafr al-Zayyat, connection between the two sections of 
the line was maintained by a steam ferry.
d) The Cairo-Suez Section:
Sa‘id decided in May 1855 to continue the railway to Suez.
The work was to be carried out at the Pasha's expense under the
direction of Mouchelet, a French engineer. The absence of any serious 
obstacles to this extension, and the good disposition of Sa‘id made 
Mouchelet hope that a year would be enough to complete the line. 
Sabatier, the French Consul-General, bearing in mind the difficulties
"^Extract from Borthwick's letter to Rouse, 9 Marc, 1851 encl. in Borth­
wick to Bruce, 9 Mar. 1851.
2Borthwick to Bruce, 9 Mar. 1851.
The French agent wrote: "je viens de parcourir cette voie ferree
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 15 of 21 May 1855 in F.O. 142/18.
4
with which even a well devised project met in Egypt, did not share 
the confidence of the engineer that the line would be completed 
towards the middle of 1857. Many obstacles delayed progress.
It was only in September 1855 that the preliminary work began.
On the other hand, the government, after promising the help of 
several thousand workers,could only provide a few hundred.^
To these first difficulties were added others about the course 
of the line. The requirements of the government complicated, to 
some extent, the engineers's task. Mouchelet was guided by three 
orders: not to damage under any pretext any house or enclosed
property; to spare as far as possble private property; and to spend 
as little as possible. For all that apart from an area of cultivated 
land round Cairo, only desert lay between Cairo and Suez. The 
postal route was straight between the two cities and that was the 
shortest way. Yet there were two inconveniences in following it. 
First, it would have been necessary to go through the cultivated 
lands surrounding Cairo. Private properties on the outskirts of 
Cairo were very valuable, and to compensate the owners, it would
(cont.) (jui est fort douce et solidement etabli. Le voyage est des 
plus agreable, on arrive a Alexandrie en 7 heures." (Delaporte 
to Walewski, No. 198, 22 Jan. 1856, M.A.E., C.C., tom.29).
5Sopwith, Notes of a visit to Egypt, p.125.
^Benedetti to Walewski, No. 12, 26 Sept. 1851, M.A.E., C.C., tom.35.
have been necessary to pay 15»000 to 18,000 francs per hectare. 
Secondly, the desert was divided by the end of the chain of the 
Muqa{J;am mountains, which rose to 500 metres above sea-level.
The postal route went through these and crossed them at Jabal 
‘Uwayba.^ Nevertheless, the railway had to go from Cairo ro Suez 
by the most direct route.
Sabatier said that these requirements were incompatible 
with the conditions imposed on Mouchelet and made the obstacles 
much greater than they had seemed at first. In order to deviate 
as little as possible from his instructions, Mouchelet had to 
renounce the idea of a straight line and to divide it into four 
sections connected by bends to go round the base of the mountain.
By these means all the cultivated lands, round Cairo, could be 
left to their proprietors and not one saqiya (water wheel) would 
be sacrificed. Moreover, to avoid levelling, Mouchelet had to 
give up the idea of a line all on the same level and had to 
build a series of small lines with combined level and slopes.
After crossing the peak of the mountain, the railway went down
towards Suez on a continual slope which was softened by two
2bends. Thus, the Suez line started at Cairo station, breaking away 
from cultivated ground along the shortest way from the station to the
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r'lerruau, L'Egypte Contenporaine. pp. 10-110, 224.
2Benedetti, to Walewski, No. 12, 26 Sept. 1856, M.A.E., C.C., tom.55.
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desert, and came out between al-Jagwa and al-Qubba, north of the
postal route without touching a house, garden or a water wheel.
Prom this point the line ran north-west along cultivated lands in
the villages of al-Qubba, Majariyya, Kafr a1-Gamus, Birkat al-
$ajj, swerved eastward leaving the Khanka Dunes on the north. It
then ran north following the route of al-Dar al-Bayda’, crossed
Jabar Jafra and reached the peak of ‘Uwayba to finally descend
towards Suez passing by al-*Agrud.^ The total length cf the line
was 136 kilometres and it was a single line.
The Suez line was completed on 5 December 1858. It only
remained to finish the stations and secondary works, and to organise
2a regular service. By the completion of this section the foundation
of the Egyptian State Railway was laid. Finally, the Kafr al-Zayyat
bridge was inaugurated on 25 May 1859 with great celebration. The
description, which the French agent has given us, is worthy of note.
The troops stood in a line on the pavement and the sound of music
was ringing in the air. He added
"du moment ou S. A. Said Pacha s'est mis en marche 
pour traverser le pont, le cadi, le mufti et les 
Ulemas en grande costume ont prononce des prieres.
Aux prieres de la religion on a,wdt joint des oeuvres 
de charite, plus de 50 buffles on ete egorges sur 
les deux t6tes du pont et immediatement depaces au 
profit des pouvres. II a ete fait en outre d'abondantes
^Merruau, op.cit., pp. 225-226.
^Schefer to Walewski, No. 76, 9 Jan. 1859» M.A.E., C.C., tom. 35*
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distributions de pain. A son arrivee a la gare de 
Kaffar Zalat, le Vice-Roi a remercie l'ingenieur en 
chef, Mr. Rose /sic/, de son beau travail et lui a 
fait don de deux cent cinquant mille francs pour 
avoir devance d'un au l'epoque ou l'on pouvait en 
esperer 1'achevement. II a fait donner egalement 
des gratification a tous les ouvriers dont le zele 
a si bien - Secnnde l'ingenieur en chef."*
2. Administration and Management
The first development of railways took place under the control 
of the Transit Administration, which has passed through some de­
velopments. At the end of 1845, Muhammad Ali was determined to control 
the transit of passengers, mails and merchandise to show that he himself 
could manage the business. Whatever his intentions were, it was 
a means of his monopolistic practices. He entrusted Artin Bey 
with the organisation thereof, and in a council held at al-Maliyya 
(Ministry of Finance) Hekekyan was suggested as theonly person who 
could fulfil the duties of chief inspector. Nevertheless it was said 
that, after Muhammad ‘Ali had seen the "Constantinople Chamberlain'' 
and without the concurrence of Artin, he commanded ‘Abbas Pasha 
to take the direction of the Transit affairs, employing Thurburn, an 
Englishman, as manager. Hekekyan comments "it is a curious fact 
that the Pasha had been induced to retain Thurburn in his own 
service, because being of Aberdeen, the present British minister for 
foreign affairs would be pleased in seeing the management given to
"4)elaporte to Walewski, No. 250, 30 May 1895, M.A.E., C.C., tom.30.
a townsmam or countryman of his".'*’ Artin retired because he had 
no more to do with the Transit question. The organisation was dis­
cussed by the Grand Council composed of ‘Abbas Pasha, the Minister of 
Justice, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Interior, the 
Minister of Public Instruction and the Minister of Finance. Accord­
ingly a diwan called Piwan al-Murur (Transit Administration) was
2 — —established in January 1846. This diwan was under the directorship
of a Nagir. During this discussion, it was proposed that the
servants of the diwan should be ’Turks' and 'Turkish officers'.
Edhem Bey, the Minister of Public Instructions, checked them saying
"Turks will sit down and smoke, and when an 
Englishman comes, they will not rise - nor will 
they say anything until they have finished their 
pipes; and Englishmen then will not be in the 
humour for staying to take a cup of coffee and
to smoke a pipe. They will beat them  and the
affairs of the transit will be in a short time 
turn out worse than those of Syria."3
So they appointed ‘Abd al-Rafcman Efendi, an Italian renegade who
spoke English tolerably well. This diwan was provided with the
necessary persons as well as animals and carriages. It had its
4principal establishment in Cairo with agencies at Alexandria and Suez.
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^Hekekyan Papers, III, Add. 37450, fols. 123B-124.
^For previous arrangements of the transit see above p . ; Rafi‘i, 
Ta’rikh al-fraraka al-qawmiyya, III, p.568; Mubarak, xii, p.71.
Mubarak calls it in another place (vii, p.64) Maglafrat al-Pazaport.
It was usually called al-Imrariyya (gassuna, op.citT, p.74).
3™ .Hekekyan, III, Add. 37450, fol. 125b. Criticising the appointment 
of Abbas, the Bombay Times wrote "at present the chief powers are 
lodged with Abbas Pasha whose bigotted attachment to Islamism, and 
hatred to everything connected with Turks, English or French,all 
equally point him out as the last person fit for this office." Xoc.cit., Hekekyan, Add. 37450, fol. 151b). (cont.')
This administration remained as constituted until ‘Abbas*s 
succession. Wishing to improve the overland communication,^ in 
February 1849 he appointed Kiani Bey, one of the most active officers 
in Egypt, as head of the Diwan al-Murur. He had full powers and 
authority and was told not to consider the Transit as a source of 
profit or revenue at present, but to do everything requisite for
putting it on an improved and enlarged scale, both on the Nile and
2 - -in the desert. However, shortly after, Kiani was removed. His energy
and independence of character lost him *Abbas's favour and consequently 
his place. He insisted on keeping his diwan entirely separate from 
the other diwans. He would not receive orders about steamers, free 
passage and similar details from Artin or any other officials. Murray
263.
(cont.)
4The managers of these depts. were:
<Cairo Chief Director Abd al-Rafcman Efendi
Alexandria Agent Mr. R. Green
Suez Agent Mr. C. Betts
The Cairo and desert establishment consisted of about:
5 European clerks 45 other native servants
31 native.coachmen, under a European 440 horses
110 grooms 46 vans
15 nazirs
The Nile establishment, seven steam-boats, consisted of:
No. 1 "Delta" 4 "Cairo”
2 "Lotus” „"Little Nile"
The Canal establishment:
3 steam-tugs, 
t rack-boats.
(lValne*s report on the past and present state of the transit through 
Egypt, encl. (l) in Murray to Palmerston, No. 45 of 6 June 1847 in F.O
97/408.) _______
^The Times, 31 May 1851.
^Murray to Palmerston, No. 9 of 24 Feb. 1849 in F.O. 78/804.
did all in his power to end this conflict between Kiani and ‘Abbas.
‘Abbas said that he had promised the British government a speedy find 
secure transit and it was not on Kiani, nor on any other officer that 
these improvements depended. Meanwhile Khair al-Din was appointed as 
the new nagir of Diwan al-Murur. This change was taken by Murray as 
probably affecting British interests more directly.^"
When the construction of the railway was decided upon in 1851,
i •• ^  ^  ^ * 2Abbas nominated Abdallah Bey al-Injlizi as the railway Ma*Jiur. On
10 Rabi‘ I 1269/22 Dec. 1852 ‘Abdallah was appointed Mudir al-Murur,
•T
and *Abd al-Rafrman Bey,' the governor of Suez, succeeded him as Ma'mur
4al-Sikka al-fladid, for his attainment as a linguist. In 1854, the
management of the railway diwan was also put under Mudir al-Murur.
On 22 Rajab 1270/20 April 1854, ‘Abbas entrusted the directioncf the
railway diwan to ‘Abdallah because the two departments had common
5 <-characteristics. When Sa id succeeded,Lee Green, who had been working 
in the transit for thirteen years and was the brother of the British 
Consul at Alexandria, replaced ‘Abdallah Pasha. Bruce, the British 
Consul-General, interpreted this appointment as a justification 
of Sa‘id's intention to improve these important branches of the public 
service.^ By 1856 the employees of the Diwan al-Murur were as follows:
"^Murray to Palmerston, No. 12 of 5 Mar. 1849 in F.O. 78/804.
2Le Moyne to Minister of For. Affs., No. 173, 9 Nov. 1851, M.A.E., C.P., 
tom. 23; "The construction development and organization of the Egyptian 
State Railway”, article in Lfflgypte Contemporaine, XXIV, No. 139, 1933,p.118
It seems this was the same as the Abd al-Ra^man Efendi on previous page.
He was bom in Malta to Italan and Maltese parents. He lost them
very^early in life and was brought to Egypt, where he was converted to 
Islam. (Murray to Canning, Private, 19 July 1851 in F.O. 352/34 Pt.L)
(cont.)
2,535 Turkish and Arab employees including coachmen, grooms, sailors,
engineers, overseers, clerks, masons, carpenters employed on works
but not including fallah labourers. The pay of these amounted to
446^274.20 piastres. There were also 127 Europeans of various nationalities
including agents, clerks, engineers, drivers, platelayers and telegraph
clerks. Their total pay amounted to 154,944 piastres.^"
• In Egypt everything was concentrated in the hands of the Viceroy.
Therefore two important questions arise. Could the Viceroy understand
the difficulties arising from the introduction of an entirely novel
system of locomotion andvhat were the functions of the general director
of the transit and the railway? Consider Sa‘id in whose reign the
railway was completed. Sa‘id seemed to have looked upon the use of
the railway by others as subordinate to his own use of it. He got the
habit of moving large bodies of troops and artillery by the railway
which rendered impossible the accommodation of passengers and goods which
2the necessities of Egypt required. He did not allow the director to 
derive the financial resources he should have from the railway, and
(cont.)
4 - -Sami, III, Pt. I, 56; The Illustrated London News. No. 609, XXII, 
p.140 (19 Feb. 1853).
5Sami, III, Pt. I, 55; The Times, 30 Jan. 1854, p.7.
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 37 of 30 July 1854* in F.O. 142/18.
Anon., Railways in Egypt, p.52; Bruce to Clarendon, No. 40 Of 18 Sept. 
1856 in F.O. 78/1222; Sopwith, Notes of a visit to Egypt, p.125.
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1Bruce to Clarendon, No. 23 of 17 May 1856 in F.O. 142/20.
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"with the egotism of a true Turk, he will sacrifice revenue rather 
than subject himself to the necessity of consulting the interests 
of the public, when he wishes to make use of the line". Therefore,
Lee Green was obliged to keep the working expenses of his establishment 
as low as possible in order to provide funds for other necessary re­
quirements, whereby he was unable to increase his working staff.
In directing the work, Lee Green was faced with many diffi­
culties both in preserving order at the stations, and in obtaining 
respectable men for the responsible posts of station-masters, and 
guards. If 'Turks' were employed, they were slow and apathetic, and 
the European passengers neither understood, nor respected their 
authority. On the other hand, the Europeans in Egypt, available for 
these posts, were needy adventurers on whom no great reliance could 
be placed. It was the habit among the Consuls-Ceneral to seek employ­
ment in the Transit for the incapable and doubtful characters they 
wished to get rid of, obtaining from the Viceroy a recommendation 
for them. The director was frequently obliged to comply with these 
exigencies. Lee Green determined to get experienced station-masters 
for the Cairo and Alexandria stations from England, to improve the 
railway management, but was prevented from doing so by the Viceroy's 
dislike of European employees in which he was encouraged by the French 
and Turks around him.'*' Bruce, however, avoided invoking interference 
in the details of a very complex administration in order not to produce
"^ Bruce to Clarendon, No. 40 of 18 Sept. 1856 in F.O. 78/1222.
increased difficulty and confusion. An appeal to the Pasha, he said, 
would produce an order for alteratinn in the Transit arrangements.
The unwillingness to employ Europeans on the railway was not a new 
phenomenon in Egypt. Under ‘Abbas, Robert Stephenson had requested 
permission to engage some English engineers to work the engines, but 
‘Abbas refused declaring that the line should be worked by 'Arabs' alone, and 
complained that the employment of foreigners had been attended with a 
great deal of annoyance to hine elf. In the meantime Bruce decided not 
to interfere because the system of management to be adopted had to be 
settled by experience. He did not wish, before the railway to Cairo was 
finished and if possible extended to Suez, to urge the Pasha to employ 
Europeans on it. He feared that any such arguments could be made use 
of by the opponents of the railway to dissuade ‘Abbas from carrying 
on with it, on the ground that he would thereby establish a foreign 
interest in Egypt. Bruce was convinced "that this feeling arose "not so 
much from a dislike of £>reigners, as such, as from his dislike to em­
ploying men whom he cannot treat with the injustice and want of con­
sideration which he displays towards the Egyptiansin his service".1'
This ©uld have been the most likely reason. Yet on the other hand, 
the contract he had signed with Stephenson did not change his attitude 
towards the coming of foreigners to Egypt. On his accession, foreigners 
lost the encouragement they enjoyed under Muhammad ‘Ali. Having feared 
the spread of French influence he dismissed French employees in the
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^Bruce to Clarendon, 16 Feb. 1854 in F.O. 78/1035.
factories and workshops.^
Under Sa*id, someinfluential 'Turks’, among them Mugfcafa 
Faflil Bey, Sa‘id's nephew , endeavoured to exclude Europeans from 
employment on the railway by playing on his jealousy. Thqr intended 
to obtain possession of the railway. To realize their main object, 
intrigues were directed against the English Mudir al-Murur, Lee 
Green. In 1857, Sa‘id reorganised all the diwans of Egypt into
four ministries, one of which, al-Maliyya, was given to Mu$$afa
2 - - - 3Bey, under whom was put the Diwan al-Murur. Thus a favourable
opportunity was given to him for renewing his intrigues against Lee 
Green, with a view to obtaining the Transit management through a mudir 
appointed by him. The principal charges brought againet Green were that 
he employed too many Europeans, and that he listened too readily to
4applications on their behalf for an increase of pay. Bruce decided 
to resist a change advocated on such grounds. He intended to prevent 
the confusion which prevailed throughout the different branches of 
the Egyptian administration as a result of the frequent removal of offi­
cers from important posts by secret intrigues. Bruce therefore informed 
Mugjafa Bey that as he was satisfied with the general management of the
^Cf. Shukri, Migr wa’l-Sudan, pp. 54-56.
2Rafi‘i, Agr ‘lsma‘il, I, p.47.
3Sanl, III, Pt. I, p.216.
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 18 of 2 Apr. 1857 in F.O. 142/20. In Bruce's 
opinion ’’the number of Europeans employed might be augmented with ad­
vantage to the public, and the salaries paid were inadequate, owing to 
the rise of prices in Egypt”.
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Transit, he would oppose any attempt to displace the present mudir. 
Sabatier, the French Consul-General, supported Bruce. Mug^afa assured 
Bruce that he had abandoned any such intention, but this did not 
prevent hin from making eveiy underhand effort to effect his object through 
the Viceroy.
In order to conciliate Bruce, Mug^afa seemed to have Intended to 
appoint **Abdallah, the English renegade, in Green's place. Bruce said 
that Sa‘id liked Lee Green personally and he had a great repugnance to 
*Abdallah. Bruce could calculate on ‘Abdallah's support in forwarding 
the Suez railway, but the effect of the change would be to weaken the 
British hold of the Transit, for ‘Abdallah, disliked by Sa‘id, and un­
popular with Sabatier and the other foreigners in Egypt, could not 
maintain his position long. Bruce added "a great step will be gained 
by those who, from various motives, wish to see the Railway handed over 
to a private company".^ However to support himself against these in­
trigues, Lee Green proposed that a council of persons in the Viceroy's 
confidence should be formed, to whom the financial questions connected 
with the railway should be referred. To this, Sa‘id assented, and declared 
his intention of naming some Turks, and with them, two or three of the 
European merchants. Since it was alike objectionable and uncalled for, 
from the Egyptian government's view, to invite merchants to share in the 
management of a government department, Bruce took the opportunity to state
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 18 of 2 Apr. 1857.
his objections to such a measure. He pointed out to Sa id that the 
complaints from which he wished to be relieved did not ariee from 
bad management of the Transit, but were the results of intrigue.
The institution of a council was in itself a good measure, Bruce said, 
but it ought to consist solely of persons in Sa‘id*s own service.1.
However, Lee Green retained his post until December 1857 when he resigned
2because of ill health. Nubar Bey replaced him. John Green, the acting 
British Consul-General, comments "/Nubar/ being looked upon by them /the 
Turks/as one of themselves, a great difficulty was got over, for it 
could not be otherwise than a subject of jealousy to the Turks that they 
should be compelled to place a foreigner at the head of one of the most
important Government Administration; more especially m there is con-
3siderable patronage attached to 1his Post". Nubar was an Armenian.
Because Ria£ Bey, Wakil al-Sikka al-Hadid. was transferred to another 
post, Muhammad Sa‘id Efendi, a Turk, was appointed in his stead on 
28 Jamada II 1274/14 Jan. 1858.^ But Nubar was removed from Nigarat 
al-Sikka al-Hadid on 27 March 1859. Sa‘id had ordered him to send some 
cannon by a special train but he sent them by an ordinary one. Sa‘id 
thought that Nubar was relying on other support, and in the decree of
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 18 of 2 April 1857.
2 — —Sami, III, Pt. I, pp. 262-63; See Tagher, "Portrait psychologique de Nubar 
Pacha", cah.hist. eg., I, nos. 5-6 (1949) pp. 360-362.
^Green to Clarendon, No. 92 of 22 Dec. 1857 in F.O. 78/1J14.
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his dismissal, he told Nubar to go to those upon whom he had relied.^
m 2Sa*id Efendi succeeded him on 23 Sa*aban 1275/28 March 1859* Since
Sa‘id Efendi spoke no European language, Charles Betts, an Englishman,
3was appointed as the first deputy. His qualifications were his know­
ledge of the English language, and that he had been employed for
4eighteen years in the Transit. Betts had to observe the movement
of trains from railway stations and to execute the work after consultations
with Sa‘id Efendi. Yusuf Efendi, Nagir Maktab al-Suways, was appointed
as the second deputy to control Arabic accounts and to supervise
general routine during Sard's absence. To increase his zeal and to
encourage him, Yusuf Efendi had 500 piastres added to his allowance
5 tstarting from April 1859, making the total 4,000 piastres. In Rabi 
I 1277/Sept. 1860 Sa‘id and Yusuf were removed with the chief derk 
because of their inaccuracy and negligence. Selim Pasha al-Gazayrli 
was appointed as Nagir but in December of the same year Paolino Bey 
replaced him.^ Nevertheless throughout all these changes Charles Betts 
still retained his position as deputy. There is one conclusion in
271.
^Sami, III, Pt. I. p.318. Nubar was regarded by the French as a creature 
of the British (cf. Marlowe.op.cit.. p.184).
Sami, III, Pt, I. p. 318.
3 - -Sami, III, Pt. I. pp. 318-319; Green to Malmesbury, No. 35 of 1 Apr.
1859 in F.O. 78/1467.
4See above footnote 4, p. 262 .
5Sami, III, Pt. I. pp. 318-319.
6  _Sami, III, Pt. I, p.358. The management of the railways continued under 
Diwan al-Murur until 1864, when the railways were brought under the 
Ministry cf Public Works. In Jan. 1866, the railways were made ^nJLnd^-
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particular which can be drawn from these constant changes in the key
posts in the administration, the instability of management. Consequently
there was not a continuous line of policy.
Could the railway work without employing foreigners? ‘Ali
MubanKsays in his Khitat
"it is known 1hat every work must have difficulties 
at its beginning, and the railway, no doubt, is 
one of the largest works, for it needs a lot <f 
necessary works and buildings for its solidity, fitness, 
management, supplying its necessities and housing its 
employees. All this needs time, money, increase of the 
number of employees and continuous thinking until it is 
completed and organised."!
According to Mubarak, the natives of Egypt at the beginning of this 
project were unable to carry on all the works necessary to run this 
Kaglaba because they lacked the knowledge of this new work. So it 
was necessary to employ foriengers with them because, in highly techni­
cal matters, the employment of foreigners was inevitable. In 1857» 
the Egyptian government applied to the Society of Civil Bigiieers in 
London to select an engineer to work as Nagir of the »pair and engin­
eering workshop of railway locomotives. This request was responded to, 
and Sa‘id agreed to employ the engineer under a five-year contract
at ar annual salary of £800f with payment of his travelling expenses
2to and from London. As the natives were not experienced as drivers, 
Egypt had to rely on Europeans, mainly English. Some of the contracts
(cont.) pendent administration. ("The construction... of the 
Egyptian State Railway", art. in L'flgypte Contemporaine, XXIV, p.118).
Mubarak, VII, p.89.
2 ---Sami, Hi, pt. i, pp. 242-43.
throw some light on the conditions and terms of service under which 
the drivers were employed. Theagreement was entered into between 
Mudir al-Murur wa'l-Sikka al— gadid and the driver; for instance, the 
contract signed with an English driver, John Wigley, on 17 February 
1857. This driver was employed at the salary of £J>8 per calendar 
month, payable monthly. He was liable to have fines deducted from 
his salary if he were reported in writing to the mudir by the foreman 
of the locomotive department. He could also get a "bonus”. All the 
fines imposed on the European drivers were allowed to accrue and at 
certain times this sum was divided out among the most deserving drivers.
The Egyptian government were responsive for paying the driver's 
travelling expenses out and back to England. If the driver were dis­
charged for misbehaviour and the British Consul in Alexandria agreed 
this was a correct decision the driver was not entitled to claim the 
»turn fare to England. Should the driver be unable to fulfil his contract 
through illness brought on by his work, Sa*id would pay his return passage 
to England and his salary until the driver's arrival in London. It 
was necessary that he should be examined by a competent European doctor 
approved by the British Consul in Alexandria. There were very compre­
hensive and concise details laying down hours of work and leisure and 
all general conduct. However, if the driver felt he was being imposed 
upon he could appeal to the British Consul, whose decision was to be 
regarded as final.^
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^Memo. of Agreement: A and B in F.O. 141/36 Pt. 1.
It would seem that there was no common contract for drivers, 
each man having a personal one. Another driver was to serve two 
years also at a salary of £18 per calendar month, but at the end 
of the first year it was to be increased to £20 per calendar month 
if he would stay for the full length of the second year. .Another in­
teresting point was that the driver during his service should not 
directly or indirectly be engaged in the cultivation of land or in any 
other trade or occupation. In this same contract there was a difference 
in the way of dealing with complaints. These were to be put before a commit­
tee consisting of the mudir, the chief engineer and the superintendent 
of the locomotive department; all of whom lad to be serving at the time.
As a British subject he lad right of appeal to the constituted consular 
authorities.^ Some of the drivers were required to carry out repairs 
to locomotives and tenders.
On 21 Rabi4 II 1274/9 Dec. 1857 a meeting was allied at the 
Ministry of the Interior between Nubar Bey and *Abdallah Bey, Berto 
and Green Bey, Riafl Bey, Mr. Betts and Khurshid, Capudan Nagir of the 
railway office st Alexandria. The purpose of this meeting was to consider 
the arrangement of Diwan al-Murur wa’l-Sikka al-Hadid with the utmost 
accuracy, and also to assess the minimum number of enployees who were 
needed for the department; and if possible to reduce the number of em­
ployees on condition that the work could be done properly. They were also
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Memo, of Agreement: ( c )  Nubar and William Elkington, 2 Aug. 1853 in
P.O. 141/36 Pt. 1.
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asked not to retain Europeans except those who were urgently needed,
and it would be impossible to replace them by others.'1' In April 1858,
Green, the acting British Consul-General, reported that Sa‘id had appointed
natives as engine drivers. This must have been the consequences of this
reorganization. Consequently Green informed Nubar that although he was
not entitled to dictate to the administration the nationality of the
persons it might employ
"the magnitude of British interests in all that 
relates to the Railway through Egypt entitles me to 
draw your serious attention to the enormous responsi­
bility which must weigh on the Administration, if per­
sons who have not gone through a thorough apprentice­
ship, and are not possessed of such professional certi­
ficates as must remove all doubts of their competency, 
are employed in the onerous and delicate position of 
English Drivers, to whose judgment and experience so 
many lives are entrusted".2
A number of persons had expressed considerable anxiety as to whether
this measure was not calculated to give rise to very serious accidents.
^Sami, iii, Pt. 1, pp. 258-259.
2
Green to Nubar, 21 Apr. 1858 in P.O. 142/22. Pew years earlier Lee 
Green told Nassau William Senior that if he did employ 'Arab1 drivers, 
all his English drivers would leave him. He added "we have only a 
single line. An English driver, who knows that there is an engine 
coming up, will not start, whatever be the authority that commands 
him; an Arab, though he might foresee the danger, or rather the 
certainty, of a collision, would obey. A few days ago an order came 
from the Pasha to forward some persons immediately by a special train.
I objected that an engine was coming up. ‘Nonsense*, said the man who 
brought the order, *you engineers are always raising difficulties to 
frighten us; we must go*. The driver of course flatly refused. If 
he had been an Arab he would have obeyed. (Senior, Conversations and 
Journals, II. pp. 56-57; cf. ^assuna, Migr wa’l-puruq al-fradidiyya, 
pp. 14C-142.)
This feeling did not only amount to anxiety but also to actual complaint 
from some Australian passengers because of a narrowly escaped collision 
of two trains on the Alexandria-Cairo railway. Green sent the statement 
of the passengers to Nubar telling him that he believed, from the informa­
tion he had received, that the 'Arab' telegraphic department neglected to 
pass a message with which it had been entrusted. This gave him ground to 
indicate the impracticability of carrying on the service safely with an 
establishment into which a number of persons had been introduced who 
were ignorant of the duties they had to perform. He drew Nubar'8 
attention to the urgent necessity of employing none but skilled Europeans 
in all posts <f responsibility connected with the railway.1
Colquohoun, the British Consul-General, also reported that Sa‘id 
was unwilling to renew contracts with foreign railway drivers and tele­
graphists. He said that Sa‘id was naturally desirous to have hfe 'Arabs' 
trained by the foreigners at the headof the railway and telegraph estab­
lishment, so as to replace by degrees the foreign engine drivers who 
might leave Egypt. Sa‘id already had several 'Arabs' who did drive, 
chiefly in branch lines, or luggage trains. "He,” Colquhoun comments, 
"professes himself very desirous to have foreigners, but he would like 
them to be as his Arabs are, from whom in a case of momentary pecuniary
2 19difficulty he stops three months pay." He pointed out to Sa id the
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^Green t> Nubar, 20 Mar. 1859$ in F.O. 142/22.
^Colquhoun to Russell, (No. 14 Consular) 6 Oct. 1859 in F.O. 78/1468.
large income he was deriving from the Indian traffic and the high
rates of fares and that they could not entrust such a number of
lives and such large interests "tomen who, whatever may be their
natural talent, had only lately taken to the business, and who in a
moment of difficulty or danger could not be relied on".
The British government received this news with much concern.
Lord Russell instructed Colquhoun to inform Sa‘id that the railway
between Alexandria and Suez was only a single line and great caution
in working it was necessary to prevent collision or other accidents.
It might justly be apprehended that collisions and accidents would
occur if the driving of the trains should be entrusted to native
engineers who could not be expected to possess the skill or steadiness
which was required to ensure the safety of the trains. He also
instructed him to point out to Sa*id that the expenses consequent
on repairing a single accident would much more than counterbalance
the saving of wages to the engineers that might be effected by the
substitution of natives for foreigners.
"Her Majesty’s Government therefore feel themselves 
justified In seriously representing to the Pasha the 
inexpediency of the change which he has in view and 
in expressing their earnest hope thet His Highness 
will continue the services of the European Engineers 
on the Egyptian Railway, at all events as regards the 
Trains employed in conveying Passengers arriving in^
Alexandria or Suez on their way to and from India."
■^Russell to Colquhoun, No. 16 of 18 Oct. 1859 in F.O. 14l/28*
The qualifications of the native drivers will be discussed later. 
But this does not mean that all the drivers were Egyptians. The Transit 
Administration continued to ensure a proper supply of European drivers, 
Belgians, French and English, the last predominating,'1' to meet the 
requirements of the overland service, and to comply with the P. AO.
contract under which it was bound to provide English drivers for all
2passenger trains. This engagement was carried out satisfactorily,
and a large number of English drivers entered1he service in 1865 and
31866. However, about thirty of thembegan to complain of certain
%
grievances and went on strike on 20 April 1867. They complained of 
excess work, accompanied by inadequate remuneration; the cost of 
lodging accommodation incurred by the complainants when detained on 
duty away from their ordinary residence; and the penalties illegally 
inflicted upon them. They were tired of waiting for redress. In 
January 1866, they forwarded a memorial to the administration, and a 
few days afterwards were formally promised a payment of two shillings 
and six pence an hour for all overtime after a certain number of hours. 
This promise was not kept. Some of the drivers received one and four 
pence an hour overtime, and even that for a smaller number of hours than 
they had worked. They therefore refused to proceed to work until
^Phillips to Stanton (Private and Conf.), 26 May 1866 in F.O. 141/60; 
Stanton to Stanley (Separate), 17 June 1867 in F.O. 78/1976.
2See below, pp. 354-56.
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3 See some cf these contracts in F.O. 141/63.
justice was done. They claimed the amount of £1,489.5.8. on account 
of overtime and of the sums due to them for lodging expenses and fines
illegally imposed on them.1 Consequently the Egyptian government
2appointed a commission to investigate these complaints. On the
other hand, the British government, without writing for the report
of the commission of enquiry, instructed the Consul at Cairo to
sequester as much of the quarterly mail subsidy as would suffice to
3pay the drivers the money due to them at the time of their strike.
However, the commission recognised in its report that the drivers were 
occasionally unreasonably overworked; that for this excessive overwork 
they were inadequately paid, and that the system by which the administration 
reckoned their overtime was illiberal and wrong. It recommended that 
the men should be paid up to the day on which such decision was communi­
cated to them. After a thorough consideration of the report, the British 
government believed that by striking, the drivers placed themselves in 
a wrong position and that their claim for damages could not be supported
in law. Nevertheless the Consul at Cairo was instructed to effect a
4fair settlement according to the commissioners' recommendation. The
^Reade to Raghib Pasha (Minister of Foreign Affs.) No. 94 of 7 June 1867 
encl. in Raade to Stanley, No. 1 of 10 June 1867 in F.O. 78/1796. This was 
not the first incident in Egypt. In 1858, a dispute arose between the 
Transit Administration and the English engine drivers. They threatened 
to strike not so much for an advance of wages as for a reorganisation of 
their work. (The Times, 19 Apr. 1858, p.5.).
^The commission composed of the inspector general of the Egyptian railways 
(an Englishman), the traffic manager (also an Englishman), and Sami Bey, 
an Egyptian officer <f rank from the Egyptian Foreign Office, who thoroughly 
understood English. Reade, British Consul in Cairo, also attended as a 
delegate from the British Consulate.
Hammond to Reade, No. 24 of 29 June 1867; Stanton to Stanley (Separate),
7 r»on -f. _ ]
3
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railway administration cffered to pay drivers a portion of overtime 
arrears, and deplacement allowance for one night in every three of their 
claims, but refused to refund fines.'1' Because the Egyptian government 
refused to continue to employ them, the drivers left for England on 
i3 July 1867. Finally, the Egyptian government consented to pay the 
drivers the full amount of their salaries during the period they were
detained in Egypt to appear before the Commission. The total sum paid
2to them was £3,215.6.8. Since a large number of European drivers 
ceased work, the Transit Administration employed native drivers in 
charge of the trains conveying the overland passengers. This was unavoid­
able. Because of these circumstances, the P. & 0. Company began to 
complain of the incompetence of native drivers; and accordingly,ttte
British Consul-General addressed a representation to the Egyptian
3government for the discontinuancecf their employment.
In accordance with the Viceroy’s policy, Egyptians were employed 
to drive the engines and to maintain the line. An investigation is 
necessary to throw more light on the rOle they played in that respect. 
Therefore, we have to answer the following questions: what was the
educational background of the native drivers? What sort of training
(cont.) 26 June 1867 encl. in Stanley to Reade, No. 25 of 29 June 
1867 in F.O. 141/61; Reade to Stanley, No. 10 of 4 July 1867 in F.O. 
78/1977.
^Stanton to Stanley, 24 July 1867; the report is enclosed in Reade to 
Stanley, No. 21 of 18 Aug. 1867 in F.O. 78/1977; Hammond to Reade,
No. 30 of 27 July 1867 and Stanley to Reade, No. 38 of 16 Oct. 1867# 
in F.O. 141/61. __________
^Reade to Stanley, No.7 of 27 June 1867 in F.O. 78/1976.
2Zoulfikar to Stanton, No. 43 of 22 Jan. 1868, encl. in Stanton to Stanley#(cont.)
had they? Who were the skilled workers? How they were selected? And
what provision was made for them at this stage?
First of all, it seems that native drivers had been given a 
European training. This task had been given to a European engineer 
called Jeffry, whom 5a‘id had promised to give £100 for each engineer
he trained and prepared to work the train by himself. In 1859. he trained
eight engineers as required, and Sa‘id ordered Nazir al-Murur to give 
him the sum of £800 after testing them, and seeing that they were capable 
of doing the job. The same system of payment was to be followed in case 
of each engineer he would train.’1’ However this system seems never to
have been carried out successfully. *Ali Mubarak, who war: appointed
-  2as Nagir Maglafrat al-Sikka al-Tjadid in 1868, deals with this question
in his Khitat. He says that there was no official specification showing 
the task of each worker. There were no rules for the Sawwaqln (drivers) 
on the lines and for the Mulabigin (foremen) in the workshops. Most of 
the drivers were unqualified for their jobs, being taken on without ex­
amination or certificate of fitness for the job. The majority was from 
Awlad al-*Arab al-‘Afrashjiyya " who knew nothing about steam, and were
(cont.)•Z
Hammond to Stanton (Separate), 14 June 1867; Howell to Stanley, 27 
May 1867 enclosing a letter from the company*s agent dated 27 May 1867 
encl. in Stanley to Reade, No. 1 of 18 June 1867 in F.O. 141/61; copies 
of the P. A 0. agent*8 representations to the British Consul at Cairo 
and to the British government in F.O. 141/63.
1Sami, III, Pt. i, p.319.
p _Mubarak stayed in the_railways until_Aug. 1870 (for a fuller biography 
see: Mahmud al-Shar qawi and ‘Abdallah al-Mishadd, ‘Ali Mubarak, bayatuhu 
wada*watuhu wa’alharuhu. Cairo, 1962; also Mubarak's perscn al auto- 
biography, ix, 37-61).
 ^‘At^h^Vy21 - stokers. (This means that the stokers were already ^gypt..ans
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ignorant of the requirements of a railway and locomotives. Very few 
could read and write, and this, of course, had unfortunate consequences. 
Mubarak says that although the railway maglafra knew this, it overlooked 
the consequences because of the smallness of the salaries. This was not 
only to economise but also to gain by not employing foreign skilled 
workers because of their high salaries. But if one reckoned comparative 
cost, he adds, employing skilled workers with large salaries was cheaper 
than repairing the damages caused by unskilled workers. The maslaba 
could have selected a batch from the students of schools to train 
in the workshops until they became fit to run this department in the most 
desirable way.1
Secondly, a great number of Egyptians seem to have been employed
on the Cairo-Suez railway. A few months after its completion, Betts,
Wakil al-Sikka al-gadid, drew up a La’ibah (schedule) for Awlad al-*Arab
(Egyptians) employed on this line. This schedule arranged the works
and salaries of the following groups: Usjawat (construction craftsmen),
Mu*ammiri al-sikak (repair-workers on the line), Mu*awini al-tarkib
(construction assistants) and their Talamidh (apprentices) from Muftabjiyya
(shunters) and al-Tablajiyya (who operated the turn-tables). Sa‘id
approved this schedule and ordered it to be adopted as a constitution
for work from 19 Mubarram 1276/18 August 1859- Moreover, the conditions
included in this schedule concerning the above groups were to apply to
2their counterparts in the railway stations generally. This schedule
Mubarak, VII, pp. 91-92.
2Sami, III, Pt. I, pp. 334-335.
classified these groups into four sections with their distinctive grades, 
and sketched out the procedure for their promotion and the amount of 
salary ascribed to each group according also to their grades. It is 
also clear that this schedule laid down guidance for selection and 
promotion which was mainly based on education and experience.^
It is impossible to say to what extent this La* Lbah was carried 
out, but this was the kind of work the skilled native workers were able 
to perform. On tie other hand, the Egyptian railway was dependent on 
European technicians. The two chief engineers were Europeans. Rouse, 
the English engineer, remained as the Viceroy’s chief engineer of the
Alexandria-Cairo line; and Mouchelet, the French engineer, ms the chief
2engineer of the Cairo-Suez section. Two English medical men were 
appointed in the service. However in 1861, Sa‘id resolved to reduce 
every branch of his administration in the sweeping plans of economy he 
had determined to follow. Consequently, he made reductions in the 
railway amounting to upwards of £12,000 a year. Among those dismissed 
were the tro chief engineers, Rouse and Mouchelet. The Mudir al-Murur 
called on Colquhoun, British Consul-General, to explain these plans 
of economy. He then told Colquhoun that the two English medical men,
Drs. Ogilvie and Patterson at Alexandria and Cairo,were also on the 
list of proposed redundancies and that their places were to be filled 
by 'Arab Surgeons* educated in Europe. Colquhoun told the mudir that he
*See translation (f the Ia’ibah in Appendix III* pp. 376-78.
Green to Malmesbury, No. 113 of 18 July 1858 in F.O. 78/1402; Colquhoun
to Russell, No. 84 of 12 Aug. 1861 in F.O. 78/1591.
could not sanction this measure. That the railroad was actually supported 
by the Indian passage, that from ten to twelve thousand travellers travelled 
on this line annually, that a laige body of English artisans and workmen 
were employed on the line, and all these required medical attendance 
constantly. The diseases of Egypt, chiefly dysentery, required great 
vigour and medical knowledge for heir treatment. Moreover an English 
practitioner? should be at hand in the event of any accident happening 
to any of the Indian trains. He informed the mudir that he would protest 
against their removal just to effect a paltry saving of £15 a month. 
Accordingly, the two doctors were retained. About Rouse, Colquhoun admitted 
that his salary was large, £1,700 a year, but the efficient state of the 
road bore testimony to the valuable services rendered by him. He warned 
the mudir that "economy could be carried out to an extent which would
compromise the public safety if any accident should now occur,
/he/should hold his Highness* government responsible for all the conse­
quences".1 A number of employees was accordingly dismissed at a moment’s 
notice. In spite of this, the whole line was entrusted to three English 
sub-engineers, Hardcastle, Parry and Duff, and all were young men. Later 
on, in 1866, the whole of the permanent way from Cairo to Alexandria was 
still under the charge of Hardcastle and Parry, who acquired a long ex­
perience in Egypt. They had under their orders, for the maintenance cf 
the line, English foremen and native workmen. The Cairo-Suez section 
was in the hands of an Egyptian engineer, whose subordinates were also
1Colquhoun to Russell, No. 84 of 12 Aug. 1861; Colquhoun to Bulwer,
No. 54 of 26 Nov. 1861 in F.O. 142/26. Mouchelet was paid an indemnity 
of £8,000 but Rouse claimed a heavy one which amounted to £11,267.
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Egyptians.^
But the management of the Egyptian railway seems to have been 
deficient. Mubarak writes that until Ismael’s accession the railway
requirements were incomplete, and the only stations built were thoee
2at Cairo and Alexandria. The rest were wooden huts, mud-bricks or 
stones. At all the stations, there was only one platform for passengers, and 
no consideration was given for their comfort and protection from the
summer heat and winter cold, or the necessary furniture, chairs,
3benches and waiting rooms for the stations. In 1858, several passengers 
made complaints about the filthy state of the Cairo railway station and 
about the unsuitable accommodation in the waiting rooms. They found, 
when they reached the station at 4.30 a.m., no accommodation, only 
dirty cold stones to stand upon, no fire, and after waiting were told 
that the train would start at 9 a.m. instead of 6 a.m. They wrote to 
Walne, the agent of the East India Company ”we... beg you will bring to 
the notice <f the government, the mismanagement of their railways, and as 
the Lucknow refugees, who are in the most delicate state of health, 
will be here by the next steamer, we hope for their sake, that they will
4not be inconvenienced as we have been".
^Phillips to Stanton (Privage & Conf.), 26 May 1866 in P.O. Hl/60.
^The station of Kafr al-4!^, for example, was extremely simple in archi­
tectural appearance. It had more the aspect of a workhouse than a 
station, and did not bear the least resemblance to those on European 
lines of railway. (The Illustrated Times, No. LXXXV, III (13 Dec. 1856).
3Mubarak, VII, p.89.
4Passengers from India to Walne, 4 Jan. 1858 encl. in Walne to Green,
5 Jan. 1858 in P.O. 141/36 Pt. I.
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Mubarak writes again about the employees cf these stations. Those 
such as Wukala* (deputies), Mu‘awinin (assistants) and all the em­
ployees of the trains aid stores were indistinguishable from one another. 
Most of them were foreigners who knew neither the native language 
nor the condition cf the people. Accordingly, the state of the railway, 
in this period, was unsatisfactory and that was why it did not make a 
profit. The heads of the mas1aba were always keen on improving it and 
fulfilling its requirements, but when its revenues did not increase, 
they failed to achieve this. This was probably due to their failure to 
know what was really needed, and their orders were not carried out as 
they required because of the ignorance of the people who were entrusted 
to supervise this work. The result was damage to carriages and loco­
motives which the maglafra did not repair at the time because of the 
constant decrease in revenue. Moreover, the Varshat al-‘Amaliyyat 
(workshop of repairs) was too small and unsuitable for doing this job 
as it should be done. There was continued loss of tools and instruments 
and a lack of workers. The workshop became so full of the wrecks from 
all the branches that finally there was not enough room for repairs.
So the maglafra was obliged to store some of these arrivals in al- 
J.Qabbary, Bab al-Gharb and on the rail-lines made as stores in some of 
the intermediate stations. There were also other causes of damage such 
as the poor quality coal and the absence of roofs over the stores* lines 
to protect the carriages from the heat <f the sun which warped the wood 
during the summer. Furthermore, they neglected to paint the carriages; 
and the general carelessness, of al-Mufattishin (inspectors), Mulafrigin
and the deputies of the statinns was responsible for this. Enormous 
sums of money were wasted in the name of repairs in the two workshops 
of Bulaq^ and Alexandria. Owing to the increasing amount of damage, 
the Kazastine workshop, situated on the Matynudiyya bank in Alexandria, 
was needed for this purpose at the end of Sa'id's reign. When eventually 
the number of locomotives awaiting repairs became really great, and 
the maintenance of the status-quo would harm the railway maglafra, and 
perhaps result in its complete stoppage, it was decided to send some of 
these locomotives to England for repair.^
The mismanagement of the railway had further consequences. Only 
five years after the completion of the railway, one of the P. & 0. staff,
pwho travelled on it, saw this constant deterioration. Furthermore in
1866, one of the railway officials foresaw a rapid deterioration in the
rolling stock in consequence of the recent dismissal of the English
- - 3employees from the workshops at Bulaq. The standard of repairs was
very low. Although the number of the carriages repaired was few,
the repair was done at the expense of the other carriages, that is to
say, to repair one carriage necessitated the damage of two or more;
4 -and to repair one locomotive cost another. During Isma il's reign,
^Mubarak, VII, pp. 89-90.
T^le wrote "the carriages which must first have been handsome first- 
class carriages, are... dirty and full of dust, their brasswork has 
never been trnched since they came out... Everything is slovenly, and you see 
a lack of energy in everything and everybody.” The same person wrote 
earlier, just as the railway was completing, that the second-class car­
riages were equal to first-class in England, and the firsts "were the 
finest carriages I have ever been in", (cit. in Cable, A hundred year 
history of the P. & 0.. p.154.)
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^Phillips to Stanton (Private & Conf.), 26 May 1866 in F.O. 141/60• (cont.)
and under the nagirship of *Ali Mubarak, the establishment of temporary 
workshops in Alexandria was decreed, and the necessary workers and arti­
sans were recruited for it. Similar establishments were made in Suez,
Kafr al-Zayyat and at Cairo station. The necessary tools were brought 
from abroad and rail-lines were extended to link these workshops with 
the main line. Technical engineers, to work as observers, were appointed 
adong the lines to supervise the trains aid write down their reports which 
were referred to the railway diwan. Before the appointment of Mubarak, 
there was not sufficient houses for the employees. The most important of 
all was the organization of Warshat al-*Amaliyyat.1 Until Mubarak’s 
appointment, it was a huge piece of land consisting of ruined buildings 
and stagnant pools. This workshop lacked the necessary conditions and 
what was left of it was in an unsatisfactory state. Although there were 
great numbers of tools and instruments, they were not used partly because
some of them were incomplete and partly because of the rust and dust
2of long neglect.
By the construction of the railway, Egypt had made a solid 
material advance in westernization, but the system of management and 
recruitment was deficient. No institution was established to supply
(cont.)
^Mubarak, VII, p.90.
^It was Muhammad *Ali who established this workshop. iAbbas appointed 
Mubarak to organise it, but Sa‘id closed it in Dec. 1854. It was 
re-opened in the first months of Ismael's reign. It belonged at first 
to diwan al-sikka al-badid (see: A.I. Abd al-Karim, Ta * rikh al-ta^im 
fi Migr, I, pp. 112-14; II, pp. 502-503.)
^Mubarak, VII, p. 91.
288.
this innovation with trained, qualified and competent men. Mubarak 
says that if thi3 system of training had been adopted at the beginning 
of the construction of the railway, it would have been possible to supply 
these qualified workers in a few years' time. This was not thought of 
until the reign of Isma‘il who issued orders for the establishment of 
Nadrasat al-‘Amaliyyat (the school of operations) to graduate Egyptians 
fit for jobs in Haglafcat al-Sikka al-gadid, such as drivers, engineers 
for locomotives and steamers. At the beginning of 1867, the Diwan al- 
Madaris thought of organising this school, but it soon set it aside 
for some time. Nevertheless the idea wa3 taken up again because of 
the government's need for Egyptian engineers to replace Europeans in 
the railway works. In 1867/1868 the arrangements for the opening of 
this school were made during a meeting held at Diwan al-Madaris between 
a group of industrial men, the nuggar of schools, the chief engineer of 
narshat al-*Amaliyyat,the nagir of Bulaq workshops, the chief engineer 
of the railways, the nagir of the preparatory school and the nagir of 
the engineering school. This school was situated in the midst of the work­
shops where the students were trained in a suitable atmosphere and where 
they could acquire ample experience. The apprentices and the soldiers,found 
in \!arshat al-*Amaliyyat, were examined, to recruit the capable one3 to the
railway and the army workshops. Study at this school began in Kay I869,
\
and one of the sections was firqat ‘analiyyat al-murur (transit operations 
group). It was decided at that meeting that the school students should 
pass two years in this section and then be distributed to the different 
crafts and works in the railway workshops according to the importance of 
each one. The number of graduates of the school during the first years
289.
was between 17 and 24, but this number decreated to about 8 and 15 
when the course <f dtudy was increased to five years. The monthly 
salary the government gave to the graduate of the school was 500 piastres. 
The railway diwan appointed them as ‘Afcashjiyya (stokers) of the third 
grade at a monthly salary of 200 piastres. Then the apprentices protested 
and Diwan al-Madaria mediated on their behalf with the railway diwan 
which agreed to increase their salaries to 250 piastres.^
Nevertheless, the construction of the railway gave employment 
to Egyptians who returned from educational missions to Europe. Some 
Egyptian engineers were also employed on the works of construction such
as Salama'Ibrahim Pasha, Thaqib Pasha, Mugjafa Bahgat Pasha and Maghar
2Pasha. Most of these engineers were amongst the students of the first 
educational mission sent to Europe. Mugfafa Bahgat, for instance, studied 
hydraulics in England, and he took part in supervising the construction 
of the railway from Banha to Kafr al-Zayyat. Some of the people in the 
area under his inspection accused him of damaging too much land. Con­
sequently, ‘Abbas Pasha went in person to inspect this work, which he
3admired, and awarded Bahgat Pasha 200 feddans. There was another 
engineer, gasan Bey Nur al-Din, who was appointed, with Mouchelet the
Hlubarak, VTI, p.92; Abd al-Karim, op.cit., II, pp. 504-506, 515;
J. Heyworth-Dunne, An introduction to the history of education in 
modem Egypt, pp. 357-358.
? «» — —Rafi‘i, ‘Vgr Isma‘il, I, pp. 13-14.
3 — <— * —Rafi‘i, Ta’rikh al-baraka al-qawmiyya. Ill, p.515; Heyworth-Dunne, 
op.cit.. p.160; Mubarak, XVI, p.57.
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French engineer, to the construction of the Suez railway. Nur al-Din 
was chosen from the Muhandiskhana (the school of engineering) in 1844 
for a mission to France where he visited the sites of the railway 
works as a part of his study and especially the railways between 
Paris and Marseille.* In addition, there were others, who were
chosen from the Muhandiskhana employed on the railways after their
2return from England. Some of the graduates of Madrasat al-Alsun 
(the school of languages) which was placed under Rifa‘a al-jahjawi,
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*Rafi‘i, op.cit., III, pp. 520-521; Heyworth-Dunne, op.cit., p.256; 
Mubarak, XII, p.60.
^The following students were sent to England to study mechanics in 
1847. Only a few of them studied railway administration and management:
Ahmad^aL-Mahdi, returned in 1852.
Uthman tjrfi, returned in 1850 and became master of several stations.
Ali §adiq, returned in 1853. He was master of several stations and 
eventually became general manager of the railways.
Isma il Bushnaq, returned in 1853 and was employed in the workshop of 
_ al-Amaliyyat.
‘Uthman Yusuf, returned in 1853 and was appointed to the carriage building 
dept. He built one particular^carriage for Sa‘id which was called 
after^him as ‘arabat ‘uthman Yusuf.
Salama al-Baz, returned in 1855 and was appointed to the telegraph dept.
of the railway.
‘Ali gasan al-Iskandrani, returned in 1853.
Jaudat Xwa$,^returned in 1856 and was employed in the carriage dept. 
Uthman al-Qa^i, returned in 1856. He was an engineer in the carriage 
_dept._and then a carriage inspector.
Ibrahim Sami. Date of return is unknown.
A£mad Jal‘at. " ” " " H
Sula^man Sulayman was appointed as a translator.
Abbas *Abd al-Nur, returned in 1856.
Ghanim *Abd al-Rafrim, returned in 1852. (See: Heyworth-Dunne, op.cit., 
pp. 2521-2 5 2, 263-264)
were appointed to the railways administration ® translators and 
accountants.^
^They^were: ^asan^Fahmi, Qasim Muhammad, A^mad §afi al-Din, Muhammad
Shimi, ‘Umar Sabri and ‘Ali Rashad. (See: Heyworth-Dunne, op.cit., 
pp. 269-71.)
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JOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
Chapter V
"The most useful work achieved by ‘Abbas was 
the construction of the railway, the benefits 
of which no pen can relate nor imagination com­
pass within its reach. Truly it is a great 
steam power discovered by the thought and know­
ledge of man to bring him to the zenith of feli­
city, and enable him to achieve within his short 
life-time the happiness and the utmost wishes 
which he could not attain to if he lived thousands 
of years. Indeed it shortens a journey of ten days 
to less than one, drawing about a hundred carriages, 
heavily laden and thousands upon thousands of human 
beings and others, with ease and without the least 
possible hardship or harm, and with low fares and 
expenditure, the converse of what one experienced 
before without achieving one's purposes but while 
incurring great hardship and abundant expenditure."
Mubarak, VII, 64.
"L'ouverture de ce chemin de fer, va changer....
la physionomie des provinces Galiobie, Garbie, 
Menoufie et Bahire qu'il traverse. Les produits 
de 1 'agriculture s'ecouler ont maintenant par 
cette voie, et donneront une vie nouvelle a ce 
provinces si fertile."
Delaporte to Walewski, No. 198,
22 Jan. 1856, M.A.E., C.C., tom.29.
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1. The Corvee
Railways were a heavy burden on the Egyptian fallafr, since
they, as well as other public works, were constructed by means of
forced labour. The Corvee is called in Arabic Sukhra. This system
had been in existence for ages during which the Egyptian labourer
was inhumanly treated. These labourers were originally employed
to dear canals, to strengthen dikes, and to guard the banks of
the Nile during the flood. Muhammad *AlI introduced the practice
of moving oorvees to any part of Egypt to construct canals for
summer irrigation. The corvee labour was arranged by the khutt^
• * 2officials with the ma’mur, at the request of the government, 
from within their districts or from neighbouring districts. They
also had the additional responsibility of apportioning the govem-
811 - 3 4ment's demands among/^he nabiyas in their districts. When the
construction of the Mabmudiyya Canal was begun in 1817, the 
• 5kashifs of the provinces of Lower Egypt were ordered to raise a 
levy of one worker for every ten inhabitants and about 100,000
Schutt: Subdivision of a province.
Sta*mur: Chief official of a markaz (district).
•* —
Nabiya: Subdistrict of a province (canton).
4 < -H. A. Rivlin, Agricultural policy of Mubammad Ali in Egypt,p.94;
for a general account of the corvee see: Olympe Audouard, Les 
mysteres de l'flgypte Devoiles, pp. 212-223.
5 -Kashif: Governor of a district.
men participated in the corvee. In 1819 the total number reached 
3 1 3v000 after orders had been issued to the principal govenors 
to assemble a number of fallafrin proportionate to the size of their 
provinces?'
The fallab. working in the corvee, was often accompanied by 
his wife, children and parents, and the entire family would estab­
lish itself in the open air in the locality to which the peasant 
had been assigned. But if the family remained in the village, 
some member was always obliged to bring provisions every few days 
to the person working in the corvee. The fallabin were accompanied
pto the place of work by their Shaykh al-Balad who put a tent or 
banner at the place alloted to his men and remained with them until 
the Job was finished. For small works the fallafrin furnished their
own tools, the mattock and the quffa (basket). In large public
3works, the government sometimes provided tools? but these tools 
were insufficient in most cases for the huge number of labourers.
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^livlin, op.cit., pp._218-220£ Shukri, Bina’ dawlat Migr. p.42; 
see also: Umar jusun, Ta‘rikh Khali.1 al-Iskandriyya al-qadim
wa-tur*at al-Mafrmudiyya, pp. 66, 86-87, 113-118, 121-122; F. Mengin, 
Histoire de l*Egypte sous le gouvemement du Mohammed-Aly, II, pp. 
331-334.
2Shaykh al-Balad: Village headman. For the development of this
office see: G. Baer, "The village shaykh in modern Egypt (1800-
1950)" in V. Heyd (ed.) Studies in Islamic history and civilization 
(Scripta Hierosolymitana, ix), Jerusalem, 1961."
Rivlin, op.cit.» pp. 243-245; see also Marlowe.The making of the 
Suez Canal, pp. 101-102.
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When Sa‘id decided to clean the Mafcunudiyya Canal one mattock was
given to each five labourers.^" The draftees were forced to work
under sub-human conditions which Madden records in his Travels:
"in Egypt , when any public work is to be done, 
soldiers are sent to surround the villages; the 
unfortunate peasants are taken prisoners, linked 
to a long rope, and marched, sometimes hundreds 
of miles from their homes and families, to the 
place of employment... Here the poor naked fellahs 
are to be seen digging the soil with their fingers 
to excavate a temporary canal, or raising water in 
baskets to irrigate the soil: how the work is ac­
complished, Heaven only knows; but the task masters 
are seen armed with their whips, parading amongst 
the labourers, lashing right and left the lazy and 
the weak; and when the work is finished, they get 
checks on the Sheik or Kaimacan, for payment of a
piastre a day As there is always delay in the
payment, the unfortunate peasants are obliged to 
sell their tiscarees or checks, for a third or fourth 
less than their value."2
The means of remunerating the fallafrin were the same throughout 
the 19th century. Each district kept an account of the amount of 
labour supplied, credit being given for it in the accounts against 
taxes. Before a man left his village, a purse was made up for him
by the government, to compensate for his loss of time and the annoy-
3 -ance of going on unpleasant duty. In the case of the Mafcimudiyya
Agr Isma il, I, p•27•
2R. R. Madden, Travels in Turkey. Egypt. Nubia, and Palestine in 
1824. 1825. 1826 and 1827. I, pp. 208-209, quoted in Rivlin, 
op.cit., p.245.
3Green to Malmesbury, No. 101 of 1 July 1858 in P.O. 142/21.
Canal, each fallah was granted twenty riyals to cover his travelling 
expenses, ten of which were paid in cash and ten deducted from the 
taxes he owed. One piastre per day was paid for his labour.^ Nassau 
William S«nior, who visited the sites of the Suez railway works, gives 
us a full description of the workers and their conditions. The pay 
to which the fallabln were entitled, without any distinction of age 
or strength, was fifty paras (50 paras = 1 piaster) per day. Prom 
this sum forty-five paras a day were deducted as the price of four 
very hard biscuits supplied by the government, which, with water, 
formed their food for the day. The remaining five paras were paid to 
them when they were dismissed after thirty day*s service; but it 
would be paid in a receipt from the government, to be taken in pay­
ment of taxes. Of the two superintendents with whom Senior talked, 
one said that they would never get the money; the other said that 
their Shaykhs would take from them the receipt, hand it in to the
tax-collector in payment of the taxes of the village, and account 
2to them for it. The treatment of the labourers was not humane.
The superintendents kept striking the fallabln with their sticks and 
"they were truly worked under the lash as a horse is". He also
^Rivlin, op.cit., p.220.
2Senior, Conversations, II, pp. 59-60; see footnote p.
Hekekyan says that every village was bound to contribute its share 
of draftees for public works. Writing on the M&npuriyya, he adds 
"now all these labourers have to maintain themselves — excepting 
those who work out in the desert, at the milway and the barrages." 
(Hekekyan Papers, V, Add. 37,452, fol. 486b).
writes:
"I can understand the Fellah*s aversion to govern­
ment employ. He is taken from his vilage, which 
he never voluntarily quits, forced to labour for 
ten hours a day in constant terror of the stick or 
the whip, fed on hard sour biscuits and water, 
and is rewarded when he gpts home, with a credit 
on the government of a half penny for each day 
that he has worked; a credij of which the real 
value seems to be doubtful.”
So under the corvee system, the labourers also furnished their
own food, although eometimes the government provided rations of
biscuits or indifferent bread. Therefore, the government was put
to no immediate expense beyond these provisions, for the normal
wages were not paid in money, but were deducted from the land-
tax payable by the villages which furnished the men. The loss was
thus only felt indirectly, by the treasury which was generally able
so to arrange the accounts as to bring in the villages as debtors.
Writing in 1857, the British Consul-General said that were the
labour to be paid for, not only would the projects themselves be
more maturely considered, "but the difficulty of obtaining labor,
and the expense of paying for it, would compel the government to
work in the cheapest manner, and for this purpose to avail itself
of the discoveries of modem science, by which human labor is so
2much economized." Thus the bad state of repair of the public
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1Senior, op.cit.. II, p.61.
o
Bruce to Clarendon, No. 25 of 29 Apr. 1857 in F.O. 142/20. A year 
later Green wrote "if the pay of the Fellahs, the bread supplied 
to them, the little work obtained from them, and the enormous roguery
of officials who charge for double and treble the amount of labour 
actually supplied, were duly taken into consideration, a more ex­
pensive system could not be had recourse to." (Green to Malmesbury, 
101 of 1 July 1858 in F.O. 142/21).
The canals were left until the agriculture of the provinces suffered, 
and then a levy of men was made.
The corvee was injurious both to the fallah and to the in­
terests of the proprietors and the peasantry. About 12,000 
fallabin perished and were buried on the banks of the Mafcmudiyya 
Canal because of hard usage and the lack of food and water. They 
were badly treated by the soldiers, who acted as overseers and 
obliged them to work continually from dawn to night.^ On the other 
hand, because of this system, a proprietor could not know before­
hand whether if he increased the area of cultivation he would be 
able to reap what he had sown. Bruce tells us of a wealthy shaykh 
who, in 1856, lost the produce of 500 acres owing to the with­
drawal of the men from his village at harvest-time. He offered 
to pay any sum the governor of the province might demand for the 
services of labourers to enable him to get his crop in, but they
were required for some public works in progress and oould not be had 
2on any terms. In addition, the corvee was an important cause of 
deserted villages, neglected fields and forfeiture of lands.
Hekekyan wirtes during ‘Abbas’s reign about the village of Manguriyya,
^Rafi‘i, Ta’rikh al-baraka al-qawmiyya. Ill, p.541; Rivlin, op.cit. 
pp. 221, 354 footnote 16; Madden, Travels, I, p.208.
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works was to be attributed in great measure to the same cause.
9Bruce to Clarendon, No. 25 of 29 April 1857 in P.O. 142/20.
in Giza, of around 3000 inhabitants that
"the number of hands this village alone sends for 
forced labour in the Pasha's palaces Elhamiyeh,
Abbassiyeh, Atabat-il-Khadra, Benha, Darb-il- 
Beida, mount Thor and the mosques of Sitti Zeineb 
in Cairo - and of Tanta - to the Bridges of the 
Delta (the barrages)the Railway - and the Vice­
regal farms, amounts to 450 These labourers
are maintained by the village; and they are re­
lieved once a month; so that nearly a thousand 
of the male population are almost constantly on 
the move out of their village.
The Shaykh of the village of Bortos, near Manguriyya, told Hekekyan
that there was scarcely a man left in the village because they
2were engaged in public works.
The laws of the Ottoman Empire, established by the Hatt-i-
Serif of Gtllhane of 1839» prohibited forced labour. Furthermore,
the hereditary ferman of 1841, enjoined Mufcammad ‘All and his
successors to carry on the government as much as possible in
conformity with the principles adopted in the other parts of the
empire, i.e. be and his successors should "be careful to ensure
the repose and the tranquility of the Egyptians by protecting them
from all injury and from all oppressions".-^ But Muframmad *Ali
4 i -had never put this into effect. Abbas was reported to have
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Hekekyan Papers, VII, Add. 37454, fol. 365a; V, Add. 37452, 
fol. 486b; VI, Add. 37453» fol. 70a; Loc. cit., G. Baer,
A histogyof landownership in modem Egypt, p.32; Idem, "The 
dissolution of the Egyptian village community", Die Veit des 
Islams, N.S., vi, 1959* Nr. 1-2, p.64.
^Hekekyan Papers, VI, Add. 37453* fol. 6£b.
3Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, I, pp. 122-23.
^In May 1847 a corvee was ordered to begin the excavation of three 
canals, cf. Rivlin, op.cit., p.237.
maintained the old system, and did nothing to alleviate the
condition of the fallah.^  According to Professor Baer, there
seems to be a change in the way of recruitment: while Muhammad
‘Ali carried out this system arbitrarily, *Abbas imposed man-
power quotas on all villages. He writes that under ‘Abbas
the village Shaykhs acquired the responsibility for filling 
3the quotas. But this view is no longer conclusive. The evi­
dence suggests that those shaykhs were entrusted with such
t - 4functions under Muhammad Ali as well. Therefore, it can be
3C1 .
B. St.->John, "Egypt under Abbas”, in Sharpe's London Magazine 
XIV, 1851, p.74. Apart from the corvee and conscription, Abbas 
was reported to have improved the conditinn of the fallafr in two 
ways: (a) the fallah. instead of being forced to cultivate some
specific crop, was free to cultivate what paid the best, his tax 
being all that was required of him; (b^ Previous^ no fallah 
could leave his village, but under ‘Abbas, if a village was over- 
populated, he could move to another village where his labour found 
a better market or gave a better return. (The Times, 31 May 1851). 
Furthermore, it was alleged that ‘Abbas*s accession marked a change 
for the better in the condition of the fallahin because he had 
none of Muhammad ‘Ali*s ambitious schemes of foreign conquest or 
any need for a large military force. (See D. M. Wallace, Egypt 
and the Egyptian Question, London, 1883, pp. 266-267, 302-303.)
2Cf. Baer, ”The village Shaykh", pp. 131-152, 137; also Baer,
"The dissolution of the Egyptian village community”, op.cit.. pp. 63-64.
■^ Baer, "The village Shaykh", pp. 131-132.
4 .Providing people for the corvee, supervising their work and pre­
venting their flight from the corvee was one of the functions de- 
volved_on the canton officials, one of_whom was shaykh al-balad 
(see La'ihat Zira*at al-fallah wa tadbir ahkam al-siyasa bi-^agd al- 
najah, Cairo,1245/l8D.PP. 38-39. For extensive use of the La ihah 
see Rivlin, Agricultural policy, pp. 95-97.) Merruau (L*figypte 
contemporaineT P.16) writes on shaykh al-balad: "quand il s*agissait
des corvees d ’homines, des emprunts de chevaux, d*fines, de chameaux. • • • • 
demandes par le gouvemement, le cheik choisissalt les hommes...”)
He provided not-only people for the corvee, but also conscripts for 
the army, (see (cont.)
concluded that the system of recruitment was carried out through
the same channels (i.e. the shaykh) as was the case under ‘Abbas's
predecessors. However, Hekekyan records in his papers the opinion
of lower clases about forced labour under ‘Abbas. He was told by
a donkey lad in Cairo in 1851 that
"Mohamed Aly was a 'vely' indeed, and that the 
pres wit Viceroy Abbas/ was idle. He said he
/ ’Abbas/ was cruel towards the poor - putting 
them to hard labour in the deserts and paying 
them nominally /sic/ nothing. The two piastres 
an able-bodied working man was to receive per 
diem dwindled away down to one piastre. He 
said that many of his countrymen died dayly z_?ic/ 
in the works of the Pasha's palaces. •• He said 
that if the levies were abolished the Viceroy would 
be pardoned his manifold sins - it was unjust and 
cruel to deprive parents of the services of an only 
son for whom they would willingly pay a thousand 
piastres rather than lose their aide /sic/in agri­
cultural labours."I
Bayle St. John, who made a tour of Egjrpt in 1851, in his
book touched on the question of the railway and its connection
with forced labours
"iron, they say, is a great civiliser; and its 
presence in that capacity is greatly wanted in
(cont.) Merruau, p.15; Lane, The manners and customs of modem 
Egyptians, pp. 200-201; Murray to Palmerston, 1 June 1848 in 
PTO. 78/757.)
hekekyan Papers, V, Add. 37452, fol. 26 (dated 6 Mar . 1851). 
Somebody well-informed gave Hekekyan the following list of wages:
government
little boys and girls 15 paras a day 10
grown up boys and girls 20 paras a day 15
full grown man 40 paras a day 30
overseers 60 paras a day 40
Hekekyan, Add. 37452, fol. 31a.
Egypt* But I do not think that the introduction 
of a railway, unless under certain conditions not 
likely to be complied with, will be beneficial 
at the present moment..*.. Has it been stipulated 
that free labour shall be employed, or are the 
unfortunate fellahs to be again dragged from their 
villages, as they were for the construction of the 
canal ^the KafcmudiyyaJ as they are for the Barrage 
and all other so-called public udertakings, and 
forced to work in hunger, whilst the divans of Cairo 
and Alexandria are disputing whose turn it is to 
send them their miserable supply of rice? Unless 
these questions be satisfactorily settled, I should 
regard the commencement of a railway as a curse 
rather than a blessing to Egypt....
What Egypt wants is a gradual emancipation of the 
fellahs, the destruction of the system of forced 
labour. Its people are remarkably acquisitive and 
naturally industrious. Let them alone, and they 
will soon find the way to prosperity, and make rail­
roads for themselves when necessary. In the meantime, 
if English capitalists could obtain permission to 
spend about a million sterling in their own way in 
improving the communication between Alexandria and 
Cairo, it would be very convenient for Indian travel­
lers, and would not only be temporarily beneficial 
to the fellahs, but might lead to a permanent im­
provement in their condition.
There is no reason, however, for supposing that
proper stipulations have been made; .... It will
be the more regrettable if arrangements have not 
been made in the interest of the fellahs....
Indeed, under ‘ Abbas, the question of forced labour was one
of the points under discussion between him and the Porte. When
Mukhtar Bey, *Abbas's confidential agent at the Porte, was sent
^St. John, Village life in Egypt. I, pp. 11-14
to Egypt in 1851* he urged ‘Abbas to abolish the use of unpaid
labour by compulsory means.* Murray, then the British Consul-
General, wrote to Palmerston privately that he had often told
‘Abbas that he was to blame for spending so much public labour
on buildings which were only for his private gratification.
But Murray admitted that no work of any magnitude could be
undertaken except by compulsory labour
"for the fellah would rather smoke all day and 
eat his mess of beans than earn half a crown 
and eat beef".2
‘Abbas^ on the other hand, Murray reports, paid for the corvee 
regularly and the books of his land-steward were shown to Mukhtar 
Bey. He claimed that the system pursued by ‘Abbas was more liberal 
and humane than that pursued by Muframmad ‘All, under whom the 
labour was compulsory and not paid. Murray concluded "when our
rail-road commences I will endeavour to persuade the V.R. to have
all the labourers engaged in that work paid regularly and I hope 
to show him that the work will be more cheaply and better done."
St. John believed that ‘Abbas had no disposition to be a tyrant but 
"he has not yet had the desire or the courage to emancipate the 
fellfths; and if he be persuaded that such and such a work - a
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Hekekyan Pagers, V, fol. 54; Canning to Palmerston, No. 104 of 4
Apr. 1851 /no. 26 J  in P.O. 424/7A.
2B.P., Murray to Palmerston (Private), 20 May 1851.
3
B.P., Murray to Palmerston (Private), 20 May 1851.
railroad, for example - be useful and desirable, he will, of 
course, think it no sin to carry it cut according to the custom 
of the country".^ Since the rough work of the railway was to 
be carried out by forced labour, St. John adds "the men required 
are taken wherever they can be found; and are nominally paid a 
piastre a day, and supplied with ratinns. I say nominally, because
if these promises be strictly carried out it will be the first time
2to my knowledge in the history of Egyptian public works."
Forced labour to be employed on tie Alexandria-Cairo railway 
became also one of the prime concerns of the Sublime Porte. Re§id 
informed ‘Abbas, in his letter of 2 September 1851* that the Sultan's 
permission to construct the railway would not be given except under 
conditions, one of which was that ‘Abbas must not employ compulsory 
labour. Murray considered this demand "no less inconsistent than 
unjust" because this matter had long been undisputed. ‘Abbas, he 
said, paid labour 20 paras a day in addition to their food.^ ‘Abbas, 
on the other hand, told Refid that forced and gratuitous labour imposed 
in former times upon the Egyptian people for works not of public 
utility, had, under his administration, been abolished. As the
X3t. John, Village U f a . II, pp. 179-180.
2St. John, op.cit.« II, p.180.
3Murray to Palmerston, Nos. 27 and 28 of 15 and 18 Sept. 1851 /nos.
110 and 1117 in F.O.424/7A.
railway was profitable to all, ‘Abbas added, the work and upkeep 
ought also to be made in common.^ * However, the Porte did not 
exclude the compulsory employment of the peasantry on works of 
public utility, but it required that their labour should not be 
entirely gratuitous. ‘Abbas reassured the Porte that the treatment 
of the workmen would be regulated by public consideration. Never­
theless, to insure humane treatment for his subjects, the Sultan
stipulated in the first article of the ferman that workers should 
2be paid. But the ferman was granted after everything had been 
arranged. In the preliminary correspondence, Stephensoninforaed 
‘Abbas that the railway would require from 15,000 to 20,000 men.
By article XIII of the contract the number of the labourers ‘Abbas 
had to furnish should be in accordance with the terms of a memorandum 
to be delivered by Stephenson to ‘Abbas on or bdbre 1 October 1851.
All requisitions for labourers were to be made by the resident en­
gineer at Cairo or at Alexandria to the appointed agent of the 
government. In November 1851, measures were taken by the govern­
ment to procure a supply of workmen, who were to be drafted from
3the different provinces in proper proportions. The correspondent 
of The Times reported that these workmen would be liberally remunerated
^Abbas Pasha to Reshid Pasha, encl. in Murray to Palmer ston, No. 117 
of 5 Oct. 1851; Canning to Palmerston, No. 129 of 17 Oct. 1851 in 
F.O. 424/7A.
Sjahoum, Receuil de firmans, p.255. See abcrre, p. 172.
3Bari owe (The making of the Suez Canal, p.lOl) says that the burden
of the oorvee for some distant public works such as the Mabmudiyya 
Canal and the Alexandria-Suez railway usually fell on the peasants
(cont.)
and fed for their labour.’*'
As usual in the case of forced labour, the labourers worked
in gangs under military surveillance. Several parties of cavalry
2were posted along the works to prevent desertion. About 24,000 
labourers worked on the Alexandria-Cairo line. This was in addition 
t> the soldiers and sailors known as al-Junud al-Imdadiyya (the supply 
soldiers) who were making embankments and carrying wood and materials. 
They were divided into two sections, both being supervised by military
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(cont.) of Upper E gypt. This is an inaccurate generalisation 
for which Marlowe cites no source of information. The labourers, 
who worked on the Mahmudiyya Canal came from al-Bu£ayra, al-Gharbiyya, 
al-Sharqiyya, al-Daqahliyya, al-Hinufiyya, al-Qalyubiyya and al- 
Gisa provinces. (See: Mengin, Histoire de l'flgypte, II, p. 335).
All these provinces were in Lower Egypt. However this does not imply 
that Upper Egypt did not take its share in any corvee. Generally 
the corvee was collected from the neighbouring districts. Prom 
the evidence at hand. Upper Egypt supplied quite a number of workers 
for the Sues railway. For instance, Girga province had to supply 
2500 labourers for the Sues line. The government discovered from 
the lists submitted by the Sues railway ma>mur that the number already 
sent from Girga was only 954. In June 1B5£># the government ordered 
the governor to expedite sending the remainder. (See: Sami, iii,
Pt. i, p. 229)
1The Times. 4 D.c. 1851.
^The Illustrated London » w a . No. 588, XXI, p.380, 6 Nov. 1852.
cavalry.* The employment of the sailors of the Egyptian navy
on the railway work by ‘Abbas was not strange as he took very
little interest in the fleet, the arsenal or anything appertaining 
2to the marine. The greater part of the sails were distributed ever 
the country for use as tents. This might have been the result of 
the conflict between him and Sa‘id Pasha, who was the Serasker 
of the Egyptian squadrons. On 7 Shawwal 1269/16 July 1853 an order 
was given to ^usayn Pasha, the general of the second and seventh 
regiments at Alexandria, to have all the soldiers of the regiments 
under his command stripped of their uniforms and arms and to have 
their names struck off from the registers, and to send them guarded 
to Sellm Bey, Ma‘mur al-Sikka al-Sadldiyya.^
When ‘Abbas received an application from the Porte, during 
the Crimean War, to send contingents of men and ships, preparations 
were made for the departure of the Egyptian fleet and 15»000 troops
4for Constantinople. So a considerable number of sailors were 
withdrawn from the railway work between Alexandria and Cairo, and
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^assuna, Migr wa'l-turuq al-fradidiyya. pp._113-114; Lahijah, Ta’rikh 
Migr al-iqtigadi. p.208; Rafi i, Agr Isma‘il. I, p.14.
Sami, iii, Pt. i, p.295 Sarhank, Saqa*iq al-akhbar. Ill, p.262.
This was not a new phenomenon. After 1841 settlement, Muhammad 
All did not send his soldiers away to their villages, but he 
employed them in the corvee, (cf. Rivlin, op.cit., pp. 209-210)
5SanI, III, Pt. i, p.58.
^ G m n  to Clarendon, No. 2 of 6 July 1853 in P.O. 78/966.
were employed in the arsenal. 1 But the Copts enrolled in the
regular army were withdrawn from the troops sent to Constantinople
beoause it was considered unsafe to send Christians to fight
against Christians. Therefore, about 2490 of these Coptic soldiers
were placed on the railway work. The acting British Consul-
General reported that hey *ere stripped of their clothes which
were not replaced by other garments and "were subjected to great
2neglect and privations". The engineers expected to have the line 
from Alexandria to the Nile opened by November 1853. Tet the French 
Consul-General, who visited the work-sites, said that the withdrawal 
of the sailors would probably retard the work until other men re­
placed them.^ When the railway was not progressing satisfactorily 
‘Abbas sent 5asan Pasha, the President of the Council at Cairo,
4to give the engineers every assistance.
5An eye-witness reported that the native labour was badly 
paid# He judged, in the absence of published information, from 
facts which had become generally known. The wages paid by the Pasha*s
^Green to Stratford de Redcliffe , 23 June 1853 in F.O. 78/966.
2Green to Addington, 18 Aug. 1853 in F.O. 78/966} Green to Clarendon, 
No. 33 of 30 Nov. 1853 in F.O. *2/l8.
3Delaporte to Drouyn de Lhuys, No.138, 25 July 1853» M.A.E., C.C., 
tom. 29.
4The Times. 13 Jan. 1854.
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Anon., Railways in Egypt, pp. 26-27.
government varied according to the type of labour but were much 
belov that paid for similar labour in free competition. The 
wages were irregularly paid, and when paid, were filtered down 
through intermediate agents to perhaps one-half of the rate allowed. 
According to this eye-witness, the ordinary able-bodied day labourers* 
who could not be obtained for private work under two and a half 
piastres, were paid by the government no more than one and a half 
piastres, which included rations, per day. Moreover, the masons 
and carpenters,^ who used to earn from ten to fifteen piastres a 
day, did not receive more than six to nine piastres a day. In 
addition to the hardships and exposure to which the labourers 
were subjected, the government did not supply them with sufficient 
implements. This eye-witness once saw a man painting iron-work 
with his hands because the government had not provided him with 
brushes. Carpenters and masons were supposed to find their own 
tools, but very few had stocks.
To the Egyptian fallab foroed labour was an adversity, but 
working on the Alexandria-Cairo railway, through the inhabited and 
cultivated area of the Delta, was very different from working in 
the waterless desert of Suez. Thus the supply of labour caused
^Masons: banna’in. Carpenters: naj.jarin. These groups (the
building crafts) must have been supplied by the Shaykhs of guilds.
The supply of services and labour for public wo lies was one of the 
functions maintained by the guilds. This function survived throughout 
the 19b h century. For a detailed study see: Baer, Egyptian guilds in 
modem times, pp. 93-100.
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some delays on the Sues line.'*' The work was retarded until 
September 1855 because the government could only supply a few 
hundred people, as it was necessary to wait for the harvest to 
be finished and agricultural labour completed. Then came the 
customary cleaning of the various canals which comprised many 
branches , the thorough cleaning of the Mafcmudiyya Canal which
occupied up to 1159000 men, and at last the month of Ramadan during
2which everything remained in suspense. Around September 1856,
Sa*Id took measures to hasten the building of the railway and
to complete it, if possible, within a year. He ordered Edhem
Pasha, the governor of Cairo, to go personally to the work-sites
to inspect progress, and to report to him. Since the control of
the work was entrusted to Edhem, he had to take the train and
go to the sites during holidays, such as Friday, and at times
when le was not engaged in any other work. This was to encourage 
3the workers. On the other hand, Mouchelet asked for a regular 
and permanent force of 4,000 workers. Therefore, Sa‘id called 
together the mudirs of the provinces and ordered them to increase 
the number of workers to 7 »000, and to go in person to the sites.
The 2,500,000 cubic metres remaining were to be shared between
XGreen to Clarendon, No. 12 of 7 Sept. 1855; No. 16 of 20 Sept.
1855 in F.O. 78/1123.
2Banedetti to Walewski, No. 12, 26 Sept. 1856, M.A.E., C.C., tom. 35. 
5San»I, III, pt. i, pp. 181-182.
the workers in the ratio of 2 cubic metres per man. Each province
would be entrusted with a task to carry out proportionate to its
contingent, and it would therefore be in its interest to furnish 
as many men as possible in order to be freed that much quicker. 
These orders were carried out. Not only was the required number of 
men oolleoted, but all their needs were attended to, i.e. fresh 
bread was brought by train daily and distributed among them.^ 
Merruau, describing the effects of a huge number of labourers, 
wrote
"once gathered in sufficient number, the workers 
fell to their task with an unparalleled zeal: the
track seemed, under thousandscf arms, to move by
itself, and advanced little by little just as lava
makes a bed In the mountains. The men doing the
levelling were followed by those laying the rails 
along the track at a speed of 1 .2 0 metre per minute, 
and on certain days at a speed of 1 .3 3 metre or 80 
metres per hour which is equivalent to laying 133 
pairs of rails in a ten-hour working day. "2
In 1836, the number of fallah workmen amounted to over 15,000.
The point reached was near al-Dar al-Bay$a’, a distance of thirty
miles from Cairo, over which the trains ran to carry the materials
and to supply the workmen with all provisions. Prom the rail head
camels were used to carry the food to the labourers. In 1857
Sferruau, L*figypte oontemporaine. pp. 111-112, 228-230.
Merruau, op.cit., p.1 1 2.
3Commercial report for 1856, encl. in Green to Clarendon, No. 15 
of 14 Feb. 1857 in F.O. 78/1316.
the encampment of the fallah workmen extended to about 20 miles 
along the line. The number of men employed was nominally 10,000 
but they could not be considered more than 8,000 effective work­
men, as some deserted and others obtained leave of absence.'1'
But twenty-five miles short of Suez, the work came to a 
standstill. This arose from from the difficulty of keeping the 
fall ahin at work in the desert. The anonymous eye-witness wrote 
that very many died from hardship and disease. Two to three 
hundred men at a time were lost from the works. The eye-witness 
added, "driven by hard usage to flee from the works, and not 
reaching water in twenty-four hours, they become prostrate, 
and perish, leaving their bodies to hyenas and vultures, and,
after the lapse of a few days, their scattered bones the only
2 -trace<f their existence." To keep the fallafr at work, Nubar
Bey informed Green that this remaining distance of twenty-five 
miles would be divided into sections, to be apportioned to the 
various provinces, so that the contingent of each province after 
having performed the task assigned to it, might depart for good, 
thus interesting the fallahin in completing their work quickly.^
^Green to Stratford de Redcliffe (semi official), 14 July 1857 in 
F.O. 142/20; Green to Clarendon, No. 19 of 4 July 1857 in F.O. 78/1314
2Anon., Railways in Egypt, p.85.
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Green to Clarendon, No. 5 of 14 Jan. 1858 in F.O. 78/1401.
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At the end <f March 1858, the workmen escaped, as their re­
placements did not arrive. Mouchelet complained that this system 
of relays would mean a loss of time. The Railway Administration 
thought on the contrary that the system of replacement would speed 
up the work because a man who had worked thirty days in the desert 
needed to be relieved. In order to satisfy Mouchelet, the Minister 
of the Interior, although of the same opinion as the administration, 
ordered that the replacements for the month of Sha‘ban should not 
be sent from the provinces until the men an the job had finished 
their work. The result of this measure was very simple; the workers 
waited a few days and then, with “the exception of two or three thousand 
rowly arrived, they all deserted. This happened on the 6th and 7th 
of Sha*ban. The Minister immediately sent orders by telegraph to 
the mudirs to seise fugitives and to send them back to the works 
at the same time as the replacements. These orders were sent on 
the 8th Sha*ban, but the men could not reach the sites before 22nd 
and 23rd of the same month. Nubar wrote to Green that for five or 
six days work (the days left in Sha*ban) the government did not 
hesitate to move over 10,000 men, because in the following month 
of Ramadan all government works would stop. Nubar concluded that 
"this measure was adopted not in the hope of speeding up the works 
but rather to demonstrate to the world that the government was 
concerned to finish speedily the Suez line".^ So the number of workmen
1.’Nubar to Green, 11 Apr. 1858 encl. in Green to Malmesbury, No. 57 
of 15 Apr. 1858 in P.O. 78/1401.
at work, at this stage, was estimated at 11,000 men. Therefore 
the uncertainty that prevailed as to the progress of the line was 
attributed partly to the difficulty of establishing an efficient 
superintendence of the large bodies of fallabin. Moreover, the month 
cf Ramadan was a period of universal idleness in Egypt.
During his visit, Nassau William Senior noted down the boys* 
and girls* songs which Hekekyan interpreted to him. The songs were 
as follows:*
Strophe: "We are all in rags; we are all in rags."
Antistrophe: "That the Sheykh may be dressed in cloth."
Another song:
Boys: "They starve us, they starve us,"
Girls: "They beat us, they beat us,"
Boys: "But there’s some one above,
There*s some one above,"
Girls: "Who will punish them well,
who will punish them well."
Hekekyan heard them singing: "No work on Friday,
No work on Friday."
*Senior, op.cit.. II, p.133
Our concern is not to investigate whether these songs suggest 
what the labourers felt towards the oppression to which they 
were subjected. Senior suspects that the songs were meant to 
be heard by the people in authority. But in the view of another 
writer^" the songs of the people were generally found to reflect 
popular feeling better than any other form <f expression, and Egypt 
was no ocception to the rule.
Green wrote that "the system of forced labour /was/ indeed 
••• one of the principal curses of Egypt". To British representatives 
forced labour was an injustice and an evil if it was called for to 
serve useless and childish purposes of the Viceroy. But since it 
was called for government purposes, it might be justified as necessary
in a country where fertility depended on canals and where without
2it the people would not serve the government. The employment of
forced labour on tie Suez Canal came under severe attack although the
3 i tJuly 1856 agreement with Sa id, for the supply of labour, had never 
been published. This opposition also applied to any other company 
of speculators who undertook liieir projects by means of forced labour. 
Writing to his government Bruce did not presume to say that forced
^E. L. Butcher, Egypt as we knew it. London. 1911, p.33.
Bruce to Clarendon, No. 21 of 13 Apr. 1857 in P.O. 14-2/20; Green 
to Malmesbury, No. 101 of 1 July 1858 in P.O. 142/21.
Cited in Marlowe, op.cit.. p.102-103.
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labour could be abandoned all at once in Egypt. He thought that 
it would require great judgment and an administration in whose 
justice the people would have confidence to obviate the incon­
venience which so important a change in the habits of an entire 
population, would in the first instance produce. He believed 
that if the Porte was anxious to retain its hold of Egypt and 
to carry out in practice the just principles of the Hatt-i-yerif 
of GtLlhane, it ought to make the Viceroy understand distinctly, 
at first in a friendly manner, and if necessary, by a formal docu­
ment, that the system was inconsistent with the just rights and 
with the improvement of the Egyptian population. Although it 
might be necessary for the present to retain the power for the 
repairs of works of acknowledged public utility, it was to be 
restrained in the narrowest limits possible. Moreover, the Viceroy 
ought to be warned that any attempt on his part to exercise this 
power on behalf of companies, "whether foreign or so-called Egyptian” 
would be an infraction of the rights of the Sultan’s subjects, and 
a violation of one of the most important conditions under which he 
administered E g y p t T h e  real aim was to hinder the construction 
of de Lessep's canal. In 1859 Colquhoun wrote to Lord Russell 
"it is true that in Egypt this has been overlooked, and the forced 
labour has been and is, imposed in cases of Public works such as
^Bruce to Clarendon, No. 25 of 29 Apr. 1857 in P.O. 142/20.
the Railroad, Barrage etc., but this is an abuse, nor must we
lose sight of the nature of the work required, which proved so
fatal when the Mahmoudieh Canal was excavated.”3' Concerning the
abolition of forced labour, Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Foreign
Minister, told the British Ambassador in Paris that no other kind
of labour existed in Egypt; moreover, the railroad had been
2executed by forced labour. Lord Russell replied that the railroad
and other public works in Egypt, having been made by forced labour,
"had no bearing whatever as an argument against the abolition of
an evil of which the works thus mentioned were only instances 
3in time past."
2. The Economic Significance of the Railway 
Before the construction of the railway, the Nile and the 
canals were the most important highways of communication. Paved 
roads were unknown in Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, although it would have been possible with little trouble 
to construct roads on the canal banks. But because of political 
circumstances, the roads were left in a state of neglect. Under 
the Mamluks, paved roads were not favoured because they were con-
^Colquhoun to Russell, No. 42 of 9 Dec. 1859 in F.O. 78/1489. 
2Cowley to Russell, No. 585 of 19 May 1863 2097in P.O. 198/27.
^Russell to Cowley, No. 675 of 20 May 1863 /no. 2107in P.O. 198/27.
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sidered a help for an enemy to over-run the country. 1 Stage-coaches
2were not known in Egypt. Land transport was by animals, mainly 
camels, mules and donkeys. Under Muhammad *Ali a new era of 
transport began in Egypt. He directed his attention to improving 
the routes of communication for the transportation of produce from 
the interior to the ports for exportation. Some of the roads whidh 
he constructed known as al-Turuq al-Sultaniyya (the Imperial roads), 
were long and wide roads with trees planted on both sides. He also 
made use of the Nile embankments for internal communication parti­
cularly to transport agricultural produce and mails, and also to 
link Cairo with the different provinces of Egypt.^
Primitive means of conveyance had restricted contacts and 
commercial exchanges between the towns. Furthermore, people, in­
capable of communicating with each other, subsisted exclusively 
upon the products of their own labour and their own soil. Each
1Clot-Bey,_Apercu generale. II, pp. 421-422; Mfchanna & Fahmy,
Iqtigadiyat al-sikak al-badldiyya. pp. 80-81; J. Lozack, Le 
Delta du Nil, p.132.
a
*All al-Gritlyj Ta*rikh al-gina ‘a fi Migr fi al-nigf al-awwal min al- 
q a m  al-tasi* <ashar, Cairo. 1952, pp. 14-15. Clot-Bey's assumption, and 
Crouchley's after him, that wheeled vehicles were almost unknown in 
Egypt before Bonaparte's carriage was greatly exaggerated. (Clot-Bey,
II, p. 423; Crouclley, The Economic development, pp. 77-78) L The 
carriage was used and known in Ottoman Egypt (see: al—Jabarti,
‘Aja’ib al-athar fi’l-tara.lim wa*l-akhbar. I,pw252.).
319.
^Lahijah, op.cit.. p. 144; Clot-Bey, II, p.422
town formed, together with the surrounding agricultural area,
a largely self-contained economic unit.^ The administrative units
into which Egypt was divided underwent constant changes because
of the lack of proper communications. Another drawback was the
fluctuation in boundaries at the beginning of the reign of Muframmad
*Ali. For instance a province could be divided into two or more
parts, each under a mudir, or again, two provinces could be
2merged into one. The development of commerce, the extension 
of cotton cultivation and the re-opening of the overland route 
necessitated, in ihe early years of Muhammad ‘Ali’s reign, the 
opening of the Mafcmudiyya Canal. The introduction of railways in 
the 1850*8 was a major change which revolutionized internal means 
of transport. The development of transport, therefore, ms one 
of the factors which contributed to the growth of Egyptian urban­
ism which had remained at a primitive stage until the end <f the
3nineteenth century. Before the railways, the perennial irrigation 
system introduced by Muframmad *Ali, marked the beginning of urbanism 
when cotton cultivation concentrated around the urban centres 
close to the water-ways. In addition, Muhammad *Ali*s Egypt was 
passing through a period of industrialization.
^Crouchley, op.cit.. p.29; G. Hamdan, The population of the Nile 
Mid-Delta past and present. A Study of dialectical integration 
in regional ecology. Ph.D. Thesis, Reading, 1953, vol. II, p.195.
^M. Ramzl, al-Qamus al-jughrafi li’l-bilad al-Migriyya, II, Pt. I, pp. 13
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3Hamdan, op.cit., II, p.200.
At the time of construction, the railway was looked upon as 
a means of connecting the administrative and important commercial 
centres in the Delta, Consequently, it ran through the most 
populated and fertile area, starting from Alexandria to Cairo via 
Daman^hur, Kafr al-Dawwar, crossing the Nile at Kafr al-Zayyat 
proceeding to fan$a, Birket al-Sab*, Banha and Qalyub. In3858 
the railwaywas extended to Suez. The exploitation of the rail­
way was such a profitable operation that Sa*id extended it 
to different parts of Lower Egypt, Commercial or military pur­
poses were not, in all cases, taken into consideration. In 1860, 
Sa*id constructed a branch line between Alexandria and MaryuJ 
which had neither economic nor military importance but was only 
for his private excursions. The total length of railway lines, 
existent in Egypt until the end of Sard’s reign, was 490 kilometres 
as follows:'*"
The year from to The length by kilometres
1 8 5 6 Alexandria Cairo 209
1 8 5 7 fan (a Samannud 53
1 8 5 8 Cairo Suez 144
1 8 5 9 Banha Zaqaziq 39
^Wiener, L'lSgypte et ses chemins de fer, pp. 83-88; Lahifcah, op.cit 
p .  2 3 4 .
The year from to The length by kilometres
1860 Alexandria MaryuJ 19
1861 Banha Mit Barr ah 13
In his Studies in Egyptian Urbanism, Dr. Hamdan writes that 
"the railway created a new order of nodalities and reassessed 
existing situational values although it re-emphasized the value 
of internal cotton situations to a large e x t e n t . T o  interpret 
this statement, it is necessary to study the effects of the railway 
on towns and consequently on internal trade.
a) Effects on towns:
Alexandria: The beginning of the nineteenth century saw
the continuing decline of Alexandria, which had begun with the
diversion of world trade from the Mediterranean to ocean routes.
This transference had placed Turkey as well as the countries over
which she ruled in a stagnant backwater through which the life-
giving stream of world trade no longer flowed. At the time of
the French Expedition, the population of Alexandria hardly amounted
2to 8,000 inhabitants. The city resembled, in the eyes of an observer,
"un orphelin dontles parents illustres ne lui auraient laisse que 
3le nom". The commercial importance of any point of the Egyptian
Hi amdan, Studies in Egyptian Urbanism, p.51.
2Clot-B«y, I, p.265.
3J. Nahas, Situation economique et sociale du fellah egyptien, p.40, cit 
in Lozach, Le Delta du Nil, p.150.
coast of the Mediterranean depended on the ease of its communications 
with Cairo, the commercial, industried and political centre of 
Egypt. No sooner had Muframmad *Ali come to power than he under­
stood the threefold military, naval and commercial importance of 
Alexandria. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Alex­
andria achieved a spectacular rise which Dr. Hamdan calls a 
•risorgimento* when Egypt began to feel the need for a coastal 
gateway to the outside world. Previously, Alexandria had been partly 
isolated from the rest <f Egypt because of the neglected state of its 
ancient canal. The destruction of this canal prevented the supply 
of Alexandria with fresh water, and made it difficult for the 
merchants to reach Alexandria with their merchandise from the 
interior. So, in 1811 Muhammad 4 Ali began to think of restoring 
the canal to navigation; but this was not achieved until 1819, 
when the Matunudiyya Canal was constructed. Foreign ships were
allowed to enter the western Port of Alexandria which had been
they
closed to them previousl^/boing permitted to land only at the
eastern Port which was not suitable for landing. 1
Native as well as foreign commercial houses were established 
2in the city. The population of Alexandria had increased to 130,000
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Mubarak, VII, p.30; Issawi, Egypt: an economic and social analysis, 
p.15; Crouchley, op.cit.. pp. 34-36, 77-80; Boar, E g y p t A familiar 
description of the land, people, and produce, pp. 17-18; fusun, op.cit.. 
pp. 51-52, 65, 81-83.
2Clot-Bey, II, pp. 307-308; according to one estimate, the European 
mercantile houses in Alexandria were twenty-one in 1822 (see Boaz,
op.cit., p. 293); in 1837 there were more than seventy foreign 
mercantile houses (Bowring, Report, pp. 80-81).
by 1830.^ By the middle of the century, the city became once
more one of the world's great entrepots with a population of
2150,000. The construction of the railway was a further step 
in the growth of the city, as it linked Alexandria directly 
with the capital and with Suez on the Red Sea. Within the Delta, 
Alexandria was connected with Damanhur, the capital and the
trading centre of the Bu^ayra province. By 1840 the population
- 3of Damanhur amounted to from 8 to 10,000 inhabitants. Muhammad
‘All established there a cotton spinning factory and another one
4for spinning and weaving wool. But it is difficult to illustrate 
the yowth, which took place in the towns of the Delta, in the 
absence of comparative censuses.
Kafr al-Zayyat: The railway had a creative effect on other 
towns. Where it crossed the Rosetta branch, tie railway created
a perfectly new break-of-bulk point, Kafr al-Zayyat. Muhammad *Ali
5created it as a modem planned village. Since then it became an
^It is to be noted that prior to 1882, the population figures for 
Egypt were merely estimates. The first census of Egypt in which 
modem methods were employed was that taken in 1882. For a detailed 
investigation »e: I. A. Farid, The population of Egypt, some aspects
of its growth and distribution. Cairo, 1948, pp. 8-14.
2Landes, Bankers, p.85; V. Crouchley, op.cit., p.138.
^Clot-Be^, I, p.272; Al-Surugi, "al-Iskandariyya fi’l-Vgiur al-fcaditha" 
in Ta’rikh al-Iskandriyya, pp. 376-378.
^Rafi*i, Ta’rikh al-fraraka A-qawmiyya, III, p.561;
5 4 ••The institution of model villages, adopted by Muhammad Ali, aimed at
introducing a system of architecture more commodious and healthy than
the old. He built several villages which were peopled with fallafrin
evicted from their mud caverns. (See St. John, Village life, I, pp. 102-
important port where boats stopped laden with passengers or merchand­
ise for yan^a.* When the river was bridged at Kafr al-Zayyat after 
the construction of the railway, an artificial nodality came finally
in its favour. This, consequently, assisted the growth of this urban
2centre which at the present time has become an industrial town.
After the construction of the railway, the markaz of a district 
was selected from the places situated near the railway stations in 
order to expedite official work and transfer of officials and in­
habitants. Kafr al-Zayyat is a good example of this trend. In 1871 
the Diwan of Basyun district was transferred to Kafr al-Zayyat, 
which has become known since then as markaz Kafr al-Zayyat.
Tanta: The capital of the Gharbiyya province, was the
most important commercial and agricultural centre in the Delta.
It was a depOt for many goods from the interior, and here came 
the speculators and the buyers, representatives from firms in Alex­
andria, Marseilles, Trieste and England.^ Its situation in the 
middle of the Delta between the two branches cf the Nile, no doubt 
conferred on JanJa these spectacular advantages. But this was not
325.
H>t. John, op.cit., I, p.102.
2Lozach, op.cit., pp. 222-223; Hamdan, Studies, p.51.
3 -Ramzi, II, Pt. 2, p.128.
^Merruau, I/feypte contemporaine, p.106.
all. The existence of the shrine of Sayyidi A^mad al-Badawi made Xan$a 
one of the most celebrated religious centres in Egypt. Every year, 
at the time of his mawlid (annual fair) Xanfca was overcrowded by 
visitors who came from all over Egypt to celebrate this remarkable 
occasion. No other religious festivities in Egypt exceeded this 
mawlid except the great pilgrimage to Mecca. This gave profitable 
opportunities for commercial activities, 1 so that the money annually
2expended during the mawlid was estimated at not much less than £2,800. 
Clot-Bey writes "pendant la grande foire de Chouroum, une affluence 
immense encombre Tantah; des marchands s'y rendent de la Turquie,
3de la Perse, des Indes et de plusieurs parties de l'Afrique".
The railway re-emphasized the situational value of Xanfca and
also played a great part in its urban growth. Sometimes about 100,000
4 ipeople were collected at Tanfca during each fair. It was Abbas who 
reconstructed the Badawi mosque at Xan$a, and it was he who insisted 
upon the construction of the Xanfca line. This was not a mere coin­
cidence. 4Abbas was a religious man; several times he visited the 
5Badawi shrine. This could be a reason for his insistence on the
Mubarak, XIII, pp. 45-51; Delaporte to Walewski, No. 196, 22 Jan. 
1856, M.A.E., C.C., tom. 29. "Tantah ou se tient annuellement une 
foire universelle, et sans contredit la ville qui profitera le plus 
de ce changement." See also: Olympe Audouard, Les mysteres, pp.
259-265.
2Boaz, op.cit., p.27.
3Clot-Bey, I, p.274; see Crouchley, op.cit., pp. 30-31.
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4Anon, Railways in Egypt, p.41.
^The Times, 25 Sept. 1849 and 17 July 1854.
Xan$a line. However, Alexandria, Kafr al-Zayyat, fan^a and
1Cairo have since become a chain of "correlated” urban centres.
This chain of railway communication was diverted to link the 
Alexandria railway with the most important centres of lower Egypt. 
One of the most profitable links was that connecting X^t® with 
Samannud, on the left bank of the Damietta branch. Samannud was 
one of the earliest urban centres in the Gharbiyya province. It 
gained an industrial function in the second decade of the 19th
i 2century, when Muhammad *Ali established a cotton factory there.
The X^ta-Sammanud line, in cutting through the Delta from east 
to west served the most important towns of Mangura and Damietta, 
and linked the villages situated on the lower Nile between Samannud 
and the Delta of the river directly with Alexandria. At that time, 
the produce of this part of Egypt had to go with difficulty up 
the Nile as far as Banha to reach the railway and then be re-
3directed towards Alexandria. This re-emphasized the situational 
value of the city of X^fca which has flourished until the present 
time.
al-Zaqaziq: The capital of the Sharqiyya province was
created when Muhammad ‘Ali ordered the construction of the tarrage
^Hamdan, The population of the Nile Mid-Delta, II, pp. 226.
2 _It became a markaz in 1826. (Ramzi, II, Pt. 2 )
Benedetti to Walewski, No. 12, 26 Sept., M.A.E., C.C., tom. 35; 
Lozach, op.cit.. p.112; Mubarak, XII, 46-51.
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at al-Zaqaziq on BafcrMuwayB. Originally, it was a camp for the 
workers employed on the construction of the barrage, who built 
mud huts on the banks of BafcrMuways in which to live. At that 
time food-sellers followed them and al-Zaqaziq began to grow as 
an urban centre. When the barrage works were finished in 1832, 
those houses were reconstructed and the mosque was rebuilt. There­
fore al-Zaqaziq overtook Belbays and became the capital of the 
province. Its growth increased after it had been linked with 
the railway.^ A considerable number of firms connected with 
Manchester had established themselves in the cotton industry 
at Zaqaziq, and its growing importance led the British Consul-
General in 1862 to suggest to the Foreign Officethe appointment
2of a consul or agent there. One of the advantages it had was 
its being the terminus of one of the branch lines. This, however, 
sustains the theory that the railway emphasized the trend in­
augurated by the irrigation and cotton revolution. Marginal 
situations, such as Belbays, had declined and interior situations
nearer to agricultural areas began to flourish as happened in the
— — 3 —case of al-Zaqaziq. The railway from al-Zaqiziq joining the
^Mubarak, XI, pp. 93-94; _al-Rafi‘i, Ta’rikh al-baraka al-qawmiyya, 
III, p. 567; Ramzi, al-Qamus, II, Pt. I, pp. 14, 89-92.
2Colquhoun to Russell, No. 76 of 6 June 1862 in F.O. 78/1693; Russell 
to Colquhoun, Nos. 8 & 12 (consular) 8 July, 13 Oct. 1862 in F.O. 
141/47; Saunders to Russel], No. 18 (consular) 23 Sept. 1862 in F.O. 142/26.
3Hamdan, Studies, p.51.
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Alexandria line at Banha was destined to offer enormous advantages 
to this region. It established a direct link between Alexandria 
and Cairo and that part of Lower Egypt contained within the right 
bank of the Damietta branch and the desert frontiers. This region 
assumed much importance from the vast increase in the amount of 
first quality cotton it produced. Zaqaziq's prosperity was due, 
then, to agricultural exploitation. It was an important depCt 
for the produce of the Delta, that is to say for cotton, sesame 
and other products. The journey between Zaqaziq and Banha took 
twelve hours by water and six to eight hours by land. Building 
the railway could only increase the commercial importance of the 
town, and provide more apid transport for the produce of the 
fertile province of al-Sharqiyya.^
Suez; Suez was one of the first towns to benefit from the 
railway. Situated on the western side of the gulf of Suez, it was 
a port and a terminus for the commerce of Arabia, India and the 
Sudan. Suez, which replaced the town of Qulzum, had been important 
throughout the centuries because of its geographical position, the 
passage of the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the amount of merchandise 
coming to it. In Suez, there was a permanent governmental force, 
a resident governor and a customs house. Nevertheless it was a 
small town whose inhabitants were few in number and had come mainly
1Benedetti to tfalewski, No. 12, 26 Sept. 1856; Schefer to Walewski,
No. 76, 9 Jan. 1859, M.A.E., C.C., tom.35.
from gijaz, al-^Ur and Egypt. It lacked the main essential, fresh 
water. The Beduins came in great numbers, but only during the 
pilgrimage period. They sold their goods and departed owing to 
this serious problem of obtaining fresh water. Its inhabitants 
used to drink from salt wells, far from Suez, such as Ghardaqa 
and Musa wells. Situated on the desert fringe, Suez was very poor 
with few buildings, and remained so until Muhammad *Ali turned 
his attention to it. With continued security Suez began to prosper 
for it became important in the transit of trade between India and 
Britain. Before the construction of the railway, camels were used 
to transport goods and coal to Cairo. In 1846, the Diwan al-Murur 
was formed. At first the route was divided into four stations, 
then to fifteen. In 1849, *Abbas issued orders for the macadamization 
of the Suez route, and only half of the road was finished at al-Dar 
al-Bay$a \ When the Suez line was built, this route ceased to be 
used and some of its stations were used for the railway.^" In 1859 $
the inhabitants of Suez were estimated at about 6,000, whose provisions
2were brought by camels from the Nile Valley, especially from Cairo.
There is no doubt whatever that the railway was very essential 
to the prosperity of Suez. Above all, it facilitated the so necessary 
supply of fresh-water. On the inauguration of the Cairo-Suez railway, 
Delaporte reported "M. Nubar Bey, Directeur du Transit, a eu l'heureuse
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Mubarak, XII, pp. 69-71; Dassy, Notes on Seuis and its trade with the 
Red Sea; E. de Leon, The Khedive’s Egypt, London, 1877, p.42; report 
on Suez and the importance of the railway to it: Batissier (Vice
Consul de Prance a Suez) to Sabatier, 21 June 1851, M.A.E., C.C., tom. 
35 (Alex.); also Hoskins, British Routes, p.228.
2Da8sy, op.cit., pp. 9-10.
pensee d’envoyer avec la premiere locomotive, qui «t entree 
dans la ville un train d’eau du nil qu'on a distribue a tous les 
habitans qui ne buvaient jusqu’a present, que l'eau saumatre de 
puits environnants. Cet evenement a etd un jour de f6te pour 
Suez."'*' On the other hand, the railway was destined to confer 
great advantages on Suez before the opening of the Suez Canal.
A quick look at the volume of merchandise, money and travellers 
passing through it will justify this fact. The value of its trade 
in 1856 was 6 5*334*938 frs., of which 40 millions was levied from 
goods in transit from Europe to Asia and vice versa. But what 
characterized the movement of the port of Suez was not just trade 
in goods but the transit, always growing in currency and specie, 
which was not included in the figure of 65 millions. There came 
through Suez in 1856 of precious metals, bars or coins in silver 
51*568 coffers containing 463*432,500 frs. Three years earlier, 
the transit at Suez oily amounted to 15*337 cases of currency, 
its movement of goods did not exceed 36 million frs.; the number 
of passengers did not exceed 17 to 18,000; its maritime movement 
did not exceed passage, to anf from, of 400 ships. In 1856 
this lad risen to 596 ships and over 22, 235 passengers. The 
Journal des Debats, quoting from the Annales du commerce
Selaporte to Walewski, No. 247* 12 Dec. 1858, M.A.E., C.C.,
tom. 30.
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exterieur, gives the total volume of goods and currency during the 
first six months of 1857 at 320,404,000 frs.^ Consequently, Suez 
began to acquire different characteristics, and to lose its 
uncared-for appearance. This growing European intercourse with 
India had largely contr ibuted to its prosperity. In 1858, the 
Illustrated Times reported "in Suez, as in Manchester, you meet 
with travellers of every nation, our own countrymen being largely 
in the majority. They are to be found in every cafe, where with
the Arabs, they smoke the chibouques, sip coffee, and listen to
2the writings of some favourite Eastern poet."
The progress of internal prosperity owed much to the con­
struction of the railway and the increase of European commerce. 
Moreover, the railway marked the revival ofthe three key cities 
of Egypt, Alexandria, Cairo and Suez. A contemporary writer 
comments
" arrest English commerce, and Alexandria would 
collapse in a single year. Suez would, of course, 
become a mere pilgrim-khan, and her brackish well, 
instead of giving water to the three or four hundred 
noble camels that transport British merchandise 
across the sands, would degenerate into the annual 
drinking-trough of the Haj caravan. Cairo would 
suffer greatly, yet less, perhaps, than other 
Egyptian cities; as she is not quite so dependent
^This is the toted of 62,206,000 frs. in goods and 255,198,000 frs. 
in currency, cf. Merruau, L'iSgypte contemporaine, pp. 230-232; Hoskins,
op.cit., p.3 6 7.
2The Illustrated Times. No. 164, VI, pp. 361-362 (22 May 1858).
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on foreign traffic. But Alexandria would soon 
shrivel up into a fourth of its present dimensions; 
and not all the power of Greek enterprise or French 
ambition could prevent such a catastrophe.
Britain needed a short route to India; and this neces­
sity has been the revival of Egypt..... Across the narrow 
strip of land, the whole West pours into the East, and
the East into the West For, let it be remembered,
that this revival of Egypt is only commencing; and the 
completion of the railway between the two seas^will bring 
with it wonders on which we do not calculate.”
b) Effects on Internal Trade and Communication;
On 10 Mutiarram 1271/3 October 1854, Sa‘id approved the tariff 
laid down by the Diwan al-Murur for railway and Nile transport.^ 
According to this tariff, passengers were divided into three classes:
1) First-class passengers provided with food in the 
cabins on the Nile steamers;
2) Second-class passengers provided with food on 
board the steamers, and
5) Third-class travel (confined to Egyptian workers 
and farmers) with conveyance by ordinary boats 
without provision of food.
Although the Alexandria-Cairo railway was still under construction, 
the fares for each destination, between Alexandria and Suez, were
Nile transport was included in this tariff because Kafr al—Zayyat 
bridge was not yet constructed and conveyance over this portion 
was performed by the Nile steamers.
^The North British Review, XXIX, Art. VII, p.163, Aug.-Nov. 1858.
2
fixed. Fares were fixed for first and second class passengers
between Alexandria and Suez, but there was no announcement of
third-class fares. No reason is given for that. Nevertheless,
the fare for third-class travellers, workers and fallahin, was
40 piastres. In addition there was a fixed tariff for the conveyance
of goods and money. Furthermore the tariff specified the general
regulations for travellers, and the weights, free of charge,
allowed for first and second class passengers. Third-class passengers
had no such privileges.^
At the beginning of 1855, it seems that Lee Green, Director
of Diwan al-Murur, made some effective reduction in the fares, and
increased departures between Alexandria and Cairo. The British Consul-
General reported that a large and increasing number of the poorest
classes had already begun to avail themselves of these advantages;
and on the part of the railway which was opened, a considerable
local traffic had sprung up between the towns situated near it.
Bruce, however, advocated on all occasions low fares for the third
class, and was convinced that if managed on liberal principles,
the railway would justify "the statement made by it’s /sic/ founders of
the advantages it would confer on the population and trade of Egypt
itself being infinitely greater than those derived by any Foreign 
2transit trade." Henceforward, the lower classes of the population
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1Sami, III, Pt. I, pp. 90-92.
2Bruce to Clarendon (Private), 17 Jan. 1855 in F.O. 195/412.
adopted the railway. It was a curious fact, Merruau wrote, that the
greatest part of its income came from transporting the fallahin, who
paid ten francs each third class, ftiis was contrary to the expectation
that the only serious custom would be from the English trade. Merruau
comments that in Egypt as elsewhere:
"ease and rapidity of communications will multi­
ply journeys and trade In fact the railway
which Mehemet Ali envisaged as a charge upon 
the state, now constitutes one of the resources 
of the Treasury. The first year it yielded 30,000 
bourses or 3*750,000 frs.; the second year, receipts 
rose to 40,000 bourses or 5*400,000 frs."l
In 1856, the railway diwan issued a pamphlet of the Tarifs et
2Reglements Du Chemin De Fer Egyptien. The passengers were also 
divided into three classes. The fares were fixed for each of the 
following destinations: Alexandria, Kafr al-Dawwar, Damanhur,
Kafr al-Zayyat, fanfca, Hawaiiat Ru£, al-Mafcalla al-Kubra,
Samannud, Birkat al-Sab*, Banha, Qalyub, Cairo and Suez. Mer­
chandise was also classified into various categories, some charged 
on weight, some on volume, some on value and some by the piece.
The various sources of revenue illustrate the progress of the
3traffic in and through Egypt.
But before the completion cf the railway to Suez, the effect 
of railway transport charges on passengers and commerce was
Hlerruau, op.cit.« pp. 108-109.
2Tarif et Reglenent in F.O. 141/30.
See the illustrative table in AppendixHT, p.379.
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questioned. The passenger fares were higher than in any other 
country in the world.^ The writer of the anonymous pamphlet was 
critical of these charges. He based his criticism on the published 
tariff and compared the charges with those adopted on European 
railways. If a first class passenger was proceeding from Alex­
andria to Cairo, or vice versa, with his wife, three servants, a 
carriage, and two horses and a proportionate quantity of luggage, 
it would have cost him formerly, for a commodious boat which would 
have taken all except the horses, £4 ; and the horses would have 
been sent for £1 more, making the total £5. But if conveyed by 
the railway, he would pay about £15.14.1.d The third class passengers 
were, from want of adequate rolling stock on the railway, generally 
packed indiscriminately with goods and luggage, or "may be seen 
swarming on the convex roofs of the third-class covered carriages, 
of which there were a few". When there was a great rush of passengers, 
as during the pilgrimage to Mecca, the government seized the opportunity 
to double the fares, or announcihg that there were none but first- 
class tickets available. Moreover, return, season and excursion
tickets, at reduced rates, did not appear to have been thought of 
2in Egypt.
The railway*s effects on internal commerce must have been 
unquestionable as it facilitated the supply of provisions to the
^The Times, 29 Apr. 1858, p.5.
2Anon, Railways in Egypt, pp. 33-35, 38-59.
different provinces of Lower Egypt. No less was its importance 
to Alexandria whose fresh provisions were brought from the surrounding 
provinces and Cairo. In 1854, the 'Towing Company", with Egyptian 
capital and administration, was established by a ferman from Sa‘id, 
conferring upon it certain privileges and Egyptian status, to trans­
port produce and passengers by tug steamers and improved boats on 
the Nile and the Mafcmudiyya Canal. Said's main object,in establishing 
this company, was to avoid the delays of the sailing-boats, which 
were controlled by winds and travelled the distance from Cairo to 
Alexandria in fifteen days. So long as Alexandria was dependent on 
provisions from the interior, a faster means was necessary to meet 
its needs particularly after the population had increased. 1 This 
means that greater advantages were expected after the construction 
of the railway. But the charges for merchandise seem to have been 
obnoxious and frustrating. The anonymous writer asked in his 
pamphlet why the food for Cairo and Alexandria should be charged 
as if it were as dangerous as gun-powder. He gives us some examples 
because he lived in Egypt and knew the prices of commodities. 1 
Qinjar of eggs in Cairo cost 15/- in Cairo, while in the villages 
it was half that sum. Butter in Cairo was about 1^/26. per pound, 
but in Alexandria people were sometimes glad to pay as much as 2/6 
per pound. So, because of the high cost of transport, Alexandria 
was not at all well supplied with fresh provisions or garden produce.
^Rafi'i, ‘Agr Iama'il. I, pp. 34-35.
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Cf. Anon, op.cit.. pp. 41-43.
Yet, it was asserted that the line did not repay the ad­
ministrative expenses. This was partly explained by the free 
services rendered to the government in the transport of troops, 
material and stores of all kinds. To remedy this, wrote the cor­
respondent of The Times, moderately good management was necessary 
for the railway to become a most lucrative source of revenue. 
Secondly, a large addition to the rolling-stock was required to 
enable the government to make reductions in ife charges to render 
the railway truly valuable to the agricultural and commercial in­
terests of Egypt. Concluding his observations, the correspondent 
adds "the tariff for the carriage of goods would elsewhere be 
looked upon as amounting to an absolute prohibition, notwithstanding 
which, at all the principal stations along the line may be seen 
piles of cotton bales and of other produce which the railway ad­
ministration, with its present means, is totally unable to bring 
forward to port of shipment.According to another estimate, 
the transport service on the land side of Suez by railway did not 
afford adequate accommodation to merchants either in respect of 
the frequency of goods trains or of rates of carriage. The cost 
by railway for all goods was still much higher than by camels,
which amounted, for the distance between Cairo and Suez, to about
1 2 16d. per 100 lbs. carried, equivalent to 4 /2d. per ton per mile.
^The Times, 29 Apr. 1858* p.5.
2Dassy, Notes on Sueis, p.15.
It is jarticularly important to examine the effects of the 
railway rates on cotton transport. Camels and boats on some of 
the large irrigation canals as long as there was water enough, 
conveyed the cotton to the larger arteries, the Nile and the 
Ma^nrudiyya Canal and the railway leading to Alexandria. Con­
siderable difficulty was experienced at times from the low level 
of water. The railway rate for carriage from Cairo to Alexandria 
imposed on impressed bales, an additional l l V 4°/°» and in 
pressed bales an additional 7^/2°/°* The means for pressing 
cotton in the districts of Egypt were so limited, that almost 
the whole work was effected in Alexandria. Thus, the railway from 
Cairo to Alexandria with its absurdly high rates,^ and its cap­
ricious management was not as useful as it could have been.
Merchants used it only when other means failed, or when time was of 
more importance than cost. But even cn such occasions, the railway
did not always afford relief, and "it /was/ a common occurrence to
2see the camel in competition along its embankments". The average 
cost of carrying goods from the land on the eastern branch of the 
Nile (via the Delta and the Mafcunudiyya Canal) to Alexandria was 
approximately one shilling per qin$ar. If the goods came from an
^According to the official tariff charges imposed on cotton were 
20 Egyptian piastres per qinjar for round bales, or 16 pes. for 
pressed bales from Cairo to Alexandria.
2A memo, from Hekekyan dated Oct. 1857 on the cultivation of cotton 
in the Nile-Valley; also a memo, from acting Consul Mtlller, in 
answer to queries of the office of Cotton Supply Association,
Manchester dated 4 Nov. 1857 in P.O. 78/1516; Anon..op.cit. pp. 22-24, 
44-45*
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inland area the extra charge for camel-hire brought it up to 
about one and sixpence per q in Jar. The steam tug company, charged 
6 to 6^/2 piastres per qin Jar (14.77 to 16 pence) as their 
maximum freight, insuranceIncluded, from Mna§ura to Alexandria; 
and 3 / 2  to 4 piastres (8.61 to 9.84 pence) from Cairo to Alex­
andria. Hekekyan concluded, in his report to the Cotton Supply 
Association, "a reduction of the unreasonable and unjustifiable 
rates on the Railway, and the extension of branch lines, of which 
some are projected and the usefulness of which the natives have 
already well understood to appreciate, are most desirable".^
Because of maladministration in the railway, people gave up 
using it. For instance, Mubarak describes the state of the Alex­
andria station, the terminus for imports and exports. When he was 
appointed in 1868, there were no places for storage. Goods were 
thrown out of the trucks on the ground between the locomotives and 
the trains, and the result was appalling. Olive casks, acids and 
paints, all mixed up with wood, were tossed with woven materials, 
cotton bales and grain baskets. The employees who moved the goods 
from the track to owner had an almost impossible task. No wonder 
the owners of -the goods made repeated complaints about the extra 
expenditure paid to the porters and the carts. The charges were 
too high and the carts carried only half loads because the ground
^Memo. from Hekekyan, Oct. 1857 in F.O. 78/1316. For an example 
of the expenses of the accommodation afforded by Alexandria-Cairo 
railway to Manchester manufacturers see: Anon., op.cit., p.45.
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was not level and the accumulation of dust tired the animals, 
particularly in winter when the goods got wet from rain and 
were mixed with mud. This bad state of affairs became widely 
known.^ Indeed in 1864 the abuses of the railway forced the 
British merchants at Alexandria to protest to the Egyptian govern­
ment. They complained of the monopoly of the railway to serve 
the Viceroy in his mercantile capacity. A British merchant was 
told when trying to forward machinery into the interior "that 
so long as there remained for transport a single package of the 
merchandize belonging to H.H. the Viceroy, the goods of private 
persons could not be forwarded". The roads from the merchants* 
stores to the shipping wharves , and from the customs house and 
the railway station to town, were in a disgraceful state, the 
holes merely filled up with loose earth and broken pottery. They 
also complained because their properties were detained for weeks 
in transit, exposed to weather, and to pillage, and whole bales 
of goods were often stolen. If the railway and the steamers were 
sufficient only for his own requirements, they asked the Viceroy 
to authorize the formation of an international company to facilitate
the transport of produce and merchandise by means of steamers,
2lighters and tugs.
^Mubarak, VII, p.90.
2The resolutions of the British merchants are enclosed in Colquhoun 
to Russell, No. 27 of 25 Mar. 1864; Merchants to Saunders, 26 Apr. 
1864 encl. in Colquhoun to Russell, No. 63 of 3 May 1864 in P.O.
78/1818; Memorial from Chairman of British Mercantile Community 
dated 30 Apr. 1864 encl. in Saunders to Russell, No. 14 of 19 May 
1864 in P.O. 78/1838.
Railway expenditure exceeded revenue. The fares were very 
high, particularly for third-class passengers. Despite this, 
they were exposed to many inconveniences because most of the 
third-class carriages looked like animal trucks, which were not 
covered for protection against wind, dust, heat and cold. These 
trucks were also seatless. The administration had none of the 
European third-class carriages.^ The behaviour of the employees
of the trains was often very bad. This displeased passengers and
2made them unwilling to travel. "In the railway carriages,” Nassau 
William Senior notes in his diary, "the third-class passengers, who 
stand staring at the novelty of the scene /were/admonished to sit
•5by being struck on the head by the sticks of the railway-porters". 
*Ali Mubarak tried to get rid of these evils. Since the revenues 
of the railway diwan depended upon commerce, it required particular 
attention because passenger fares could not cover the expenditure.
So three means were necessary to attract the merchants to transport 
their merchandise by the railway. These were : to reduce the railway
charges on merchandise to less than those paid if conveyed by land 
or sea; to transport merchandise to its destination in less time 
than taken by rival means of transport; and to protect merchandise 
from disasters, such as fires, theft and damp. According to Mubarak,
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^Phillips to Stanton (Private and Conf.) 26 May 1866 in P.O. 141/60.
^Mubarak, VII, p.92.
4Senior, Conversations, II, p.59.
the second and third points were achieved through publishing 
regulations in all the stations, and by building roofs to loading 
and unloading bays. With regard to the first point, all means of 
persuasion vere pursued, such as signing contracts with merchants; 
deducting a certain sum from the fares of some sorts of merchandise 
for well-known merchants; deducting 10°/° from the total fares of 
the merchandise conveyed in every three or six months or one year; 
grades were fixed and a temporary tariff was drawn up which was 
published and circulated to all the stations, the diwans and to 
the leading merchants. Furthermore, inspectors were appointed 
to supervise the execution of these regulations so that each train 
would start with its full load. Previously this point h ad been 
neglected so that frequently the train carried only one-fourth 
or one—half of its proper load. The cultivators1 desire to transport 
their crops to the markets, or to another town of the countryside 
trading centres, had not been realized. There were many obstacles 
against achieving these purposes, for instance some of the lines 
were far from some of the important towns and villages, and, finally, 
there were also long distances between some of the stations.^-
A last point oughtto be made here. The adoption of the railway 
for conveyance of local mails was a turning point in the history
343.
1Mubarak, VII, pp. 92-93
of postal communications in Egypt. Under Muhammad ‘Ali the transport
of government letters between Cairo and Alexandria was by couriers
on foot. The couriers were relieved at every telegraphic station,
of which there were nineteen between the two cities. The government's
courier-eervicewas daily, and the distance was covered in twenty-four
hours. The Egyptian government always permitted consuls to send
letters by government couriers, but the weightwas limited. To avoid
some inconveniences, the consuls and European merchants in Alexandria
and Cairo combined to establish a regular post between these two
places. This was carried into effect in August 1831. The service of the
European post was done by 'Arabs' and by am arrangement with the
shaykh of the couriers in Egypt,^ who furnished the couriers for which
2he was paid by the European Postmamter, Signor Meratti. The Post 
Office also undertook the conveyance of letters between Cairo and 
Alexandria and vice versa. This warn the first organised Post Office 
in Egypt.
Under the successors of Meratti, the Post Office was developed
a 3amd became known ais the Ppsta Buropea. It achieved an increasing
success so that it opened new offices in Lower Egypt. When the
railway was constructed, the Post Office was not slow to raadce use
of it for conveyance of mails. This was a marked sign of confidence
in the new method of tramsport, amd the relation between the Post
*Cf. Baer, Egyptian guilds in modem times,
^Campbell to Wellington, No. 5_of 5 March 1835 in P.O. 78/260; ‘Umar Amin 
and I. Girgis, Ta’rikh al-barid fi Mjsr. pp. 47-48.
^Ta’rikh al-barid, p.48.
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Office and the railway became close. The expansion of the European 
Post Office followed the railway. After the completion of the 
line from Alexandria to Kafr al-‘l§ in 1854, three offices were 
opened, in Cairo, al-*A$f and Rosetta. Another two were established 
in Damanhur and Kafr al-Zayyat in 1855. When the line was extended 
to Cairo, the owners of the Post Office concluded an agreement 
with Maglahat al-Murur for the conveyance of letters between Cairo, 
Alexandria and the intermediate stations and vice versa, in return 
for an annual sum of 72,000 piastres. The agreement lasted for 
five years from January 1856. On 5 March 1862, the European Post 
Office acquired a ten year concession by which it was authorized 
to carry the mails on the railway free of charge in return for 
undertaking to convey government letters free of charge as well. 1 
The Post Office operations proved so profitable that Isma‘il 
purchased it in 1865.
c) Effects on Transit Traffic:
Geographical position,together with the construction of the 
railway, made Egypt the principal channel of communication, and 
the intermediate stetion between Europe and Asia before the opening 
of the Suez Canal. On 30 ^arch 1852, the East India Company concluded
1Ta,rikh al-barid. pp. 49-52, 99
an agreement for the transmission of the British mails.^ The 
Transit Administration undertook to convey the mails from Alexandria 
to Suez in 75 hours, and from Suez to Alexandria in 65 hours. These 
hours were to be computed from the time the mails were delivered 
over to the Transit Administration. For the performance of this 
service, the East India Company agreed to pay to the Administration 
£6,000 per annum in quarterly payments. It was a three-year contract 
which could be extended for another three years. The contract was 
made under the then existing means of conveyance in Egypt. But 
the railway was in process of construction; therefore the two parties 
agreed that if it were completed before the first t€rm of three years, 
the mails should be carried by the railway, and the clauses concerning 
the time of conveyance were to be modified so that the mails should 
reach their destination at Alexandria and Suez, at or about the same 
time as the Indian passengers conveyed by railway.
If the opening of 1he Alexandria-Cairo railway in 1856 had 
conferred great benefits on all branches of commerce in Egypt, it 
especially facilitated the transit of British passengers, mails, 
merchandise and specie to and from India. The total number of passengers 
that passed through Egypt an their way to India during the year 1855 
was 2,458, being an increase of 282 on the previous year. The 
number of packages of merchandise and specie for India was 45,339# 
showing an increase of 11, 478 on the previous year. The number
^State Papers, vol. 57, pp. 778-780.
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of passengers homewards was 2,571 showing a decrease of 42 passengers.
The number of packages of merchandise and specie from India was 16,827 
being a decrease of 2,274 on the previous year. The value of the specie 
forwarded to India from Europe by this route during 1855 was about 
nine millions sterling.1 Furthermore, the railway was no less bene­
ficial to Egypt than to the Peninsular and Oriental Company. From 1852
2to 1857, there was a steady increase of passengers.
Nevertheless there were some complaints about the conveyance of 
the mails. In November 1857, the British Post Office wrote to the 
Treasury calling their attention and through them the British Foreign 
Secretary and the President of the Board of Control to the irregular 
and unsatisfactory manner in which the Indian mails were conveyed 
through Egypt. They referred the Treasury to the agreement of 1852, 
particularly the two articles indicating the time-limit of conveyance.
At that time, the Cairo-Cuez railway was not yet completed. The Post 
Office did not overlook the fact that since the date of the agreement, 
the weight <f the mails lad been much increased, but a proportional 
increase should be made ±l the means of conveyance. The Post Office wished 
Lord Clarendon, British Foreign Secretary, to instruct the British 
Consul-General in Egypt not only to press for an improvement of the 
present service, but to take early measures for the renewal of the
3agreement of 1852 with a much reduced allowance of time.
Commercial report for 1855 encl. No. 1 in Green to Clarendon, No. 23 of 
10 Mar. 1856 in F.O. 78/1224; for effect on Indian Mutiny see above, pp. 
220- 221 .
See the table in Appendix V, p. 380.
^Hill (Post Office) to Wilson (Treasury) 4 Nov. 1857; Wilson to Hammond, 7 
Nov. 1857 ends, in Clarendon to Green, No. 59 of 9 Nov. 1857, in F.O.141/32; 
also enclosing tables of the date of the dispatch from Alexandria, and of 
arrival at Suez and hours occupied between dispatch from Alexandria and(contj
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Nubar Bey, the director of the railway, »plied that when 
the time of the renewal of the agreement drew nearer the Suez railway 
would have been completed, so the question would be rapidly resolved. 
He said that a special train would transport the mails in 18 hours 
from Alexandria to Suez and vice versa. He pointed out that in 
order to speed the transport of the mails, the Administration could 
slow up transport of goods; but even then there would travel with 
the mails the passengers, their luggage and their valuables which 
all together could not be carried in less than fifty hours. Be­
sides, the bridge at Kafr al-Zayyat was not finished, and the steam- 
ferry operated slowly in low water. The line was primitive and to 
avoid crashes, the trains were often obliged to go into sidings 
especially when the boats arrived at the same time at Suez and 
at Alexandria. Nubar also added that the most considerable source 
of income of the railway was the speedy transport of coin and goods. 
Sa‘id hoped that Green, acting British Consul-General, would stress 
to the British Ministers, in case they should decide that only the 
mails should be speeded up, the great losses which the Administration 
would suffer. So, the only possible way to reconcile all these in­
terests was to alter the arrivals and departures of the P. & 0. 
ships. ^ Because Green knew that the real difficulty in reducing 
the time did not arise from the mails but from the cargo, passengers 
and specie, he believed that Nubar's suggestion, for re-arranging
(cont.) delivery by Transit Dept, at Suez.
Nubar to Green, 22 Jan. 1858 encl. (l) in Green to Clarendon, No. 11
of 25 Jan. 1858 in P.O. 78/1401.
the arrivals and departures of the P. & 0. ships, would meet 
the case. Green observed to Nubar that £12,000 annually would be a 
very moderate remuneration for the transmission of mails through 
Egypt.^ However, Green had to wait for Clarendon’s instructions
to conclude the formal agreement.
2Having learnt from Trollope, of the Post Office, that Nubar*s 
idea had also occurred to the Post Office authorities in London,
Green drafted an agree ment which Sa‘id accepted. According to 
article III of this draft agreement, the time for conveyance from 
Alexandria to Suez and vice versa, should not, except under un­
controllable circumstances, exceed eighteen hours. But Nubar 
reiterated his assertinn that this time was not sufficient.
Green neither agreed with Nubar, nor believed he had any valid 
reasons to offer in this matter. Green believed that the real 
objection was on the part of the P. & 0. which considered that 
the transit of mails should not be so rapid as to interfere with 
the transport of the cargo and the convenience of the p^sengers.
But Green hoped to settle this question on Anderson*s arrival 
in Egypt, which was expected. However after allowing sixteen 
hours for the transit of mails from station to station, Green 
inserted tiis clause:
"^Green to Nubar, 25 Jan. 1858 encl. (2) in Green to Clarendon in 
P.O. 78/1401.
Anthony Trollope (1815-1882), the novelist and Post Office official. 
He was sent on a postal mission to Egypt in 1858.
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Nubar to Green, 2 Mar. end (2) in Green to Clarendon, No. 33
of 4 March 1858 in P.O. 78/1401.
350.
"The time to be employed in conveying the mails 
from the Packets at Alexandria and Suez to the 
Railway stations - and from the Railway stations 
at Alexandria and Suez to the Packets - shall 
not exceed eight hours per trip; so that the
whole time employed in the transit from the
packet at Suez to the Packet at Alexandria, shall 
not exceed twenty four hours each way."
Nubar refused to accede to this article because the mails were only
delivered to the Transit Administration at the station on the shore,
and no such stipulation existed in the agreement in force. Un­
willingly, Green consented to its exclusion from the draft.*
Having examined this draft agreement, the Postmaster General 
drew up an amended draft which included the alterations he had made. 
Instead of the 18 hours stipulated for the transit, the whole time 
occupied from packet to packet should not exceed 24 hours. This 
stipulation was to be subject to the same proviso in Green's draft 
(that the packet between Southampton and Alexandria should arrive
20 hours before and sail 20 hours after the packet conveying the
9overland mail> The agreement was signed on 16 June 1858. Green 
made, on his own responsibility, a change in article VI, without 
reference to Londai. The original article provided that "so long as 
any part of the Railway between Cairo and Suez shall remain un­
opened for use, additional time shall be allowed for the conveyance of 
the mails vizt: two hours for the loading of the camels, and a
^The Draft Agreement encl. (l) in Green to Clarendon, No. 33 
of 4 March. 1858.
Art. Ill in the new drafted agreement. For a copy of the agreement 
see ends, in Malmesbury to Green, No. 14- of 24 May 1858 in F.O. 141/34.
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quarter of an hour per mile for the slower pace of camels as
compared with travelling by Railway," Green found that a number
of loaded camels could not be made to proceed for any distance even
at three miles an hour. Therefore, this aurticle was re-worded as
follows: "so long as any part of the Railway between Cairo and
Suez shall remain unopened for use, additional, time shall be aLlowed
for the conveyance of the mails, calculated on the slowerjace of
camels as compared with travelling by Railway, and the Administration
binds itself to accelerate the transport of the mails through the Desert
by camels as much as p o s s i b l e . I n  September 1859> the Postmaster
General intended to send Page, one of the principal clerks of
the Post Office, to Egypt to inspect personally whether since the
completion of the railway the full advamtaige of this improved mode
2of transit was given to the mails. By this agreement, the mails
were to be conveyed, on the railway in closed trucks and neither
passengers, goods, nor anything else was to be placed in the same trucks.
Warehouse room was also to be provided at the railway stations at
Alexandria and Suez for storing the mails. In return for these
services, the British government agreed to pay to the Egyptian govera-
3ment £12,000 per annum, the payments to be made quarterly.
*Green to Malmesbury, No. 91 of 16 June 1858 in P.O. 78/1401; copy
of the Posted Agreement is enclosed in P.O. 141/36 Pt. Ii state Papers, vol. 52, pp. 897-99.
nill (Post Office) to Hammond, 16 Sept. 1859 encl. in Hammond to 
Colquhoun, No. 27 (c9nsular) 19 Sept. 1859 in P.O. 141/38.
See articles IX, X, XII of the agreement. Here is a Return of the sums 
paid in each year since 1850 for the Transit of Mails across the 
Isthmus of Suez:
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While the Post Office was concerned with speeding up the 
transit of mails, the P. <9c 0. Company las trying to reduce the transit 
dues, both for passengers and cargo. The directors of the Company 
wrote to the Board of Trade that the completion of the railway and 
its approaching opening to traffic from Suez to Alexandria made it 
the appropriate moment to obtain the assent of the Egyptian govern­
ment to this reduction. They indicated that since the reduction 
of the transit duty from 3 per cent, ad valorem to ^/2 per cent., 
which was obtained by the company from Muhammad *Ali in 1841, the 
transport of costly articles of merchandise and specie had gradually 
increased and amounted during the twelve months ending 30 September 
1858 to £30,000,000 in value. During the same period there passed 
through Egypt en route to and from India, China, Australia and 
other places in the east, about 8,000 passengers consisting chiefly 
of commercial men, officers in the civil and military services and 
their families. Since the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, the Company 
conveyed by this route, exclusive of those carried by other means,
333 officers and 7,857 men. The Company paid to the Pasha £188,802 
for the transit of the foregoing during that period. On the other 
hand, the charges made by the Egyptian government for the transit
(cont.) £
Year 1854 (first payment, being for a portion of the year)...1,789
" 1855
" 1856 
" 1857
*  1858 
" 1959
8,000
8,000
9,833
11,000
12,000
(P.P., 1860, LXII, p.187.)
were high, viz. £10 each for passenger and £8 per ton for goods 
and parcels, and the means of transit consisted of steam boats on 
the Nile and a large and costly establishment of camels, horses, 
mules for the desert portion. To get a material reduction the 
Company sent Anderson to Egypt to negotiate with Sacid. They 
believed that their demand was justified by the fact that while 
the cost of construction of the Egyptian railway was estimated 
at somewhat less than one-third of 1he average cost of railways 
in England and on the continent, the present charges for the 
conveyance of merchandise and passenger, across Egypt were about 
four iLmes the average of the rates charged for conveyance by these 
other railways. Furthermore, the working expenses of the Egyptian 
railway were also less than on European railway.^
To assist Anderson's mission, Malmesbury, the British Foreign 
Secretary, instructed Green to represent to the Egyptian government 
that "such a direct discouragement to intercourse as a tax upon 
transit, in addition to the high cost of transport /yas/oo manifestly 
at variance with interests of Egypt that it ought to be entirely 
abolished". As the charges of conveyance by the railway were 400°/° 
greater than by European lines, Malmesbury told Green that it was 
possible to make large reductions in the tariff and still make a 
profit. In addition, it was of great consequence to remove from
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Howell to Tennent,7 Dec. 1858 encl. in Malmesbury to Green, No. 62 
of 15 Dec. 1858 in F.O. 141/35. For the amount of duties paid by 
the P. & 0. to the Egyptian government since 1852,see Appendix VI,
p. 381.
the overland route impediments which might discourage its use
in favour of the less advantageous route of the Cape of Good Hope.
Moreover, he believed that many articles, such as indigo (which,
from risk of damage could not be sent through Egypt because of the
imperfect mode of conveyance upon camel), might now be entrusted
with entire safety to the new railroad. But this advantageous
change ”/would7be altogether neutralized if the charges continue
so high as to secure a preference to the route by the Cape."^
Sa*id had no objection to abolishing transit duties. But to avoid
getting himself into difficulties with others, he had given orders
to make enquiries on the subject, and asked Green whether transit
duties existed in other countries. Green informed him that there
were no transit duties in England, and that he rather thought they
2had been abolished on the continent. Nubar was entrusted with
these enquiries.
Anderson's mission was a complete success, and a five year
3contract was signed on 1 March 1859. In addition to reducing 
the cost of transit of passengers, goods and specie across Egypt, 
the contract contained provisions for the safety and comfort of 
travellers, and security of prosperity. The passengers, booked by 
the P. & 0., were considered as belonging to one of two classes 
and were charged the following rates: class (a) £7 and class (b)
i£3.10.0. Sa id consented to remit the duty of /4 per cent ad
Malmesbury to Green, No. 62, 15 Dec. 1858 in P.O. 141/35.
2Green to Malmesbury, No. E  of 10 Feb. 1859 in P.O. 78/1467.
Return of the amount of the reduction on the Mail^gg^^ract with the
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valorem charged on merchandise in transit, but he reserved to 
himself the right of re-establishing it when the goods were no 
longer so conveyed.^" These rates for travellers were more than 
double the ordinary local fares for passengers betweeen Alexandria 
and Suez, viz. 314 piastres (£3.4*5.) for first and 206 piastres 
(£2.2.3.) for second-class. Anderson accepted this high scale of 
charge for two main considerations: (a) to get some extra facili­
ties for passengers, such as being taken to and from the ships by 
small steamers, conveyedfrom the hotels and railway stations at 
the Viceroy'8 expense, also to be allowed to carry extra luggage
free of charge; (b) to insure greager safety to passengers on 
2the railway.
While in Egypt, Anderson discussed with the Egyptian officials 
the question of the irregularity of trains and its grave conse­
quences. He was told that the Viceroy was the sole proprietor of 
the railway, and had a right to the uncontrolled use of it for 
his own pleasure or convenience. He discussed these matters 
verbally with the then mudir al-murur. but for the information and 
guidance of any further mudirs, Anderson placed on record these 
matters. He pointed out, in his letter, the principal conditions for
(cont.) P. & 0. Company occasioned by the opening of the Alexandria-
Suez railway was as follows:
India and China Mails £20,000 per annum
Bombay and Aden Mails 27,000 " "
Both these deductions commenced from the 25th November 1859.
(P.P., 1860, LXII, p.187.)
copy of this agreement in P.0.78/1472; Annual Reports of the P. & 0..I, pp. 8-9; P. & 0. archives keptjn the Public Relations office.
(cont.)
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which the high rate of transit charge was submitted to. These 
conditions were^:
First: The increase of regular and discontinuance of special trains.
These high rates were for the sake of running extra regular passenger 
trains (say two trains in the 24 hours instead of only one as at 
present). Consequently the service was to be regulated as follows:
a) The hours of departures and stoppages at intermediate 
stations should be arranged so as to meet in the best
practicable manner the comfort and convenience of the
passengers;
b) For their greater safety, none but drivers of known
ability and experience should be entrusted with the 
trains conveying those passengers.
c) With reference to article V of the contract , the providing
of suitable retiring rooms and conveniences should be com­
pleted and their situations should be marked in English 
(as well as any other language used) in the manner adopted 
on the European lines of railway.
Second: The railway transit tickets, agreed upon to be issued by
the Compares agent, should be available without necessitating the 
taking out of any tickets from the transit offices.
(cont.)
2Anderson to Walne, 9 Apr. 1859 encl. in Howell to Malmesbury,
29 Apr. 1859 in F.O. 78/1472.
^Anderson to Nubar, 5 Feb. 1859 encl. in Howell to Malmesbury, 29 Apr.
1859 in F.O. 78/1472.
This article provided that "proper refreshment stations to be (cont.)2
Third: Police regulations. The Egyptian government was bound
responsible for adopting every reasonable precaution for the 
comfort and safety of persons and security of property (art.
VI of the contract-). The government was also to make proper 
regulations for the maintenance of order , and employ competent 
officers and employees to enforce them and give every needful 
aid and information to the passengers. But Anderson demanded 
some more efficient means to be provided than the ones which 
existed.
But a few months after the conclusion of the contract, the 
directors of the P. & 0. began to complain of much procrastination 
on tie part of the Transit Administration in carrying into effect 
the arrangements stipulated for, particularly the running of 
two regular passenger trains daily and the abandonment of the 
frequent and extra despatch of special trains. Therefore, the 
directors of the Company decided to send a representative, James 
Davidson, to Egypt to press upon the Viceroy a more prompt ful­
filment of the contract. They also asked for the support of 
the British government "to keep the Railway in a safe and efficient 
state both as regards the fabric, and the manner of working it".^
(cont.) erected and maintained, by the Egyptian government at 
Kafr Zayat or Tanta, Cairo, a convenient point on the Desert and 
at Suez with suitable retiring rooms and conveniences attached 
to be kept in a state of proper repair and in a clean and healthy 
condition to which passengers will have free access and where they 
can obtain wholesome and suitable refreshments at their own expense 
and at a reasonable rate (to be regulated by published Tariff which 
will be afterwards attached hereto)."
Mowell to Malmesbury, 29 Apr. 1859; Hammond to Howell, 7 May 1859,Howell to Malmesbury, 4 June 1859; Hammond to Howel, 8 June 1859; (cont.
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It had not escaped Sa'id's attention that the railway was 
of great benefit to the Egyptian revenues. Railways in Egypt 
were constructed, controlled and owned by the government, i.e. 
the Viceroy. Had the government not built the railway, it would 
have never been constructed, as individual capital investment did 
not exist in Egypt. Being the sole proprietor of the railway, 
the Viceroy could not resist the temptation of using it to suit 
himself. Nevertheless, he responded to the demands for reducing 
the transit fares to encourage the continuous use of the overland 
route. In 1860, at the request of the British Consul-General, 
he extended the reductions, recently given to the P. & 0., to the 
British troops in their passage between Alexandria and Suez. Under 
this new scale, officers were to have first-class at 314 piastres 
(£3.5.0.) and soldiers second-class carriages at 206 piastres (£2.2.0.).
In addition, officers were allowed 80 lbs.weight of luggage and 50 lbs 
for soldiers.^” But these fares were reduced once more in 1865 to 
the effect that officers paid 240 piastres (£2.9.3.) for first- 
class and soldiers paid 120 piastres (£1.4.8.) for second-class.
(cont.) Howell to Russell, 6 Sept. 1859 ends. (1-5) in Hammond 
to Colquhoun (No. 26 Consular) 16 Sept. 1859 in P.O. 141/38.
■^Colquhoun to Russell, No. 15 of 15 Feb. 1860 in F.O. 78/1522.
2Betts to Tisquet Commr. Sup. Des Forces Navales Francaises stationnees 
en Egypte, 31 Oct. I860; Tables of fares for conveyance of Troops through 
Egypt; Nubar to Colquhoun, 6 Feb. 1865 ends, (l), (2) and (3 ) in 
Colquhoun to Russell, No. 12, 6 Feb. 1865 in F.O. 78/l871.
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Conclusion
Egypt was the first country in Africa and the Middle East to 
adopt railway transport. The Alexandria-Cairo-Suez line was one of 
the first to be constructed outside Europe, just twenty-eight years 
after the Railway Age had started in England. In this field of tech­
nical advance, Egypt war more progressive than the rest of the Ottoman 
Empire. The first Turkish railway, from Izmir to Aydin, was opened 
to traffic in 1866.^ When Sultan Abcflllaziz visited Egypt in 1863, it 
was his first acquaintance with a railway. On this occasion, the British 
Consul-General remarked "I am not without hopes that travelling over 
this really good line with every possible comfort, His Majesty’s at­
tention may be called to the subject of railroads as an element of
2civilization in this country". The railway was indeed commented upon
by Gardey, who accompanied the Sultan <ji this visit. He wrote:
"Puis, on a causd. Le chemin de fer avait fait 
impression et l'on s'ecriait: Plflt a Dieu qu'il
y’en eQt beaucoup en TurquieJ Les grandes 
quantites de merchandises, venant de la Haute- 
Egypte, du Soudan ou de l’Inde, transportes par 
les trains que nous avons rencontres en route, 
avaient ete remarquees; et l’on trouvait que 
sous ce rapport, comme sous celui du transport 
des voyageurs, les voies ferrees sont une ex- 
cellente chose.
^B. Lewis, The emergence of modern Turkey, p.180.
L. Gardey, Voyage du Sultan Abd-ul-Aziz de Stamboul au Caire. Paris, 
1865, pp. 60-61.
^Colquhoun to Russell, No. 55 of 9 April 1863, in P.O. 142/27.
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One might search fer the factors which promoted railways 
development in Egypt. As explained above, politics were responsible 
for the inauguration of the first Egyptian railway. Once this railway 
was a fact, economic needs guided jts growth. Prom3858, the pace of 
construction went steadily ahead linking the chief towns of Lower 
Egypt with Alexandria, Cairo and Suez. When increasing movement of 
transport began on the mein line, it was necessary t> make double tracks 
to lessen the pressure. This work started in 1859 and was done by 
sections according to local needs and as far as financial restrictions 
permitted. The line from Kafr al-Zayyat to a^afca was double tracked 
in 1859; from Qalyub to Cairo in 1861; from Alexandria to Damanhur 
and to Kafr al-Zayyat in 1864 and 1865. The section from Jan$a to 
Qalyub was doubled in 1866. Construction continued in Lower Egypt; 
two lines extended from Qalyub, one to the Barrage (12 kms.) and the 
other to al-Zaqaziq via Belbays (62 kms.) These two lines were 
inaugurated in 1865 and the line from al-Zaqaziq was extended to Hangura 
via Abu-Kebir and al-Sinbillavin in 1869. A junction was established 
from Abu-Kebir to al-Jalibiyya in the same year. Railways were reaching 
the borders of Egypt and there was a sufficient network for agricultural 
and commercial purposes.'1'
The defects of the old Suez line, inaugurated in 1858, became 
very evident. There was enormous wear and tear on the rolling stock
Meej gassuna, op.cit., pp. 145-146 and seq.; al-§ayyad, al-Naql fi al-
bilad al-*Arabiyya, pp. 38-40; Art. in L'lSgypte contemporaine, XXIV,
P. 91; Raf i *7, Agr Isnall, II, pp. 14-16.
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because of numerous curves and steep inclines, as well as the expense 
of carrying all the water required.^ Supplying water was a major 
problem. Stations on the Suez line had water containers, either stone 
cisterns or iron tanks, but capacity was extremely variable. The water
was pumped daily from the Nile at Banha and distributed to the desert
2stations by special "water trains'1. In spite of this expensive 
operation, nothing developed along the track. The engineering defects 
of the line were revealed in May I860 whenlhe Suez desert was visited 
by heavy rain storms. The embankments, made almost entirely of loose 
stones and sand, gave under pressure of water, and over five miles of 
embankment were swept away, leaving the rails suspended in mid-air.
It soon became apparent to Isma4il, the new Viceroy, that this line 
was only maintained at great financial loss to the government, and 
actually absorbed much of the profit from the Alexandria-Cairo section.
These disadvantages of the old desert line led to its abandonment. 
The main line from Banha-Zaqaziq was extended 98 miles along the Fresh 
Water Canal to Tsma‘iliyya, with a branch line from Naflsha Junction 
to Suez. This new line from Banha to Suez was formally opened for traffic 
on 8 September 1868, and two days later a regular daily service between 
Alexandria and Suez commenced.^ This mfn’n line from
XP.P., 1866, LXVII, pp. 614-615.
2H. Phillips to Stanton, (Private & Conf.), 26 May 1866 in P.O. 141/60.
3Colquhoun to Bulwer, No. 25 of 15 May 1860 in F.O. 142/25.
^P.F., 1866, LXVII, pp. 614-615; J. C. McCoan, Sgypt as it is, New York,
1877, p. 237.
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Cairo to Suez had better gradients and avoided the worst portions of 
the desert. Although it was longer than the old route, it ran through 
more productive country, and cost little in making and maintenance.^
The old Cairo-Suez line became redundant and was finally dismantled 
in 1879.2
While the railway network was developing in Lower Egypt, intro­
duction into Upper Egypt was not carried out until 1867. While Sa‘id 
was visiting Paris in 1862, Messrs. Murray & Tucker, an engineering 
company in London, presented him and the French government with a pro­
ject and map for a proposed railway from Cairo to Qugayr and thence to 
Ras Benas, by which the overland route to India would be shortened by 
at least two day3. The Viceroy was pleased to approve the project sub­
ject to the approbation of the British and French governments. The 
promoters obtained French approval and therefore expected to receive 
it from the British also. They proposed the formation of an Anglo-
French company for the construction of the line because easy communi-
•5cation through Egypt was important for both countries.
Lord Russell, British Foreign Secretary, informed them that 
although he saw no reason for opposing the project, he was not prepared
^P.P., 1866, LXVII, pp. 614-615; J. C. McCoan, Egypt as it is. New York, 
1877, p.237.
2This line was re-constructed and_re-opened on 11 October 1935, mainly 
for purposes of tourism, (gassuna, op.cit.. pp. 297-298)
V/alnisley and others to Russell, 5 September 1862, encl. in Erskine 
to Saunders, No. 12 of 30 Sept. 1862 in F.O. 14l/41.
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to instruct the British Ambassador in Constantinople to press either
the Porte or the Viceroy in favour of this proposal.^" Messrs. Murray
& Tucker sent a deputation to urge this project upon the Viceroy who was
2then visiting Constantinople. However as the Viceroy had left Con­
stantinople and the Porte knew nothing about the project, the British 
Ambassador asked the British Consul-General in Egypt to make enquiry and 
pass any information to Lord Russell.
The deputation followed Sa‘id to Egypt. The British Consul- 
General learned that Sa‘id, when at Paris, was invited by M.de Thouvenel, 
French Foreign Minister, to consider this enterprise favourably. He 
thought that sa‘id might not be unwilling to concur in a useful project 
for internal communications. Nevertheless, he scarcely anticipated 
that Sa‘id would be disposed to listen to any proposal which would 
involve a guarantee from the Egyptian treasury. The returns expected 
from this proposed line were not obvious, and because they must depend mainly
on attracting transit traffic going by way of Suez , the Egyptian gover n-
3ment would hardly favour this project. Nothing was achieved during the 
life time of Sa*ld.
The British Consul-General mentioned the project to Isma*il, 
who replied that he intended continuing the railway up the Nile at 
least as far as Qina, and this would be undertaken by his government
M.O. to Walmisley,17 Sept. 1862 in F.O. 78/1675. 
r'V/almisley to Hammond, 3 Oct. 1862 in F.O. 78/1675.
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Maunders to Russell, No. 93 of 17 Oct. 1862 in F.O. 78/1675.
as soon as finance allowed. The Viceroy was unable to give an opinion 
about the continuation of the line from Qina to Ras Benas. However 
his private secretary said that "there were no inducements for the 
Government to lay out three millions sterling on a line which had 
no traffic to look to but that of India and China".^
By June 1863, the British government thought it desirable for 
the sake of their communications with India that this line should 
be constructed. But "the question of a guarantee, the facilities 
afforded by the country for making the line, the expense per mile, 
the natural disadvantages of the Port to which the Railway should 
be carried as its terminus, all these are matters which must be dis­
cussed between the Vice Roy and the parties who undertake the enter­
prise".2 Isma*I.l replied that he had already made arrangements for 
the first portion of the Upper Egypt railway, which he hoped to be 
able to make at a cost far below that which Messrs. Murray & Tucker 
had offered. He seemed resolved that whatever was done should be 
done by himself.
Isma*il fulfilled his intention about Upper Egypt. This region 
did not require a huge network of railways as did Lower Egypt because 
the populated areas south of Cairo were in a narrow valley and mostly
^Colquhoun to Russell, No. 44 of 23 Mar. 1863 in P.O. 78/1754.
2Buiwer to Colquhoun, No. 6 of 14 July 1863, encl. in Russell to 
Bulwer, No. 289 of 26 June 1863 in P.O. 141/41.
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3Colquhoun to Russell, Nos. 122 and 137 of 15 Aug. and 10 Sept. 1863
in P.O. 78/1755.
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on the west bank of the Nile. Therefore one main line from the 
north to the south, with some branches, could easily serve Upper 
Egypt. The people of Upper Egypt themselves began to feel the need 
for a railway, and were prepared to welcome it. During his tour 
in Upper Egypt in September 1865 Ismael received apetition bearing 
thousands of seals at Banl-Suwayf which earnestly implored him to 
proceed immediately "to confer on Upper Egypt the boon, of which 
the natives below Cairo had, for so many years, been in the possession, 
namely, a railway; the petitioners say that, this year, they had been 
so much harassed by clearing the canals, that they were unable to 
give more labour to the public weal, but, that next year, they would 
most carefully unite in masses to complete the earthwork on such part 
of the railway as may be decided on."'*' Isma‘il, too, had a personal 
interest in developing this line up the Nile because it would open 
up his large sugar factories and cotton fields.
Work began in 1867, and in 1874 the line reached Asyuf, the most 
important town in Upper Egypt 568 kms. south of Cairo, but work halted 
for some years during the period of financial crisis. In 1893 work 
was resumed and the line was gradually extended to Suha<^ Girga and 
then to Qina, passing by Nag ‘-Hammadi where the line was transferred 
from the western to the eastern bank of the Nile* The line from Qina to
1Colquhoun to Russell, No. 137 of 10 Sept. 1863 in P.O. 78/1755.
to Aswan ms opened in 1898 and reached al-Shallal in 1900. One of 
Ismael’s motives for constructing this railway was to connect Egypt 
with the Sudan, to assist administrative centredisation. The idea 
was not new. When Sa*id visited the Sudan in 1857, he considered 
linking the four administrative provinces of the Sudan more closely 
to Egypt by camel post. A railway from Wadi Haifa to Khartoum was 
discussed, but this scheme was abandoned. In 1875, under Isma*Tl, 
work started on the section from Wadi Haifa to Metemma but it was 
not finished. Apart from an abortive attempt to construct a line from 
Suakin to Berber during the Mahdia,there was no further railway-rbuilding 
in the Sudan until Kitchener*s campaign in Dongola during 1896, when 
a railway was constructed for the Reconquest <f the Sudan.1
Trade in Upper Egypt greatly benefitted from the extension of 
the railway south of Cairo. The tourist trade did not develop until 
after -orld War I, so this profitable business does not fall within 
the period under consideration. Nevertheless the reign of Iama‘il 
was a new phase in the history of Egyptian railways. He attempted 
to reform the system. This movement of reorganisation increased parti­
cularly after his numerous visits to Europe where he enquired into 
the systems and regulations of European railways. A time table of arrivals 
and departures of trains was arranged. A number of new rolling stock 
was purchased and a register was established for recording the date
^P. M. Holt, A Modern history of the Sudan, pp._52, 71, 12Q;
R. L. Hill, Sudan transport, pp. 25-27; gassuna, op.cit.. pp. 159,
275-281.
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and place of purchase and the date of repair. Most of the engines 
were bought from Britain, Between 1852 and 1858, 27 engines were 
acquired, all from British makers. Of the 79 engines bought between 
1859 and 1864 56 were British made and 23 came ft*om France. Prom 1865 
to 1869 all the 116 engines ordered ©me from British makers. There 
is no record of new engines being ordered between 1869 and 1887 and 
for this there are two probable reasons. Traffic from Alexandria to 
Suez possibly decreased because of the increasing use of the Suez Canal, 
and, Egypt was going through a period of severe financial crisis. At 
such tines purchases of engines were undesirable. Ismael insisted on 
the strictest economy when buying new equipment necessary for replacement.^ 
For example, in 1854 there were 111 wagons and these lad only been in­
creased by 8 by 1874.
Illumination on the railway, et this early stage, was very simple 
as electricity was not used until 1892. Lighting on passenger trains 
was confined to oil lamps though candles were used in the rulers*s 
coaches. Petroleum lamps were used on Hie stations, either fixed 
on posts or attached to the ©iling. The rules and regulations of the 
railway were published in Arabic, sometimes being translated from 
English. English was almost the official language of the railways and 
was used for correspondence, memoranda, reports, and all internal 
correspondence between the railway departments and Hie administration
367.
^P.P., Egypt, Cd. 1010, pp. 53-54; $assuna, op.cit., pp. 190-191.
or between the latter and the government branches in the different 
ministries. In the first phase of the railway, most of the employees ^  
in the technical and administrative posts were British. In later periods,
♦ which are beyond the scope of this research, the organisation and ad­
ministration of Egyptian railway underwent a series of serious changes 
in accordance with the subsequent financial difficulties of Egypt.
Arabic only became the common language of correspondence in 1933 when 
Mahmud Shakir Pasha was appointed as mudir.
Without the extention of a network of railways further economic 
development of Egypt would not have been possible. Railways established, 
in tie reign of Isma'il, and up to the end of September 1873» stretched 
1,110 miles at a total cost of £12,334,320. It is a common dictum 
of economic historians that the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) di­
verted from the Egyptian railways the rapidly growing and profitable 
transit traffic in goods and passengers from East to West. It was not 
because of this, as Crouchley states, that the railway from Cairo to 
Suez went entirely out of use and was dismantled.^ For some time 
there remained the transport of mails which constituted a source of revenue. 
Mail contracts with the P. & 0. in force in 1870 provided for the use 
of the Egyptian railway. When the company’s mail steamers began using 
the canal, they still landed the mails at Alexandria or at Suez and 
continued through the canal with their other cargoes. However, this
368.
1cf. Crouchley, op.cit., p.140.
arrangement was no longer enforced in 1874.1 In 1868, the British 
Secretary for War believed that the existing system of transit of
British troops through Egypt by railway was preferable to that by
2the Suez Canal. In 1871, the India Office experimented with the use 
of the Suez Canal for the conveyance of troops during the trooping
•z
season 1871/72. Therefore, the effects of the canal were not im­
mediately damaging, but the overland route gradually ceased to serve
its original purpose.
569.
^Hoskins, British Routes, p.417.
2
^Stanton to Granville, No. 30 of 23 March 1871 in P.0.78/2186; 
Stanton to Granville, No.15 of 6 March 1872 in P.O. 78/2229-
Stanton to Stanley, No. 97 of 19 Augusg 1868 in P.O. 78/2059.
Appendix I
Memorandum of Galloway’s conditions for constructing the 
Suez railroad at his own cost.
"Sur la cession d'un firman a 6tre accorde a l’Ingenieur J. A.
Galloway ses heritiers ou mandataires a fin de construire et exploiter 
un chemin de fer entre le Caire et Suez aux conditions ci apres men- 
tionnees:-
1. D*accorder au susnomme Sieur J. A. Galloway le terrain necessaire 
pour la construction du susdit chemin de fer...
2. Qu'aucun autre firman ne sera donne a d’autre individu si le trayail 
est commence dans l’espace de douze mois de la presente date...
j m3. Le S. J. A. Galloway s'engage de foumir 1*argent necessaire pour 
la construction et mise en activite du susdit chemin de fer...
4. Par ce firman le Gouvernement s’engage de vendre a J. A. Galloway 
tous les materiaux / au prix du Gouvernement / dont il pourra avoir 
besoin ainsi que de lui accorder le nombre suffisant d'ouvriers
et travailleurs auxquels il payera leur travail joumalier...
5. Bn vertu dudit firman le Gouvernement vendra au sf J. A. Galloway 
tous les articles qui se trouvent ici et seront en etat a 6tre 
employes pour ses travaux aux prix qu'ils auront coute au Gouvemmaent 
et dont le montant sera paye par J. A. Galloway.
6. Le firman accordera protection entiere tant a J. A. Galloway qu’a 
ses employes dans 1*execution de ses travaux...
7. J. A. Galloway s*engage de donner passage aux officiers, trouppes / s ± c j
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employes, provisions du Gouvemement au mfime prix que ce 
transport leur cotite actuellement ou contre le payement des 
fraix occasiones pour ces voyages...
8. Le Gouvemement aura sa part dans les profits annuels apres une 
deduction de huit pour cent, et un montant suffisant pour servir de 
fond pour le conservation en bon etat de la Route, le surplus a fitre 
divise par moitie egale, laquelle moitie sera payee chaque demi 
annee, ou sans cela une rente fixee par an soit environs £10,000...
9. Le Gouvemement pourra s’il le desire acheter le chemin de fer
lorsqu’il seraqcheve au prix cofttant en y joignant un surplus de
o / r25 /o pour S. J. A. Galloway.
10. Un quart du montant que le Gouvemement Britannique paye a S.A. 
pour le passage des Malles par l'figypte sera paye a J. A. Galloway.
11. On admettra libre de Droit de Douane les Materiaux et Charbon 
necessaires a l’usage de chemin de fer...
12. 3n cas de quelque differend sur 1*interpretation dudit firman entre 
le Gouvemement et J. A. Galloway on soumettra la question en dis­
cussion au Consul General Anglais, et celui de Prance, et si ces deux 
personnes ne puissent pay tomber d*accord ils devront nommer une 
troisieme personne a choisir parmi les Negotiants Anglais resident
en cette ville..
L’utilite pour l*l2gypte sera:
1. L'usage de la route.
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2. L* achat des Materiaux existant ici, tant Machinerie que Rails &c. &c<
3. La moitie des benefices apres la deduction de certaines depenses, ou 
une rente annuelle.
4. L'augmentation d*argent depensee en figypte par un plus grand nombre 
de passagers.
5. Une augmentation de Droit de Transit sur le trafic commercial lequel 
naturellement prendra un grand developpnent.
6. La faculte de fair 1*achat du chemin de fer si le Gouvernement le
desire.
7. Une depense fait en Iilgypte de £200,000.1
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^Encl. (l) in Barnett, No. 17 of 7 May 1845 in P.O. 78/623
Appendix II
Letter from Thomas Waghorn to Muh­
ammad Ali urging him to construct 
the Cairo-Suez railway.
To His Highness the Pasha of Egypt
"You asked me for a letter last evening. This is the letter 
promised to Your Highness in my interview with you.
The time is now come; the British Government require the 
shortest route to the East. This is only to be got at through your 
country, Egypt being the centre and high road between China to the 
East, and America to the West. Eleven years ago, your Highness 
projected a railroad over the Desert of Suez - the time has now 
arrived to execute it.
Let no political object stop its execution; do it, through 
the highest auspices, and you will make Egypt the emporium, as it 
was of old.
This I write confidently - Messrs. Rothschilds, the most ex­
tensive financiers of Europe, can find you the money either in London, 
Paris or Vienna. Should you doubt it, I have been assured by them it 
can be done. The railroad through Egypt must come. I beg your High­
ness to reflect on this, in order to hand your name to posterity as 
a greater mar^beyond any sovereign, in any European country.
Cairo, Oct. 18, 1844
Political, commercial, and domestic relations between the East
and the West call upon you to do this work. Egypt has already become 
the high road for Governors-General, officials, and their dependents, 
also of letters, valuable merchandise, &.c . between Europe and the 
East and the West.
Let a railroad be consolidated, by acquiring information from 
the first-rate engineers of Europe - Messrs. Stephenson or Brunnell 
/sic/. Tour country is destined to rise. The views of Russia, Austria, 
Prussia, England, America, and all other nations, except Prance, now 
wish for this railroad. Because Prance knows, if it be done, that 
Trieste will become what Marseilles now is. Look to the map of 
Europe for the truth of these observations, and if your Highness 
will place yourself or me in communication with both the financiers 
and engineers, you will have ample proof it will pay your country, 
and be the means of more wealth and commerce than now is foreseen.
The diplomatists would keep your Highness from its execution. 
Reasons call on you to do this work. By it you will attract the 
whole world to this country; destined, I believe to rise among 
nations.
'Whether your Highness makes a railroad between Cairo and 
Suez, or not, it will come to pass by time as certain as the sun
rises.
Seize the opportunity at once, and effect it. In your 
dynasty of Egypt it will come, as certain,as these lines are written.
Money, if wanting, is to be had,and the execution of a railroad 
from Cairo to Suez will send your name to posterity greater than any 
act that I can remember in modern history.
I seek no emolument, no honour, no credit.
Your Highness stands forward among rulers for what you have done. 
Complete this railroad from Cairo to Suez, and Egypt is sure to become 
greater; and who can predict the benefits it may not produce?
I am only a humble man is telling you these ideas; I 
feel that every word here expressed comes from my heart, as I hope 
it may carry conviction to your own feelings.
Circumstances call on you to make the railroad.
V'ith humble respect,
Your Highness's humble servant,
THOMAS 'rfAGHORN."1
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^The Times, 5 Nov. 1844.
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Translation of a La"ibah published in Arabic 
on 18 August 1859 setting out the work, pro­
motion and salaries of Egyptians employed on 
the Suez railway.
Section I: The craftsmen found in the large and intermediate
stations shall consist of two grades and their salaries be fixed
as follows:
Piastres
500 Monthly salary for the first grade.
450 " " n H second grade.
These construction craftsmen shall be selected from the maintenance 
workers of the first grade, from senior government workmen, being 
literate, as far as possible.
Section II: The maintenance workers, assigned to the repair and
maintenance of the railway between the intermediate stations, and 
in charge ofthe upkeep and cleaning of these railways, shall con­
sist of three grades, and their salaries be fixed as follows:
Pes
560 Monthly allowance for the fourth part of the
maintenance workers considered first grade.
500 Monthly allowance for the fourth part of the
maintenance workers considered second grade.
240 Monthly allowance for the fourth part of the
maintenance workers considered third grade.
Those workmen shall be selected from the first grade apprentices
with distinction id none of them shall proceed to a higher grade 
before serving one full year in his grade; /i.e. anyone in the 
third grade may not be transferred to the second before serving 
one full year at least, and also one in the second grade shall not 
be promoted to the first grade before serving one full yearJ  
i/hereas the number of maintenance workers must be equal to the 
number of intermediate stations, the number of those promoted to 
the first grade shall not exceed one-fourth of the total, and the 
same applies to those promoted to the second grade.
Section III: Construction assistant apprentices shall consist
of apprentices whose grades, and salaries be fixed as follows:
Pes
200 Monthly salary for one-fourth of the
apprentices considered first grade.
180 Monthly salary for one-fourth of the
apprentices considered second grade.
150 Monthly salary for one-half of the
apprentices left considered third grade.
Those workmen shall be selected, as far as possible, from the youths
of the a*e of twenty, from craftsmen /arbab al-gina*a7 such as
carpentry, iron-working and filing. Since the apprentices of the
Suez railway were neither educated nor trained for the works, and
the necessary workmen for railways construction shall be chosen
from those being trained and educated, they shall be 24, six of
them for the first grade, six for the second and twelve for the
third.
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Section IV: The group of shunters, al-jablajiyya /who operated
the tum-tablesj maintenance workers, pumpers and the assistants 
of the maintenance workers shall consist of three grades, and the 
salaries be fixed as follows:
Pes
120 Salary of those of the first grade.
100 " w n " ,f second grade.
90 " " H " » third grade.
Those persons chosen from the old veterans for employment on the
Suez railway shall be promoted to the first and second grades if
they are trained in shunting, rolling the frabla /turn-tablej. 
digging and assisting the maintenance workers on condition that 
those selected for the two grades shall not exceed half the number 
of the workmen.^-
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Appendix IV
A return of the receipts of the Transit Administration 
during the Coptic month of Baramhat (10 March to 9 
April 1856)1:
Local Traffic
Passenger fares E.P.
Freight of 
merchandize
D9 on Baggage
Peninsular & Oriental 
Company’s Service
Passenger fares
Freight of 
merchandize
D? on Specie
D? on Baggage
Govt, passengers 
by orders_______
Value of old 
materials returned 
to store
Less amount of Salaries 
and other expenses_____
527,307 20
462,504 5
63,674 30
1,053,486 15
359,043 30
169,282 14
412,513 38
9.659 32^
950,499 34V2
207.774 _ 39
2,211,731 QX/2
42,292 35
2,254,024 3lV2
729,060
Egyptian
Piastres 1,524, 964 31 /2
Bruce to Clarendon, No. 59 of 13 Dec. 1856 in P.O. 78/1222
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Appendix V
The following table is to illustrate 
the increase of the P. & 0. passeng­
ers- from 1852 to 1857 :
PASSENGERS CARGO
Year Number Year Tons
1852 2,257 1852 957
1853 • 2,471 1853 1,285
1854 3,919 1854 1,774
1855 4,324 1855 1,420
1856 4,454 1856 2,844
1857 8,293 1857 3,694
Total 25,723 Total 11,974
The number of passengers conveyed through 
Egypt from July 1857 to June 1858 were:
PASSENGERS MONEY
9,037 £68,833
Prom July 1858 to December 1858:
July 453 3,870
Aug. 365 3,130
Sept. 534 4,710
Oct. 698 6,108
Nov. 637 5,515
Dec. 679 5.731
Total . 3.366 £29.064
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The two following tables show the amount of 
transit duties paid only by the P. & 0. to 
the Egyptian government between 1852 and 1857 :
Appendix VI
TRANSIT DUES 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 Total
Passenger transit 
for year 23#994 23,236 34,670 38,137 39,285 63,458 222,780
Tonnage rate 
£8 per ton 7,656 10,261 14,200 11,223 22,405 28,706 94,451
lV4 per cent, 
on value cargo 5,566 7,541 7,088 3,751 8,028 14,248 46,222
3/8 ditto on 
value Specie 8,735 20,893 23,910 31,522 54,508 79,390 218,958
Transit Coy.'s 
Employees 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,000 2,000 3,000 16,000
48,951 64,931 82,868 86,633 126,226 188,802 598,411
VALUE
Cargo Specie Total
For the year 1852 1,112,256 2,329,512 3,441,768
11 i» 11 1853 1,508,222 5,571,664 7,079,886
w n 11 1S54 1,739,564 6,377,208 8,116,772
it 11 n 1855 1,523,925 8,416,311 9,940,236
H 11 it 1856 3,214,049 14,536,324 17,750,373
11 ti 11 1857 5,067,712 21,071,130 26,138,842
*>
14,165,728 58,362,149 72,467,877
^Encl. (2) in Malmesbury to Green, No. 62, 15 Dec. 1858 in P.O. 141/35.
Appendix VII
British and French Consuls-General in Egypt (1853-1858)
1. Great Britain:
Campbell, Col. Patrick
Hodges, Col. George 
Lloyd
Barrett, Col. Charles 
John
Murray, Charles
Augustus
Bruce, Frederick 
William
Green, John
1835-1839
1839-1841
1841-1846
1846-1853
1855-1858
1855-1859
Colquhoun, Robert 
Gilmour
Saunders, Sidney Smith
1858-1865
1859-1863
Walne,Alfred Septimus 1837-1861
Agent & Consul-General
Appointed Consul at 
Alexandria on 11 Feb. 
1853; was acting Agent 
and Consul-General from 
22 June to 19 Dec. 1855; 
from 14 July to 20 Nov. 
1855; and from 7 May 
1857 till 13 Apr. 1859.
Agent and Consul-General
Appointed Consul at 
Alexandria, 20 May 1859; 
was acting Agent and 
Consul-General from 12 
Aug. to 17 Sept. 1861; 
and from 11 June 1862 
to 12 Jan. 1863.
Appointed Vice-Consul 
at Cairo, 31 Aug. 1837, 
and Consul 16 Aug. 1841. 
Was Her Majesty’s Com­
missioner at Jeddah from 
2 Dec. 1858 to 6 Sept. 
I860. Was transferred
Walne (cont.)
2. Prance:
Mimaut, Jean Fran§ois
Cochelet, Andrien Louis
Gauttier d'Arc
La Valette, Charles Jean 
Marie Felix,
Marquis de
Benedetti, Vincent
Barrot, Adolphe 
Le Moyne
Sabatier, Raymond Gabriel 
Baptiste
Delaporte
1829-1837
1837-1843
1841-1843
1843-1845
1840-1849
1845-1849
1850-1852
1852-1859
1850-1861
1859» which appointment 
was cancelled 2 May 1859* 
Was acting Agent <3fc Consul- 
General at Cairo from 3 
Apr. to 13 Aug. 1859. 
Resigned 15 Oct. 1861.
to Alexandria, 6 Feb.
Appointed Consul at Alex­
andria 5 Feb. 1829» then 
Consul-General 7 Oct. 1830,
C onsul-General
Appointed Consul at Alex­
andria in 1845; acted 
several times as Consul- 
General.
Consul-General
Consul at Cairo
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